I intend ultimately (but not in this paper!) to answer this Essay Question: “Can God's necessity establish the existence of God?”, or at least an agreed variation on the theme. Having been forced to look at it, I find this an unexpectedly interesting topic. Does anyone else?

I had thought that this argument was completely dead – that it had been answered by Kant’s “Existence is not a predicate” objection – but this only seems to apply to Descartes’s defective formulation of the argument, and to the tacit understanding of God as an object like anything else (only “greater”). However, it seems that it’s still a live issue and that the jury is still out. The smart money seems to be on the claim that valid versions of the argument (of which there are many) don’t take you any further than you started. While the arguments may be valid, they are only sound if their premises are true, and the premises seem to include (tacitly at least) the conclusion of the argument. So, we get something like “if God exists, God exists”, which while a valid argument, is not very enlightening. But this is to jump ahead a bit.

To quote from Alvin Plantinga (more on whom later):-

This argument for the existence of God has fascinated philosophers ever since Anselm first stated it. Few people, I should think, have been brought to belief in God by means of this argument; nor has it played much of a role in strengthening and confirming religious faith. At first sight Anselm's argument is remarkably unconvincing if not downright irritating; it looks too much like a parlor puzzle or word magic. And yet nearly every major philosopher from the time of Anselm to the present has had something to say about it; this argument has a long and illustrious line of defenders extending to the present. Indeed, the last few years have seen a remarkable flurry of interest in it among philosophers. What accounts for its fascination? Not, I think, its religious significance, although that can be underrated. Perhaps there are two reasons for it.

1. First, many of the most knotty and difficult problems in philosophy meet in this argument. … Is existence a property? … Are existential propositions – propositions of the form x exists – ever necessarily true? … Are existential propositions about what they seem to be about? … Are there, in any respectable sense of “are,” some objects that do not exist? … If so, do they have any properties? … Can they be compared with things that do exist? These issues and a hundred others arise in connection with Anselm’s argument.

2. And second, although the argument certainly looks at first sight as if it ought to be unsound, it is profoundly difficult to say what, exactly, is wrong with it. Indeed, I do not think that any philosopher has ever given a cogent and conclusive refutation of the ontological argument in its various forms.

Well, there’s a challenge! And also a warning to those who think the problem is trivial. It echoes an un referenced “quotation” from Bertrand Russell that I’ve seen on a few occasions:-

“It is much easier to be persuaded that ontological arguments are no good than it is to say exactly what is wrong with them.”

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1 I’d hoped to answer these questions at the end of the paper, but they are too difficult even to have an opinion on.
Firstly, a small complaint; as we’ve just seen, this is a very complicated topic, with ramifications across the whole of philosophy, including very technical areas in mathematics and philosophical and modal logic, which I’m not ready to write on, yet I’m lumbered with this seminar. So, whatever I have to say is very much work in progress, and I’ve read nowhere near enough to have much of an opinion on the question. However, this is the case for all the Seminars in a course that tears along at the pace this one does.

A preliminary administrative remark: there are a lot of web-links in this paper. In general, the URLs appear as end-notes. Unless you like typing, they will be easier to access, if you have a mind to, from the soft copy at:-


We have a reading list, but being of a suspicious mind and noting the propensity of academic institutions to give prominence to their own journals, staff and alumni, I thought I’d check out whether it was representative. Firstly, I have a look on The Philosopher’s Index, using a database I extracted from it in early 2006, topped up with a trawl of the live database for 2006-2010. It’s difficult to know quite how many books or articles address the topic – I just searched using the criteria “Ontological argument” AND NOT “Deontological argument”, in title and abstract, and got the following cumulative figures.

- 2006-2010 (35 items)
- 2000-2010 (72 items)
- Full List (452 items).

The lists (basically, author, title, journal, abstract and year) are useful to squint at to see what’s under discussion – I intend to do an analysis shortly. To save trees, I’ve not printed these lists off – though have an 8-page printout of the most 2006-2010 list to pass round as a taster; they are available on my website ii. They are not likely to be complete, as articles that discuss the topic, but don’t use the key words in the title or abstract won’t be picked up. For instance the article by Gene Fendt alluded to (but not referenced iii) in Peter Vardy’s notes doesn’t feature, because “ontological argument” only appears in the text, which The Philosopher’s Index doesn’t index. Also, you have to watch out concerning what you’re being told – for example, what looks like an article by Daniel Dombrowski in Mind turns out on closer inspection to be a review by Graham Oppy of Dombrowski’s iv book. And not all the articles are in English. But it’s a start v.

There are some useful-looking Web-based resources. Of course, you have to be careful as these are rarely peer-reviewed, but they can sometimes be good summaries, or jumping-off points for other resources. The “prescribed” papers and books (and much else besides) are essential reading – and require critical analysis if you want to write an essay, but I think it best to orient yourself into the subject matter first of all so you’ve a better understanding of the subject from a number of different angles – and know the sort of issues that will arise. That will provide the stimulus to keep going through what, in the absence of motivation and orientation, can seem like impenetrable heaps of stodge.

Ignoring the rubbish (and admitting that there may be lots of non-rubbish that I’ve missed), a quick Google revealed the following which may or may not be useful in practice:-

**Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy**: this is a useful first port of call for anything philosophical. It’s peer-reviewed, and has a very useful article vi “Ontological Arguments” on our topic by Graham Oppy, who has written on this subject for many years in philosophical journals, and is also the author of one of the books noted below (from which his Stanford article is substantially pillaged). It contains lots of onward links and references. I will discuss some key points later.
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article by Kenneth Einar Himma "Ontological Argument". It is less thorough, though still scholarly and peer-reviewed (it says).

Wikipedia: is not to be despised – though the articles are perfecr anonymous. The entry "Ontological Argument" looks scholarly and useful.

I found a couple of useful links on Kurt Gödel's Ontological Argument (more of which later):

1. Wikipedia: "Gödel's ontological proof"
2. Chris Small: "Kurt Gödel's Ontological Argument". An excellent-looking article – 3 web-pages, 24 pages when printed off in 12-point. It leads on to an even more technical paper;

There are also a few brief items on YouTube, of which the one involving Zimmerman, Plantinga, etc. is interesting, if only in allowing us to see the great men briefly in action (though it has a helpful reflection on Kant’s thalers, and distinguishes the two forms of Anselm’s argument).

There are also two excellent Books, namely:

1. Graham Oppy - Ontological Arguments and Belief in God – specific to the topic, by a professional agnostic, who “features large” in this paper.
2. Jordan Sobel - Logic and Theism: Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God – “from the sceptical viewpoint”. Chapters II – IV cover the Ontological Argument, but the whole book looks useful for other elements of the Philosophy of Religion module. Oppy is particularly appreciative of this book. It is a large book, and very technical in places, but claims you can skip the techy bits, which it also introduces from scratch.

I now want to focus on elements of Graham Oppy’s web-page. He gives the following useful history of the problem:

1078: St. Anselm, Proslogion. Followed soon after by Gaunilo's critique In Behalf of the Fool.
1264: St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa. Criticises an argument which somehow descends from St. Anselm.
1637: Descartes, Meditations. The Objections—particularly those of Caterus and Gassendi—and the Replies contain much valuable discussion of the Cartesian arguments.
c1680: Spinoza, Ethics. Intimations of a defensible mereological ontological argument, albeit one whose conclusion is not (obviously) endowed with religious significance.
1709: Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Contains Leibniz's attempt to complete the Cartesian argument by showing that the Cartesian conception of God is not inconsistent.
1776: Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Part IX is a general attack on a priori arguments (both analytic and synthetic). Includes a purported demonstration that no such arguments can be any good.
1787: Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Contains famous attack on traditional theistic arguments. Three objections to “the ontological argument”, including the famous objection based on the dictum that existence is not a predicate.
1831: Hegel, Lectures of 1831. Hegel makes repeated assertions in these lectures that there is a successful ontological argument, though he nowhere says what the argument actually is. Some scholars have claimed that the entire Hegelian corpus constitutes an ontological argument. Since no one has ever said what the premises of this alleged argument are, there is good reason for scepticism about this scholarly claim.
1884: Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic. Existence is a second-order predicate. First-order existence claims are meaningless. So ontological arguments—whose conclusions are first-order existence claims—are doomed.
The interesting point of this list, it seems to me, is that it bears out Plantinga’s claim quoted earlier that a lot of philosophical heavyweights have investigated the matter. Of interest are the appearance of David Lewis and Kurt Gödel on the list. David Lewis – despite holding (indeed developing) the heretical views of modal realism and perdurantism – features at number 3 (behind Wittgenstein and Russell) in Brian Leiter’s Poll of Greatest Philosophers of the 20th Century. Kurt Gödel is even more famous – for proving (contra Whitehead and Russell) that mathematics (or at least number theory) cannot be reduced to logic – he may have been the greatest logician since Aristotle, though Gotlob Frege (who also features on the list) might squabble with him over the plaudit. If they – even in the 20th century – are willing to consider the argument and even, in Gödel’s case, support it, then it cannot be trivially false.

Oppy points out that there isn’t a single ontological argument but a whole family. He provides a taxonomy as below, though he notes that the some arguments belong to more than one type, and some types can be sub-categorised. Also, all this is very schematic and compressed. His book covers the subject in more detail:-

1. **Definitional** ontological arguments. **Example:** “God is a being which has every perfection. (This is true as a matter of definition.) Existence is a perfection. Hence God exists.

2. **Conceptual** (or hyperintensional) ontological arguments. **Example:** “I conceive of a being than which no greater can be conceived. If a being than which no greater can be conceived does not exist, then I can conceive of a being greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived—if, namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived that exists. I cannot conceive of a being greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. Hence, a being than which no greater can be conceived exists.”

3. **Modal** ontological arguments. **Example:** “It is possible that that God exists. God is not a contingent being, i.e., either it is not possible that God exists, or it is necessary that God exists. Hence, it is necessary that God exists. Hence, God exists.” (See Malcolm, Hartshorne, and Plantinga)

4. **Meinongian** ontological arguments: **Example:** “[It is analytic, necessary and a priori that] Each instance of the schema “The F G is F” expresses a truth. Hence the sentence “The existent perfect being is existent” expresses a truth. Hence, the existent perfect being is existent. Hence, God is existent, i.e. God exists. (The last step is justified by the observation that, as a matter of definition, if there is exactly one existent perfect being, then that being is God.)”

5. **Experiential** ontological arguments: **Example:** “The word ‘God’ has a meaning that is revealed in religious experience. The word ‘God’ has a meaning only if God exists. Hence, God exists.” (See Rescher for a live version of this argument.)

6. **Mereological** ontological arguments: **Example:** “I exist. Therefore something exists. Whenever a bunch of things exist, their mereological sum also exists. Therefore the sum of all things exists. Therefore God — the sum of all things — exists.”

7. ‘Hegelian’ ontological arguments: **Example:** None, as the argument doesn’t exist.

Before giving thumb-nail critiques of each type of argument, Oppy’s general thoughts on the success of Ontological arguments are:-

One general criticism of ontological arguments which have appeared hitherto is this: none of them is **persuasive**, i.e., none of them provides those who do **not already** accept the conclusion that God exists — and who are reasonable, reflective, well-informed, … — with either a **pro tanto** reason or an all-things-considered reason to accept that conclusion. Any reading of any ontological argument which has been produced so far which is sufficiently clearly stated to admit of evaluation yields a result which is:-

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2 Sic. I presume this may be intended as “ordinary language”, but I’m not sure that this term applies to disciples of Wittgenstein, though that’s controversial (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordinary_language_philosophy).
1. Invalid, or
2. Possesses a set of premises which it is clear in advance that no reasonable, reflective, well-informed, ... non-theists will accept, or
3. Has a benign conclusion which has no religious significance, or else
4. Falls prey to more than one of the above failings.

Before letting Oppy loose on his detailed critiques, we might note:

3. **Definitional**: This is Descartes pro, Kant contra
2. **Conceptual**: This is Anselm pro, at least in *Proslogion 2*, Aquinas contra
3. **Modal**: Gödel fits in here, along with Plantinga and the others Oppy mentions; as does Anselm in *Proslogion 3*. At first sight, it looks as though we have a stark choice here. If we allow that God is possible (however “God” is defined) – i.e. God exists in at least one possible world – then because of the usual assumption that if God exists he necessarily exists – i.e. if he exists in one possible world he exists in all possible worlds – we seem stuck with saying that God is either necessary or impossible. Not much room for fence-sitting.
4. **Meinongian**: Meinong was the philosopher in response to whom Bertrand Russell devised his celebrated *Theory of Definite Descriptions*. Is or is not the present King of France bald? Meinong seems to have held – to make this sentence meaningful – that the present King of France must exist in some way – or at least “subsist”. Others (e.g. P.F. Strawson, I think) thought the sentence meaningless because none of its terms fails to refer. Russell thought it meaningful but false, on the grounds that it should be stated formally as “An x who is the present King of France exists AND no y is the present King of France unless y = x AND x is bald”. This statement is false because the first conjunct is false. I mention this both for context and because there’s a lot of funny business to do with existence in Ontological arguments, and this might be a warning worth noting.
5. **Experiential**: obvious rubbish, as otherwise Father Christmas exists. And no doubt he does in some dodgy sense of “exists”. But not everything with sense has reference.
6. **Mereological**: another non-starter, as any pantheist definition of God as the mereological sum of all things is deficient.

Now Oppy’s detailed critiques are as follows:

1. **Definitional** arguments: These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely via a definition. An obvious problem is that claims involving that vocabulary cannot then be non-question-beggingly detached from the scope of that definition. (The inference from ‘By definition, God is an existent being’ to ‘God exists’ is patently invalid; while the inference to ‘By definition, God exists’ is valid, but uninteresting. In the example given earlier, the premises license the claim that, as a matter of definition, God possesses the perfection of existence. But, as just noted, there is no valid inference from this claim to the further claim that God exists.)

2. **Conceptual** arguments: These are arguments in which ontologically committing vocabulary is introduced solely within the scope of hyperintensional operators (e.g. ‘believes that’, ‘conceives of’, etc.). Often, these operators have two readings, one of which can cancel ontological commitment, and the other of which cannot. On the reading which can give cancellation (as in the most likely reading of ‘John believes in Santa Claus’), the inference to a conclusion in which the ontological commitment is not cancelled will be invalid. On the reading which cannot cancel ontological commitment (as in that reading of ‘John thinks about God’ which can only be true if there is a God to think about), the premises are question-begging: they incur ontological commitments which non-theists reject. In our sample argument, the claim, that I conceive of an existent being than which no greater being can be conceived, admits of the two kinds of readings just distinguished. On the one hand, on the reading which gives cancellation, the inference to the conclusion that there is a being than which no greater can be conceived is clearly invalid. On the other hand, on the reading in which there is no cancellation, it is clear that this claim is one which no reasonable, etc. non-theist will accept: if you doubt that there is a being than which no greater can be conceived, then, of course, you doubt whether you can have thoughts about such a being.

3. **Modal** arguments: These are arguments with premises which concern modal claims about God, i.e., claims about the possibility or necessity of God’s attributes and existence. Suppose that we agree to think about possibility and necessity in terms of possible worlds: a claim is possibly true just in case it is true in at least one possible world; a claim is necessarily true just in case it is true in every possible world; and a claim is contingent just in case it is true in some possible worlds and false in others. Some

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3 This is me … so … health warning!

4 This conjunct is required by the definiteness of the description “The …”
theists hold that God is a necessarily existent being, i.e., that God exists in every possible world. Non-theists do not accept the claim that God exists in the actual world. Plainly enough, non-theists and necessitarian theists disagree about the layout of logical space, i.e., the space of possible worlds. The sample argument consists, in effect, of two premises: one which says that God exists in at least one possible world; and one which says that God exists in all possible worlds if God exists in any. It is perfectly obvious that no non-theist can accept this pair of premises. Of course, a non-theist can allow — if they wish — that there are possible worlds in which there are contingent Gods. However, it is quite clear that no rational, reflective, … non-theist will accept the pair of premises in the sample argument.

4. **Meinongian** arguments: These are arguments which depend somehow or other on Meinongian theories of objects. Consider the schema ‘The F is G’. Naïve Meinongians will suppose that if F is instantiated with any property, then the result is true (and, quite likely, necessary, analytic and a priori). So, for example, the round square is round; the bald current King of France is bald; and so on. However, more sophisticated Meinongians will insist that there must be some restriction on the substitution instances for F, in order to allow one to draw the obvious and important ontological distinction between the following two groups: (Bill Clinton, the sun, the Eiffel Tower) and (Santa Claus, Mickey Mouse, the round square). Choice of vocabulary here is controversial: Let us suppose (for the sake of example) that the right thing to say is that the former things exist and the latter do not. Under this supposition, ‘existential’ will not be a suitable substitution instance for F—obviously, since we all agree that there is no existent round square. Of course, nothing hangs on the choice of ‘existential’ as the crucial vocabulary. The point is that non-theists are not prepared to include god(s) in the former group of objects — and hence will be unpersuaded by any argument which tries to use whatever vocabulary is used to discriminate between the two classes as the basis for an argument that god(s) belong to the former group. [Snip ... discussion for the Cognoscenti distinguishing nuclear from non-nuclear properties].

5. **Experiential** arguments: These are arguments which try to make use of ‘externalist’ or ‘object-involving’ accounts of content. It should not be surprising that they fail. After all, those accounts of content need to have something to say about expressions which fail to refer (‘Santa Claus’, ‘phlogiston’, etc.). But, however the account goes, non-theists will insist that expressions which purport to refer to god(s) should be given exactly the same kind of treatment.

6. **Mereological** arguments: Those who dislike mereology will not be impressed by these arguments. However, even those who accept principles of unrestricted composition — i.e., who accept principles which claim, e.g., that, whenever there are some things, there is something which is the sum or fusion of all of those things — need not be perturbed by them: for it is plausible to think that the conclusions of these arguments have no religious significance whatsoever — they are merely arguments for, e.g., the existence of the physical universe.

Oppy also has, *inter alia*, useful sections on:-

1. **Parodies of Ontological Arguments**: these (starting from Gaunilo) are almost certainly misguided. The idea is to show that there must be something wrong with the form of the argument (however formulated) because the form in question can be used to “prove” ridiculous propositions. But, two things in response. Firstly, we already know there’s something dodgy about the various ontological arguments; we just want to put our finger on that bit of the argument that’s most dodgy – and the parodies don’t help. Secondly, the best ontological arguments are valid – so there’s nothing wrong with the form of the argument. It’s one or more of the premises that are open to exception (basically, you won’t accept them unless you’re already a theist).

2. **Gödel’s Ontological Argument**: too difficult to discuss here.

3. **Plantinga’s Ontological Argument**: this gets a good pasting.

4. **Anselm’s Ontological Argument**: Oppy gives 5 formal reformulations, including that by Plantinga and one by David Lewis, followed by a detailed critique.

5. Yet more reading lists and on-line resources. No doubt a warying of the flesh.

That’s enough Oppy for one paper. I feel that I ought to say something about the papers on the items on the reading list. No doubt I will shortly, or maybe only eventually, and such thoughts will appear on my website. Currently, the comments are only contents, cover blurbs and such like – though they may help you to determine whether the readings are worth tracking down.

Nonetheless, we ought to discuss one paper — and, if I have time, I’ll write a quick 2-sider on the paper by Norman Malcolm that Peter Vardy considers to be cogent if viewed from an anti-realist perspective.

Finally, some of my own animadversions – probably just prejudices to be refined in due course – on this general topic that I want to air before we whoosh off onto something else. They’ve just been rattled off and should probably be deleted; but they’ll be something to talk about if we get bored.
1. **Concepts**: When Anselm uses expressions like “that than which no greater can be conceived”, in modern terms it would contain reference to concepts. Concepts are complicated things. I don’t think concepts have to be in minds, except when they are being “conceived”. They can be on paper or in computers – and all the better for that, as the details can be spelled out. Their content, if they are of natural kind concepts, can be constrained or corrected by particulars of the kind the concept is of. “That than which no greater can be conceived” is a concept. What category does “that” fall under? God is not a concept, nor is he a “thing”. And our concept of a cat is not a cat. A final point – while it is true that we cannot form a concept of God, this may not be relevant to the ontological argument, where the proxy-concept “that than which no greater can be conceived” may do.

2. **Existence**: This is a slippery word. In normal parlance, things exist if they are instantiated – ie. cats exist if there are any cats. The species “domestic cat” exists, but not in the way cats do. Concepts don’t exist in the same way either. God has a very special mode of existence as he’s neither a particular nor a universal, nor a concept, nor an idea. I suspect that lots of equivocation on the various meanings of “exist” goes on in ontological arguments.

3. **Substances**: are things that persist through time “as the very same thing”, and that have properties and “persistence conditions” that define what changes they can undergo without ceasing to exist. Cats are substances, but it’s not clear to me that God is.

4. **Properties**: are had by existing things. Existence isn’t a property, but that without which there’s nothing to have properties.

5. **Possible worlds**: there’s lots of disagreement about what these are. David Lewis (I think) thought that the other possible worlds exist in the same way as the actual world — they just aren’t actual. Most philosophers think there’s a “logical space” of possible worlds and that all but the actual one don’t really exist — they are just models of what the actual world (or any world) might have been like or would be like if certain counterfactual conditions had or will obtain. Note that the ontologically profligate “multiverse” theory, wherein the universe is supposed to split at each quantum event, so that everything that could happen does happen, is not the same as the ontology of modal realism, which is even more profligate in that it includes nomologically impossible worlds — ie. those with different laws of physics to those that obtain in the actual world.

6. **Mathematical Nominalism**: We’ve had discussions about whether π exists. My view is that mathematics is just a set of models that may or may not apply to the world. It’s a useful language, or rather a collection of language-games. Within each language-game, all sorts of non-obvious implications of the use of terms come out when we work through the details. That includes the value of π. There are no perfect circles in the world, so π isn’t “out there”, or anywhere else. The language-games are invented and then the various theorems of these language games are discovered. Language-games may or may not be invented with an eye to their usefulness (G.H. Hardy thought the virtue of pure mathematics was its alleged uselessness). It’s a theorem of chess (a rather useless mathematical structure with no obvious application to physics) that you cannot force-mate bare King with bare King and two Knights. This is a timeless truth of chess (according to its current rules) which was discovered by the method of cases. It doesn’t seem to help to locate the game, and all its potential variants, in Plato’s heaven, or in the mind of God. It exists in peoples’ minds, computers, books and so on. When they are gone, so will it be gone. Quite why mathematics is so useful in physics is a very deep question to which I have no decent answer. Nor does anyone else.

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**End-Notes**


2. See the following references on my website:-
   - http://www.theotodman.com/Philosophers_Index_List_OA_2006-2010.htm,
   - http://www.theotodman.com/Philosophers_Index_List_OA_2000-2010.htm and
   When I get a moment, I intend to change the generator to be more efficient with space.

I’ve not mentioned this book - Dombrowski, Daniel A. Rethinking the Ontological Argument: A Neoclassical Theistic Response. It presupposes process theology, so it’ll be junk (in my humble opinion).

Evidently, further scans using keywords “Anselm”, “Monologion” and “Proslogion” (with subsequent pruning) will be required. Extracts from The Philosopher’s Index are a pain, as there is a 200-citation limit and there is no (or is no longer an) Excel interface, so analysing the text file requires some subtle coding or endless tedium.


Web URL http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/.


Web URL http://www.stats.uwaterloo.ca/~cgsmall/ontology.html. Chris Small is a Statistics Professor at the University of Waterloo, Canada. As such, he may provide an interesting alternative perspective.

Available at http://www.stats.uwaterloo.ca/~cgsmall/Godel.final.revision.PDF. This paper doesn’t appear in The Philosopher’s Index as it’s privately published.

Web URL http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iiCXwWFrGQ.

At £38 each, they are a tad expensive, but there’s a single copy of each in the Heythrop Theology library (or at least will be shortly when my copies turn up from Amazon):-


Oppy doesn’t mention Robert Brecher. Anselm’s Argument: The logic of divine existence. It also failed to show on the “ontological argument” scan of The Philosopher’s Index, for reasons previously noted.

Apologies for this shameful rip-off, but the – admittedly useful – “Resources on William James …” hand-out prepared by Flint McLaughlin that we received earlier was entirely made up of cuts-and-pastes from web-pages, so there is a precedent.


See http://www.theotodman.com/Notes/Notes_9/Notes_951.htm for the control document for my thoughts on the Ontological argument, with links to whatever I’ve got on the reading material. It also includes an (incomplete) précis of Peter Vardy’s hand-out should anyone want a second take on it.
