COMMENSAL ISSUE 101

An Original Research Article by Frank Luger (frankluger@hotmail.com)

The Freudian statement that Psychology is a pursuit concerning happiness was generally discussed. Psychology and happiness were examined both in their historical and actual contexts. It was shown that they had both been among the traditional concerns of Philosophy; Psychology had been the concern of metaphysics, and happiness, that of ethics. Psychology was shown to have acquired scientific status at the threshold of the XXth century, and as such, ethical neutrality as well. Happiness was shown to have had a clear meaning in ancient ethics; but in recent times it has been much misused and abused, resulting in its demise as a meaningful motivational concept. It was concluded, that there is no reliable and valid connection between Psychology and happiness; thus the question whether Psychology is or is not a pursuit of happiness simply does not arise in any serious discourse.

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), the founder of psychoanalysis, is alleged to have said, somewhere in the voluminous writings of his late life, that Psychology is a pursuit concerning happiness. This assertion, in the context of Freud's work, might be a fine topic for historical research. However, because of its intuitive, popular appeal and superficial face validity, it may be interesting to examine it in a general sense, devoid of its historical context.

The purpose of this essay, then, is the general discussion of the above Freudian statement. Although it would be tempting to undertake the discussion in order to arrive at either a positive or a negative conclusion, i.e. that yes, Psychology is a pursuit concerning happiness, or that no, this is not the case; in the opinion of the present author such temptation is inherently dangerous because it takes too much for granted. Specifically, it assumes that there is such thing as an unequivocally definable state of happiness, that it is a goal intrinsically worth pursuing; and, that Psychology is a goal-directed endeavor in this sense- as though happiness were the proverbial Holy Grail and Psychology were the noble Knight in earnest quest of it. However, without such assumptions it is doubtful whether the statement gives rise to a meaningful question at all. Before any serious question can be formulated, the legitimacy of each conceptual component has to be established as unequivocally as possible. If this initial endeavor turns out to be reasonably successful, then questions may be meaningfully raised; and, hopefully, answered one way or another.

Therefore, the present study will examine, on a conceptual level, both Psychology and happiness. Their definitions and conceptual meaningfulness will be discussed. A brief historical survey of each will be followed by a discussion of their actual 'status'. Finally, an attempt will be made to explore possible connections between Psychology and happiness. If such connection exists, and if it indicates some sort of functional relationship, then questions will be raised and their answer attempted in order to elucidate the nature of such relation.

According to Funk & Wagnalls Standard Desk Dictionary (Funk & Wagnalls, 1969, p.534), Psychology is "(1) The science of the human mind in any of its aspects, operations, powers, or functions. (2) The systematic investigation of mental phenomena... (3) The behavior patterns regarded as characteristic of an individual, type, group, etc. (4) A work on Psychology.". The same dictionary defines 'happy' (p.292) as "(1) Enjoying, showing, or characterized by pleasure; joyous, contented. (2) Attended with good fortune; lucky. (3) Produced or uttered with skill and aptness; felicitous: a happy phrase...". Happiness, then, means all this, albeit in a neutral sense.

A pocket dictionary of Psychology (Drever, 1952, p.232), after the indication of various theoretical biases, proposes this definition: "(Psychology is)...the branch of biological science which studies the phenomena of conscious life and behavior, in their origin, development, and manifestations; and employing such methods as are available and applicable to the particular field of study...". The same dictionary fails to define happiness at all.

William James (1962, p.15) felt that "The definition of Psychology may be best given in the words of Professor Ladd, as the description and explanation of states of consciousness as such... Psychology is to be treated as a natural science..." (italics in original). As far as happiness is concerned, James made no mention, at least not in this book.

A recent introductory text (Silverman, 1971, p.1) definess Psychology as "...the science that seeks to measure, explain, and sometimes change the behavior of man and other animals.". Happiness is not mentioned anywhere in the same text.

Hebb's famous 'Textbook of Psychology' (1972, p.15) defines Psychology as "...the study of the more complex forms of integration or organization in behavior.". A definition, or even a mention, of happiness, is absent.

Fox (1972, p.5) maintains that: "Psychology is a science, but it is also a philosophy and an art. As a science, Psychology is the study of behavior. As a philosophy, it is the study of persons. As an art, it is the intuitive application of what is known about persons and their behavior.". However, Fox does not mention happiness in his book.

Before the suspicious reader begins to smell the rat, he might as well face the somber fact: there is no unequivocal definition of happiness, while there is a plethora of converging definitions of Psychology. Although happiness had been rather precisely conceptualized by Aristotle, as it will be explained below, for the most part, happiness seems to have been a rather nebulous and elusive concept, inextricably embedded in ethics. Despite such difficulties, 'happiness' has perhaps been one of the most widely used, misused, abused, and disused concepts in human history, in that order. It is singularly peculiar, that a term of such general usage as that of 'happiness' is almost impossible to define with an acceptable degree of reliability and validity. Yet everybody seems to know what it is, at least intuitively.

Most people might say, when buttonholed, that 'happiness' is something akin to joyous contentment and harmony; and that it is a highly desirable state of mind, intrinsically enjoyable. Perhaps 'happiness' is a notion of culture in general. Let's see it in some other languages.

The German equivalent of 'happiness' is 'Glückseligkeit', denoting a felicitous state of mind / soul. The French expression is 'bonheur', which denotes a state of perfect inner satisfaction. The German word approximates the Latin 'felix', while the French one the Latin 'beatus'; although the distinction is a very delicate one, and it is blurred.

Happiness is usually regarded as the highest ranking human value, both individual and collective, a value worth striving for, an end in itself (Jones et al., eds., 1977). While it may escape rigorous definition per se, and seems to be an empirically unverifiable abstraction, most people might vehemently object to the proposition that 'happiness' might be conceptually vacuous, perhaps even meaningless.

As far as Psychology (in the above sense) is concerned, despite a plethora of definitions, there seems to be a fair, i.e. acceptable consensus as to what it is. Its etymology notwithstanding, even in the loosest sense, Psychology is the study of the mind in general and the scientific study of behavior in particular; but it is neither the study nor the science of the 'soul' or the 'spirit' or the 'ghost' or any of the similar superficial and misleading, albeit popular notions. In other words, presently, the subject-matter of Psychology is behavior. However, this had not always been the case.

Historically, both Psychology and happiness had a lot to do with Philosophy, albeit with different branches of it. Philosophy, the venerable study of wisdom, has traditionally been subdivided into epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics-esthetics; i.e. theories of knowledge, reality, and value, respectively. Psychology has been a traditional concern of metaphysics, especially with regards the mind-body problem; although not exclusively. Happiness, on the other hand, has been a prime concern of ethics, to the exclusion of the other branches of Philosophy (e.g. Hospers, 1967; Russell, 1945; etc.).

Psychology, or the study of the soul / mind, in the historical sense, has always been the subject of lively metaphysical interest. Specifically, two psychological concepts were almost axiomatic to metaphysics; that of the mind as a substance, and, that of a fundamental difference between mind and matter (e.g. Boring, 1950; Hospers, 1967). The two basic questions that metaphysical psychology has endeavored to answer, throughout its long history, were concerned with the mind's ability to perceive and think truthfully about an external world, and the mind-body relationship. Idealism, materialism, empiricism, etc., were among the historical 'schools' dealing with the first question, while the second question was dealt with in various monistic and dualistic 'schools', e.g. identity theory, epiphenomenalism, interactionism, parallelism, etc. While a detailed survey of the history of metaphysical psychology is clearly beyond the scope of this essay, it may be noted, for the present purposes, that before Psychology had spread its wings to fly out of the maternal nest of Philosophy toward scientific skies, it was held down to rather sterile armchair discussions and arbitrary conjectures. However, one historical feature was the tacit assumption of the mind (soul) as a substance which exists in its own right. In short; things mental and physical were conceptualized as being capable of equal juxtaposition; and were subjected to different degrees of overlap (e.g. Kaufman, 1961; Lowry, 1971; Russell, 1945; etc.)

Although Psychology had spread its wings about a hundred years ago and effectively left the maternal nest toward scientific skies, it still had to learn how to fly. The various early 'schools' of structuralism, psychoanalysis, functionalism, behaviorism, and Gestalt psychology were flying instructors of varying degrees of proficiency. Furthermore, stormy conditions hampered flying instruction from the outset. Psychology has eventually learned to fly on its own; but, because of the prevailing turbulences, it still cannot fly graciously. But, at least, it is in the air; and, presumably, flying in the right direction. Time will tell, we trust.

Psychology had to pay a stiff price for its emancipation and achievements. As part of the bargain, it had to lose its mind / soul, at least in the traditional sense. 'Mind' and 'soul' are no longer part and parcel of academic Psychology as entities, conceptual or otherwise. To be sure, they are still used for linguistic convenience and in loose, informal talk; but beyond that they hardly represent more than relics of bygone times, of intellectual giants, and of blissful ignorance. They remain important for religion, literature, etc., but not for Science.

Such XXth century trends as operationism for example, had made it increasingly clear that it is entirely possible to study events or phenomena regardless of their assumed or presumed metaphysical status or implications. While the metaphysician may continue to speculate about the ultimate nature of matter and mind in his 'esoteric' ivory tower, this need not detain the physicist and the psychologist, who may, at the same time, cheerfully study such notions as electricity, heat, gravitation, etc., or perception, cognition, motivation, etc., respectively. As long as the physicist is able to unequivocally specify, in operational terms, what he means by such convenient abstractions, the fact that basically he is studying matter in motion is a conventional, but at the same time a logically irrelevant, statement. Analogously, the psychologist may research such abstractions as intelligence, creativity, learning, etc., provided that he can unequivocally define them in empirically verifiable terms and operations. The fact that all the while he is actually studying the mind is also a conventional, but equally irrelevant statement of little, if any, importance (e.g. Boring, 1950; Schultz, 1969; Sidman, 1960; etc.).

Consequently, most modern definitions of the term 'psychology' usually omit 'mind' or 'soul' altogether, as exemplified above. Mentalistic connotations are absent, not only because they hamper progress by hopelessly circular, esoteric arguments, but also because they are simply useless for the purposes of modern psychology, which is predominantly concerned with the processes by means of which an experiencing organism responds to and adjusts to the world around it. The organism is not necessarily a purposeful robot composed of an inferior, mortal body and a superior, immortal mind / soul, as modern psychology's predecessors assumed and / or presumed. Rather, it is an active, spontaneous 'robot', in dynamic interaction with hereditary and environmental variables, both external and internal. In short; the organism is an open system, in a dynamic steady-state, equally capable of short-term adjustment, and long-term, cumulative change (e.g. Bertalanffy, 1967, 1968a, 1968b.; etc.). That some functional aspects of the organism may be easier conceptualized with the convenience of some 'mentalistic' terms represents hardly more than the temporary inability of psychologists and laymen to communicate effectively. It is perhaps unfortunate that oversimplifications are still prevalent in bridging the gap between theory and practice. Much confusion and sterile debate could be avoided without them. Among the future tasks of Psychology it would be desirable to include the systematic elimination of oversimplifications and the concurrent improvement of communication.

Since 'happiness' seems to be inextricably linked with ethics, a brief survey of the history of ethics appears indicated. Traditionally, ethics has recognized three ultimate values: truth, goodness, and beauty (e.g. Hospers, 1967; Joad, 1965; Williams, 1972). Strictly speaking, Philosophy is the pursuit of truth only, relegating goodness to morality and beauty to esthetics and art. Thus whenever Philosophy deals with these subjects, it merely seeks the truth about them. While this distinction may seem somewhat strained, it had to be made, at least for the present purposes. There is too much confusion about ethics, morality, and philosophical theories about them to overlook this point (e.g. Jones et al., eds., 1977).

Throughout the long history of Western Philosophy, ethics has been concerned with two fundamental problems: namely the goal of life, the sort of experience that is intrinsically most worth having (or, rather, striving for); and human conduct, the criteria of human decisions. Two classical 'schools of thought' have been associated with each of the above problems. Hedonism maintained that the only intrinsic good is pleasure, thus the goal of life is to seek and maximize pleasure. Pluralism, on the other hand, has recognized a plurality of intrinsic goods: knowledge, beauty, love, etc. Thus the goal of life is the pursuit of pluralistic values, as these are worth pursuing for themselves besides whatever pleasure may attend them. As far as the problem of human conduct is concerned, utilitarianism maintained that only that act is right, which, if chosen from all other alternatives, produces the highest possible degree of total good, however conceived. The other 'school' concerned with human conduct has been intuitionism, according to which the right or wrong nature of an act is inherent in the act itself, as opposed to its consequences (e.g. Hospers, 1967; Joad, 1965; Jones et al., eds., 1977; Kaufman, 1961; Russell, 1945; etc.).

It has been mentioned above, that 'happiness' has been widely used, misused, abused, and disused in the history of the philosophy of ethics, in the order listed here. In ancient times 'happiness' had a rather definite meaning, and was used accordingly. Hedonists and epicureans thought of happiness as the sum total of pleasure, or perhaps as the absolute absence of pain. To attain happiness, all Man had to do was to engage in as much pleasureful activity as possible. Aristotle, although believing that pleasure is good, saw in it a means to an end rather than an end in itself. For him, happiness meant harmony, balance, a 'golden middle way'; the fullest possible actualization of human potentialities, which may be paraphrased as 'to be the right man in the right place at the right time doing the right thing'. Specifically, Aristotle postulated three criteria for determining happiness (in 'Nicomachean Ethics' repr. Kaufman, 1961, Vol. I, pp.480-518); that it must be a desirable goal, that it must be self-sufficient, and, that it must be found in the life and activity peculiar to Man. Thus, as Rader (1964, p.61) had summarized, "happiness is an active, virtuous, and sustained mode of living that calls into play the specifically human capacities, above all, Man's rational nature.". Although Aristotelian ethics did not escape subsequent criticism (e.g. Joad, 1965; Rader, 1964; Russell, 1945), this definition of happiness remains perhaps the most comprehensive and elegant conceptualization ever since. In fact, the ethics of Aristotle have been a moral beacon for Mankind for over two thousand years.

Medieval and Renaissance times have misused the concept of happiness both in its narrow hedonistic and in its broad, Aristotelian sense. The religious dogmatism of these times had promptly relegated hedonism in general and pleasure in particular to the domain of sin, one way or another. Man's earthly plight through the 'valley of tears and shadows' was depicted as sinful, reprehensible, and meaningful only insofar as being a stepping stone and testing ground for eternal happiness or eternal damnation. Happiness was the love of God, pure and simple. Man's acts were inherently right or wrong, and the criteria for them, along with actual dictates, were spelled out by Church canon rather clearly and dogmatically. The formula was very simple; all Man had to do to obtain salvation was to blindly obey the Church's code of conduct, which, for the sake of greater credibility, was proclaimed to be a divine revelation, and as such, both infallible and incontestable. If Man did as told, his eternally happy life after death was guaranteed. Happiness other than the love of God was inadmissible. Herd conformity was demanded, even brutally enforced; and individual happiness, in the Aristotelian sense, let alone in the epicurean sense, was actively discouraged and extirpated, wherever possible. Whoever dared to defy the Church, incurred its wrath upon himself. Charges of heresy, witchcraft, etc. easily resulted in torturous inquisitions, excommunication, or burning at the stake. Happiness on Earth could not exist- it was abhorrent anathema.

Following this dark and shameful era, modern Philosophy had slowly dawned. The rationalism of Descartes, the cosmology of Newton, the empiricism of Locke, etc., had resulted in a new conception of human nature. As Lowry (1971, p.62) had aptly characterized: "…medieval psychology regarded Man as a tainted but still partially divine performer in a purposeful cosmic drama; by contrast, the new psychology considered him to be a mere animal- albeit ‘the most advantageously organized of any’- inhabiting a blindly mechanical Universe.". To be sure, God still played an important role in human conduct. For example, the life enhancement doctrine of Spinoza identified the active, volitional love of God as the ultimate value. Yet, as Rader (1964, p.69) had noted: "…happiness depends upon the quality of objects upon which love is fixed, and love toward the greatest of objects, God or Nature, feeds the mind with a profound joy. He who loves God in this intellectual way is a free man…". Thus Spinoza’s ethics represent a somewhat Aristotelian idea of self-realization with religious overtones (e.g. Kaufman, 1961; Jones et al., eds., 1977). His ethical doctrine represents a point of transition between the earlier uses and misuses of ‘happiness’ and the subsequent abuses, from Bentham to Freud, followed by present-day confusion and apathetic disuse, as exemplified by mass media and existentialist-nihilist ethics, respectively.

The Age of Enlightenment culminated in violent revolutions, profoundly shattering the old intellectual edifice. The new conception of human nature failed to provide guidelines for conduct. This need was filled, at least partially, by the ‘school’ of intuitionism, as exemplified by Kant and his Categorical Imperative; and also partially, by a strong revival of hedonism, as exemplified first by Bentham and his doctrine of utilitarianism, and later, by Freud and his pleasure principle.

The great Revolutions cast a strong doubt on the legitimacy of existing social institutions. Utilitarianism, as formulated by Bentham and J.S. Mill, declared that social institutions, as well as individual acts, must be guided by the principle of the greatest general happiness, which was conceptualized as the sum total of everything that is good (e.g. Hospers, 1967; Joad, 1965; Russell, 1945). Those acts, whether individual or institutional, that potentially or actually promote the happiness of the greatest possible number of people, are to be judged as right. The principles of majority, and collective benefit should take precedence under any and all circumstances. Yet, this classical, act-utilitarianism had been so severely criticized, mainly because of its failure to guide those acts of conduct that do not necessarily result in the greatest general good yet they are not necessarily wrong either; that rule-utilitarianism gradually superseded it. This latter maintains that an act should be judged not by its consequences, but by the consequences of adopting the rule under which the act falls. This form of utilitarianism, in one sophisticated form or another, has survived into the XXth century (Hospers, 1967).

Besides utilitarianism, the other main example of the great abuse of the concept of happiness, especially in its hedonistic form, was the pleasure principle of Freudian psychoanalysis. Freud assumed that Man intrinsically seeks pleasure and tries to avoid pain. Later, he modified this idea by postulating the conflicting tendencies of Eros and Thanatos, or the instincts of life (pleasure) and death (pain). Happiness, for Freud, is Eros maximized. The conflict of Eros and Thanatos is the ultimate basis of neurosis (e.g. Freud, 1920, 1961). To be sure, Freudian psychoanalytical ‘ethics’ included other concepts besides Eros, for example polarity, catharsis, self-knowledge, and self-realization; but the pleasure principle is so pervasive in Freud’s works that for him, Eros seems to have been the ‘master’ notion. Indeed, Freud’s abuse of hedonism (and thus ‘happiness’) had been subjected to severe criticism (e.g. Heidbreder, 1933; Rader, 1964; etc.). It is noteworthy that hedonism, quite independently from Freudian psychoanalysis, has survived as a minor ethical doctrine in its own right; although it is still widely misinterpreted (e.g. Hospers, 1967; Jones et al., eds., 1977).

However, the concept of happiness, whether in its Epicurean or Aristotelian sense, has never been as generally abused and disused as in the XXth century. In the modern era, when Science and Technology are improving the quality of human existence almost daily, a wholesale vulgarization of knowledge is taking place, mostly by the mass media. The great XVIIIth - XIXth century movements of the mechanical and industrial revolutions, and concurrent, other developments gave rise to the masses, to the lower classes of urban societies. They had to be educated and entertained. Mass culture, as disseminated by the mass media, has fulfilled mostly the role of entertainment, and, sometimes, even that of education, in however simplistic fashions. The XXth century has seen the gradual amalgamation of social classes, and the definite disappearance of clearcut social divisions. The emerging enormous middle class, while far from homogeneity, has been characterized by conformity, intellectual shallowness and superficiality, and perhaps even general mediocrity, depending on the particular society.

The typical representative of this new class is ‘Mr. Average’- whatever that means. He is the prime target of most commercial manipulations. He is educated enough not to be too naïve, but not educated enough to see through advertising tricks, publicity stunts, and mass culture in general. He knows that there are such things as values, and that they are worth pursuing. But he fails to realize that commercialized values are not values but tricks aimed at his wallet. The result is utter confusion. Traditionally cherished, (presumably) timeless values, such as beauty, goodness, etc. are blatantly profanized (for example, posters of Mona Lisa with Pepsi Cola bottles in her hand) and distorted (for example, Mr. Good Guy stereotypes) by mass culture. Happiness is instantly available- all Mr. Good Guy and Ms. Good Gal have to do is to purchase this product or get that kind of credit card, etc.; i.e. simply pay for it. Never before in the history of Mankind has happiness been promoted in such wholesale manners. Yet, Mankind is not happier at all; in fact, Mankind is definitely unhappier today than ever before.

Indeed, this wholesale cult of happiness, instead of being beneficial, is rather detrimental; for it promotes herd conformity, it fails to indicate any road, it profanizes and distorts traditional values, and it dehumanizes the quality of existence (e.g. Ortega y Gasset, 1951, 1961; Tumin, 1957; van den Haag, 1962, etc.). Ironically enough, ‘happiness’ seems to fall into gradual disuse. It is no longer proclaimed as an ultimate, timeless value; or even as a long-range goal or desideratum (e.g. Feinberg, 1969). The intensely individualistic existentialist philosophy of Sartre, for example, makes no use of ‘happiness’ at all; for him, authentic existence is the goal (e.g. Green, 1960; Sartre, 1956). Generally speaking, in the last decades of the XXth century, ‘happiness’ seems to have gradually disappeared from intellectual circles. It is still widely abused in mass culture, but perhaps less conspicuously than in the 1950’s and 60’s. As the consumer becomes less gullible, promotion techniques become somewhat more sophisticated, with the end result being of course the same, i.e. middle-class poverty, whether financial, intellectual, emotional, and so on.

It has been mentioned above, that the concerns of classical ethics usually revolved around two main problems: the goal of life, and human conduct. The traditional answers (hedonism, Golden Mean, pluralism, utilitarianism, and intuitionism) to these problems have been challenged in the XXth century, besides existentialism-nihilism, also by logical positivism. According to this doctrine, the statement that something is good or right reflects on the preferences of the speaker only, this in the strict sense, it is not a statement at all, but a value judgement. Subjective preferences, even if shared by many other people, cannot be projected as an objective goal. Hence to speak of an ultimate good which men should strive for is meaningless. Whether people happen to prize the ‘goal’ is irrelevant. It is equally meaningless, for the same reasons, to speak of an objective standard of moral value applying to all men alike in the absence of absolute yardsticks, i.e. the kind that’s independent of humanity, now or ever. Therefore, it seems just about impossible to conceive of ethics as a rational body of value judgements. Ethics can be conceptualized as a comparative study of customs or culture-dependent preferences only. Logical positivism maintains that since values have no rational basis, any discussion about them in terms other than personal preferences and suggestions is futile and meaningless (e.g. Stevenson, 1944).

The statement that the ultimate goal of life is happiness would therefore be promptly declared meaningless by the logical positivist. What does one do with a meaningless statement? Reject it? Accept it regardless? Neither: one simply ignores a meaningless statement or proposition.

To recapitulate: Psychology (today) is the scientific study of behavior. Its goals are the explanation and prediction of behavior. It is a science because it uses the scientific method in its pursuits. As such, it is ethically neutral. Happiness, as used today, is an ambiguous, well-nigh meaningless abstraction, loosely referring to such notions as the epitomy of pleasure, or goodness, or a harmonious state of affairs.

Happiness is supposed to have motivational properties. Namely, since happiness is assumed to be intrinsically desirable, Man should be motivated to strive for happiness above all. Especially, if happiness is the highest desideratum, then ‘happiness-motivation’ should be the strongest of all secondary (non-physiological) motives. This is simply not the case.

Modern research concerned with the psychology of motivation has shown (e.g. Korman, 1974) that motivation is the consequence of deviation from the optimal level of function, in the most general sense. In other words, deviations from (dynamic) equilibrium motivate the organism to reestablish the balance, so that the function in question returns to the optimal operational range. Pleasure would mean mild stimulation, and pain, intense stimulation. The greater the deviation, the stronger the motivation, in the inverse sense and reverse direction. If happiness is the epitomy of pleasures, then it can be either the most intense of those, or the most enduring of these. However, neither intense, nor sustained pleasure (or joy, or euphoria, etc.) can be tolerated by the organism for long. The neutral balance will soon be reestablished, and automatically at that. Thus, happiness cannot be the epitomy of pleasures, however conceptualized. On the other hand, if happiness is a harmonious state of affairs, then it should correspond to the optimal level of overall function in the organism. However, this state, the optimal range, is not motivating at all. Indeed, a well-adjusted organism is unaware of its functions. Thus, if happiness means a harmonious state of affairs, it cannot have motivational properties. This is a blatant contradiction.

Perhaps happiness is a sustained feeling of general contentment, of overall satisfaction. Maybe it is the result of successive achievements, in the cumulative sense. Maybe it is a feeling of serene tranquillity, of general reconciliation. Perhaps it is a feeling of fulfilment of desires. Perhaps…

The point is, that once ‘happiness’ is stripped of its motivational properties, it becomes speculations galore. Furthermore, for the purposes of the science of Psychology, such speculations are not only futile, but meaningless as well. Let’s see why.

Man cannot seek happiness actively, because Man would not know just what to seek. Happiness cannot be incurred passively either, because it would have to give rise to reproducible processes in behavior, which simply does not happen.

Psychology studies the relations among psychological variables. As Zimmerman (1963) has pointed out, these relations may be subsumed under the notions of functional laws and reproducible processes. Functional laws would describe the immanent and well-nigh changeless characteristics of the Universe, and as such, they are mostly absent from Psychology, except in those aspects in which Man is subject to the Universe and its cosmodynamic patterns. On the other hand, reproducible processes involve aggregations or assemblies of time-bound events. Most relations among psychological variables could be characterized as reproducible processes. Happiness is neither a functional law, nor a reproducible process. Thus it is not a psychological variable.

Since general psychology uses the scientific method, it is part and parcel of the scientific enterprise. Science is traditionally thought of as having two distinct functions; the explanation of Nature, and the improvement of human existence. General psychology endeavors to explain that part of Nature, which is called ‘behavior’. Applied psychology tries to improve the quality of human existence (e.g. educational, industrial, clinical, etc. psychologies). Although there is a certain disagreement concerning the scientific status of applied psychology (e.g. Fox, 1972), this disagreement is not important for the present purposes. Pure science is ethically neutral (e.g. Conant, 1951), since its job is to explain, not to make value judgements. However, applied science, or for that matter, applied psychology, does make indirect value judgements from time to time. Educational, industrial, clinical, etc. psychologies many times face situations in which ethical neutrality is impossible, or in which a certain commitment must be made, or in which certain value assumptions must be made, or certain decisions must be made, etc. While ethical dilemmas sometimes do plague scientific work (e.g. Otto, 1949) in general, and applied psychology in particular; it is only with a great stretch of imagination, that the concept of happiness can be seen as relevant in this context. Presumably, happiness has something to do with such situations. Maybe the educational psychologist designs a teaching program which improves teaching efficiency and classroom happiness (?). Perhaps the prison psychologist recommends parole after considering aspects of community safety and happiness (?). But do these psychologists know what they mean by ‘happiness’? More importantly, can they measure it?

As it has been explained in the introductory section of this paper, the purpose of this essay was the general discussion of the Freudian assertion, that Psychology is a pursuit concerning happiness. Accordingly, both Psychology and happiness were examined in their historical and present contexts, in order to demonstrate a possible connection. It was necessary to consider them within the traditional framework of Philosophy.

While both Psychology and ‘happiness’ were part of Philosophy’s long history, this is no longer the case. Psychology, in the XXth century, has become an empirical science. ‘Happiness’, after its privileged position in ancient ethics, has been so much misused and abused, that, especially in the XXth century, it has gradually lost its meaning and is fading into disuse. It may even disappear completely.

There seems to be little, if any, connection between Psychology and happiness. Even in the most oversimplified scheme, far too many assumptions would have to be made in order to show some (strained) connection between Psychology and happiness, let alone demonstrate a functional relationship, such as one being the pursuit of the other. If there is such a thing as happiness, if it is intrinsically worth pursuing, if psychology is not neutral but a goal-directed endeavor, if happiness is a goal suitable for psychology to be pursued, if…

Psychology, or for that matter Science in general, cannot be thought of as pursuing some lofty ideal, except perhaps truth, namely probabilistic truth. A theory aimed at approximating truth is neither good nor bad; it is either useful or useless. Therefore, it seems evident, that there is no connection worth mentioning between Psychology and happiness. Any arbitrary connection would be a non-sequitur, thus logically inadmissible. Since there seems to be no connection worth mentioning between Psychology and happiness, the question whether Psychology is a pursuit of happiness or not, simply does not arise.

While the topic may be of interest to historians, the present essay cannot help but emphasize the only reasonably unequivocal conclusion: objectively, academic Psychology has no longer anything to do with happiness.

Frank Luger

Written: Ottawa, October, 1975; Revised: Budapest, February, 2000.