Paul Cadman’s article (C98/25) seems to be answering the question of whether in a particular or possible society we are considered by law to own our lives. My inkling (sic) is that the human being by his very nature (self-conscious thinking being) belongs to himself, whatever a law says about it. Perhaps only the thinking being who attributes self-ownership to himself actually does own himself. The point is to know our nature as it really is - at first, as we find it given.
Is ownership a feature of the world or a social convention? If I enter an untouched wood, fell trees and build a house, is the house mine in reality, i.e. by virtue of the nature of me and the wood and my action? If so, law should support it. If not, there is no difference between working for your living and living off others.
Stability of society is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of a rightly lived human life. Stability seems to me pointless if the means enforcing it trample on that rightly lived human life.
Albert Dean (C97/13) says we should just get on and tax people to maintain civilisation. In practice, this is what I do. However, what I want to know is: am I essentially a social being? Am I, is my real self, fulfilled only in society? Are we members of one another, or united at some level? If so, if I am supposed to belong to a community, be a member of it in an organic sense, if the stranger on the street really is my brother - the implications are vast. Firstly, few seem to practice this. Secondly, the implementation of comprehensive social ideals seems always to end in oppression and inhumanity - perhaps because they are linear, one-track, one-sided. Paul Cadman is, however, right that having an ideal is the first step to change, especially an individual’s self-change.
I need to see that in murdering, or stealing, or directing anger, I am harming myself, my real self. Otherwise, compassionate social arrangements come down to self-concern (one day I might need something) or genuine compassion without an objective basis. Either way, there is no reason (threats and emotive appeals are not reasons) we can give to a callous brute as to why he should set about acting differently and changing himself.
Nigel Perks
Nigel : a couple of things … Firstly, any rights to chop down trees & build houses are not natural rights. You have no right to build a house out of my trees in my wood, and if you did it would be my house not yours. You don’t even have the right to do likewise in your wood, though the house would be yours before the local authority got you to pull it down. However, different societies might view things differently - American pioneers were "legally" allowed to build their houses with other people’s wood on other people’s land, and these "native Americans" naturally were offended. Other societies might view that all property belongs to the state. The only constraints on societies’ laws are that they be tolerable for the society, to prevent revolution, and not too objectionable to those outside - to prevent overthrow. Societies also need power to maintain themselves internally & externally against competition, even when their laws are not obnoxious. Your point was rather, should legitimate labour be rewarded. This is for societies to work out practically. Other things being equal, people will not work without reward, though the reward can come in various forms - eg. they can persuade themselves that they are working for their children’s future, for their own benefit in a non-material way or they may work because they enjoy it, where work is its own reward, or simply to avoid boredom.
Secondly, in your final paragraph, surely if my reason for avoiding anti-social behaviour is that doing so harms myself, then I would be showing self-concern ? I think you can reason with the "callous brute" on this basis, but not just on the potential quid pro quo basis ("that person might pay me back some time"). It would sufficient to argue that a rational understanding of societies is that they are co-operative ventures where the co-operation increases the average good. It is a fact that, if we cut ourselves off completely from society and its products, our lives would be impoverished. It is a fact that some people can take advantage of the co-operative tendency of society without themselves co-operating, but it is clear that not everyone can do this without society and its benefits breaking down. It is a fact that most people don’t like being taken advantage of over-much, and will resist, or at least not support, those that try to do so. Hence, it is rational to co-operate with society and the individuals that make it up, at least as a compromise if not wholeheartedly. Of course, rational arguments and rational approaches don’t need to be accepted psychologically or put into practise. People can, in practise, do what they want within the limits of their power. That’s why we have enforcement agencies to limit the power of the callous & other deviants. There is also a degree of latitude in that the good things of society are differently evaluated by different people, and some people value their freedom more than others. It’s all a game.
Theo