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(Text as at 21/04/2018 18:44:38)

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Supervision: Monday 4th February 2008; 11:30

The focus of the supervision was the discussion of four papers.

  1. The introductory text1 of my essay “What Are We2?”.
  2. A Note3 on "Brandom (Robert) - Toward a Normative Pragmatics", sections I:1-3.
  3. A Note4 on "Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'".
  4. A Note5 on "Baillie (James) - What Am I?".

Discussions:-
  1. Essay Introduction6
    • Jen objected (not for the first time) to my distinction between two questions “what sort of being am I identical to?” and “what sort of properties do I have?”. All uses of “is” reduce to the same thing – “I am red” means “I am identical to something that is red”.
    • Sorts: The whole point of Wiggins’s D2 is that I cannot make identity statements until I know what sort the identification is made under. Consider “I am that child” versus “I am that human being”.
    • Kinds: But, isn’t the issue one of kind membership? Do persons form a kind? Do red things form a kind? That is, it’s not just belonging to set indexed by some property {x: f(x)}, but some natural way of connecting the x’s into the set that makes categorising them as the same f metaphysically worth doing?
    • I made an illegible scribble at the meeting about cross-kind identifications: f(x) & g(y) & x=y & f <> g? But there cannot be any such things, because its kind-membership is an essential property of any thing, so things belonging to different kinds cannot be identical (by Leibniz’s Law).
    • There’s no third-person in view in the question “What are we7?” – “We” is first person plural. And this first-person is important – we are the sort of entities can say “I”. “What are they?” has no implication that they can refer to themselves as “I”.
  2. Brandom8: "Brandom (Robert) - Toward a Normative Pragmatics", sections I:1-3.
    • I.1(4): What we can do is not just agency. I need to decide what aspect of “we” I am interested in.
    • Families: we still have the capacity for propositional interaction, even if it is unexercised.
    • We discussed the idea that in some societies dependence on animals is so great that they might be introduced into the “we” community – eg. hunter-gatherers and their dogs, horses, camels.
    • Can cats think? Does thought require language? Is there a “language of thought” apart from a natural language that maybe cats have access to? Do they intend anything? I raised two examples of behaviour, neither of which is a learned response. Pawing against doors is different from pawing the floor prior to defecation. Pawing the floor appears to be purely instinctual and irrational. Pawing to be let out appears to be rational and to require some rudimentary theory of (human) mind on the part of cats, though other interpretations are no doubt possible.
    • Brandom’s pragmatics is all language-dependent. So, does he allow that the higher mammals do enjoy intentional states?
    • Sentience and sapience are not logically independent, even though you can have one without the other.
  3. Chisholm9: "Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'".
    • Chisholm is really too eccentric to be worth considering: the crazy metaphysical suggestions all arise due to his mereological essentialism. However, I think lots of interesting points are raised by erroneous metaphysics. A number of Chisholm’s arguments in favour of his position, or defending it against attack, parallel those of others – eg. Baker’s constitution view.
    • First note: Jen thinks that distinguishing bodies from organisms is important. This is (probably) for the above reason. If what I am10 is an organism, then the problems thrown up by mereological essentialism and entia successiva cannot arise, as organisms change parts all the time. Chisholm’s basic assumption that “if we are physical things, then we are bodies or proper parts thereof” sets him off on completely the wrong foot.
  4. Baillie11: "Baillie (James) - What Am I?".
    • There is no such thing as token-token reduction. Reduction is of one theory to another. What I’m talking about is token-token identity.
    • But – I would respond – aren’t there different forms of reduction; namely inter-theoretic reduction and explanatory reduction?
    • Quasi-memory – review "McDowell (John) - Reductionism and the First Person". This may be relevant to my theories on the difference between forward and backward psychological continuity, where in the absence of the right causal chain, there’s no forward continuity of experience.
    • “Physicalism”12 (note, p. 2) – I really mean anti-dualism. Physicalism13 has to do with physics, reduction thereto.
    • De re / de dicto: (p. 3, section 3 last note) – Jen was suspicious of the coherence and utility of this distinction in this context – I need to explain or abandon this note.
    • Note (1), p. 3, top: unduly behaviouristic? Really?
    • The discussion of Baillie14 was left incomplete on account of time.

Next Supervision: Monday 18th February 2008; 11:30. To complete discussion of the paper15 on "Baillie (James) - What Am I?" and discuss one16 on "Olson (Eric) - What Are We?".


Table of the Previous 2 Versions of this Note:

Date Length Title
18/12/2010 12:00:00 5029 Jen_080204 (Brandom, Chisholm, Baillie)
12/03/2008 08:05:17 5052 Jen_080204


Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
21/04/2018 18:44:38 None available None

Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Baillie - What Am I? Brandom - Toward a Normative Pragmatics (Introduction) Chisholm - Which Physical Thing Am I? Olson - What Are We? Physicalism
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?) What are We?      

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.



Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Convention Holes & Smiles Jen_080218 (Olson) Language of Thought Locke
Logic of Identity Metamorphosis Natural Kinds Olson - What Are We?, 2 Persistent Vegetative State
Physicalism Sortals Status: Personal Identity (Summary of Progress to Date), 2, 3, 4 Teletransportation Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2, 3 Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues), 2 Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
Universals What are We?, 2, 3 Wittgenstein    

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.



Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Olson (Eric) What Are We? Paper High Quality Abstract 2 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) Paper Medium Quality Abstract 2 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) Paper Medium Quality Abstract 2, 3 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Paper Medium Quality Abstract 2 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Convention Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Holes & Smiles Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Language of Thought Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Locke Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Logic of Identity Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Metamorphosis Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Natural Kinds Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Persistent Vegetative State Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Physicalism Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Sortals Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Teletransportation Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Universals Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - What Are We? Paper Medium Quality Abstract 2, 3 Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Wittgenstein Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes


References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Baillie (James) Problems in Personal Identity Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 45%
Baillie (James) What Am I? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 4 Yes
Brandom (Robert) Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing & Discursive Commitment Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 3%
Brandom (Robert) Toward a Normative Pragmatics Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Brandom (Robert) - Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing & Discursive Commitment, 1994, Chapter 1 50%
Chisholm (Roderick) Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?' Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Van Inwagen & Zimmerman - Metaphysics: The Big Questions, 1998 Yes
Dancy (Jonathan), Ed. Reading Parfit Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 17%
JCS Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 14, Issue 05-06 (2007) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied No
McDowell (John) Reductionism and the First Person Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Dancy - Reading Parfit, 1997, Chapter 11 Yes
Olson (Eric) What Are We? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 14, Issue 05-06 (2007), pp. 37-55 (19) Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) Paper - Referencing   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) Paper - Referencing   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Paper - Referencing   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View) Paper - Referencing   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Paper - Referencing   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) Paper - Referencing   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Convention Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Holes & Smiles Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Locke Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Logic of Identity Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Metamorphosis Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Natural Kinds Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Persistent Vegetative State Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Physicalism Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Sortals Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Teletransportation Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Universals Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - What Are We? Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Wittgenstein Paper - Referencing Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean) Metaphysics: The Big Questions Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 17%


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