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Baker - In Favour Of the Constitution View
(Text as at 28/09/2022 10:24:58)
Introduction
Author’s Abstract1
- Concludes the book with reasons to accept the Constitution View2. It really is a materialistic3 view. It can accomplish almost everything that a dualist wants without the burden of dualism. It takes persons seriously in a specified sense: Being a person is relevant to the fundamental kind of individual that one is; elimination of any person would be elimination of an individual; having mental states is relevant to what a person is. No other materialist4 view takes persons seriously in all three of these respects.
- The Constitution View5 explains how it is that, although we are set apart by our first-person perspectives6, we are still animals. Hence, the Constitution View7 locates human persons in the material world. The general idea of constitution (without identity) allows for a metaphysics that is both materialistic8 and nonreductive. This general conception of constitution supports an ontological pluralism that honors the genuine variety of kinds of individuals in the world.
Contents
- Yes, Materialism9
- Dualism and its Desiderata
- Taking Persons Seriously10
- Materialistic11 Competitors
- Conclusion
Comments on the above12
- Chapter 9 ("Baker (Lynne Rudder) - In Favour Of the Constitution View") concludes the book with reasons to accept the Constitution View. It really is a materialistic13 view. It can accomplish almost everything that a dualist wants without the burden of dualism. It takes persons seriously in a specified sense: Being a person is relevant to the fundamental kind of individual that one is; elimination of any person would be elimination of an individual; having mental states is relevant to what a person is. No other materialist14 view takes persons seriously in all three of these respects.
- The Constitution View explains how it is that, although we are set apart by our first-person perspectives18, we are still animals. Hence, the Constitution View locates human persons in the material world. The general idea of constitution (without identity) allows for a metaphysics that is both materialistic19 and nonreductive. This general conception of constitution supports an ontological pluralism that honors the genuine variety of kinds of individuals in the world.
- Nothing much to add here, except to repeat that all the benefits of the CV would seem to be available if we say that human persons are human animals, distinguished from other animals by having the special, though temporary, property of being a person.
- Of course, this doesn’t satisfy Baker’s hidden agenda, of wanting an account of human persons that allows for resurrection or some other form of eternal existence.
This text below is my detailed review of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - In Favour Of the Constitution View", Chapter 9 of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View". The main text is my interpretation of what Baker says, with my specific comments and objections appearing as footnotes.
0. Introduction
- In this final Chapter, Baker wants to review the benefits of the CV that she has introduced throughout the book, expand on some of them, and add a few more.
- The aim of the Chapter is to stress the strengths of the CV and its advantages over its rivals.
1. Yes, Materialism20
- … to be supplied.
2. Dualism and its Desiderata
- … to be supplied.
3. Taking Persons Seriously21
- … to be supplied.
4. Materialistic22 Competitors
- … to be supplied.
5. Conclusion
- Baker repeats the analogy23 of Sculptures and Human Persons from the perspective of CWI:-
- Sculpture: is distinguished from its piece of marble by its relation to an artworld. It has a physical nature in virtue of being constituted by a piece of marble. It has its aesthetic nature by being non-derivatively a sculpture.
- Human Person: is distinguished from the human animal by its FPP (or its capacity for one). Has a biological nature by being constituted by a human organism and a psychological / moral nature in virtue of being non-derivatively a person.
- Both CWI and the CV were (says Baker) shown to be coherent in Chapters 7 & 8 ("Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution" & "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons"). But, there are more things in their favour. Baker lists four:-
- The CV of Human Persons shows how they are related to their bodies in a completely general way without any special pleading for persons. CWI gives a comprehensive definition of ‘material thing’.
- The CV is superior to its competitors in providing realism and determinacy about Persons. It’s compatible with our deep-seated intuitions24 without resorting to immaterialism. She cites Locke25’s ‘Prince and Cobbler’.
- The CV grounds what is unique to us (moral and rational agency) in our ontological difference26 from other things. Hence, it’s distinguished from Animalism27, which claims that the most important fact about us ontologically is that we are animals, whereas the CV claims that what’s most about us ontologically is that we have a FPP28. The CV ties together what we are with what matters to us and what is important about us with what we most basically are. The evolution of the FPP – if this is true – does not detract from the fact that29 beings with a FPP are fundamentally different from other beings.
- The CV explains why – despite our distinctive FPPs – we are ‘still animals and straightforwardly part of nature’. Constitution means that we have an animal nature just as30 Michelangelo’s David has a marble nature. So, the CV locates human persons firmly in the material world while accommodating our special FPPs that set us apart from other animals.
- In addition, CWI has many other virtues:-
- CWI can be spelled out using (C) as explained in Chapter 2, supplemented by the notion of ‘having properties derivatively’.
- CWI achieves what certain deviant logics of identity31 try to achieve, but retaining the classical meaning of ‘Identity’.
- CWI allows for a metaphysics that is nonreductive without being anti-materialistic. It is consistent with global supervenience32 of all properties on fundamental physical properties. That stops it being anti-materialistic. But it denies ‘intrinsicalism’, which claims that an object’s nature and identity is determined by the properties of the fundamental particles that constitute it. Hence it’s nonreductive.
- CWI supports ontological pluralism for the genuine variety of kinds of individuals in the world.
- Between the Big Bang and now many things have come into existence, either naturally or man-made. The CV sits comfortably in all this.
In-Page Footnotes:
Footnote 1: Footnote 12: Footnote 23:
- I still can’t see the cogency of this analogy. In fact, the more I think about it, the more absurd it seems, not least because there can be no analogy of any depth between artifacts and naturally-occurring organisms.
- What makes a sculpture a sculpture is an extrinsic property – it requires people to consider it to be a sculpture.
- What makes a person as person is (according to Baker, but not unreasonably) a FPP. But, this is an intrinsic property.
- The sculpture is tightly bound to its piece of marble. Any other piece of marble that looked like this sculpture would be a copy. It’s not possible to port this sculpture to a different infrastructure. It’s hardware not software.
- As Baker is a materialist, any psychological properties of a person are also tightly bound to the organism that has them. But, Baker wants these to be portable to another infrastructure. But, this is no more possible than for the sculpture. We are wetware, not software.
- We share many psychological properties with the higher animals, to whom Baker denies an FPP. I would say they do have a FPP, though ‘first person’ is in the grammatical sense rather in the ‘death pondering self-improving’ form that Baker requires.
- Moral properties may well be partly extrinsic – depending on being part of a community; but there is only a difference of degree with other social animals.
Footnote 24: Footnote 26:
- This is more transparently grounded in our being very special animals.
Footnote 29:
- Of course, this ‘fact’ is denied by many, who see a continuity and matters of degree.
Footnote 30:
- As I’ve remarked elsewhere, I doubt the cogency of this analogy.
- But, even if it is a valid analogy, it may not work as Baker wants it to.
- Michelangelo’s David can’t escape the particular piece of marble from which it is made (though – denying mereological essentialism – it might be repaired; but – as it’s an artifact – it is somewhat arbitrary how much repair it can stand). Some other piece of marble that looked the same would be a copy. It’s an essential property of Michelangelo’s David that it was made by Michelangelo.
- However, Baker wants our FPP to be able to hop to another body at resurrection.
Table of the Previous 4 Versions of this Note:
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
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Summary of Notes Citing This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?) |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Constitution View |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Physicalism |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - References |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Taking Persons Seriously |
Paper |
|
Yes |
References & Reading List
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
In Favour Of the Constitution View |
Paper - Cited |
Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 9, pp. 213-229 |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Personal Identity Over Time |
Paper - Cited |
Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 5, pp. 118-146 |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View |
Book - Cited |
Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' |
Paper - Cited  |
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View" |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Reply to Zimmerman’s 'Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism' |
Paper - Cited  |
Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004 |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons |
Paper - Cited |
Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 8, pp. 191-212 |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution |
Paper - Cited |
Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 7, pp. 167-190 |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. |
E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Cooper (John) |
Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate |
Book - Cited |
Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate |
23% |
| Peterson (Michael) & VanArragon (Raymond) |
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
13% |
| Van Inwagen (Peter) |
The Possibility of Resurrection |
Paper - Cited |
The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 9, 1978 |
56% |
| Williams (Bernard) |
Problems of the Self |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
37% |
| Williams (Bernard) |
The Self and the Future |
Paper - Cited |
Williams - Problems of the Self |
Yes |
| Zimmerman (Dean) |
Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism |
Paper - Cited |
Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004 |
Yes |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)