Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
Degrees of Personhood
(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)
Plug Note1
- Thesis Text:
- That personhood may come in degrees – rather than being “all or nothing” – is rather a dangerous thought, at least if applied to human persons2.
- However, if we are inclined to extend the boundaries of personhood to include some higher non-human animals3 (or – in the future – artificial intelligences4) – but don’t want them to be on a par with human beings, for instance in moral accountability – we might have to allow the thought “person – 2nd class”, or something like that.
- It seems clear that the qualities that qualify an individual to be a person5, come in degrees.
- The key point at issue is probably whether personhood is an honorific (a property of substances) rather than a substance6-term itself. If it is not a substance-term, as I believe it is not, then we have the option to provide – say – legal protection to the underlying substance – say human animal7 or human being8, and then denying the epithet “person” to some human beings need not have the genocidal overtones that are usually suspected whenever such a thought is expressed. But, it still might be better to avoid refusing the term altogether.
- So, maybe some persons are “more” persons than others and persons do indeed come in degrees. But maybe they are just better persons according to some criteria – whether ethical or metaphysical – and these criteria need to be sharply distinguished.
- For instance Frankfurt – in "Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" – claimed that wantons9 are not persons, but maybe we should say that (from an ethical perspective) they are poor exemplars of the concept PERSON.
- We can think of an analogy with animals. Some animals (eg. human beings – or, lest we be considered a special case - chimpanzees) are, according to many evaluative criteria, superior to other animals (worms). Yet all are animals. Now ethically and practically, some animals deserve greater consideration than others – it would appear that chimpanzees have a greater capacity for suffering than worms, for instance. So too, presumably, do exemplars of the same species, though not to the same degree except in severely pathological cases.
- The issue is thus highlighted by the possibility that some of the higher mammals are persons, nearly persons, or persons of reduced degree. If all persons are just persons, period, and all persons have to be treated equally (if that is our ethical outlook), then we might be stuck with duties that seem counter-intuitive (to some, at least). Alternatively, an “all or nothing” stance may be used by us to avoid giving certain sentient beings the care they deserve.
References
- Relevant Works cited above:
- "Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person", 1991, Write-Up Note10, Internal PDF Link, Read
- For a Page of Links11 to this Note, Click here. Somewhat minimal; I need to think up useful alternates to search on.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read12, include the following:-
- A further reading list might start with:-
- General:
- "Anstotz (Christoph) - Profoundly Intellectually Disabled Humans and the Great Apes: A Comparison", 1993
- "Carter (William) - Once and Future Persons", 1980, Internal PDF Link, Read = 50%
- "Jaworska (Agnieszka) & Tannenbaum (Julie) - The Grounds of Moral Status", 2013-18, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 10%
- "Parfit (Derek) - Later selves and moral principles", 1973, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 11%
- For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
- Read: No items to list.
- Further Reading: No items to list.
- This is mostly a place-holder14.
In-Page Footnotes:
Footnote 5:
- See in Dennett, and also my main Note on Persons.
Table of the Previous 7 Versions of this Note:
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
| Baker - The Importance Of Being a Person |
Forensic Property |
Intelligence |
Language of Thought |
Methuselah |
| Person |
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3 |
Semantics, 2 |
Sorites |
Status: Personal Identity (2025 - December) |
| Status: Priority Task List (2026 - February) |
Status: Summary (2025 - December) |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2 |
Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues), 2, 3 |
| Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 |
Vagueness |
Wantons |
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
|
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
The Importance Of Being a Person |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Carter (William) |
Once and Future Persons |
Paper |
2 |
|
| de Bres (Helena) |
Both one and yet distinct |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Jaworska (Agnieszka) & Tannenbaum (Julie) |
The Grounds of Moral Status |
Paper |
|
|
| Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Marino (Lori) |
Happy the person |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Mitchell (Robert) |
Humans, Nonhumans and Personhood |
Paper |
|
|
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) |
Paper |
2, 3 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Forensic Property |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Intelligence |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Language of Thought |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Methuselah |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Person |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Personal Identity |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Semantics |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Sorites |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Vagueness |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Wantons |
Paper |
|
Yes |
References & Reading List
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
| Anstotz (Christoph) |
Profoundly Intellectually Disabled Humans and the Great Apes: A Comparison |
Paper - Cited |
Cavalieri & Singer - The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity |
No |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
The Importance Of Being a Person |
Paper - Referencing |
Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 6, pp. 147-163 |
Yes |
| Carter (William) |
Once and Future Persons |
Paper - Cited |
American Philosophical Quarterly, 17, Jan. 1980, pp. 61-66 |
33% |
| Carter (William) |
Once and Future Persons |
Paper - Referencing |
American Philosophical Quarterly, 17, Jan. 1980, pp. 61-66 |
33% |
| Cavalieri (Paola) & Singer (Peter), Eds. |
The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Cavalieri (Paola) & Singer (Peter), Eds. |
The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| de Bres (Helena) |
Both one and yet distinct |
Paper - Referencing |
Aeon, 21 November 2023 |
Yes |
| Frankfurt (Harry) |
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person |
Paper - Cited |
Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind |
Yes |
| Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) |
Aeon: Follow-up Boxes |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
100% |
| Jaworska (Agnieszka) & Tannenbaum (Julie) |
The Grounds of Moral Status |
Paper - Referencing |
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2013-18 |
10% |
| Lewis (David) |
Philosophical Papers Volume I |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Lewis (David) |
Survival and Identity |
Paper - Cited |
Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 1: Ontology, Chapter 5 |
Yes |
| Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper - Cited |
Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987 |
Yes |
| Lockwood (Michael) |
When Does a Life Begin? |
Paper - Referencing |
Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987 |
Yes |
| Lockwood (Michael), Ed. |
Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
29% |
| Lockwood (Michael), Ed. |
Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
29% |
| Marino (Lori) |
Happy the person |
Paper - Referencing |
Aeon, 16 September 2022 |
Yes |
| Mitchell (Robert) |
Humans, Nonhumans and Personhood |
Paper - Referencing |
Cavalieri & Singer - The Great Ape Project - Equality Beyond Humanity |
44% |
| Rosenthal (David), Ed. |
The Nature of Mind |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
10% |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Degrees of Personhood |
Paper - By Subtopic |
|
Yes |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026