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Blog - Unmerited Suffering & Hominid Evolution - Response
Firstly, the letter1 on unmerited suffering. Obviously the arguments in the letter are not news, and I doubt we can make much further progress on this topic. My objections to the arguments are firstly that the Biblical quotations seem to read into the text a positive slant that's not there, and secondly that the Isaiah quotation really ought only to be invoked as a last resort.
With respect to the matter of David and Bathsheba, David’s comment that – as far as his dead son is concerned – “I will go to him but he will not come back to me”, makes reference not to the happy hereafter, but to the grave. Is there any suggestion in the context that things will be “all right” for David’s son? The focus is entirely on David and his wicked ways.
In the passage from Luke, the focus is on perishing, not on future happiness or final restitution. I raised this passage myself, as it doesn’t say who’s responsible for the disasters, other than that it wasn’t the victims’ fault; and presumably Pilate was (immediately) responsible for the slaughter his soldiers wrought. Anyway, the victims hadn’t brought the Tower of Siloam down on their own heads. It’s interesting to consider just when the “perishing” would be. I’d have thought a good dispensationalist would think that it would be in the cataclysm that would engulf Judea at the end times if there was no national repentance, much as happened at AD 66-70.
Isaiah 55:8-9: obviously a being with the attributes traditionally predicated of the Christian God can do lots of things – anything that’s not logically impossible or contradictory to his declared character. But that’s the whole issue concerning the problem of what appears to be excessive “collateral damage” unmerited by the recipients. The thought that God, with his infinite bag of goodies, can “make it up” to anyone caught in the cross-fire seems too facile. It reeks of using people as means rather than ends, to the dismay of the Kantians. Now, personally, I’m a consequentialist (ie. a sophisticated utilitarian). So, there are some dreadful acts that have to be done in order to avoid even worse consequences. If the Kraken comes and demands one of your daughters, and won’t take you instead, but would otherwise take everyone, what are you to do? Of course, in the myth some super-hero comes along and slays the Kraken, but we’ll assume that way out isn’t open (incidentally, this story from “Clash of the Titans” seems to be a mix-up of Greek and Norse mythology – it seems that it’s Ceto (and not the Kraken) that Perseus turns to stone using the Gorgon’s head; but we’ll let that pass). But, to continue, God is that super-hero, and (it might be said) has failed to turn up when he could have. If I allowed my daughter to be eaten alive by ants, say, when I could have done something about it, but would not “for the good of the cause”, I’d not be considered virtuous even if I could conjure her up again and give her an eternity of bliss. And what would she think of me? Even the Catholic clergy don’t abuse children that badly. These are the ideas that have to be wrestled with.
I’ve discussed this issue a couple of times with Pete – he quoted “God is no man’s debtor”. Where’s this thought from? Is it scripture or a proverb? I’ve done Bible and internet searches and can’t find it. I even asked Julie, the walking concordance. It appears in the Summa Theologica, in an objection. See Link (https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1021.htm) (which looks like a useful site – even if a Catholic one – follow the scripture links to a triglot Bible). But there are two ways of taking this – that God owes us nothing, or that God does owe us something, and will pay up. The Calvinists take the first approach – we all deserve the everlasting bonfire because of what we are2, irrespective of what we’ve done. See this blog (Link - Defunct). The atheist lobby would say this makes God out to be a monster. Are there really any promises that everything will be all right for everyone other than “the wicked”? Other than in Julian of Norwich, that is.
To take this further, I’m teetering on the edge of joining (or succeeding) Pete at Heythrop. They do an MA in “Philosophy and Religion”. Apart from evaluating the arguments of natural theology (which I’ve never been impressed by) you have to endure a course on “20th century religious thought”, which I imagine involves evaluating utter drivel. Then there are a couple of courses on ethics – probably the ones Pete took.
Secondly, the article ("McKie (Robin) - Out of Africa: The Sequel") enclosed with the letter (follow the Abstract / Comment Link for a transcript). Naturally, I don't agree with the comments, which were "Please find enclosed an article from the weekly Guardian. Sylvia has done all the markings and we were discussing this. It shows the absolute uncertainty of the absoluteness of evolutionary science. No other scientific theory would be allowed to get away with so many caveats and still hold it head up high."
The reason I don't agree with the comments is that this is all “work in progress”. The presumption that humans and the great apes are related, and have a common ancestor, is based on genetic and morphological studies. Evolution (taken as descent with modification, whatever its mechanisms) is taken as the unifying principle that brings together all the seemingly arbitrary facts of biology. Why do we have all this diversity and similarity, other than because God decided to do it that way? And if evolution is right as a general paradigm, then we’d expect human beings to fit into it somehow. Articles like the one you enclosed are attempts to fill in the gaps. Now it seems that this is a difficult task. Until relatively recently, on geological timescales, hominids haven't been very numerous, and by all accounts, they don't fossilise well - fossilisation being rather an extraordinary process in any case. So, it's difficult to find much evidence, and piecing together what has been found is a difficult task. All this is just an artefact of where the science is at right now. Presumably (Sylvia will like that), as time goes by, more bits of the jigsaw will be discovered and it'll be possible to tell a more robust tale, and one in which the paradigm isn't as likely to be upset by the next discovery. But even now there's a story that can be told that some would say has more flesh on its bones, and more credibility, than that the first man was made out of the dust in some middle-eastern garden. The reason that "cat's are amongst the pigeons" is that there's a bunch of data that's been pieced together, and new data indicates that some of the pieces might be in the wrong place. But there are more bits to this jigsaw than are available in the Biblical account - which is so brief that it can't be regarded as a scientific account at all. Nor should it be.
There have been a couple of similar articles recently on the same topic – you may have seen them. One was "Krause (Johannes) - Our Ancestral Cave Gets More Crowded". The other was "Burkeman (Oliver) - Revolution in Evolution". Like you, no doubt, I’m not too impressed by extrapolation from fingers, but the “Revolution” article is interesting, if a little muddled. The suggestion that Lamarkianism – the inheritance of acquired characteristics – might have something going for it isn’t to be viewed as the overthrow of evolution, but as a major adjustment to the Darwinian synthesis (natural selection plus genetics). Everyone (if they are honest) is worried by the improbabilities of genetic variation, inheritance and natural selection being the whole story if the only generator of variation is random mutation. But if somatic changes induced by behaviour could somehow get into the genome, then the improbabilities would reduce enormously. Then, we’d only need to fall back on anthropic principles and multiverses to get the initial replicator off the ground. Maybe, but because something would be “nice to have” (for those of us inclined in that direction) doesn’t mean it should be accepted as true.
I look forward to hearing your thoughts on "Walton (John H.) - The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate". I'd not had time to read the last couple of chapters, but I think he was summing up by then. I liked the general approach, and in particular the author’s distinction between the thought that the Biblical account is "indebted" to other ancient creation accounts (which he rejects) and the thought that such accounts formed the backdrop of common pre-scientific assumptions into which the Genesis account was directed, and against which it needs to be understood.
Note last updated: 20/04/2018 23:25:26
Footnote 1: (Unmerited Suffering & Hominid Evolution) (CORRESPONDENT)
Now you remember we were discussing suffering, and disasters. And I think we agreed that ‘limited' suffering did humanity good – although philosophically one could not define that limit. Then we moved on to Haiti and natural disasters. I think I mentioned something that if God did allow any to suffer unjustly (e.g. David's child by Bathsheba who died in David's place) God was more than able to make that up to people in eternity.
It is interesting that some in our Lord's time may have had the same problem with God permitting man's inhumanity to man and also to natural accidents. In Luke 13:1-5 we read:
'Now there were some present at that time who told Jesus about the Galileans whose blood Pilate had mixed with their sacrifices. Jesus answered, "Do you think that these Galileans were worse sinners than all the other Galileans because they suffered this way? I tell you, no! But unless you repent, you too will all perish. Or those eighteen who died when the tower in Siloam fell on them—do you think' they were more guilty than all the others living in Jerusalem? I tell you, no! But unless you repent, you too will all perish."
The interesting thing about this is that Christ seems not interested in what happened in the here and now, on earth. He is much more interested in the hereafter. Maybe it is a case of:
Isaiah 55:8-9: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways," declares the LORD. As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts. "
Also please find enclosed an article ("McKie (Robin) - Out of Africa: The Sequel") from the weekly Guardian. Sylvia has done all the markings and we were discussing this. It shows the absolute uncertainty of the absoluteness of evolutionary science. No other scientific theory would be allowed to get away with so many caveats and still hold it head up high.
Note last updated: 29/04/2010 09:51:50
Footnote 2: (What are We?)
Plug Note
- This Note cannot answer this question. Rather, it’ll try to consider the sort of desiderata necessary for formulating and answering the question, and for deciding between the various candidate answers.
- Thesis Text:
- This Chapter has the title “What Are We?”. The use of the plural is significant, as we will see in the course of this Thesis when we consider the social and reciprocal aspects of what it is to be a person. However, the determination of “we” as “the sort of entity likely to be reading this paper” isn’t quite right, even though Dennett and others use similar expressions.
- “We” implies a reciprocal relationship. We find others (of “our” sort) intelligible, and it is important that they find us intelligible in return. Does this thereby make R = “finds intelligible” an equivalence relation, dividing the world into equivalence classes of mutually intelligible individuals, or does R come in degrees and fall prey to Sorites paradoxes?
- Nonetheless, should we not start with the singular, maybe even solipsist, question “What Am I?”, and expand out from there into the collective question? How we phrase our initial question has an impact on the course of our investigations, and may reflect our deepest presuppositions. The first-person question adopts the Cartesian stance of looking from the inside out, whereas the third-person question considers “us” collectively. The first-person question may presuppose that the answer to the question is that I am primarily a psychological being, whereas the third-person question may assume or expect the answer that I am fundamentally physical.
- Some of the potential answers to the question will be the same whether we phrase the question in the singular or the plural.
- Taking it in the plural for now, we need to distinguish, as candidates for what we might be on the physical side, (prefixing “human-” passim):-
- Animals,
- Organisms,
- Bodies,
- Beings and
- Brains.
- On the psychological side, I might be a Self or, more popularly, a Person. I might even be a non-essentially-embodied entity like a Soul.
- I will consider all these options in due course; with the exception of a detailed discussion of the concept PERSON (which is reserved for the Chapter 3), I will do so later in this chapter.
- Olson12 also considers whether we might be Humean bundles of mental states and events, and even the nihilist view that we don’t exist at all. While I won’t have space for a detailed discussion of all of these possibilities, we need to remain aware of the possibilities and motivations for these positions.
- However, for the moment I want to consider some themes connecting the possible answers to our question. Firstly, does there have to be a single answer? I know that I, and presume that my readers also, fall happily under the concepts HUMAN ANIMAL, HUMAN ORGANISM and HUMAN BEING. I at least have a human body and a human brain, though I would initially feel reluctant to say that I am one of either of these things. I would certainly claim to be a SELF, and also a PERSON, as no doubt would my reader. So, cannot all these answers be correct?
- This raises the question of what I mean by saying what I am (or we are) something. In saying that I am any of these things, what sort of relation is the “am”? Am I using am in the sense of an identity relation, a constitution relation, ascribing a predicate, or have some other sense in mind?
- There are two kinds of questions I want to ask.
- Firstly, what sort of being am I identical to?
- Secondly, what sort of properties do I have; both metaphysically essential properties (those without which I would cease to exist), and those I merely consider essential (that is, “very important”, though I would continue to exist without them)?
- Any “is” that does duty for the identity relation inherits the formal properties of an equivalence relation; in particular, it is a transitive relation. Additionally, the “two” identical entities either side of the copula must satisfy Leibniz’s law; “they” share (at a time) all their properties; actual and modal, intrinsic and relational. So, if I am identical to a human animal, and also identical to a human person, then that human animal must be identical to that human person. This would mean that these “two” entities are really one. They co-exist at all times in all possible worlds where either of “them” exists, and share all their properties and relations, at any time and world. Everything that happens to “one” at a world and time happens to the “other” at those coordinates. This places strong logical constraints on how much cake I can have and eat. I may want to say that I am identical both to a human animal, and to a human person, yet claim that a human person has certain mental properties essentially, but deny that a human animal does. However, I am then claiming what is logically impossible, at least for the classical logic of identity that denies that such notions as relative identity are coherent. As we will see, this point is essential to the animalist case that we are not identical to human persons (given the claim that we are identical to human animals).
- My thesis addresses the topic of personal identity, but we might claim that what we’re really interested in is in our identity. Not that we have doubts as individuals as to which particular individual we are (as though I, as Bill Clinton, don’t know whether I am Bill Clinton or George W. Bush), but what sort of individual we are, together with worries about our persistence (how long we are going to last, and in what form). Historically, it has been a standard presupposition that what we are most fundamentally is persons, or at least that’s all we care about. So, concern about our identity has been elided with concern for personal identity, almost as though we thought that the two questions are the same. Animalists argue that the two questions are indeed different, but for convenience, and the historical continuity of the general topic under discussion, still say they are talking about personal identity.
- Maybe contrast terms like “Wikipedia: Mensch (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mensch)” with “person”.
- Refer to the first parts of "Brandom (Robert) - Toward a Normative Pragmatics" in "Brandom (Robert) - Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing & Discursive Commitment" for inspiration on “We”.
- For my Thesis Chapter on this topic, follow this link.
- For a page of Links to this Note, Click here.
- The reading lists below are somewhat bloated; but, in general, only a small portion of the works cited needs to be addressed in the context of this question. No doubt the best place to start is
→ "Olson (Eric) - What Are We?" (the Paper), followed by
→ "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology" (the Book).
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read, include the following:-
- Aeon:
- "Callcut (Daniel) - What are we?", 2018, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- General:
- "Baillie (James) - What Am I?", 1993, Write-Up Note, Footnote20
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics", 2008, Write-Up Note, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons in the Material World", 2000, Write-Up Note, Internal PDF Link
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'", 2001, Write-Up Note, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Response to Eric Olson", 2008, Write-Up Note, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson", 2008, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - What Am I?", 1999, Write-Up Note, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Footnote26
- "Belshaw (Christopher) - Review of Paul Snowdon's 'Persons, Animals, Ourselves'", 2015, External Link
- "Bilgrami (Akeel) - What Kind of Creatures Are We? Foreword", 2018
- "Blackburn (Simon) - Review of Stephen Pinker - The Blank Slate ('Meet the Flintstones')", 2003, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism (SEP)", 2014, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Blatti (Stephan) - We Are Animals", 2018, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'", 2000, Write-Up Note, Footnote28
- "Claxton (Guy) - Intelligence in the Flesh - Limbering Up: An Introduction", 2015
- "DeGrazia (David) - Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply", 2002, Write-Up Note, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Footnote30
- "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings", 1987, Write-Up Note, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Liao (S. Matthew) - The Organism View Defended", 2006, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?", 1987, Annotations
- "Nozick (Robert) - The Identity of the Self: Introduction", 1981
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We?", 2007, Write-Up Note, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Footnote33
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? The Question", 2007, Internal PDF Link
- "Parfit (Derek) - Nagel's Brain", 1986
- "Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be", 1986, Write-Up Note
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", 2009
- "Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) - Audio: What Does It Mean to Be Me?", 2015, External Link
- "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity", 2009, Write-Up Note
- "Taylor (Charles) - Responsibility For Self", 1976
- A further reading list might start with:-
- General:
- "Bailey (Andrew M.) - The Elimination Argument", 2014, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Bailey (Andrew M.) - You Needn’t be Simple", 2014, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Animalism vs. Constitutionalism", 2016
- "Barash (David P.) - Through a Glass Brightly: Using Science to See Our Species as We Really Are"
- "Blackburn (Simon) - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?", 1997, Write-Up Note
- "Bloom (Paul) - Descartes' Baby: How Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human", 2004, Footnote37
- "Brandom (Robert) - Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing & Discursive Commitment", 1998
- "Brandom (Robert) - Toward a Normative Pragmatics", 1994, Write-Up Note, Footnote39
- "Broks (Paul) - Into the Silent Land: Travels in Neuropsychology", 2003
- "Brown (Warren) - Numinous or Carnal Persons - The Practical Costs of Inner Souls and Selves", 2005, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Bynum (Terrell Ward) - Audio: Two Philosophers of the Information Age", 2009
- "Chitty (Andrew) - First Person Plural Ontology and Praxis", 1997, Internal PDF Link
- "Chomsky (Noam) - What Kind of Creatures Are We?", 2018
- "Corcoran (Kevin) - Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul", 2006
- "Dennett (Daniel) - Natural Freedom", 2003
- "Doepke (Frederick) - Introduction: What Are We?", 1996, Write-Up Note, Annotations
- "Doepke (Frederick) - What We Are", 1996, Write-Up Note
- "Ford (Norman) - When Did I Begin: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science", 1988
- "Hershenov (David) - Animals, Persons and Bioethics", 2008, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Jeeves (Malcolm A.) - Neuroscience, Evolutionary Psychology and the Image of God", 2005, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Locke (Don) - Who I Am", 1979, Internal PDF Link
- "McMahan (Jeff) - Identity", 2002
- "Mitchell (Kevin J.) - Innate: How the Wiring of Our Brains Shapes Who We Are", 2018
- "Murphy (Nancey) - Scientific Perspectives on Christian Anthropology", Undated, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Noe (Alva) - Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness", 2009
- "Olson (Eric) - The Nature of People", 2014, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology", 2007, Footnote42
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? What Now?", 2007, Internal PDF Link
- "Parfit (Derek) - We Are Not Human Beings", 2016, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Pollock (John L.) - What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem", 2008, Internal PDF Link
- "Richards (Janet Radcliffe) - Internicene Strife", 2000
- "Smith (Joel) - The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error", 2018, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Snowdon (Paul) - [P & not-A] Cases: An Introduction", 2014
- "Stevenson (Leslie) & Haberman (David) - Ten Theories of Human Nature", 2004
- "Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory", 1984, Write-Up Note
- "Trigg (Roger) - Ideas of Human Nature: An Historical Introduction", 1999
- "Trupp (Andreas) - Why We Are Not What We Think We Are: A New Approach to the Nature of Personal Identity and of Time", 1987
- "Ward (Keith) - More Than Matter: Is Matter All We Really Are?", 2010
- "Williams (Bernard) - Making Sense of Humanity", 1987, No Abstract, Internal PDF Link
- "Wilson (Robert) - Persons, Social Agency, and Constitution", 2005, Internal PDF Link
- This is mostly a place-holder.
In-Page Footnotes
Footnote 12: In "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology"
Footnote 20: Footnote 26: Footnote 28: Footnote 30: Footnote 33: Footnote 37:
- This looks interesting, but is somewhat off-topic for a priority reading-list.
Footnote 39:
- See sections I:1-3.
- See Draft Note, Review Comments.
- This excerpt from Brandom raises some questions about the community we call “we”.
Footnote 42:
- Probably the most important source for this Chapter of my Thesis.
- There are hosts of papers by Olson that touch on this topic, but this book, and the paper of the same name, are enough in this context.
Note last updated: 08/02/2022 11:09:36
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Timestamp: 23/02/2022 14:09:40. Comments to theo@theotodman.com.