COMMENSAL ISSUE 91

11^th January 1998 : Michael Nesbit

RESPONSE TO C90

Dear Theo,

Some comments further to C.90. Apologies to readers if what follows is a bit disjointed.

1. Yet more about morality.

First in response to Dave Botting ( C90 p.5. ). I agree that "all men are not akin", but I didn’t say that they were. My words in C89 are: "all persons are akin to ourselves". That is, all human beings whom we judge to be persons are ipso facto akin to ourselves. I am not trying to state a moral imperative, but to offer an analysis of what morality is and how it works.

To act on the assumption that all persons (however defined) are akin to ourselves -to treat them accordingly- is to act morally. If a universal system of morality is required, then whoever requires it must broaden the scope of their definition of the person to the widest possible extent: then everything else will follow. If, on the other hand, anyone wishes to go to the opposite extreme and refuse to accord the status of person to anyone other than themselves, then they must face the fundamental indifference of the universe to the existence of the individual, alone.

For reasons adumbrated towards the end of my C90 contribution, a universal ethical system may not, however, be possible, unless perhaps we take the indifference of the universe as that in contradistinction to which we define ourselves as moral beings. I would like to remind readers at this point of Arthur Koestler's words: "The selfishness of the group feeds upon the altruism of the individual".

2. Reflexive awareness etc. etc.

Now to the questions usefully posed by Eric Hills ( C90 pp.13-14 ):-

2.1. Q. "How does human reflexive awareness create the subject-object dichotomy of religion and science?"

A. Reflexive awareness is the act, or event, whereby the human organism recognises itself as a discrete entity. In doing so, it splits the continuum of the organism-environment field into a dichotomy of a self or subject that acts and a series of objects that are acted upon. Prior to that act or event, all action is an integral part of that field.

2.2. Q. "Why does the act of reflexive recognition involve a partial disidentification of the nascent self with its body?"

A. Because 'I' and my body are not entirely one and the thing. By 'I', I mean more than just my body. I am in part - in my existence as a bodily entity - object to myself (I can act upon my own body). Prior to the birth of the self, there is only the body as an integral part of the field.

What this does entail is the realisation that the self (the subject) is not free and absolute, but a subject rendered object -or objectified- by the bodily ground of its existence. We collectively attempt to resolve this quandary by positing the self as prior to bodily existence.

2.3. Q. "In any case, why potentially disastrous consequences to the ecosphere?"

A. Because the ecosphere now contains an element - the self - that is not an integral part of it in functional terms. The needs of the unselfconscious organism are an integral part of the organism-environment field (this is what ecology is all about). The advent of the self means that an entity is now present in the field that refers its needs reflexively rather than, unconsciously, to the whole, or rather, bears them as part of the whole.

There is of course some controversy as to the extent, if at all, that we have damaged the biosphere as a whole, but at least on a local basis we seem to be highly capable of messing things up. The most worrying thing, from our own perspective, is the decrease in the human sperm count, which, as you doubtless know, is quite probably due to the release by ourselves of oestrogen-mimicking chemicals into the environment. We may have inadvertently struck at the very roots of our existence.

2.4. Q. "Would not regaining the perspective of an unself-conscious organism be an undesirable loss?"

A. From our own point of view, probably yes, if it were possible to achieve that state on a permanent basis. But the state that Douglas Harding describes as "headlessness" - the temporary dissolution of the fixity of one's consciousness of oneself as a discrete entity - is elusive. Yet to have touched upon it does broaden one's perspective considerably. (I know that this is a bit unfair, as I am appealing to something beyond rational argument. But take it or leave it).

3. The understanding of reflective surfaces.

Last to Rick Street's comments ( C90 p.28 ) and in particular, "Now if you could demonstrate that (say) blackbirds understood reflective surfaces but still attacked their own reflection, I would happily eat my words". I do not wish to make anyone eat their words, whether happily or otherwise, but I would refer readers to "The Ape's Reflection" (Adrian Desmond, London 1979) pp 175-176, where Gordon Gallup's experiments with the crab-eating macaque monkey are mentioned. A specimen of that species continued to treat its reflection as another individual of the same species even after a total of 2400 hours of mirror exposure. The author then refers to experiments dating from the mid 1960s in which macaques were shown to be capable of using mirrors to locate food morsels hidden by the experimenters behind screens. Desmond states that the monkeys "appreciate that the food's reflection is inedible (or at least unattainable) since, having spotted the food, they smartly turn away from the mirror to feel for it".

Unless someone else asks me for a response on a specific point - as against merely criticising what I say - I think I had better now shut up on these issues. Indeed I feel that, doubtless to the relief of many, I have now more or less exhausted my limited philosophical repertoire.

Yours sincerely,

Michael Nisbet

Previous Article (in Commensal 90)

Michael : Well, I seem to have run out of time this month for a comment on what you’ve written, but we can’t have you absenting yourself from the list of "regulars" ! We’ve already lost Philip Lloyd Lewis and, last time at least, Rick Street. Where will it all end ?

Theo