COMMENSAL ISSUE 88


The Newsletter of the Philosophical Discussion Group
Of British Mensa

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Number 88 : September 1997

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ARTICLES
14th July 1997 : Philip Lloyd Lewis

COMMENTS ON ISSUE 87

Theo Todman (C87, pp. 2-5) : By and large, yes.

Michael Nisbet (C87, p. 5) : What is the "science versus religion controversy" ? Is there only one ?

Anthony Owens (C87, p. 8) : I can't answer the question about objective truths / reality, as I don't understand it. Is Anthony seriously asserting that "once a physical law is writ", we cannot revise or reject it ? I see no need to "suggest examples" (of physical laws, I take it). Would he like to suggest one or two ?

Rick Street (C87, p. 16) : To say that "we can never know the objective answer" (to a particular question) is to imply that there is an objective answer. For me, there are no objective answers to any questions; in the last analysis, there are only assertions and opinions.

    • Rick believes that "there is objective reality'' but "can't prove it"; I know that there is objective reality (meaning "reality not created by humans") and feel no need to "prove it".
    • Is Rick confusing "objective truth" and "objective reality" ?
    • I do not think that Rick is "a figment of my imagination". Some misunderstanding here, it seems.

Theo Todman (C87, p. 21) : If Theo thinks that TTR "denies the very meaning of misuse" (of a philosophy), then he has misunderstood it, but I can't make out how. I find no difficulty in "criticising anyone's world-view", and I am not persuaded that I am acting illogically or inconsistently in so doing.

    • We all "build our own subjective worlds", whatever the varying degrees of social restraint, and we cause mayhem by "bumping into other people's worlds'' - with or without TTR philosophy.
    • There is no objectively "true state of affairs", independent of personal and cultural beliefs.
    • The ''obviousness'' of the "obvious" truth or falsity of any belief is "in the eye of" the believer/non-believer.
    • If Theo wishes to regard himself as "an insignificant speck", he is free to do so, but I think he is being unnecessarily modest. I don't regard myself (or him) as "an insignificant speck", nor do I see that as a sign of immodesty. Theo seems to be suffering from a severe form of ‘sizeism’. The significance of a person or thing is not determined by size.
    • If the "probability of truth" of a statement is assigned a value between 0 and 1 (or in any other way), that assignment is of course subjective. One man's 0.9 is another man's 0.1. If the 0.9-man is a good talker, however, he may be able to persuade the 0.1-man to become a 0.5-man...
    • Geometrical theorems are regarded as "true" if mathematicians in general accept the validity of the proof. But modern mathematics has shown that, for example, some of Euclid's proofs lack rigour.

Theo Todman (C87, p. 24) : Words, as units of language, have material aspects (marks on paper, movements of air particles, ear-drum vibrations) and non-material aspects (mental concepts). And so ?

    • The word "reality", ultimate or non-ultimate or whatever, implies existence. Similarly, "unreality", however qualified, implies non-existence.
    • A person’s/culture’s "subjective world" is not a "model of reality" - it is that person’s/culture's (secondary/subjective) reality. This "subjective world" cannot approximate to different aspects of "objective reality", because primary/ultimate/objective reality has no ''aspects" - it simply is (one-and-indivisible).

Rosemary Clarke (C87, p. 28) : Don't give up on us, Rosemary, we need you and people like you - if only to help keep our feet on the ground! My advice would be to concentrate on what you do understand and be sure to get in your penn’orth of comment. In particular, don't be put off by not understanding what TTR is all about - neither does anyone else! (I have difficulties myself, sometimes...)

Philip Lloyd Lewis


Philip : we don’t seem to be communicating very well, so maybe it’s not a good idea for me to expend much paper trying. There are certain philosophies (such as solipsism, or else the assumption of systematic deception) that are very difficult conclusively to refute, but which, like certain scientific theories, eventually die out for lack of support. I think yours is one of those, but I may be being very unfair because it seems I don’t understand it.

I’m willing to go along with the idea that reality is one, and that any way of chopping it up does violence to it. Also, that all scientific theories are provisional and subject to correction. However, I disagree with what I perceive to be your rejection of the scientific enterprise, a cornerstone of which is the act of faith that there is a reality out there that is open to investigation and to which scientific theories ever more closely approximate, albeit with some diversions along the way. I’ve argued before that there is evidence from the fact that scientific theories make correct predictions that this act of faith is not misplaced. The same cannot be said for other acts of faith. Decision between statements isn’t just a matter of persuasive talk. Also, while the standards of mathematical rigour may have improved over the millennia, mathematical theorems aren’t true simply because mathematicians have come to some private agreement.

Theo



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