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Animadversions

Awaiting Attention (Write-ups)

(Text as at 10/11/2007 13:17:46)

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Live Version of this Archived Note

Date Length Title
10/11/2007 13:17:46 477 Awaiting Attention (Write-ups)



This version updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
10/11/2007 13:17:46 None available Awaiting Attention






Summary of Note Links to this Page

Anscombe - On Sensations of Position Armstrong - Bodily Sensations Atherton - Berkeley's Anti-Abstractionism Atherton - Locke and the Issue Over Innateness Awaiting Attention, 2, 3
Baillie - What Am I?, 2, 3 Baker - In Favour Of the Constitution View, 2, 3, 4 Baker - Personal Identity Over Time, 2 Baker - Persons and Bodies, 2, 3, 4 Baker - Persons and Bodies - Precis, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18
Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Garrett, 2, 3 Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Noonan, 2, 3 Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Olson, 2, 3, 4 Baker - Persons and Bodies (Book Summary), 2, 3 Baker - Persons and Bodies (e-Symposium)
Baker - Persons in the Material World, 2, 3, 4 Baker - The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons, 2 Baker - The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution, 2, 3 Baker - The Constitution View of Human Persons, 2 Baker - The First-Person Perspective, 2
Baker - The Human Animal: Big-Tent Metaphysics, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 Baker - The Human Animal: Response to Olson, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Baker - The Importance Of Being a Person, 2 Baker - The Very Idea of Constitution, 2 Baker - What Am I?, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Bealer - The A Priori Brandom - Making It Explicit: Conclusion Bynum - Resurrection of the Body (Preface + Introduction), 2 Carter – Artifacts of Theseus, 2 Chisholm - Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions
Chomsky - A Review of B.F.Skinner's Verbal Behavior Clatterbaugh - The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy 1637 - 1739 Cohen - The Logic of the Third Man Cowie - The Role of Universal Grammar in Language-Learning Crain - Brass Tacks in Linguistic Theory
Dancy - A Priori Knowledge Dancy - Coherence Theories Dancy - Coherence, Justification and Knowledge Dancy - Contemporary Epistemology: Introduction Dancy - Empiricist Theories of Meaning
Dancy - Foundationalism Dancy - Foundationalism and Other Minds Dancy - Holism and Indeterminacy Dancy - Induction Dancy - Is Epistemology Possible?
Dancy - Knowledge Dancy - Memory Dancy - Perception: the Choice of a Theory Dancy - Scepticism Dancy - The Conditional Theory of Knowledge
Dancy - Theories of Perception Davidson - Actions, Reasons, and Causes Davidson - Agency Davidson - Intending DeGrazia - Are We Essentially Persons?, 2, 3
Dennett - True Believers Descartes - Fifth Meditation Doepke - What are We? Doepke - What We Are Dretske - Laws of Nature
Edgington - Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions Edgington - The Logic Of Uncertainty Fine - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Fodor - A Functional Taxonomy of Cognitive Mechanisms Fodor - Caveats and Conclusions
Fodor - Central Systems Fodor - Doing Without What's Within Fodor - Four Accounts of Mental Structure Fodor - Input Systems as Modules Fodor - The Persistence of the Attitudes
Fodor&Pylyshyn - Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture Frankfurt - Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility Garrett - Animalism, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Garrett - Persons and Bodies - Response, 2, 3, 4 Gemes - Logical Content and Empirical Significance
Gemes - The World In Itself Gibbard - Contingent Identity Goodman - The New Riddle of Induction Goodman - The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals Haugeland - Semantic Engines
Hempel - Laws and Their Role in Scientific Explanation Hume - Of Justice and Injustice Hume - Operation of the Understanding Jackson - Epiphenomenal Qualia Jackson - Grue
Johnston - Human Beings, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Kagan - Death, 2, 3, 4 Kenny - Reason and Intuition Laurence+Margolis - Poverty of Stimulus Mackie - Causes and Conditions
Markosian - The Human Animal: Three Problems for Olson, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 McDowell - Aesthetic Value McDowell - Values and Secondary Qualities Meinwald - Third Man Mill - Utilitarianism
Moore - Certainty Moore - Common Sense Moore - External World Moore - Four Forms of Scepticism Moreland & Rae - Body & Soul: Establishing a Framework For Approaching Human Personhood
Moreland & Rae - Body & Soul: Human Persons as Substances or Property-Things Moreland & Rae - Body & Soul: Introduction Noonan - Persons and Bodies - Response, 2 Olson - Persons and Bodies - Response Olson - Review of 'Persons: Human and Divine', 2
Olson - The Human Animal: Reply to Baker, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 Olson - The Human Animal: Reply to Zimmerman, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Olson - What Are We?, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Olson - What Are We? The Question, 2 Olson - What Are We? What Now?, 2
Parfit - What We Believe Ourselves To Be, 2, 3 Pink - Reason and Agency Plato - Republic on Women & Children Popper - Conjectures and Refutations Popper - Fallibility as a Criterion of Demarcation
Popper - Merits of Improbability Rosenberg - Thinking Clearly About Death: Methodology Russell - Proper Names Schopenhauer - Freedom of the Will Searle - Intentionality
Searle - Minds, Brains, and Programs Skyrms - Goodman Paradox Spinoza - Ethics Sterelny & Griffiths - From Sociobiology to Evolutionary Psychology Strawson - Why I Have No Future
Stroud - Hume's Theory of Ideas Swinburne - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory, 2 Torchwood, 2 Van Inwagen - Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism Virgin Birth, 2
Vlastos - Third Man Wickler - Berkeley on Immaterialism Williams - Ethics Williams - Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame Williams - Relativism
Williams - Skepticism Wilson - Descartes's Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness Wittgenstein - Bodily Sensations Wong - Relativism Woolhouse - Leibniz and Substance
Woolhouse - Spinoza and Substance Zimmerman - The Human Animal: Objections, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28      

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