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Personal Identity

Psychological Criterion

(Work In Progress: output at 27/08/2025 11:47:02)

Plug Note¹

• Thesis Text:
  1. The Psychological Criterion is the use of psychological facts as a criterion of personal identity, as definitive of whether we persist or not. So (on this view) if we want to know whether a person survives or not, it’s matters of psychological continuity or connectedness that we must investigate.
  2. In general, doubts arise about whether an individual has persisted if there are too radical changes in its properties in
     1. a short space of time (failure of continuity) or
     2. over longer stretches of time (failure of connectedness).
  3. These factors can be in tension², as had been noted since Reid’s “Brave Officer” objection to Locke’s “memory criterion”, and Lewis’s Methuselah³ case. Identity is an equivalence relation, so transitivity is expected. Yet it is not necessarily respected in the case of memory – because continuous so-called memory-identity fails to lead to connectedness over long periods of time.
  4. Another factor I have noted is that there’s a distinction between the evidential force of forward and backward psychological continuity, covered later.
  5. Roughly speaking, the Psychological View (PV)⁴ of Personal Identity is that which argues that
     1. Questions of our identity are settled by psychological facts.
     2. We are most fundamentally psychological beings.
     3. We come and go when our psychology comes into or goes out of existence.
     4. We cannot survive radical changes to our psychology.
     5. And so on.
  6. I reject this whole approach if matters of identity are uppermost in our minds. However, if we’re talking about what matters to us in survival, then psychology is obviously important.
  7. In relation to the above distinction between continuity and connectedness, …
     1. See "Blackburn (Simon) - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?" for what Blackburn calls the Unity Reaction⁵: we cannot envision fissioning⁶: our FPP⁷ would just seem to go on in one direction only.
     2. Because of reduplication⁸ problems – as in the “inconceivable” fission case above – at least in the absence of perdurantism⁹ – no amount of backward psychological continuity is sufficient for identity.
  8. This is all rather complex:
     1. We anticipate forward psychological continuity – and while we’re continuously conscious, this is what we experience, and this seems to be evidentially sound.
     2. Yet our checking is always based on backward psychological continuity. But, in the absence of evil demons, this doesn’t seem to be a problem.
     3. The issue arises in the case of traumatic cases of discontinuous consciousness, where we don’t know how we arrived in our present state. We’d then need to rely on third parties. My point is that no amount of inner conviction is sufficient proof, as distinct from when we are continuously conscious.
        

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  Further Remarks:
  1. This Note is one of a nexus of similar topics₁₀, namely:-
     1. Psychological View¹¹,
     2. Psychological Continuity¹²,
     3. Psychological Continuity – Forward¹³,
     4. Psychology¹⁴,
     5. Psychopathology¹⁵.
        

References

• Relevant Works cited above:
  1. "Blackburn (Simon) - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?", 1997, Write-Up Note¹⁶, Read = 156%
• For a Page of Links¹⁷ to this Note, Click here.
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read¹⁸, include the following:-
  • General:
    1. "Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity: In Conclusion", 1993
    2. "Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity: Preface", 1993
    3. "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism and its Implications", 2005, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    4. "Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel", 1987, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Garrett (Brian) - Criteria of Personal Identity", 1998
    6. "Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'", 2007, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    7. "Olson (Eric) - Persistence", 1999
    8. "Parfit (Derek) - How We Are Not What We Believe", 1986
    9. "Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain", 1986
    10. "Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be", 1986, Write-Up Note¹⁹
    11. "Rorty (Amélie Oksenberg) - The Identities of Persons: Introduction", 1976
    12. "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics", 2005-12, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    13. "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Moral Responsibility", 2009
    14. "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", 2009
    15. "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity", 2009, Write-Up Note²⁰
    16. "Thomas (Janice L.) - Psychological continuity", 2000
    17. "Thomas (Janice L.) - What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection", 2000
• I don’t really have a study-list to hand. Reading will be covered by the related Notes. However, a “starter pack” might include:-
  • General:
    1. "Baillie (James) - Memory", 1993, Read = 7%
    2. "Baillie (James) - Personal Identity And Mental Content", 1997, Internal PDF Link, Read = 11%
    3. "Belzer (Marvin) - Notes on Relation R", 1996, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
    4. "Blackburn (Simon) - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?", 1997, Write-Up Note²¹, Read = 156%
    5. "McCall (Catherine) - Physical and Psychological Criteria of Personal Identity", 1990
    6. "Slors (Marc) - A Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity: The Five Problems Revisited (Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind, Chapter 4)", 1997
    7. "Slors (Marc) - A Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity: The Five Problems Revisited (The Diachronic Mind, Chapter 5)", 2001, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Slors (Marc) - Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory", 2001, Internal PDF Link

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• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
  1. Read: No items to list.
  2. Further Reading: No items to list.
• This is mostly a place-holder²².

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In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 10:

• None of these Notes currently have much written on them!

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Table of the Previous 8 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
06/07/2023 00:43:12	5229	Psychological Criterion
20/09/2022 11:24:00	4944	Psychological Criterion
11/04/2022 00:01:26	4563	Psychological Criterion
17/02/2021 01:17:46	4345	Psychological Criterion
30/09/2020 01:16:19	3971	Psychological Criterion
27/10/2018 19:52:19	6060	Psychological Criterion
02/08/2015 10:55:12	3921	Psychological Criterion
25/05/2010 14:58:34	89	Psychological Criterion

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
14/04/2026 04:35:09	Psychological Criterion	Psychological View

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Blackburn - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?	Connectedness vs Continuity	First-Person Perspective	Fission
Methuselah	Note Links Explanation	Parfit - What We Believe Ourselves To Be	Perdurantism	Plug Note Apologia
Psychological Continuity	Psychological Continuity - Forward	Psychological View	Psychology	Psychopathology
Reduplication Objections	Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity	Unity of the Person	Works Read - Explanation

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Biological Criterion	Brain	Closest Continuer	Memory	Olson - What Are We? Animals
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3	Psychological Continuity	Psychology	Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion)	Thesis - Current Stance
Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Baillie (James)	Memory	Paper
Baillie (James)	Personal Identity And Mental Content	Paper	2
Baillie (James)	Problems in Personal Identity: In Conclusion	Paper		Yes
Baillie (James)	Problems in Personal Identity: Preface	Paper		Yes
Beck (Simon)	Let's Exist Again (Like We Did Last Summer)	Paper	2
Belzer (Marvin)	Notes on Relation R	Paper
Bernecker (Sven)	Memory: A Philosophical Study	Book
Blatti (Stephan)	Animalism and its Implications	Paper		Yes
Burke (Michael)	Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism	Paper		Yes
Campbell (Scott)	Animals, Babies, and Subjects	Paper
Campbell (Scott)	Could Your Life Have Been Different?	Paper
Campbell (Scott)	Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival?	Paper
Campbell (Scott)	Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival?	Paper
Campbell (Scott)	Persons and Substances	Paper
Campbell (Scott)	The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events	Paper
Ehring (Douglas)	Personal Identity and Time Travel	Paper		Yes
Funkhouser (Eric)	Notes on Olson, 'An Argument for Animalism'	Paper
Garrett (Brian)	Criteria of Personal Identity	Paper	2	Yes
Garrett (Brian)	Personal Identity and Extrinsicness	Paper	2
Garrett (Brian)	Personal Identity and Self-consciousness	Book		Yes
Hershenov (David)	Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'	Paper		Yes
Hudson (Hud)	I am Not an Animal!	Paper
McCall (Catherine)	Assessment of Parfit's Analysis	Paper
Olson (Eric)	Persistence	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	Psychology and Personal Identity	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	The Human Animal: Introduction	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Animals	Paper		Yes
Parfit (Derek)	How We Are Not What We Believe	Paper	2	Yes
Parfit (Derek)	Nagel's Brain	Paper		Yes
Parfit (Derek)	What We Believe Ourselves To Be	Paper	2	Yes
Petrus (Klaus), Ed.	On Human Persons	Book
Rorty (Amélie Oksenberg)	The Identities of Persons: Introduction	Paper		Yes
Schechtman (Marya)	Personhood and Personal Identity	Paper	2
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Ethics	Paper		Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Ethics - Conclusion: Notes on Method	Paper		Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Immortality	Paper		Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Moral Responsibility	Paper		Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Shoemaker (David)	The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism	Paper	2
Sider (Ted)	Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis	Paper
Slors (Marc)	Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind: Preface	Paper		Yes
Slors (Marc)	Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind: Setting the Stage	Paper	2
Slors (Marc)	Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind: Summary in Dutch	Paper	2
Slors (Marc)	Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory	Paper	2, 3, 4
Slors (Marc)	Setting the Stage: Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind	Paper	2
Slors (Marc)	The Diachronic Mind: An Essay on Personal Identity, Psychological Continuity and the Mind-Body Problem	Book
Snowdon (Paul)	The Self and Personal Identity	Paper		Yes
Stone (Jim)	Why Potentiality Matters	Paper
Thomas (Janice L.)	Psychological continuity	Paper	2, 3, 4	Yes
Thomas (Janice L.)	What matters for survival and the logical possibility of resurrection	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Biological Criterion	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Brain	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Closest Continuer	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Current Position	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Memory	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Personal Identity	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Continuity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychology	Paper		Yes
Wiggins (David)	Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity	Book

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Baillie (James)	Memory	Paper - Cited	Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 6	7%
Baillie (James)	Problems in Personal Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	45%
Baillie (James)	Problems in Personal Identity: In Conclusion	Paper - Cited	Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Conclusion	Yes
Baillie (James)	Problems in Personal Identity: Preface	Paper - Cited	Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Preface	Yes
Blackburn (Simon)	Has Kant Refuted Parfit?	Paper - Cited	Dancy - Reading Parfit, 1997, Chapter 9	78%
Blatti (Stephan)	Animalism and its Implications	Paper - Cited	OU Website (now deleted)	Yes
Dancy (Jonathan), Ed.	Reading Parfit	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	17%
Ehring (Douglas)	Personal Identity and Time Travel	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Nov., 1987), pp. 427-433	Yes
Garrett (Brian)	Criteria of Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 3	Yes
Garrett (Brian)	Personal Identity and Extrinsicness	Paper - Referencing	Philosophical Studies 59, pp. 177-194, 1990	No
Garrett (Brian)	Personal Identity and Self-consciousness	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Hershenov (David)	Review of Nancey Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'	Paper - Cited	Religious Studies, 43:2, June 2007, 237-242	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Persistence	Paper - Cited	The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 2, pp. 22-41	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Psychology and Personal Identity	Paper - Referencing	The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 1, pp. 7-21	Yes
Olson (Eric)	The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Olson (Eric)	The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Animals	Paper - Referencing	What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 2 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.)	Yes
Parfit (Derek)	How We Are Not What We Believe	Paper - Cited	Parfit - Reasons and Persons, January 1986, pp. 219-245(27).	Yes
Parfit (Derek)	Nagel's Brain	Paper - Cited	Parfit - Reasons and Persons, Appendix D	Yes
Parfit (Derek)	Reasons and Persons	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Parfit (Derek)	What We Believe Ourselves To Be	Paper - Cited	Parfit - Reasons and Persons, January 1986, pp. 199-219(21).	Yes
Rorty (Amélie Oksenberg)	The Identities of Persons: Introduction	Paper - Cited	Rorty (Amelie) - The Identities of Persons, 1976	Yes
Rorty (Amélie Oksenberg), Ed.	The Identities of Persons	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	23%
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Ethics	Paper - Cited	Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2005-12	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Criterion	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes

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Text Colour Conventions

1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026

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