Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
I
(Work In Progress: output at 29/08/2025 21:50:24)
Plug Note1
- Thesis Text:
- What is the reference of “I”, and does this linguistic usage and convention have any bearing on the metaphysics of Personal Identity in general or Post Mortem Survival2 in particular.
- Naturally, I doubt that it does, but there are arguments to the contrary.
- This topic is not to be confused with discussion of Selves3 or Cartesian Egos4 and maybe other similar topics.
- It is also not really related to the question What We Are5, though the reference of “I” will be to that being.
- "Glover (Jonathan) - I: Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity" and "Button (Tim) - Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the 1930s: Private Pains, Private Languages, and Two Uses of ‘I’" would be good places to start my research.
- Additionally, see "Zimmerman (Dean) - Personal Identity and the Survival of Death", Section 4, and another important source is David Kaplan, though I don’t seem to have many relevant papers yet.
Further Remarks:
- None, currently.
References
- Relevant Works cited above:
- "Glover (Jonathan) - I: Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity", 1988, Book, Read = 6%
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Personal Identity and the Survival of Death", 2015, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read = 42%
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read6, include the following:-
- Aeon:
- "Laing (Olivia) - Me, myself and I", 2012, No Abstract, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- General:
- "Anscombe (G.E.M.) - The First Person", 1991
- "Garrett (Brian) - Anscombe on 'I'", 1998, Internal PDF Link
- "Nagel (Thomas) - Subjective and Objective", 1979, Internal PDF Link
- "Nagel (Thomas) - The Objective Self", 1989
- A further reading list might start with:-
- General:
- "Button (Tim) - Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the 1930s: Private Pains, Private Languages, and Two Uses of ‘I’", 2018, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 5%
- "Campbell (John) - The First Person, Embodiment, And The Certainty That One Exists.", 2004, Internal PDF Link
- "Campbell (John) - What Is It To Know What 'I' Refers To?", 2004, Internal PDF Link
- "Cassam (Quassim) - Introspection, Perception, And Epistemic Privilege", 2004, Internal PDF Link
- "Castaneda (Hector-Neri) - Indexicality: The Transparent Subjective Mechanism for Encountering A World", 1990, No Abstract, Internal PDF Link
- "Castaneda (Hector-Neri) - On the Phenomeno-Logic of the I", 1969, No Abstract
- "Coliva (Annalisa) - The First Person: Error through Misidentification, the Split between Speaker's and Semantic Reference, and the Real Guarantee", 2003, Internal PDF Link
- "Glover (Jonathan) - I: Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity", 1988, Book, Read = 6%
- "Kaplan (David) - Demonstratives", 1993
- "Lukasiewicz (Jan) - The Principle of Individuation: I", 1953
- "Mackie (J.L.) - The Transcendental 'I'", 1985, No Abstract
- "Madell (Geoffrey) - The First Person", 1981
- "Oderberg (David) - Review of Jonathan Glover's 'I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity'", 1992, Internal PDF Link
- "Ormsby (Eric) - Jorge Luis Borges & the plural I", 1999, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Perry (John) - “Borges and I” and “I”", 2007, External Link, Internal PDF Link
- "Perry (John) - Indexicals and Demonstratives", 1997, Internal PDF Link
- "Perry (John) - Myself and 'I'", 1998, No Abstract, Internal PDF Link
- "Perry (John) - The Problem of the Essential Indexical", 1979, Internal PDF Link
- "Perry (John) - Using Indexicals", 2005, Internal PDF Link
- "Ramsey (I.T.) - The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'", 1955, Internal PDF Link
- "Rovane (Carol) - The Epistemology of First-Person Reference", 1987, Internal PDF Link
- "Rovane (Carol) - The First Person", 1998
- "Schechtman (Marya) - Personhood and Personal Identity", 1990, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - ‘I am Elizabeth Anscombe’ is Not an Identity Proposition", 2001, Internal PDF Link
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - What Do We Refer to When We Say 'I'?", 1992, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Personal Identity and the Survival of Death", 2015, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read = 42%
- For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
- Read: No items to list.
- Further Reading: No items to list.
- This is mostly a place-holder7.
Table of the Previous 7 Versions of this Note:
| Date |
Length |
Title |
| 06/07/2023 00:43:12 |
3073 |
I |
| 20/09/2022 11:24:00 |
2798 |
I |
| 11/04/2022 00:01:26 |
2417 |
I |
| 12/02/2021 23:58:34 |
2138 |
I |
| 26/09/2020 19:58:05 |
1270 |
I |
| 19/07/2018 13:56:38 |
2586 |
I |
| 02/07/2017 10:36:29 |
1708 |
I |
| Note last updated |
Reading List for this Topic |
Parent Topic |
| 02/03/2026 07:18:26 |
None available |
Person |
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
| Baker - Review - Olson - What Are We? |
Brain |
Cartesian Ego, 2 |
Constitution View - Objections, 2 |
Fetuses |
| Future Great Pain Test |
Olson - What Are We? The Question, 2 |
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Psychological Continuity - Forward, 2 |
RIP: The Royal Institute of Philosophy - Podcasts, 2 |
| Status: Personal Identity (2025 - December) |
Status: Priority Task List (2026 - February) |
Status: Summary (2025 - December) |
Survival |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2 |
| Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time) |
Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism), 2 |
Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View), 2 |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) |
| Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 |
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
Zygote |
|
|
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Kolak (Daniel) |
Room for a View: On the Metaphysical Subject of Personal Identity |
Paper  |
|
|
| Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| RIP |
The Royal Institute of Philosophy - Podcasts |
Paper |
2 |
|
| Schechtman (Marya) |
Personhood and Personal Identity |
Paper |
|
|
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Brain |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Cartesian Ego |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism) |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View) |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Constitution View - Objections |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Fetuses |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Future Great Pain Test |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Personal Identity |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Survival |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Zygote |
Paper |
|
Yes |
References & Reading List
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
| Anscombe (G.E.M.) |
The First Person |
Paper - Cited |
Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind |
Yes |
| Baker (Lynne Rudder) |
Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson |
Paper - Referencing |
Mind, 117:1120-1122, 2008 |
Yes |
| Bradley (Ben), Feldman (Fred) & Johansson (Jens) |
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)  |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
7% |
| Button (Tim) |
Wittgenstein on Solipsism in the 1930s: Private Pains, Private Languages, and Two Uses of ‘I’ |
Paper - Cited |
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, Volume 82 (Metaphysics) - July 2018, pp. 205-229 |
5% |
| Glover (Jonathan) |
I: Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity |
Book - Cited |
Glover (Jonathan) - I: Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity |
6% |
| Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul) |
Aeon: L-P |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
33% |
| Laing (Olivia) |
Me, myself and I |
Paper - Cited |
Aeon, 19 December, 2012 |
Yes |
| O'Hear (Anthony), Ed. |
Metaphysics |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
8% |
| Olson (Eric) |
What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology |
Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Olson (Eric) |
What Are We? The Question |
Paper - Referencing |
What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 1 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.) |
Yes |
| RIP |
The Royal Institute of Philosophy - Podcasts |
Paper - Referencing |
RIP, Various Dates |
16% |
| Rosenthal (David), Ed. |
The Nature of Mind |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
10% |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Future Great Pain Test |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Personal Identity |
Paper - Referencing |
|
Yes |
| Zimmerman (Dean) |
Personal Identity and the Survival of Death |
Paper - Cited |
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death; ed. Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, and Jens Johansson (OUP, 2015), pp. 97-153 |
42% |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026