COMMENSAL ISSUE 103

An Original Research Essay by

Frank Luger

(frankluger@hotmail.com)

The notion of time was introduced as a perplexing, paradoxical problem. Several historical conceptualizations of time were briefly surveyed, from the pre-Socratic philosophers to Alfred North Whitehead. Some physical dilemmas of time were mentioned, such as the metric of uniform time flow, the causal and irreversible notions of time order, as well as absolute and relative distinctions. Certain psychological problems of time were also touched upon, such as measurement, individual time-sense, time experience, the 'present moment' as the unit of subjective time, private time as a continuum, the irreversibility of psychological time, and the notion that time cannot be halted. Several conceptual difficulties of time were noted. Following these enigmas, the 'myth' of time was mentioned as having arisen from surplus meanings and a certain 'deification' of time. Finally, it was suggested, that since change (and thus motion) is both necessary and sufficient for the notion of time; perhaps, for the sake of conceptual elegance, time could be 'reduced' to a particular form of change.

"Quid est ergo tempus?
Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio;
si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio..."

St-Augustine, Confessions,
Book XI, Chapter XIV,xvii.

"What is thus time? If nobody asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to somebody, I do not know...". These were some of St-Augustine's lamentations over fifteen centuries ago. Today, much scientific research and even more philosophical discussion notwithstanding, St-Augustine might not be able to arrive at a better result or a different conclusion. Time is still an enigmatic paradox, and a rather perplexing one at that.

In the most general sense, time is an abstraction that denotes both duration and succession; and connotes the measurement of these phenomena. However, if an attempt is made to analyze these notions more precisely, they are found to be riddled with epistemological and metaphysical difficulties. Yet, the concept of time itself seems to survive logical scrutiny, no matter how rigorous. Is this because of its elusive nature? Or its pragmatic usefulness? Or, perhaps, the lack of a more adequate conceptualization?

The purpose of this essay, then, is the discussion of the enigmatic nature of time. Following a brief survey of some of the major historical conceptualizations, both physical and psychological 'times' will be very briefly examined; and mention will be made of its 'deification' or promotion to 'mythical' status in lay vulgarizations. Finally, it will be considered, albeit in a cursory fashion, whether time may be meaningfully reduced to change; and some of its conceptual problems effectively solved thereby.

Although the first written record of Man's attempt to measure the cyclic recurrence of diurnal and nocturnal periods as well as seasonal changes dates back to the Sumerian civilization around 3,500 B.C.E. (Lloyd, 1966), the first written record of Man's attempt to understand such changes is some three thousand years more recent. Specifically, it was during the pre-Socratic era in ancient Greece that the first (recorded) philosophical discussions of time had taken place.

Among the preoccupations of the pre-Socratic philosophers was the discussion of the ontological status of becoming or change, versus being or permanence, corresponding to the two most generally observed phenomena, i.e. instability vis-a-vis stability in Nature, respectively (Benjamin, 1966). Heraclitus (cca. 500 B.C.E.) asserted that reality is flux and constant change (hence his famous saying that 'one cannot step into the same river twice'; e.g. Kaufman, 1961, Vol. I, -fr.41); while Parmenides (cca. 540 B.C.E.) and Zeno (cca. 460 B.C.E.) argued that only the permanent is real (Kaufman, 1961).

Plato (428-347 B.C.E.) attempted to resolve the controversy by postulating a common Universe for all phenomena, comprising material change and ideal permanence, or instability within a framework of stability. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) affirmed the reality of time as motion; and defined time as the number of motion in respect to 'before' and 'after'. In other words, for Aristotle, time is a measure of motion (e.g. Benjamin, 1966; Kaufman, 1961; Russell, 1945; etc.).

The early Christian philosophers, Plotinus (204-269 C.E.), St-Augustine (353-430 C.E.), and St-Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) discussed time somewhat reminiscently of Plato and Aristotle. However, their preoccupation with theology led them to emphasize the timeless or eternal nature of God; and thus shift focus to 'otherworldly' concerns (Russell, 1945), generally along the lines of the static philosophy of the Middle Ages and the renewed interest in Nature during the Renaissance (Kaufman, 1961).

The British empiricists in general, and John Locke (1632-1704) in particular maintained that time is quantified change based on the experience of duration and succession, whether subject to human sense-perception or not (Russell, 1945).

Newton (1642-1727) introduced the notion of absolute time (together with absolute space) as an independent dimension, somewhat akin to a steadily flowing river; and affirmed its reality, regardless of human existence. His intellectual adversary, Leibnitz (1646-1716), maintained that time is ideal and potential, whose essential feature is succession; and as such, paved the way for the later intuitionism of Kant (Benjamin, 1966; Kaufman, 1961).

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), reacting to the British empiricists, asserted that time is an a priori form of intuition (perhaps reminiscent of an innate category of the mind), which compels the perception of a temporal world (Benjamin, 1966; Russell, 1945).

The post-Kantian era saw the re-emergence of philosophical emphasis on change, roughly paralleling the emergence of the biological theory of evolution, before, during, and after Darwin. Philosophers, such as the German idealists (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), positivists (Comte, Spencer), materialists (Feuerbach, Marx, Engels, Vogt, Moleschott, Büchner), as well as their followers and elaborators, adopted a dynamic viewpoint, somewhat reminiscent of Heraclitus and Aristotle. Darwinian evolutionary theory, in particular, seemed to suggest that change is the essence of reality; and enormous stretches of time were required, in a uniform sense. Time was conceptualized accordingly, although cosmogonical problems indicated that time could not be denoted as being synonymous with change (Hodgson, 1865, Russell, 1945).

Henri Bergson (1859-1941), the philosopher of 'emergent' evolution, was convinced that time is the key to reality. He distinguished duration and spatialized time, corresponding to intensive and extensive quantities, respectively (Benjamin, 1966; Russell, 1945). William James (1842-1910) identified the unit of time as a duration block (James, 1962; Russell, 1945).

Samuel Alexander (1859-1938), perhaps one of the thinkers who undertook most comprehensive and painstaking analyses of time (Benjamin, 1966), asserted the space-time dimensionality of pure events. He maintained that space is temporal, time is spatial; and so, maybe space-time is the categorical basis of all things (Alexander, 1920; Brettschneider, 1964).

Relativity Theory and Quantum Mechanics had given rise to much philosophical analysis of time. Einstein's Special Relativity demonstrated the untenability of the absolute-time notion (Barnett, 1957, Einstein, 1961; Hawking, 1988). Quantum Mechanics called attention to the fundamentally discrete units of energy (which probably influenced Wittgenstein, who conceived of time-quanta, cf. Whitehead, 1965), and the relationship between matter and energy (Hawking & Penrose, 1996). Nevertheless, the reality of time was asserted, albeit in a relativistic sense (Reichenbach, 1958, 1966).

Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) conceptualized time as the interplay of three fundamental categories; those of supersession, prehension, and incompleteness. No concrete entity can change, it can only be superseded. Supersession is a three-way process; each occasion supersedes other occasions, it is superseded by other occasions, and it is internally a process of supersession, in part potential, and in part actual. Prehension expresses how the World is a system of organisms. An occasion is a concretion- i.e. growing together of diverse elements that is why each occasion is an organism. Prehension is blind physical perceptivity. 'Incompleteness' refers to the fact that if anything were complete, the World would be not only static but timeless as well. Every occasion holds in itself its own future. Time has to be conceptualized as epochal (discrete, categorical), otherwise the phenomenon of infinite regress must be accounted for (Whitehead, 1965, 1967; Lucas, 1973; Schwarz, 1972).

It is worth recalling at this juncture that according to Kant, we cannot form the concept of time from our observations or experiences of events happening successively, etc. (i.e. we cannot derive time from phenomena) since the notions of succession, simultaneity, etc. presuppose time. For Kant, time cannot be an a posteriori concept.

However, following Einstein's unified concept of spacetime, Schrödinger (1956, p.250) felt that: "...the fact remains that time no longer appears to us as a gigantic, world-dominating chrónos, nor as a primitive entity; but as something derived from (the regularity of) phenomena themselves. It is a figment of my thinking..."

Figment or not, the ontological status of time remains unsettled: time is still an enigma, and a rather baffling metaphysical one at that.

Among the traditional concerns of physics, the measurement of things or events has, since Galileo, always been of great importance. Thus the physicist would first assume the reality of time, whether explicitly or implicitly, then conceptualizing time as proceeding by uniform 'flow', he would endeavor to measure it. Having observed the uniform alternation of diurnal and nocturnal periods, and knowing that these periods can be explained by the rotation of the Earth with respect to the Sun, the physicist might hypothesize that a measure of these periods would yield an accurate yardstick of time (Reichenbach, 1966).

To his dismay, the physicist discovers that his measure is not quite uniform, because the Earth rotates on an elliptical rather than circular orbit. To remedy this situation, he then endeavors to measure the Earth's rotation with reference to a distant (fixed) star. The first measure is called solar, while the second sidereal, time (Reichenbach, 1966). However, he soon discovers that even sidereal time is not exactly uniform, because of the precessional motion of the Earth. Although this motion is very slow, taking about 25,000 years for a complete turn, its observation deprives the physicist of saying that sidereal time is truly uniform, flow (Lloyd, 1966). Also, there always are inaccuracies and imprecisions in every measurement.

Not even the most modern cesium clocks (atomic half-time clocks) permit an unequivocal conclusion as to the uniformity of time 'flow'; and although some deviations might be negligibly small, they are there, nevertheless (Lloyd, 1966).

The philosopher, who has been lurking around the corner during these measurements, now pounces upon the problem and points out that what the physicist calls uniform time, whether truly accurately or not, is not directly observable, but must be derived by complex mathematical computations. Therefore, time is a relational concept; and 'uniform time' is merely an abstraction that the physicist has imposed upon observed data (Reichenbach, 1958, 1966).

Furthermore, laments the philosopher, the mathematical operations themselves rest upon the so called 'Laws of Nature', which, irrespective of their ontological status, were derived with reference to uniform time. This is a curious situation. To know uniform time the Laws of Nature must be known; and to know the Laws of Nature uniform time must be known. This circular reasoning, although not a fallacy per se, leads nowhere (Reichenbach, 1966; Lucas, 1973).

The physicist retorts by saying that he is not concerned with this tautology, since he did not ask whether the uniformity of time was epistemologically true, but he defined astronomic time as uniform. In short, argues the physicist, whether there is truly uniform time or not is not his business; he simply calls a certain measured flow of time uniform in order to possess a measurement standard for other 'times', such as non-uniform time, cyclic time, and the like (Reichenbach, 1966; Bieri, 1972).

The metric of time, thus, seems to be merely a definitional matter. Yet a definition is no proof of existence (Hospers, 1967; Russell, 1967). Even the most 'adequate' definitions of a perfect woman or a perfect unicorn, for examples, fail to prove that they exist. Pity (I mean the woman, forget the unicorn).

Another problem of great concern for both the physicist and the philosopher has been the order of time (Gent, 1965; Herrmann, 1971; Meerloo, 1970; etc.). What does it mean that event A was earlier than event B? More importantly, how can the order of time be known? Measurement alone is insufficient, even if it were absolutely reliably and validly performed.

The physicist affirms that causal relations reliably and validly indicate a time order, since a cause must perforce precede an event, and per definitionem at that (Goeje, 1949, 1951; Grünbaum, 1963; Schwarz, 1972). Not so, argues the philosopher; because there are simultaneous as well as two-way causal relationships (Grünbaum, 1963; Sellars, 1962; Wallis, 1968). Furthermore, causal relationships are not immutable. For example, although event A usually caused event B, now A causes B, C, and D in such a complicated pattern that the time-order is obscured. Finally, if the Universe were timeless, causal serial orders would disappear. Precisely so, expostulates the physicist; this is the confirmation that time exists, since it reflects the causal order of the Universe. Immutable or not, obscure or not, a causal order specifies a time order. Therefore, a simultaneous relationship, in the sense of the above definition, is not causal; but concomitant, or covarying (Hospers, 1967; Sellars, 1962).

Furthermore, argues the physicist, irreversible processes also indicate a time order. If state A has irreversibly become state B, state B must have occurred later than state A, according to the Laws of Thermodynamics, especially the Second Law (Blum, 1968; Cleugh, 1937; Koestler, 1967; Layzer, 1975; Lucas, 1973; Ornstein, 1969; Prigogine, 1967; etc.). However, the philosopher, on his turn, points out that this is again a tautology, since the Laws of Thermodynamics were derived with reference to time order, without which the notion of irreversibility is incomprehensible. The physicist escapes this dilemma by maintaining that irreversibility defines time order, thus the observations and experiments from which the Laws of Thermodynamics were derived, were valid (Cleugh, 1937; Grünbaum, 1963; Lucas, 1973).

It would therefore seem to be the case, that the order of time is a matter of definition (Monod, 1971; Reichenbach, 1958, 1966; Schwarz, 1972; Wallis, 1968; etc.); namely, that of causality and irreversibility, as mentioned above.

Finally, in order to be a reliable standard, time would have to be absolute, or universal, to which no exception could be made. In other words, if time reliably indicates units of duration and succession, this indication should be valid everywhere and everywhen. However, the phenomenon of time-dilation (Shklovskii & Sagan, 1966; Sagan, 1973; etc.), according to which the passage of time is inversely related to the speed of travel, shows that time is not absolute but relative, as shown by the Special Relativity Theory of Einstein (Barnett, 1957; Einstein, 1961; Kaufmann III, 1973; Nordmann, 1925; etc.). The Big Bang theory of current cosmology, black holes and singularities, and similar phenomena also argue against absolute time and in favor of its relativity (Hawking, 1988; Hawking & Penrose, 1996; etc.) .

To recapitulate, in the physical sense, time seems to be a relative notion that measures durational and successional aspects of (regular or irregular) physical change, whose uniformity and order are matters of definition (Grünbaum,1963; Lucas, 1973; Reichenbach, 1958; etc.).

However, since the knowledge of time is not a priori, but the result of definition and indirect observation; time is real only in the sense that space is real (Reichenbach, 1966). That is, physics seems to have been unable significantly to contribute to the elucidation of the metaphysical nature (ontic status) of time. All that can be said on the basis of physical knowledge with an acceptable degree of confidence is that if time exists, then it exists.Once again, this is a tautology.

According to Reichenbach (1966, p.144):

This eloquent description well summarizes the main features of psychological time; time is experienced as a flow (of events), time perception is dependent on sensory events, time is a continuum made up by units called 'present', time can be directly experienced only by such units, a unit can be experienced only once after which it is labeled 'past' and before which it is called 'future', time is irreversible, and it cannot be halted.

The measurement of psychological time is almost impossible without reference to some external standard, be it a clock, an observed physical change, etc. (Priestley, 1964), as shown by sensory deprivation studies (Murch, 1973). Furthermore, even in the presence of external standards, estimates of subjective or private time can be greatly influenced by cognitive, motivational, emotional variables, as well as psychopharmacological agents, such as hallucinogenics, etc. (Bieri, 1972; James, 1962; MacIver, 1962; Meerloo, 1970; Murch, 1973; Orme, 1969; Ornstein, 1969; Shibles; 1969; Stuart, 1925; Wallis, 1968; etc.). Even cultural factors may make a difference (Anastasi, 1958).

The susceptibility of the individual sense of time to external and internal variables renders it notoriously unreliable as demonstrated by controlled experiments and observational studies (Meerloo, 1970; Murch, 1973; Orme, 1969; Wallis, 1968; etc.). In the absence of timekeeping devices, idiosyncratic time estimates can be grossly inaccurate. Even the so-called biological clock may be misleading by as much as several hours, depending on external and / or internal factors (Meerloo, 1970; Wallis, 1968). Psychological time must be externally measured with a reliable and valid yardstick, any and all personal experience notwithstanding.

Time as such cannot be experienced (Bieri, 1972; Lucas, 1973; Ornstein, 1969). Only observed environmental change, whether external, internal, or both, can be experienced. Furthermore, conscious awareness is necessary for such experience; since, as Aristotle has already observed (Benjamin, 1966), an individual in deep sleep cannot experience time at all. Thus, it has been suggested (Hodgson, 1865; James, 1962; Lucas, 1973; Shepherd, 1941; Stuart, 1925) that time is an essential concomitant of (human) consciousness. However, this suggestion would be valid only if time and consciousness existed separately and experienced environmental change could be conceptualized as an intervening variable between them. Since neither time, nor consciousness have been demonstrated to exist by themselves; i.e. time existing independently of physical change and consciousness existing independently of its neocortical 'host', this suggestion, as worded above, is clearly fallacious.

If the 'present' is a 'legitimate' unit of psychological time, then it should be observable, or otherwise experienced. However, what is 'present', depends on the level of observation. Present century, year, season, month, week, day, hour, minute, and second seem to indicate that there is such thing as 'present'. Yet none of these can be directly experienced. Furthermore, the smaller the unit of 'present', the less meaningful it is to call it present. Before a second can be designated as present, it has already passed. Neural transmission occurs in milliseconds, and photons travel even much, much faster than action potentials. Strictly speaking, this puts the observer in an odd situation: as his eyes wander about he cannot know whether he sees present or past. As James (1962) suggested, no matter how fast the observer repeats: 'present' 'present' 'present' or 'now' 'now' 'now', by the time he utters 'now' he is already in the future. Perhaps the 'present' does not exist at all, but the future immediately melts into the past, through a narrow bottleneck, as it were. Or, if it does exist, maybe it does so on such a miniature scale that it cannot be perceived. There's no evidence to suggest that time may be discrete or quantized, at all.

Psychological time may thus be better conceptualized as a continuum, rather than a chain of discrete quanta or 'present' units. However, as Whitehead (1965) has pointed out, if time is a continuum, and such questions as the beginning and end of time can not be answered, then the philosopher is faced with the problem of infinite regress and infinite divisibility. But does it make sense to say that time is timeless, and that time can be infinitely subdivided? Especially if, following the theories of Einstein, time is thought of as relative rather than absolute?

Whether time is conceptualized as continuous or categorical, it is said to be irreversible (Cleugh, 1937; Stuart, 1925). However, this is a physicalistic notion, which is not necessarily true in the case of psychological time, as demonstrated by sensory-deprivation experiments (Murch, 1973). Also, depending on subjective factors, temporal relationships may easily be perceived as reversible (Gent, 1965; Lucas, 1973; Orme, 1969). Cultural indifference to time may also give rise to reversible temporal experiences (Anastasi, 1958).

Another feature of psychological time is the notion that objectively, time cannot be halted, or reversed. For example, the momentary desire of Dr. Faustus to hold time still had promptly relegated him to eternal hellfire, as per his pact with Mephistopheles, the Devil (e.g. Priestley, 1964). However, this notion may be entirely culture-dependent (Anastasi, 1958); and may not reflect more than a resignation in the face of such psychological threats as death for example.

In sum, as Lucretius noted (in De Rerum Natura, I, 459-60, 462-3; quoted in Lucas, 1973, p.9): "Tempus item per se non est, sed rebus ab ipsis consequitur sensus... nec per se quenquam tempus sentire fatendum est semotum ab rerum motu placida que quiete..." That is, time by itself does not exist, but the sense of time follows from things themselves... nor should it be said that anyone experiences time by itself when he is removed from the calm and peaceful motion of things...

Perhaps the notion of time is neither necessary nor really useful, whether physically, psychologically, or both. Whether this is the case or not seems to entirely depend on the various 'arrows of time' and similar conceptualizations. No single, unequivocal, omnibus notion of time is available. Time has been conceptualized in a great many different ways; as duration, as succession, as flow, as passage, as spacetime, as direction, as continuum, as determinism, as absolute, as relative, as cyclic, as irreversible, as causal, as unidimensional, etc. There is solar time, sidereal time, atomic time, biological time, psychological time, etc.; and even notions of timelessness and eternity. Despite a plethora of possible definitions, there is little general consensus as to just what time is (Grünbaum, 1963; Sellars, 1962).

These difficulties, at least partially, arise because of the 'myth' of time. Originally, time meant nothing more than regular change, as for example in ancient Greek philosophy (e.g. Benjamin, 1966; Lovejoy, 1909; Russell, 1945). However, with the scientific-philosophical progress and the theological-cosmogonical considerations of many centuries, time has gradually acquired so much surplus meaning that the original concept is almost inextricably buried in the heap. The initially harmless mollusc metamorphosed into a giant squid whose tentacles reach everywhere and choke the hapless bystander who but needed a protective suit of simple logic to ward off the tentacles. Just what is this 'myth'?

The 'myth' of time consists of a heap of superficial and false beliefs that time exists by itself, and that somehow, it is 'omnipotent'. Time takes care of everything, time judges all, time is wisdom, time brings relief, time is merciless, time is inevitable, time will tell, etc. Yet to be able to do even a fraction of these things, time would have to be a supernatural entity, i.e. god. This all-too-common 'deification' of time by most laymen and even by many intellectuals is, regrettably, even exploited for commercial purposes. To have a good time, hard time, noisy time, etc. and similar ‘oversimplifications’ are busily expounded by the advertising and blatantly profiteering mass media which capitalize on the 'myth' of time. As Shibles (1969, p.40) has noted: "...as if time can do and say things, as if time were an entity... a force which can produce effects... manipulate events..."

If time could be stripped of its surplus meanings; and, especially, of its 'myth', it might continue to serve as a reasonably useful and meaningful measure of durational and successional phenomena. The reality of change is, by now, almost beyond philosophical dispute (Hospers, 1967; Lucas, 1973). In the physical sciences, time and its measurements present relatively little difficulty (Blum, 1968; Hawking, 1988; Hawking and Penrose, 1996; Layzer, 1975; etc.); changing paradigms and physical theorizings notwithstanding. Since time can be fairly adequately conceptualized as the measurement aspect of regular change, or the nonspatial order in which things change; it would seem, without committing the reductive fallacy, that time may be safely reduced to observable, regular change within corrigible error. Finally, since change is an aspect of motion in general; it may be said that time is but a particular kind of motion.

Since the concept of change is both necessary and sufficient for the notion of time, it may be quite reasonably concluded that its enigmatic nature notwithstanding, time is nothing but a particular form of change, rather than any kind of perplexing myth.

Written: Ottawa, February, 1976; Revised: Budapest, February, 2000.

Frank Luger