After last year's PDG conference at Brazier's College Theo Todman wrote that my reasoning in favour of determinism had been asserted rather than argued so I thought I would represent the argument with the utmost clarity and polarity.
Most people accept that in most matters we are not free to choose. That is not my position. I believe that every word we say, every least finger movement is determined. We never at any moment in our life make a choice that is free, an act, a word, an intake of breath in which we could have done otherwise. In the forty years since I became a determinist I have looked up determinism and free will in many introductions to philosophy. I have never seen a defence of free will that is judged to be strong, all writers agreeing with the arguments for determinism. This debate has rumbled on for over two millennia and unlike most philosophical arguments there is now broad agreement. The strangeness is that nearly everyone believes they can exercise freewill.
Sometimes our choices are not free because someone is constraining us to do what we have not chosen to do. They have taken away our liberty and forced us to do what we do not want. I am not discussing this sort of constraint upon choice. The metaphysical theories of absolute constraint such as fatalism or predestination have also nothing to do with determinism.
Nor am I discussing physical determinism. Many people have believed the physical world to be determined by mechanical cause and effect and some have believed the brain and body to be such a machine. Physical determinism is a mere belief extrapolated from observations which could never be conclusive. It may well be that observations of quanta will prove this theory to be wrong and that God does play dice.
The strongest arguments for physical determinism of the brain are easily countered. Imagine an omniscient neurologist who knew the workings of my brain and mind so impossibly well that she could always predict my next thought or action and presented to me an account of how I was to spend the next minute. I would always be free to upset her calculations by choosing to disagree and do otherwise. Of course, she could predict my rebellion but as her predictions would have to be of finite length I could always add on my rejection of her conclusion. Determinism lies on much surer foundations than physical determinism.
I first came across the problem while walking across the downs in Bristol. Between the university and my hall of residence was a water tower. Each morning I had to choose which side of the water tower to walk. In hot weather I might choose the sunny side, or the shady side in heat waves or the sheltered side which depended on the way the wind and rain were blowing. In summer I might walk on the side where the girls sunbathed but I was often shy and chose the other. If I was late I would choose the quickest route but if I was very late I might go to the other side to a bus stop but only if I saw a bus coming. Sometimes I would flip a coin. Once I closed my eyes and walked a few paces to establish my orientation. Occasionally I would decide to reverse my decision and if I really wanted to prove that I had free will I would reverse it again.
All was in vain. Later analysis showed that every motive arose from the now unalterable past, such motives as a wish to disprove determinism, or not to be late again, or a liking for girls or shyness or the outcome of a flip of a coin. The only alternative was determination by a contemporaneous, external, uncontrollable event such as a flip of a coin or the appearance of a bus or its non-appearance coupled perhaps with a lack of fare money or a wish to be late again.
I revisited Bristol and the site of my enlightenment last year. The water tower is still there. The girls are not so pretty. Several decades of wisdom have not enabled me to get past the water tower without being determined by wishes that have grown up in the distant or recent unalterable past or a chance occurrence. I wonder if you could do better, if you could act on a wish that was not predetermined even by being determined to be perverse mid go against your wishes. You may believe that you could reconstruct the situation of Tantalus who, equidistant from two desired fruits, was unable to choose. If you then took a random decision, would this be choice and an example of free will and would it really be random?
You may believe you can resort to quantum theory, religion, parallel universes or relativity theory to defend free will. If so I shall be pleased to hear from you unless you propose a linguistic slight of hand such as free will language describes the same situation as determinist language and so must be identical. It won't help either to say that if I cannot conceive of free will then determinism has no meaning. I can conceive of free will. If I had it I would choose to be a better philosopher, like figs, not be shy of beautiful women and choose to believe in free will. But determinism is a real problem. Of course we usually have freedom from constraint, free will to select from several options but the selection we make will result from every influence from nature, nurture and the present situation that has contributed to making us into the person who at this moment has one certain predilection.
Accepting the arguments for determinism must have an influence on our life. Those who offend in society and those who offend us personally will be treated with more compassion. Philosophy can radically change the way we live.
Roger Farnworth