Number 92 : May 1998 |
Dear Theo,
I think it might be useful to consider the 'is/ought' problem in the form of the following proposition:
In any syllogism where there is an 'ought' in the conclusion there is always another 'ought' (explicit or implicit) in at least one of the premises.
All the supposed counter-examples offered by Hanfling (C90) and Farnworth (C91) can be explained that way. For example:
A
B
The reason for this is that 'is' statements do not allow for the possibility of anything other than what is and therefore do not allow for free will, while 'ought' statements presuppose that there are at least two possibilities and that the choice between them does depend on free will. If you take the 'ought' in the premise of one syllogism and make it the conclusion of another syllogism then you get another 'ought' in a premise of that second syllogism and so on either ad infinitum (infinite regress) or until you come back to the 'ought' you started with (tautology or going round in a circle).
In order to make any use of 'ought' statements there has to be an agreement among the people using them that a hard core of 'ought' statements will be taken as incontrovertible so that they may be used as premises in subsequent syllogisms. The fact that such an agreement is arbitrary is fairly obvious in the case of the rules of chess, but I would suggest the same underlying arbitrariness is there even in a moral code. The considerable similarities between moral codes in different societies can be accounted for by the similarities in the aspirations which bring people together to form those societies and in the discovery by trial and error of the means best suited to satisfy those aspirations. That, however, is as near as you can ever hope to get to your ideal of a universal morality.
Malcolm Burn
Malcolm: I agree entirely - very succinctly put too !
Theo