Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages

1. The purpose: of the supervision was to complete the discussion of a paper¹ on "Olson (Eric) - What Are We?". The second part of a Note² on "Baillie (James) - What Am I?" was very briefly touched on.
2. The objectionable consequences of the TA argument: I had criticised Olson on the grounds that the metaphysical and epistemological conclusions of the TA argument that Olson finds so objectionable are not in fact so objectionable. I seem to have been confused. Surely, if it turned out that there were really 12 billion people on earth when we had thought there were only 6 billion, this would be objectionable (or at least surprising). My objection is that this conclusion is common to a number of arguments that trade on multiple occupancy, so there must be something wrong with the argument-form. But in itself, this is insufficient – I have to say just what is wrong with the argument. Saying that the argument doesn’t have these consequences isn’t to say that its having these consequences, if it genuinely does have them, is benign.
3. 4-D: I can either say that (for the sake of the thesis) I am assuming that 4-D is false (or true), or I can give fairly comprehensive reasons for why I think it false (or true), or make some intermediate-level attempt to demonstrate its falsehood (or truth). Whatever position I take, I need to make it clear that I am taking it. Since Olson has been influenced by the possibility of the general truth of 4-D, I will probably have to address it to some degree.
4. 4-D and substances: there is a tension between 4-D and the concept SUBSTANCE as traditionally applied to continuants. It may be that perdurantists can co-opt a term “substance” with a somewhat different meaning.
5. 4-D and fatalism: the two issues are orthogonal. Fatalism depends on determinism. The future is fixed if the worms in all physically possible worlds are identical, but this need not be the case in the absence of determinism. In the absence of presentism (the claim that only the present exists), a particular space-time worm will exist at all times in its entirety, but only in a particular world, which may or may not be the actual world.
6. Dualism: there are varieties. Either the soul thinks and the brain thinks, or the soul thinks with its brain. Those who hold the view that the soul can think when disembodied are probably committed to the first option, which seems to make the brain superfluous.
7. Cerebra: A cerebrum denotes both hemispheres, so there’s no such thing as a double-cerebrum transplant (other than for “two-brains”). The transplant of a single hemisphere would be referred to as a cerebral-hemisphere transplant.
8. Wiggins: re-read "Wiggins (David) - The Concern to Survive" for an early critique of Parfit.
9. Parfit: Jen claimed that there are no persons for Parfit. I didn’t understand (and can’t remember) the reasoning behind this claim.
10. Surviving in my works: There probably are cases where a knowledge of my works does not involve knowledge of me, but usually it does (eg. of Hume). Why is this? Because in a person’s works we get to know the person? I presume this depends on the topic of the work – OK if literary or philosophical. What about very impersonal subjects like science or mathematics? There’s a difference between the biographical account of a discovery, and an impersonal account of the results themselves. Newton’s Principia contains a lot of philosophy, so reveals Newton’s personality, but much mathematics doesn’t. The style may also reveal much of the author, even in mathematics – for instance, the parsimony or fullness of the proofs, the tightness of the argument, and so on. What about music or the graphic arts?
11. Parfit and survival: (I think) we agreed that for Parfit I can have what matters to me without surviving, because survival involves identity, and identity is not what matters for Parfit. In my essay, I’d said that we can’t have anything that matters without surviving, which is a flat rejection of Parfit’s view. There is some confusion on this topic, with some philosophers saying that there are degrees of survival. For Parfit I can have what matters if the future in some sense involves me (eg. if there are a lot of clones carrying on my work). We discussed the temporal sense of “I have what matters”. Since, ex hyposthesi, I do not exist at the relevant time in the future, just when do I have what matters to me? Now, when I’m contemplating that I will have what matters, or then, when I no longer exist? There are connections here to to the topic of death – how, and when, are the dead harmed. See "Kagan (Shelly) - Death: Course introduction".
12. Going where our brains go: On p. 8, point 4 (my Note), I had included a “so that”? What’s the import of this? I was just claiming that most of us have a strong intuition that we go where our brains go, because we go where our window on the world goes and this window is enabled by our brains. On certain views, we might instead go where our brains don’t go – eg. if we can survive by being brain-state-transferred onto another brain, our original brain being destroyed (though this TE assumes the truth of functionalism, which I believe to be false). My original intuition is predicated on the brain in question being fully functional and supporting a first person perspective (so this intuition is much weaker in the case of babies which may not have a first person perspective: but even here, I’m not talking of a fully-developed sense of self, but (as I said) a “window on the world”. I have an intuition that a cat goes where its brain goes, even though it’s doubtful that cats have a sense of self. There’s nothing that it’s like for a brainless cat to be, whereas there might be something it’s like for a catless brain to be. However, my assumption here is that our brain continues to function, and that if so, we go with it. Are there circumstances where I don’t go where my brain goes even on the assumption that my brain is still functioning? I suppose that a closest-continuer theorist might say of the case where I’m teletransported, but where instead of being destroyed my brain is envatted, that my closest continuer is my post-teletransportation teletransportee rather than my disembodied brain, on the grounds that the psychological continuity is greater for the teletransportee than for the disembodied brain, with all its disorientation. But I’m not convinced most of us would have that intuition.
13. The reference of “I”: when I say “I weigh 14 stone” is this really “conventional” for “my body weighs 14 stone”? Jen thought not. I suspect this depends on whether we are dualists or not, and whether our language developed in a dualistic milieu. If I am an immaterial substance, then strictly speaking I don’t weigh anything. I seem to have read somewhere that there is a dispute as to whether Cartesian dualism represented the common-sense of the day, or was a radical philosophically-oriented departure from an assumed materialist perspective. If I remember correctly, Baker’s view is that I have the property of weighing 14 stone derivatively because I am only constituted by my body, and not identical to it. Incidentally, I seem to have slightly garbled the Note to point 9 of the “Messy View” (p. 12) – a word (“know”) has been omitted. Also, I may have misrepresented the views of philosophers here.
14. Brains and consciousness: there was some mumbling in denial of my contention that disembodied brains can support consciousness (or so I thought).
15. Organisms and matter-replacement: we discussed pieces and portions – I’ve inherited this terminology from somewhere (probably from "Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity"). Jen suggested that not only can organisms exchange matter with their environment, it is necessary that they do so.
16. Baillie: Concerning the Note³ on "Baillie (James) - What Am I?", the important point is that I need to develop an argument for the intuition that it is insufficient for it to seem to one that one is person X for one to be person X; and here even a very strong “seeming” is insufficient. One may have perfect memories, perfect psychological continuity, and an exactly similar body, yet not be (identical to) the person to whom one is exactly similar. The basic reason is that modal reduplication arguments (even in the standard TT case where there is in fact no competitor) and the logic of identity forbid identification. Yet it would seem to the arriving teletransportee that he is the departing teletransportee, when he is not. My contention is that it would not seem to the departing teletransportee that he arrived, because he was destroyed by the teletranportantion process. The problem is to convince people of this. The logic ought to be sufficient, except (Jen claimed) it fails for those who (knowingly or not) are influenced by Parfit. If we think that survival is not what matters, we might think that we have all we need. My point is that we don’t have anything much, except for others carrying on one’s projects and relationships. Even so, Jen thinks a promising line of attack has to do with intentions … read on …
17. Intentions: we discussed (without explicitly mentioning it) the Brundlefly case, where Jen is imagined to have suffered this fate. If the arriving teletransportee is a fly, it cannot be Jen, whatever its metal faculties are. Now, prior to teletransportation, Jen might have had all sorts of intentions. An intention may fail to be fulfilled for one of several reasons: change of mind, external prevention and loss of function. A “far gone” fly would be unable to fulfil these intentions because of loss of function, but not (it seems to me) immediately post-teletransportation. So, can this be the answer to the problem?
18. Future papers: The next supervision (see below) will be the last (for the time being) that treats critically of individual papers. Thereafter I will try to present my own arguments and write my PhD Thesis.

Live Version of this Archived Note

1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026