The previous article (by Theo Todman) was posted to PDGList, and received the response below from "Rhodotus" in the US. To save space, I’ve printed the contextualising quotes in tiny type after the first few words.
TT: "I questioned whether the new animal is a bull, or is it something else, and suggested that there's a distinction between violating a bull by lobotomising it and simply breeding one that is quiescent - whether by genetic engineering or by natural means."
Rho: I agree that there is a distinction, though my reasons to think so may be different from yours.
TT: "Has humanity violated wolves by breading lapdogs from them : are lapdogs violated wolves? Alternatively, is the issue one of gradualism versus instantaneous change ? Do we not notice if the change is gradual in an evolutionary manner ? Is the talk about "bulls" having integrity that can be violated really a Platonic notion that there is an ideal form of a bull ? Is this undermined by evolution, in which organisms are always adapting to their environments (or not - and becoming extinct) - so is there ever an immutable proper form for them to be ?"
Rho: You raise many interesting points there. I don't believe in the existence of Platonic ideals, but I do think that there is, for every species, a range of properties that we consider normal. I also think that our breeding practices do occasionally result in forms that offend the aesthetic sense. I am not particularly interested in horticulture, and when I first visited a huge commercial greenhouse, I felt like visiting a hospital. Near all the plants looked sick around me. Some showed symptoms of nutrient deficiency, some of viral or fungal infection. They were stunted, purple or chlorotic, the shoot tips were deformed in a variety of ways -- you get my point. Of course this was not the result of poor greenhouse management practices. The plants were bred to look like diseased specimens. Violation is le mot juste. But I don't think that many people object to producing extreme forms via traditional breeding practices, while there is a much greater opposition to genetic engineering. I am inclined to think that this is so because few people realize that the new horticultural varieties result from new genes, so the only difference is how this situation is brought about. In genetic engineering, the appearance of new genes in the plant is emphasized, made explicit.
TT: "If we modify all bulls, so they are all quiescent, the loss is greater than if only some are bred that way. Then we have made bulls extinct & created another line (but maybe not another species - this didn't occur to me at the time - as these bulls would have been inter-fertile with the un-engineered species). Another point not appreciated in the heat of debate - the genetic method of creating quiescence was of introducing similar genes to those that lead to Downs syndrome in humans. If I say these modified bulls are not bulls, am I committed to saying Downic humans are not humans ?"
Rho: Accepting now for the sake of the argument that you say so: then you are, if you want to remain consistent. Moreover, once one starts excluding from the species individuals with genetic disorders, one has to continue with those suffering from phenylketonuria, galactosemia, cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anemia, etc. -- and the list is quite long. Would we then proceed to exclude albinos as well? Including or excluding individuals based upon the amount of melanin they produce is a long-discredited idea. The matter is further complicated because Down syndrome is caused by trisomy 21-- that is, the person has an extra copy of a chromosome normally present in humans. So what is the basis to exclude from the species an individual who has nothing but genes normally present in the gene pool characteristic of the species? No, your conclusion that they still belong in the same species is correct.
TT: "If we avoid speciesist categorisations, does it matter ? Peter Singer, who would treat all organisms equally on non-specific lines in accord with their ability to suffer (or with various other criteria - such as boredom, restriction & other goods or ills, but irrespective of species except in so far as their members experience or anticipate these goods or ills), would presumably so "no" from a philosophical or ethical perspective (though clearly from a legal perspective, much hangs on these distinctions)."
Rho: I admit that the Singer whose work I am familiar with is Rolf Singer, not Peter, and contrarily to Peter, Rolf does nothing but categorize organisms into species [and higher taxa]. Since I am not familiar with Peter Singer's work, perhaps you could explain to me how he carries out in practice his ranking based upon the above criteria. Frankly, his anthropomorphic criteria are not only without any scientific merit, but are also impossible to implement. What does he mean by this? How do criteria "such as boredom, restriction & other goods or ills, but irrespective of species except in so far as their members experience or anticipate these goods or ills" apply to plants, fungi, protistants, bacteria, viruses, not to mention even smaller entities? Just how does he establish how much a plant suffers? For all he can know, a yeast cell may look forward with great anticipation to a sucrose feast. The criteria he uses are simply impossible to ascertain. Does Singer restrict, in his concept, the living world to vertebrates? Or does he subscribe to the nonsense published in The Secret Life of Plants ? How can he rank all organisms, as you said, along this scale? We can concoct any system we wish, if we don't mind leaving reality behind, only I am not convinced that such an endeavor gives us a better understanding of the world. And would not that be the very purpose of philosophy?
TT: "But a genetically modified bull isn't noble, and never has been and doesn't know that that humans think it ought to be."
Rho: Theo, I would not be sure that a genetically unaltered bull knows that, either. I understand what you mean, and ever since I read your post, I have been trying [unsuccessfully] to put my finger on the reason why I agree with you, but I don't think this is it.
TT: "Another example introduced by Professor Cooper was that of biologically engineered capons with small brains, few feathers & high meat content - are they violated chickens, and do (or should) most people find their existence abhorrent ? We might ask whether chickens are violated birds because they are fat and flightless."
Rho: Flightlessness in itself is no violation. The trait has arisen repeatedly in birds such as penguins; generally in birds that had no predators in their environment.
TT: "Does it just not depend on "what it is like to be" an X ? If we engineer X's that are happy to be X's (or don't know they could be happier as Y's) is this not better than violating un-engineered chickens by keeping them in the desperate conditions of factory farms ?"
Rho: I disagree. I don't think that a genetically altered chicken is happy, because it has no concept of what it feels like to be a genetically unaltered chicken. I submit that a normal chicken hatched in an incubator and raised in crowded cages has no concept of the freedom of a chicken roaming free on a farm. It IS still miserable, but because of the discomfort caused by stress and the lack of movement. And that would affect your altered chicken as well.