1. Comments on C98 (comment by Bob Cooper on C97/6)
Omnipotence and omniscience suggest properties of a deity rather than a deity’s obligations; if the deity is truly omnipotent it will be able to choose not to exercise its power when it wishes to permit us Free Will.
This would not be the same as choosing to be "less powerful and less knowledgeable".
The omniscient deity may also choose not to act upon its complete knowledge.
It may be that we are not able to imagine the nature of omniscience, being non-omniscient ourselves. This is of course a humbling perspective and for this reason one often rejected by philosophers.
This chicken & egg type conundrum has often popped up over the centuries - whatever one may conceive the totality of existence to be, another can always add "except god, which is outside that definition …"
I sometimes envisage a deity which sees at one glance the totality of everything that happens - before now, now and after now, and knows in advance everything that will have happened before and after it will happen … it would allow things to occur but could interfere if it wanted - so free will is preserved - but then of course, there is no way to prove that free will exists in the first place ….
2. Comments on Ethics of an Inquisition Victim, C96, by Fred Hobson : I didn’t get C97 so forgive any overlap.
Whether the acts concerned broke the law or not in the accused’s view is not relevant as the situation depends upon the Justice system’s determination of the existence of criminality, right or wrong.
Actions to be taken then depend on whether Fred wants to be ethical or pragmatic, or both and in what proportion.
If he doesn’t do as he is told he goes away - will this achieve any ethical advance for himself or for others? If so, is it enough to make prison worthwhile?
If not, then be a good boy and thus stay out of jail, act the part "they" want, and remain free to fight the system on the outside later.
A parallel dilemma faces persons convicted of arson who plead not guilty; if convicted they are not eligible for parole until they admit to their offence; but to do so is to admit prior guilt. For this reason some remain in Jail many years after they could have been paroled. Is this ethical? For whom?
John Stuart Mill has a lot to answer for ….
Carl Ainsworth
Theo Todman à Carl Ainsworth (Email, 19/09/1999) : Thanks for your comments - they seem cogent enough, though leaving enough issues to pick at ! One question - I didn’t understand the allusion to John Stuart Mill at the end. I’m a consequentialist myself, so am sympathetic to Mill. Are you saying that deontological ethics is simpler (provided you can decide on those things that one always ought to do) and that consequentialism is more difficult in practise because the consequences & paybacks are hard to calculate, and are in any case subjective as they depend on the evaluation of the individual ?
Carl Ainsworth à Theo Todman (Email, 21/09/1999) : Thanks for the response and courteous comments. I’m glad you think I left something to pick at - the whole area is so vast that it only ever seems possible to scratch at the surface, as an individual. In response to your comments on John Stuart Mill - Yes, I think so. If we subscribe to JSM’s belief that experiential knowledge is the only valid form of knowledge then Utilitarianism becomes almost a necessity … I think I meant to suggest that things would be a whole lot simpler in "Life" if JSM’s was the total solution - but also that the dichotomy between Act and Rule types of Utilitarianism cautions us to be aware that consequentialism points out many difficulties in over-simplification.
Theo Todman à Carl Ainsworth (Email, 04/10/1999) : I’ve been writing up C99 and have included our little clarificatory exchange. Without wanting to distract attention from your main points by digression on the last line, it might help our readers, some of whom may be ignorant of philosophy, if we gave a bit of background as to the difference between Act and Rule Utilitarianism (and of the motivation for the distinction). My understanding is that Rule Utilitarianism is a middle ground that says that we should generally follow moral rules, but these rules should be chosen based on their expected consequences; whereas, Act Utilitarianism dispenses with rules altogether and evaluates each act on its expected consequences, and therefore seems open to the "the end justifies the means" reductio along Karamazovian lines. Do you want to add a though to this effect or shall I ? Or should we let them look it all up in a good book ?
Carl Ainsworth à Theo Todman (Email, 14/10/1999) : Yes, perhaps a brief summary a bit like one I once heard … The local council wanted to spend £500 on a garden for the blind. The "Rule" Utilitarian argues thus: What USE is a flower garden for the blind ? The "Act" Utilitarian says: Not much, unless … it is a scented garden, the blind appreciate this type of art enormously; also, they can appreciate it at night …. The "Rule" man responds: Ah, but, the greatest good to the greatest number suggests that we apply the resources where most will benefit …. To which he receives this reply: Yes, but who is to say what represents the greater good - the number of people benefited or the amount by which they are benefited ? Hope this is not too late or too little ! Mind you, there’s a lot to be said for looking it up in the "book" as well … <VBG>