April 2000 : Nigel Perks
A PHYSICAL CAUSE OF CONSCIOUSNESS ?
Response to Roger Farnworth, C100
Roger's article begins with an observation that philosophy of mind has wrapped itself up in notions of mental phenomena distinct from physical phenomena, making any connection between the two, in particular between the conscious mind and the physical brain, very puzzling. It suggests that we can see how physical impressions, typified by light, cause and constitute consciousness, by showing that there is no consciousness distinct from that of which it is conscious.
A thought-experiment is described, in which a speck of light is introduced into a complete absence of inner and outer experience. "The darkness as well as the light becomes conscious." I am unclear as to the purpose of the experiment and the meaning of this statement.
If it means the darkness and light become conscious (of something), which is what it says, this is counter-intuitive, beyond experience and not shown to be true.
If it is meant to show how consciousness can arise in previously non-sentient stuff, it does not. The only consciousness present, the only being awakened by the light, is the one performing the experiment - an already conscious human being.
If it is to show how the perceived world is built up out of simple sensations, it is fine up to the statement "all concepts have been reduced to light". It is percepts which have been reduced to light. Sometimes ideas "occur" to us, just as things (in a general sense) appear before us; but sometimes we have to think hard in order to work out what something is or to understand another's communications. From ordinary experience, it seems that concepts are sometimes attained by an activity (thinking), and not merely given like patterns of light. It should not be assumed that this is not the case.
When aware of something, we are not usually aware that we are aware of it. Looking at these words, I am thinking of the words and their meaning, rather than "I am looking at and understanding these words". Except just then! It is possible to look at an object and be aware that one is looking at it, but it requires a decision and an effort. This is another instance where the content of consciousness goes beyond the given and includes a product of our activity. The statement "we can never be aware of consciousness" is false in that I am certainly aware that I am conscious, and from the article I am sure that the author is aware that he is conscious. If it means, we are aware of the objects of consciousness and not of a thing "consciousness" - that consciousness always has a content and has no existence apart from that content - this is a description of the situation before we deliberately become aware of what we are doing. A thing and the experience of that thing are different. When I am aware of a table, there is something more going on than the table just being there, and I can direct my attention to this "more".
The article's contention for a physical cause of consciousness boils down to a statement that a central nervous system becomes conscious when light colonises it. To me this does not explain anything and gives no intuitive understanding. If you shine a bright light in my eyes at 5 a.m., you will see light "causing" consciousness (and emotion besides) in one sense, but shining a light in my teddy bear's eyes (if I had one) would not cause consciousness. That I am a being which can be conscious, and yet am a physical object just as is the teddy bear, is the whole point.
A distinction we observe is that between the dead and the living. A plant grows and moves and responds to light, which my teddy bear does not. An animal can even move about as it feels inclined - and has some kind of inner experience. There is "something in there". There is "something behind that person's eyes". The difference between a plant withering after being uprooted, and an animal screaming in pain, is a total difference of kind of phenomenon.
I have a feeling that Roger was trying to show that the need for a bridge between the two apparent kinds is artificial, based on incorrect distinctions. If that is the case, I should be grateful for a further attempt.
The second part of Roger's article brings biology and evolution into the story. It is concerned with external things that we can observe with our senses. Whether these things are alive or dead, simple or complex, they seem to be just things that we could dissect without coming across anything like a sensation or thought. So again this does not help us understand how the non-sentient comes to be sentient.
"The emergence of the concept of self" is mentioned briefly. As experienced, this is given - it just happens that we realise, "Oh! I am here!". However, I can now become aware that "I am here, I exist" by choice, by directing my attention, just as I can become aware that I am aware of something by decision and effort. If concepts attained by thinking, awareness of awareness attained by effort, and consciousness of self by directing attention to oneself, do add content to consciousness besides sense impressions which are just given, then it is conceivable that our decisions and actions too can go beyond the given - can become free of the controlling sense impressions.
Sources
("I might not think this way if I had not read...")
Rudolf Steiner: The Theory of Knowledge Implicit in Goethe's World-Conception; Truth and Knowledge; Philosophy of Freedom.
Nigel Perks