Theo Todman (C88, p. 2) : Format is not irrelevant, even in a philosophical newsletter. The medium is (part of) the message. For Commensal, I think that the format should basically reflect the editor's aesthetic sense (and editorial experience), marginally modified by readers' suggestions.
No one wants "endless replies", but discussion and comment are as important as the original articles or observations. It's up to the editor to decide where to draw the final line.
(C88, pp. 7-8) : 'Unsupported' philosophies never die. They simply fade away, and (if recorded) lie dormant - perhaps for centuries - until the right Prince Charming comes along and kisses them back to life... Even Greek philosophy, on which Western culture is largely based, had to be 'rediscovered'.
Michael can, of course, try setting his alarm clock an hour earlier ....
Anthony Owens (C88, p. 27) : If "subjective" and "objective" are used in their TTR senses, then I have no idea of what the question might mean. All I can say is that events are part of secondary/subjective reality - but then what ? If Anthony is using "subjective" and "objective" with non-TTR meanings, then I must ask him to define them in the context of his question. But even if he does that, I doubt whether I shall be able to follow his argument well enough to comment usefully. Perhaps we should just accept that our thought processes do not mesh?
That's plenty for one issue. I shall comment on reactions to the "Science and Pseudoscience" article in C90 (D. et Ed. V.). Theo has made a number of interesting points which I should like to deal with at some length.
Philip Lloyd Lewis
Firstly, more on science. I don’t hold the view that the laws of physics are "out there" like Platonic forms, but I do assert that the universe, ie. that which the currently accepted laws of physics attempt to describe, is out there and that the scientific paradigms do increasingly approximate to an increasingly accurate description of (aspects of) the universe. Maybe there are two elements of scientific paradigms that get muddled up. One is their attempt to explain how things really are. The second tries to relate sets of phenomena so as to deduce other phenomena. The first provides the intuitive background for the second, and is more likely to throw up discontinuities as paradigms are replaced. Some paradigms (eg. phlogiston) have been just plain wrong, and have been jettisoned. Others have prior paradigms as limiting cases or as crude first attempts. I don’t claim that science is a certain route to all truth, but do claim that it’s made real progress. The scientific enterprise is an attempt to investigate "how things are" and therefore needs to assume that this programme is not a forlorn hope; that is, that there is no fundamental inaccessibility of the underlying data nor any pervasive deception in the way they are presented to our senses. The justification for this approach is again in its success. Of course, it recognises that some parts of reality (in the scientific rather than the TTR sense) are hard to get at, on account of factors such as time, distance, size or energy.
What is pseudo-scientific about the interest in origins ? This is different from "creation", which seems to imply a creator; creation is only one possible solution to the problem of origins. The interest arises from Big Bang cosmology. If we crank back the expansion, we are left with a singularity. It is fair to ask what initiated the expansion. There are at least three alternatives. Firstly, that getting behind the singularity is impossible in a scientific sense, and so is a scientifically meaningless quest. Secondly, trying a "no boundary condition" solution along with Hawking and making the problem go away. Thirdly, introducing a deity into the act of creation. I look forward to your comments on "pseudo-science" in the next issue.
There’s also a question of when the scientific process ends. When a paradigm is being developed, critical tests are put to it; especially to discriminate between rival possibilities. Once scientific consensus is reached, a theory is put to daily use, and it is only when it fails to predict physical outcomes successfully on a daily basis that it is called into question. As is often pointed out, the mathematical predictions of special relativity & quantum mechanics are tested every day in particle accelerators & detectors throughout the world. Even if a paradigm fails to work in a new domain, or is found to have second order errors in its primary domain, any replacement theory has to explain why the first worked in the domain it did.
Some mathematicians (maybe most) have held a Platonic view of mathematics - that mathematical theorems are out there waiting to be discovered. I don’t take that view myself, but rather believe that mathematical theorems are true solely on the basis of a correct application of rules of deduction to the axioms. Any connection between mathematics and the real world is by the application of mathematical models. Mathematics itself says nothing about the world. The "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematics in describing the physical world does require explanation, however. So, I agree that there is no mysticism involved here, but would say that a great many theorems are true (in this context) beyond reasonable doubt.
Incidentally, how do you know what my (or anybody else’s) motivating factors are for believing things ? If you don’t want me to exercise my editorial privilege by the application of gratuitous abuse, please don’t attribute disreputable motives to other SIG members. As it happens, I don’t hanker after ungrounded certainty. I believe that all statements are only probably true (or probably false) but that it is irrational to doubt (or believe) many of them.
Theo