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Personal Identity
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)
(Text as at 02/10/2014 17:12:29)
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Abstract
- The Thesis seems to fall naturally into three sections (other than this Introduction and the Conclusion); namely,
- Setting up the problem (Chapters 2-5),
- Olson and Baker’s views contrasted (Chapters 6-9); and
- Testing the preferred solution (Chapters 10-11).
- Consequently, I intend my Thesis to have the following chapters:-
- Chapter 01: Introduction
- Chapter_021: What are We?
- Chapter_032: What is a Person?
- Chapter_043: Basic Metaphysical Issues
- Chapter_054: Persistence and Time
- Chapter_065: Animalism and Arguments for It
- Chapter_076: The Constitution View and Arguments for It
- Chapter_087: Arguments against Animalism
- Chapter_098: Arguments against the Constitution View
- Chapter_109: Thought Experiments
- Chapter_1110: Resurrection
- Chapter_1211: Conclusion
Research Methodology
- Follow this Link12 for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
- The method is broken down into 12, possibly iterative, stages.
- Follow this Link13 for my progress dashboard on these tasks.
- The methodology for this Chapter differs somewhat from most other Chapters in that there is little real work, other than background reading and checking that the Thesis as a whole hangs together.
- However, I do need to record while reading the general surveys anything that needs to go into the Historical Survey or Motivating Statement.
- Another couple of “clearing up” tasks14 specific to this Chapter are:-
… to ensure that all the Papers on Identity that I have actually read are referenced somewhere15 in this Thesis.
… to ensure that all the Notes on Identity that I have actually produced are referenced somewhere16 in this Thesis.
Main Text
- For convenience, brief abstracts (as currently intended) of the above chapters are given below. I have included on-going hyperlinks from the above links to my initial thoughts on these topics (and to reading lists and plans for further research) by way of further clarification. The reading lists are rather full, and I’ll need to whittle them down to those I actually intend to read (and, better, address).
- Chapter Abstracts
- Introduction: See below for a motivating statement and a brief historical general survey of the topic of Personal Identity.
- What are We? : The topic “personal identity” has historically presupposed that we are (in the sense of “identical to”, or “most fundamentally”) persons, whereas I (along with other animalists) claim that we are identical to human animals. “We” requires explanation. This chapter will sort out the topic of discussion for the Thesis as a whole.
- What is a Person?: This chapter will canvass the various views and consider how important issues in this area are to my main concern of our identity.
- Basic Metaphysical Issues: Substances and sortals are central to the persistence of anything, and in particular to my claim that persons are phase sortals of human animals (the substances). I need to address the concept of a SOUL as souls are the major counter-claim to the persisting entity being an animal; or at least popularly so. The question of Natural Kinds arises in considering whether PERSON is a natural kind concept.
- Persistence and Time: A number of thought experiments that feature in Chapter 10 seem to fail if perdurantism is true (because the reduplication objections fail). Depending on whether any of these are critical to my arguments, I may need to consider the impact of perdurantism. But this complex area may be a step too far within a fairly limited word-count. I’m also unsure whether it should feature before or after the account of Thought Experiments.
- Animalism and Arguments for it: This Chapter describes what Animalism is, with an excursus on animals and organisms and their persistence. It puts forward the arguments in favour of animalism, those against being reserved for a later Chapter. It focuses on the account of Eric Olson, the primary contemporary exponent of Animalism.
- The Constitution View and Arguments for it: This Chapter gives an account of Lynne Rudder Baker’s thesis that human persons are not identical to human animals, but are – temporarily at least – constituted by them.
- Arguments against Animalism: A discussion of the arguments against animalism, as given by those of anti-animalist persuasion and defended by the principal animalists (with a focus on Olson), with a critique.
- Arguments against the Constitution View: A discussion of the arguments against the Constitution View, focusing on the principal animalists, with a critique. In particular, I intend to critique Olson’s “thinking animal” argument against the Constitution View (though I think this argument is unnecessary for Olson to establish the case for Animalism).
- Thought Experiments: Any account of personal identity needs to give an account of what is going on in the various thought experiments that have been thought relevant to the topic. It’s also the area that’s most fun. Indeed, I think that the entire Thesis will be an exercise in inference to the best explanation. It needs to account for our intuitions (if there is a universal response) or explain them away as confused. I will firstly briefly consider the propriety of using thought experiments in this domain of enquiry, and then consider the usual suspects, including the following:-
… Fission
… Fusion
… Replication
… Commissurotomy
… Multiple Personality Disorder
… Brain-state Transfer
… Brain Transplants
… Teletransportation
… Siliconisation
- Resurrection: If mind-body substance dualism is false, and we are identical to human animals, then the only possibility for post-mortem existence is some form of bodily resurrection. Since the body is destroyed at death, it would seem that any resurrected individual could only be a copy of the original. It might think of itself as the resurrected pre-mortem individual, but it would be wrong. Consideration of arguments by Peter Van Inwagen in this respect. This chapter is likely to be controversial, so needs to be very carefully argued, and factually correct concerning what is actually believed by intellectually-aware Christians and Muslims (unlike what seems to be the case with most swipes against religion). Maybe I should also cover reincarnation.
- Conclusion:
… We are human animals,
… Human persons fall under phase sortals of the concept HUMAN ANIMAL,
… The person is inseparable from the animal,
… The animal is utterly destroyed at death,
… Substance dualism is false, and
… Consequently (given the sort of thing we are) resurrection or any other post-mortem survival is impossible for us.
Motivating Statement
- This will explain why I’ve undertaken this research, and encourage the reader to continue.
- To be supplied17.
Brief historical general survey of the topic of Personal Identity
- To be supplied18.
Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed19
- In this Chapter I will consider the following papers or book chapters (together with some others referenced by these). There are doubtless many more that are relevant and which will be addressed in the course of the thesis, but these are probably sufficient to get us going.
- The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce and motivate the Thesis. As such, I need to situate it in the history of the topic. This is done in a number of introductory books, General Surveys, or collections of Papers that are standard fodder in courses on Personal Identity.
- Consequently, I will review the various Surveys of Personal Identity that feature in the standard reading lists, both to demonstrate that I’ve read them, and to ensure I’ve missed nothing major.
- If a Paper in a Collection or Chapter in an Introduction is specific to a later Chapter in this Thesis, its consideration may be reserved until a later Chapter, even if the Book itself is not. These will be noted in due course.
- Other works were considered and either cut or reserved for later, as indicated below. The easiest way to see all the works considered is via the reading list at the end of this Note.
- Introductory or General Books
- Standard Collections
- "Harris (Henry) - Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford", Harris21
- "Kolak (Daniel) & Martin (Raymond), Eds. - Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues", Kolak&Martin
- "Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John), Eds. - Personal Identity", Martin&Barresi
- "Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Personal Identity (Readings)", Noonan
- "Paul (Ellen), Miller (Fred) & Paul (Jeffrey), Eds. - Personal Identity", Paul&Miller22
- "Perry (John), Ed. - Personal Identity", Perry
- "Rorty (Amélie Oksenberg), Ed. - The Identities of Persons", Rorty
The Cut
- Various works were considered for this Chapter, but were either reserved for consideration in other Chapters, or were rejected, at least for the time being.
- Priority Works to be read later for other Chapters:-
- For Chapter_0323:
… "Margolis (Joseph) - Persons and Minds: Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism", Margolis
- For Chapter_0424
… "Hirsch (Eli) - The Concept of Identity", Hirsch
… "Lowe (E.J.) - The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time", Lowe
… "Lowe (E.J.) - Kinds of Being: Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms", Lowe
… "MacBride (Fraser), Ed. - Identity and Modality", MacBride
… "Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Identity", Noonan
- For Chapter_0525:
… "Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings", Haslanger&Kurtz
… "Hawley (Katherine) - How Things Persist", Hawley
… "Heller (Mark) - The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter", Heller
- For Chapter_0726:
…"Rea (Michael), Ed. - Material Constitution - A Reader", Rea27
- I have largely ignored the many works by Lynne Rudder Baker and Eric Olson in this Chapter, as they feature heavily later in the Thesis.
- Secondary Works to be “parked” for the time being:
Links to Notes
- General_Surveys31.
- Maybe others (to be supplied).
In-Page Footnotes
Footnote 14: These will be left until all Chapters have completed Task 7.
Footnote 15:
- This may either be “as utilised” or “as ignored”.
- Follow this link .
Footnote 16:
- This may either be “as utilised” or “as ignored”.
- Follow this link .
Footnote 19:
- See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
- The author’s surname is repeated in the text to make it easier for me to see what’s going on in the encoded text I work on.
Footnote 20: Somewhat elementary, but worth (re-)reading quickly
Footnote 21: Harris is an interesting case, in that it includes three important papers and three that are off-topic, but important in illustrating the divergent usages of the term “identity”.
Footnote 22: This is more recent than the others.
Footnote 27: But note that Baker’s account of constitution differs from the mereological account assumed in Rea’s anthology.
Footnote 28: The works by Reuscher and Trupp are too eccentric to be given any priority.
Footnote 29: The works by Slors may be worth reading as a fairly contemporary defence of the psychological view; just not yet.
Footnote 30: The work by Vesey is too out of date for a priority item.
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