Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
Hybrid Theories
(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)
Plug Note1
- Thesis Text:
- In the philosophy of personal identity, I’d like the term “Hybrid Theory” to apply to (to put things somewhat pejoratively) “cake and eat it theories” where you’re faced with an awkward choice between two inconsistent theories, but want – in certain circumstances – to choose the best parts of each. In other words, we might in general want to follow one theory, but in certain awkward cases, be willing – or even strongly inclined – to follow the other.
- My own temptation is to espouse animalism2 but also give a high regard to the First Person Perspective3 so that – if this FPP4 is maintained throughout some adventure – it trumps whatever animalism has to say. This applies particularly to Brain Transplants5, though there are ways out of this conundrum other than adopting a Hybrid theory or simply denying the “brain transplant intuition”.
- "Keles (Serap) - Personal identity and persistence over time : the hybrid view with regard to hylomorphism", a PhD Thesis, looks important in attempting to bring together Animalism6 and the Constitution View7 as a hybrid theory in the context of Hylomorphism8.
- "Ferner (Adam) - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity", another PhD Thesis, contains the claim that David Wiggins held to a Hybrid theory with respect to personal identity. To quote from p. 91:-
Yet while Wiggins takes these features as indicators that ‘person’ is akin to a natural kind word, he is cautious of giving it the full status of such terms, like rabbit, ivy, butterfly, and (putatively) human being. Rather, he suggests that we see ‘person’ as something like a qualification of a natural kind determinable, a ‘hybrid concept’ with a natural kind element and a systemic element as well (alike to how ‘vegetable’ collects together a group of savoury, edible plant kinds).
- The only other material I have that propose or discuss a Hybrid Theory of Personal Identity are:-
→ "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Bodies" (Section 7),
→ "Hodson (Sommer) - A Hybrid View of Personal Identity", a PhD Thesis, and
→ "Kotak (Aakash) - The Hybrid Theory of Personal Identity", an MPhil Thesis.
Further Remarks:
- Of course, there are Hybrid theories that relate to philosophical (and other) questions other than those related to Personal Identity. A number appear in the page of links below.
- I fear I may have been suffering from a terminological muddle when I first set up this Note with the title “Disjunctivism”, not having known how the term is generally used in analytic philosophy, where it is a term of art in areas of philosophy other than Personal Identity, in particular in Epistemology or in treating of perception in the Philosophy of Mind.
- What I’d intended was to say that the term “disjunctivism” stems from that of “disjunction9” – the “or” operator in philosophical logic (in contrast to “conjunction” – namely – “and”).
- However, … all the references to “disjunctivism” that appeared on-line last I looked, and within my own database, seem to refer to other usages.
- I ought really, therefore, to remove all references to “disjunctivism” from this Note, but have decided to retain them for the time being until I get a better handle on what these usages are.
- In "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? What Now?", Eric Olson uses the term “disjunctivism” towards the end of Section 6 (“Theories of Composition”) to refer to a particular theory of composition “… that there are no parts of organisms except tiny particles”. I’m not yet sure whether or not this usage is eccentric, but that’s not what I intend by the term.
References
- Relevant Works cited above:
- "Ferner (Adam) - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity", 2014, Write-Up Note10, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 90%
- "Hodson (Sommer) - A Hybrid View of Personal Identity", 2013, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read
- "Keles (Serap) - Personal identity and persistence over time : the hybrid view with regard to hylomorphism", 2020, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 1%
- "Kotak (Aakash) - The Hybrid Theory of Personal Identity", 2018, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read = 213%
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? What Now?", 2007, Write-Up Note11, Internal PDF Link, Read
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Bodies", 1995, Annotations, Read
- For a Page of Links12 to this Note, Click here. I included “Disjunction” as a cognate, along with “Disjunctivism” and “Disjunctivist”, but it only came up with lots of items in logic and language, so I was going to removed it. But as I’m confused on the topic, I’ve left it for now, but I should probably purge the list of all this.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read13, include the following:-
- Disjunctivism:
- "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? What Now?", 2007, Write-Up Note14, Internal PDF Link
- General:
- "Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings", 2003, Annotations
- "Olson (Eric) - Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity?", 1994, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
- "Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity", 1999
- Hybrid Theory of Personal Identity:
- "Hodson (Sommer) - A Hybrid View of Personal Identity", 2013, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Bodies", 1995, Annotations
- A further reading list might start with:-
- Disjunction:
- "Aloni (Mari) - Disjunction", 2016, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 10%
- Disjunctivism:
- "Blatti (Stephan) - Disjunctivism", 2006, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
- "Candlish (Stewart) & Damnjanovic (Nic) - The Identity Theory of Truth", 1996-2010, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 13%
- "Crane (Tim) - The Problem of Perception", 2005-11, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 2%
- "Thau (Michael) - What is Disjunctivism?", 2004, Internal PDF Link
- "Travis (Charles) - Frege, Father of Disjunctivism", 2005, Internal PDF Link
- Hybrid Theory of Personal Identity:
- "Ferner (Adam) - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity", 2014, Write-Up Note15, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 90%
- "Keles (Serap) - Personal identity and persistence over time : the hybrid view with regard to hylomorphism", 2020, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 1%
- "Kotak (Aakash) - The Hybrid Theory of Personal Identity", 2018, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read = 213%
- Other Hybrid Theories:
- "Conolly (Oliver) - Pleasure and Pain in Literature", 2005, Internal PDF Link, Read = 13%
- "DeGrazia (David) - The Nature of Human Death", 2014, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
- "Kamm (F.M.) - Prerogatives and Restrictions", 1996
- "Kamm (F.M.) - Supererogation, Obligation, and Intransitivity", 1996
- For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
- Read: No items to list.
- Further Reading: No items to list.
- This is mostly a place-holder16.
In-Page Footnotes:
Footnote 9:
- As detailed – amongst other uses of “disjunction – in the SEP article "Aloni (Mari) - Disjunction".
- In common usage, a “disjunction” is often used as implying a lack of connection – if not a contrast or contradiction – between two ideas.
Table of the Previous 5 Versions of this Note:
| Note last updated |
Reading List for this Topic |
Parent Topic |
| 06/07/2023 00:43:12 |
None available |
Logic of Identity |
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
| First-Person Perspective |
Hylomorphism |
Olson - What Are We? The Question, 2 |
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3 |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) |
| Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2, 3, 4, 5 |
Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It), 2 |
Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5 |
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
|
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
| Adams (Ernest) |
On the Logic of High Probability |
Paper  |
|
|
| Aloni (Mari) |
Disjunction |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 |
|
| Balaguer (Mark) |
Anti-Metaphysicalism, Necessity, and Temporal Ontology |
Paper |
|
|
| Bar-On (Dorit) |
Transparency, Epistemic Impartiality, and Personhood |
Paper |
|
|
| Blackburn (Simon) & Simmons (Keith) |
Truth: Introduction |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4 |
Yes |
| Blatti (Stephan) |
Disjunctivism |
Paper  |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
|
| Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) |
The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe? |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Candlish (Stewart) & Damnjanovic (Nic) |
The Identity Theory of Truth |
Paper |
|
|
| Conolly (Oliver) |
Pleasure and Pain in Literature |
Paper |
2, 3 |
|
| Crain (Stephen) & Pietroski (Paul) |
It's not Wise to Fool with Mother Nature |
Paper |
|
|
| Crain (Stephen), Goro (Takuya) & Minai (Utako) |
Hidden Units in Child Language |
Paper |
|
|
| Crane (Tim) |
The Problem of Perception |
Paper |
2, 3 |
|
| DeGrazia (David) |
The Nature of Human Death |
Paper |
|
|
| Earman (John), Smeenk (Christopher) & Wuthrich (Christian) |
Do the Laws of Physics Forbid the Operation of Time Machines |
Paper |
|
|
| Garrett (Brian) |
Personal Identity and Extrinsicness |
Paper |
|
|
| Geisler (Norman) & Corduan (Winfried) |
Ontological Arguments |
Paper |
2, 3 |
Yes |
| Hartl (Daniel L.) |
Our Uncertain Heritage: Genetics & Human Diversity |
Book |
|
|
| Hartshorne (Charles) |
The Necessarily Existent |
Paper |
2, 3 |
Yes |
| Hetherington (Stephen) |
Gettier Problems |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Hinton (J.M.) |
Review of Minds, Brains and People by T. E. Wilkerson |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Horgan (Terence) |
Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum |
Paper |
|
|
| Kamm (F.M.) |
Prerogatives and Restrictions |
Paper |
|
|
| Kamm (F.M.) |
Supererogation, Obligation, and Intransitivity |
Paper |
|
|
| Kim (Jaegwon) |
Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction |
Paper |
|
|
| Kingma (Elselijn) |
Were You Part of Your Mother? |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Kotak (Aakash) |
The Hybrid Theory of Personal Identity |
Paper |
2 |
|
| Noonan (Harold) |
Persons, Animals and Human Beings |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity? |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
Psychology and Personal Identity |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Plantinga (Alvin) |
On Taking Belief in God as Basic |
Paper |
|
|
| Pritchard (Duncan) |
What do you know? What is Knowledge? And Do We Have Any? |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Reimer (Marga) |
Reference |
Paper |
|
|
| Schellenberg (J.L.) |
Pluralism and Probability |
Paper |
2, 3 |
|
| Searle (John) |
The Recent History of Materialism: The Same Mistake |
Paper |
|
|
| Snowdon (Paul) |
Persons, Animals, and Bodies |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Thau (Michael) |
What is Disjunctivism? |
Paper |
|
|
| Todman (Theo) |
Review of 'What is Truth?' by Peter Vardy |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - First-Person Perspective |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Hylomorphism |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Personal Identity |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5 |
Yes |
| Travis (Charles) |
Frege, Father of Disjunctivism |
Paper |
2 |
|
| Weiskrantz (Larry) |
Some contributions of neurophysiology of vision and memory to the problem of consciousness |
Paper |
|
|
References & Reading List
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
| Aloni (Mari) |
Disjunction |
Paper - Cited |
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016 Edition |
10% |
| Bermudez (Jose Luis), Marcel (Anthony) & Eilan (Naomi), Eds. |
The Body and the Self |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
4% |
| Blackburn (Simon) & Simmons (Keith) |
Truth: Introduction |
Paper - Referencing |
Blackburn & Simmons - Truth |
Yes |
| Blackburn (Simon) & Simmons (Keith), Eds. |
Truth: Oxford Readings in Philosophy |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
8% |
| Ferner (Adam) |
Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity |
Paper - Cited |
PhD Thesis, Birkbeck, 2014 |
98% |
| Garrett (Brian) |
Personal Identity and Extrinsicness |
Paper - Referencing |
Philosophical Studies 59, pp. 177-194, 1990 |
No |
| Hodson (Sommer) |
A Hybrid View of Personal Identity |
Paper - Cited |
PhD Thesis, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, 2013 |
Yes |
| Keles (Serap) |
Personal identity and persistence over time : the hybrid view with regard to hylomorphism |
Paper - Cited |
PhD Thesis, London Metropolitan University, February 2020 |
1% |
| Kingma (Elselijn) |
Were You Part of Your Mother? |
Paper - Referencing |
Mind, Volume 128, Issue 511, July 2019, Pages 609–646 |
Yes |
| Kotak (Aakash) |
The Hybrid Theory of Personal Identity |
Paper - Cited |
Retrieved from Academia.edu |
73% |
| Noonan (Harold) |
Personal Identity |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Noonan (Harold) |
Persons, Animals and Human Beings |
Paper - Cited |
Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 11 |
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
Is Psychology Relevant To Personal Identity? |
Paper - Referencing |
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72, Number 2, June 1994, pp. 173-186(14). |
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson) |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
16% |
| Olson (Eric) |
What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper - Referencing |
What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 1 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) |
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? What Now? |
Paper - Cited |
What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 9 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) |
Yes |
| Snowdon (Paul) |
Persons, Animals, and Bodies |
Paper - Cited |
Bermudez, Marcel & Eilan - The Body and the Self, 1995 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Hybrid Theories |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)