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Supervision: Monday 22nd October 2007; 11:30

The purpose of the Supervision was to discuss a brief essay submitted the previous day. The version discussed is at this link. A later version was issued too late for discussion. The latest version of the paper is here1.

Specific comments received:

  1. Motivate the discussion. Why do I care? What’s the point of my discussion of Dennett’s paper? Answer:The reason I care is because I’m discussing personal identity and want to know what a person is. Even if I deny that it’s the person (as distinct from the human animal) that persists, I still need to know what a person is supposed to be because the general question-area has always assumed this is the term that matters, and I need to be clear on what was under discussion to show where the discussion was misguided.
  2. Be careful about attributions to Locke. He doesn’t mention caring about persistence, nor phenomenal consciousness.
  3. What do I mean (under “The Right Set of Themes?”) by “an entity for which persistence matters”? Matters to whom? Answer:To it. The question was raised that some people (eg. those contemplating suicide) don’t want to persist, so persistence doesn’t matter to them. I think it does – persistence matters, though maybe persisting doesn’t. What I meant is that whether they persist or not matters to persons. If things get too bad (or are perceived to be that way), it may be important to them that they don’t persist. In the normal case, it’s important that they do. Either way, persistence matters to them.
  4. Avoid throw-away lines about Fodor and the language of thought (LOT). I hadn’t intended to imply that a LOT was essential to personhood, only that we might be able to do with less than a natural language; if not for communication, at least for rationality.
  5. Be careful in the use of language. Eg. things aren’t concepts, but fall under them.
  6. How should I indicate concepts? Quotation marks would indicate the word rather than the concept. Usually italicise. I noted that the paper "Spicer (Finn) - Are There any Conceptual Truths about Knowledge?" (to be read at the Aristotlelian Society in 2 weeks time) capitalises CONCEPTS. I propose to follow this convention as it’s easier to implement.
  7. When does a natural kind come into existence? Natural kinds are concepts, and such questions are controversial. Side-step this question and simply talk about when the concept becomes instantiated.
  8. “She’s not the same person”, means she’s undergone a change of personality. Do personalities have persistence conditions (I’d suggested that personalities were a loose collection of properties; no agreement on this!)? No. Analogy with colour. The question is better phrased as does x have the same personality / colour at t1 as at t2.
  9. Dennett is talking about the present capacities (because “mental defectives” are non-persons and we might become such if hit on the head sufficiently hard). He doesn’t address questions of persistence, but would agree that a person can become a non-person.
Other items discussed:
  1. Vagueness; There can be clear paradigm cases even though it’s vague whether something is a paradigm case. So there can be vague boundaries to the concept PERSON.
  2. Persons of varying degrees. Maybe some higher mammals possess all the qualities of persons to a reduced degree.
  3. A natural kind can develop into another. This doesn’t involve relative identity.
  4. Discussion of "Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)" in "Lovibond (Sabina) & Williams (S.G.) - Identity, Truth & Value: Essays for David Wiggins". While artefacts aren’t mentioned, Wiggins is talking about the same sort of thing. Angels and aliens: insofar as we can conceptualise them, they are animals. So they aren’t counter-examples to all persons being animals (though not necessarily human animals).
  5. Robots and cloning: Contrast the possibility of atom-by-atom cloning (as distinct from medical cloning which uses existing structures but interferes unnaturally in a fairly minor way).
  6. Websites: Agreed that this isn’t what’s wanted of me (a collection of footnotes) but a sustained argument in the standard format.

Actions
  1. For next supervision, write (say) 5,000 words of an 8,000-word chapter on “what is a person”.
  2. Also try to come up with a set of chapter headings for my Thesis.
  3. If I have questions in the interim, email.
  4. Finish off Dennett “sometime”.

Jen: Could you email me a copy of the revised version of your talk “Knowledge of Language and Epistemic Interdependence”?

Next Supervision: Monday 12th November 2007; 11:30.


Previous Version of this Note:

Date Length Title
11/11/2007 13:00:29 4772 Jen_071022


Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
18/12/2010 12:00:00 None available None

Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Daniel Dennett – Conditions of Personhood        

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.



Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Baillie - What Am I? Individual Language of Thought Status: Personal Identity (Summary of Progress to Date), 2 Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)
Thesis - Personal Identity        

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.



Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Baillie (James) What Am I? Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Dennett (Daniel) Conditions of Personhood Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Individual Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Language of Thought Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Personal Identity Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes


References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Dennett (Daniel) Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 43%
Dennett (Daniel) Conditions of Personhood Paper - Referencing High Quality Abstract Dennett - Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Chapter 14, 1976 Yes
Lovibond (Sabina) & Williams (S.G.) Identity, Truth & Value: Essays for David Wiggins Book - Cited High Quality Abstract Lovibond (Sabina) & Williams (S.G.) - Identity, Truth & Value: Essays for David Wiggins 10%
Spicer (Finn) Are There any Conceptual Truths about Knowledge? Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 5th November 2007 22%
Wiggins (David) Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity) Paper - Cited Lovibond & Williams - Identity, Truth & Value: Essays for David Wiggins, 1996 Yes


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