Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Supervisions
(Text as at 29/12/2019 12:57:36)
Supervision: Monday 17th March 2008; 11:30
- The purpose: of the supervision was to discuss a paper1 on "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - What Am I?".
- Overview: We agreed that Baker’s paper is unsatisfying because the force of the argument depends on the coherence of the CV, which is not defended in the paper itself. To make progress, I need to address this question.
- Constitution: As background for this paper, and for general background on constitution, I should read Kit Fine’s paper in Mind 2003 - "Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter". Fine doesn’t actually use the term “constitution”, but he is considering co-location, which he thinks possible, and dubs the most extreme of those who doubt this as “fanatical mono-referentialists”. Maybe (not Jen’s suggestion) I should also see the earlier papers:-
- De Dicto / De Re: this has been discussed at sundry other supervisions, and I seem to have misunderstood the distinction. These aren’t two forms of reference. I’ve been trying to understand the terms based on their Latin derivation. However, the terms have moved on since Roman (and earlier Greek) times. Contemporary usage is not a difference of reference. The distinction is between necessity de dicto and necessity de re; to distinguish modalities in opaque contexts (for de dicto) & analyticity. Modality and time relate. I don’t currently fully understand this, but am expecting "Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter" to provide enlightenment as opaque contexts are referenced therein. There are sundry passages in my recent papers that require correction2 as a result.
- In my paper, “x” is a dummy proper name rather than a variable. I need to clarify3 this.
- Criterion: … of identity: this is not just an epistemological term. Jen doubted that supporters of the SV are only interested in evidential matters. “Surely the SV is a view in metaphysics”. I need to follow-up4 on the use of “the criterion”.
- Most Fundamental: Wiggins’s D2 brings this requirement to centre stage – what is the primary sortal under which a thing falls?
- Jen: If we want to know answers to questions about PI, do we need to establish what persons most fundamentally are? Olson: Yes.
- Jen: (in response to my suggestion that in "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology" Olson had denied that his interest was in what I am5 most fundamentally, but only in what I am6 identical to …) Olson’s approach doesn’t need to put in fundamentalism (? – handwriting!). TT: Presumably the point is that on Olson’s approach, the distinction doesn’t arise.
- Jen: in response to my … [Olson’s only interested in our identity (rather than PI)] … “because he doesn’t think there’s a (different) question about personal identity”.
- Psychological Properties: Contrast psychological capacities with psychological properties. Which psychological properties? Be explicit – FPP7.
- Desires: Another discussion on whether animals have desires. On one level they obviously do – as do babies – yet on another they don’t. In Jen’s usage, desires are explanatory of intentional action. Babies’ desire for milk isn’t of this sort.
- Buddhists: Buddhists want to escape from self, and the distinction between self and others. This isn’t a moral matter (like the denial of self in Christianity – which is a focus on others – other selves). The Buddhist view is that the distinction between self and other is unhelpful and is something to be escaped from (after a series of reincarnations)8. Its motivation is the thought that attachments to self and one’s hopes, fears and desires lead to pain and loss – something to be avoided. All this appears to be mistaken, if not plain false, or impossible to achieve.
- Baker & the SV: Why is Baker not a supporter of the SV? Jen: Need more definition of the SV to determine. SV = persistence requires psychological continuity. To see how Baker differs from the SV, we might need to think about non-human animals. Can PVs allow for persistence in the absence of a FPP9?
- Phase Sortals: Olson and phase sortals. Persons as phase sortals. Phase sortal definition. What persons? Jen: (in response to the suggestion that the “possible view” consistent with the SV is that persons are phase sortals of human animals …) “provided any phase sortal applies essentially”. Note: this might be an important point – the phase of an animal that qualifies as a person might not have done so, yet for anyone holding the SV (or PV)10, persons have the appropriate psychological properties essentially. Now, the substance does not possess any of its phases essentially – I might die young, so my animal may never enjoy its “old man” phase. Yet is the old man, qua old man, essentially an old man? The phase cannot exist without the qualities that qualify it for being that phase. This is all de dicto.
- Baker & the “Phase Sortal” view: I alleged that Baker’s acceptance of (B) showed she thought of a person as a thing, and not a phase of a thing. Jen: “earlier seemed to say it was the phase sortal view”. TT: this earlier suggestion was not Baker’s view, but a possible reading of the SV.
- Reduplication11 and the CV: Non-human reduplication12. Is this different for Baker? Would she share standard views here? For human reduplication13 – does “God know” the fact of the matter? Is there a fact of the matter on this account?
- FPP14 and worries about Death: Jen: (those with a FPP15 are) capable of a thought of inexistence. “Inexistence” – temporally don’t exist (eg. after death). Non-existence – never existed (eg. unicorns). Anecdote – Jen’s young son wondering about where he was before birth (past inexistence); the same sort of thing applies to future inexistence. That’s what worries about death are – that we will no longer exist – not about the process of dying, or of any unpleasant future state.
- The “is” of Constitution: When is “is” the “is” of constitution? We need a principled rule of applicability.
Example: Species Membership. In “Tigers are animals” we have the regular “is” of predication. (x)(Tx implies Ax).
- Bodies: Having bodies. For Baker, all animals (human as well as non-human?) just are bodies. See the sociological use of the term “body”. Olson. Jen: maybe she thinks organisms are bodies.
- Equate: ie. “equating persons and human organisms” – what is meant by “equate” – a conceptual identification? This isn’t an expression Baker uses – what she says is that “to hold that to be a person simply is to be a human organism is to …”.
- Morality: Jen and I agreed that Baker’s assertions about the moral peculiarity of human persons are unmotivated in this paper.
Other Matters
- Printing: Jen’s copy of the paper had printed with the numbered bullets not resetting to “1” on change of Section. It hadn’t been printed from one of Jen’s PCs, but was not from an Apple PC. I will investigate.
- Seminars: I expressed my concerns at having to deliver a paper prematurely. Jen suggested that such exercises, apart from being a duty, are useful in providing feedback and determining which areas are subject to dispute. Further, these are useful as training in not addressing areas too much in turmoil to the detriment of areas that might be clear to me but not to others. The fact that I don’t want a career in philosophy, and am therefore not so interested in some of the training exercises that form part of postgraduate work, is no excuse. Fraser popped in and I was firmly booked for Thursday 19th June 2008 (though this later changed to Thursday 26th June 2008). Topic is down as “Personal Identity”, but I should attempt to present Baker’s Constitution view. Start at the beginning and don’t be tempted to address resurrection at this stage.
- Further Reading: after the supervision, Jen suggested that I read "Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Embryos and Final Causes" from "Anscombe (G.E.M.), Geach (Mary), Gormally (Luke), Eds. - Human Life, Action and Ethics" some time (I note that "Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Were You a Zygote?" and maybe others from the same volume also look relevant).
Next Supervision: Monday 21st April 2008; 11:30. On Constitution?
Table of the Previous 3 Versions of this Note:
| Note last updated |
Reading List for this Topic |
Parent Topic |
| 29/12/2019 12:57:36 |
None available |
None |
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Baker |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Biological View |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Christian Materialism |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Constitution View |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Duplication |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Fetuses |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Olson |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - What Are We? |
Paper |
|
Yes |
References & Reading List
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
| Anscombe (G.E.M.) |
Embryos and Final Causes |
Paper - Cited |
Anscombe (G.E.M) - Human Life, Action and Ethics |
Yes |
| Anscombe (G.E.M.) |
Were You a Zygote? |
Paper - Cited  |
Anscombe (G.E.M) - Human Life, Action and Ethics |
Yes |
| Anscombe (G.E.M.), Geach (Mary), Gormally (Luke), Eds. |
Human Life, Action and Ethics |
Book - Cited |
Anscombe (G.E.M.), Geach (Mary), Gormally (Luke), Eds. - Human Life, Action and Ethics |
10% |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
What Am I? |
Paper - Cited |
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mar99, Vol. 59 Issue 1, p151, 9p; |
Yes |
| Fine (Kit) |
Compounds and Aggregates |
Paper - Cited |
Nous, June 1994; 28(2): 137-158 |
No |
| Fine (Kit) |
The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter |
Paper - Cited |
Mind - 112/446 (April 2003) |
Yes |
| Martin (Michael G.F.), Ed. |
Mind - 112/446 (April 2003) |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
50% |
| Olson (Eric) |
The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology |
Book - Cited  |
Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Baker |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Biological View |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism) |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Christian Materialism |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Constitution View |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Duplication |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Fetuses |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Olson |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - What Are We? |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026