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Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity

(Text as at 13/08/2015 23:55:41)

This note provides my detailed review of "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity". The Paper is a rather elementary piece in a book designed for beginners in philosophy, so maybe wasn’t really worth the effort reviewing it. However, in my defence I’d say that – given that I’m intent on defending Animalism¹ – it’s always worth attending to a recent piece written by a prominent Animalist². The structure and headings in the analysis below are my own, but hopefully closely reflect Snowdon’s discussion.

Sections

1. Selves and Persons
   • See "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity" for the full text of this Section, on which my comments appear as footnotes.
   • In summary:-
     1. Snowdon divides what’s in the world into three categories: material objects, sentient beings, and us.
     2. He notes that whatever we are that distinguishes us from other beings in the second category is only a matter of degree.
     3. He makes no distinction between persons³ and selves⁴, something I’m not happy with.
     4. He has three things to say about the terms “person” / “self”: they pick out all of each of us; they are the referent of the first-person pronoun; they don’t necessarily pick out what we most fundamentally are.
     5. There’s an ambiguity in the philosophical literature on Personal Identity as to whether philosophers are talking about what we most fundamentally are, or only about us insofar as we qualify as selves or persons.
     6. Snowdon thinks they at least ought to be talking about what we most fundamentally are, and that’s what he’ll do.
2. Some Questions
   • Snowdon sees three questions, the first two of which are to be dealt with in the other two sections of this Chapter, and the final one is parked:-
     1. The Self-Body Problem: A synchronic question – what do we consist of – is there any more to us than our bodies?
     2. Personal Identity: A diachronic question, leading on from the answer to the previous one. It deals with matters of persistence for beings such as us.
     3. What qualifies an individual to be a person or self?: Snowdon asks, but does not answer:-
        • Do they need to be physical things?
        • Do they need to be subjects of particular types of experience?
        We are referred to "Cassam (Quassim) - Self and World".
3. The Self-Body Problem
   • As noted in the first Section, Snowdon equates Selves and Persons. He now asks what is the relation between this entity, P, to its body₅, B.
   • He asks whether there are any parts of P₆ that are not parts of B, and vice versa.
   • He will consider two initial views:-
     1. No parts of B form part of P; P is entirely distinct from B.
     2. B and P are mereologically identical. B is all there is to P.
     Other possible views are ignored in this introductory essay.
   • He accepts various methodological principles in this Section, as means of determining whether two things are or are not identical:-
     1. Leibniz’s⁷ Law (LL),
     2. Modal⁸ arguments and Essential⁹ Properties¹⁰,
     3. Occam’s Razor₁₁.
   • The example Snowdon gives of View (i) is Cartesian Dualism¹², or the Soul¹³ View. He gives three of Descartes’ arguments:-
     1. I know I’m a P, but don’t know I’ve a B, so – by LL – P<>B. This is exposed as the Masked Man Fallacy₁₄.
     2. (I) P is essentially thinking, (II) B not; (III) B is essentially extended, (IV) P not: so P<>B. While this is a valid form of argument, we need not accept all its premises, in particular (I₁₅) and (IV₁₆) are false, so it is unsound.
     3. Things composed only of bodily parts cannot perform certain acts, such as engaging in conversation and problem-solving. The second alleged problem is the easiest to attack, as the motivation for Descartes was the limited technology of his time (clocks and mechanical models of animals). The possibilities of matter are easily underestimated, and our coincidence with our bodies is proof that bodies can do a lot₁₇.
   • Now on to View (ii), namely P=B. Descartes has given us no reason to think P<>B. There are two sorts of reason why we cannot be identical to something distinct from our bodies₁₈.
     1. Incoherence: there are two alleged cases of this adduced by Snowdon:-
        1. Causal Interaction: there’s a two-way transfer of influence between P and B (sensation and action). Isn’t it impossible to explain this on the dualist view? Snowdon is unimpressed, on the grounds that it’s not ruled out a priori, and might be a special₁₉ case of causation.
        2. Individuation: How are we to make sense of the persistence and individuation of non-physical Selves; between one persisting self and two successive ones? And, how are we to distinguish between two qualitatively identical Selves? Snowdon dismisses these worries as epistemological rather than metaphysical or conceptual.
     2. “Other Bad Features”:
        1. Needless Complexity: There’s no reason to believe that we need anything beyond B to give P, so – by Occam’s Razor – we should stick with the simpler solution, namely B.
        2. Reject Hume’s “Bundle Theory”²⁰: This theory is alleged by Snowdon to try to show that no part of B is a part of P – and is briefly rehearsed and rejected on three counts not worth discussing₂₁.
   • Constitution:
     1. So, if we have shown that there is no reason to think that there are any parts of P that are not parts of B, do we have P=B?
     2. No, for consider a statue S and the piece of clay C that was shaped into it. S just consists of C, yet it doesn’t look as though S=C, as they have different life-histories. C constitutes S and – for all we know – B may constitute P without being identical to P.
     3. A footnote refers to an example of Kripke’s₂₂.
     4. Snowdon claims the debate is completely unsettled, and has to move on. We are referred to Wiggins, but there is no mention of Baker₂₃.
4. Personal Identity
   • We (taken to be Ps) persist over time. Can anything informative be said about our persistence conditions? Snowdon thinks three factors are involved:-
     1. Future contingencies
     2. Some of these lead to P’s survival, others not.
     3. Criteria²⁴ of identity: non-circular specification of just which contingencies P can survive.
   • Snowdon has reservations about TEs²⁵, in that he doesn’t trust our intuitions in unusual cases, but will proceed in the orthodox manner to use them, at least initially.
   • Snowdon initially considers three popular criteria of Personal Identity:-
     1. Body²⁶ Criterion: it is both necessary and sufficient for P to survive that B does.
        • This gives the correct answer to whether the adult is identical to the child.
        • Changes in P’s psychology pose no problems for identity.
        • Some are, however, uncomfortable with this …
     2. Psychological²⁷ Criterion: The above approach is unpopular for two₂₈ reasons:-
        1. TEs seem to show that B and P may come apart in two ways.
           1. B and not-P: To cases … Irreversible brain damage (or Shoemaker’s brain-zap) and MPD²⁹ (Note₃₀).
           2. P and not-B: Brain Transplants³¹.
        2. Locke’s³² theory of Personal Identity seems to many to be along the right lines. So:-
           1. A Person is "a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places", so that “as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person.”
           2. This general approach seems to accommodate people’s intuitions about the TEs.
           3. It displays two general features:-
              1. Persistence of persons consists in psychological relations across time.
              2. There is no requirement for the person to be tied to a particular body.
        3. Neo-Lockeans substitute wider psychological features to the memory-criterion that is central to Locke’s own theory.
           1. Snowdon’s favourites are "Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons" and "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account".
           2. These accounts also substitute “quasi-memory³³” and the like for the standard psychological predicates, which since Butler have been seen to presuppose personal identity rather than analyse it.
           3. We are referred to "Parfit (Derek) - How We Are Not What We Believe", pp. 219-23, and – for a critique – to "Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity".
        4. Whatever the attractions of the psychological view³⁴, some prefer the third traditional alternative …
     3. Brain³⁵ Criterion:
        • The main objection to the body view was the main P and Non-B case – the brain-transplant intuition that “we go with our brains”.
        • We effectively have the best of both worlds, and the person is tied to the object that grounds their psychology.
        • Snowdon cites "Mackie (J.L.) - Identity and Diversity" and "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings".
        • He also notes that the Brain view does not₃₆ claim that I am identical to my brain, as my physical properties differ significantly from those of my brain.
        • What the theory does claim is that I can only survive if my mental features remain grounded in that physical object. But the person is the total thing organised around that object and usually extends well beyond it.
        • Snowdon thinks there are no decisive objections to the BV, though
          1. Neo-Lockeans think there are further P and Non-B cases which show that the brain is not necessary to our survival, and
          2. We can question whether the empirical grounding of mental states is a necessary one.
   • Animalism³⁷
     1. Motivation for Animalism:
        • Snowdon thinks the restricted pallet of concepts involved in the above three options (and others) – namely bodies, body parts and psychological states – has an unnecessarily constraining effect on the debate.
        • Where you are there would appear to be a human animal. What weight – Snowdon asks – should be given to that fact in debates about personal identity?
     2. Arguments for Animalism: Snowdon considers three issues:-
        1. For a brain-theorist or neo-Lockean, the Person and the human animal are not identical.
           1. The B & not-P cases make non-identity clear for the neo-Lockean.
           2. For the BV it’s less clear. Snowdon is less bullish than Olson – he doesn’t say “the brain is just another organ” – but imagines a case in which enough brain is transplanted to ensure the transfer of the psychology, while leaving enough brain behind to ensure the animal survives in some form.
        2. In the course of a normal human life it would be hard to think of any predicates we would ascribe to the person that don’t apply to the human animal (and vice versa). They would seem to be identical.
        3. If the person and the animal are really distinct, then we have what Snowdon calls the Two Lives problem₃₈, unless we don’t allow human animals to have psychological states when we’re quite happy (nowadays) that non-human animals have them. While not a formal contradiction, having twice as many thinkers as we expected is a surprise. This also undermines the thought that persons are marked out by their psychological capacities if human animals have these and yet are not persons.
     3. Animalism:
        1. Has led to a “downgrading” of the Body view, which has no advantages not shared by Animalism.
        2. If we persons are identical to human animals, what are the persistence conditions of animals? There are unresolved questions about the end of life – Snowdon says – are. Does an animal cease to exist when it dies, or continue as a corpse₃₉?
        3. Psychology is irrelevant to the persistence of animals.
        4. We are referred to the following exponents of Animalism:-
           • "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Ourselves",
           • "Ayers (Michael R.) - Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy",
           • "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology".
     4. Problems⁴⁰ for Animalism:
        • The same examples as for the Body view apply, namely “A and not-P” and “P and not-A” cases.
        • In these it is usually easy to see that we are tracking A correctly, but it is not so obvious that we are correctly tracking P.
        • So, take the B and not-P case (re-badged as A and not-P) where an individual has lost all psychology as a result of an accident or brain-zap. Has P really ceased to be, or has P simply suffered a tragedy, while remaining in existence?
        • The most difficult case is the P and not-A case of a brain transplant. Snowdon adopts the “organ donation” solution, that many will find deeply implausible. Detailed Animalist answers include
          1. "Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants", and
          2. "Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach".
5. Where to now …?
   • Snowdon thinks that the problem of the Self and Personal Identity is difficult, and
   • We should not be deceived into thinking we have the answer based only on a cursory sampling of standard TEs.
   • Maybe we are right to think that we are “advanced mentally-endowed self-conscious animals” who have got into a muddle₄₁ and convinced ourselves that we have a differing nature to that animal.
   • But, we are a long way from knowing this₄₂.
6. Further Reading: This is mildly interesting in revealing what Snowdon thinks are the next steps, in case I’ve missed any. I’ve ignored the Classics (Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Butler, Hume).
   • The Self:
     1. "Armstrong (David) - A Materialist Theory of the Mind", Chapters 1-4,
     2. "Smith (Peter) & Jones (O.R.) - The Philosophy of Mind - An Introduction",
     3. "Ryle (Gilbert) - The Concept of Mind", Chapter 1
     4. "Strawson (Peter) - Persons",
     5. "Strawson (Peter) - Self, Mind and Body"
     6. Foster, Ayer
     7. "Wong (Hong Yu) - Cartesian Psychophysics",
     8. "Smart (J.C.C.) - Sensations and Brain Processes",
     9. "Lowe (E.J.) - Substantial Change and Spatiotemporal Coincidence",
     10. "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed",
     11. "Williams (Bernard) - Are Persons Bodies?",
     12. "Nagel (Thomas) - The Objective Self",
     13. "Cassam (Quassim) - Self and World".
         
   • Personal Identity:
     1. "Mackie (J.L.) - Problems from Locke", especially
     2. "Mackie (J.L.) - Identity and Diversity",
     3. "Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity",
     4. "Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness",
     5. "Williams (Bernard) - Personal Identity and Individuation",
     6. "Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons",
     7. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account",
     8. "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings",
     9. "Nagel (Thomas) - Mind and Body",
     10. "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Ourselves",
     11. "Ayers (Michael R.) - Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy",
     12. "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology".

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In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 5: Just note here that this may be an expository simplification. Olson distrusts “bodies” (Click here for Note) and prefers “animals”(Click here for Note) or (maybe, I forget) “organisms” (Click here for Note).

Footnote 6: Not merely for the sake of the argument, since – at this stage – P might be a sum of body and soul or mind and body.

Footnote 11: I have an old Note on this – Click here for Note.

Footnote 14: Intensional properties are really properties of me – the knower – not of the object allegedly known.

Footnote 15:

• Snowdon’s grounds are that
  1. D doesn’t think when asleep or knocked out, and
  2. D might have been born congenitally incapable of thought.
• (i) seems fair enough – though I think D has an answer – disposition, rather than actual practice, but
• (ii) is somewhat question-begging. It assumes something like animalism. A dualist might claim that if “D” had been born congenitally unable to think, then D (the person) would never have existed at all.

Footnote 16:

• Snowdon points out the Descartes’ “clear and distinct” impression that he could exist without a body had been refuted by Arnauld, …
• on the grounds that people had not realised that right triangles are essentially Pythagorean, so how does he know he’s not essentially embodied?

Footnote 17: Snowdon says this is a proof of the existence of the CNS (Click here for Note).

Footnote 18:

• This is rather strangely put. At first sight, it seems equivalent to trying to demonstrate that P=B, so why not just say so?
• However, there is a reason, as Snowdon will consider the issue of constitution at the end of this Section.

Footnote 19:

• It’s usually ruled out, either
  1. by saying it’s a mysterious phenomenon, so any P<>B can be lopped off by Occam’s Razor, or
  2. by invoking the principle of the conservation of energy.
• See, for instance,
  1. "Kim (Jaegwon) - What Could Pair a Nonphysical Soul to a Physical Body?",
  2. "Wilson (David L.) - Nonphysical Souls Would Violate Physical Laws",
  3. "Papineau (David) - There is No Trace of Any Soul Linked to the Body",
  4. "Angel (Leonard) - Since Physical Formulas are Not Violated, No Soul Controls the Body".

Footnote 21: If I ever look into Hume’s views on Personal Identity (Click here for Note) in any detail, I may return to this.

Footnote 22:

• The example seems badly formulated and poorly edited.
• It has to do with a tree which for part of its existence has had its leaves and branches shaved off, being reduced to a trunk. So, says Kripke (says Snowdon), for a period the tree is constituted by its trunk while not being identical to it (as the trunk is a proper part of the tree under normal circumstances).
• Where does this come from? "Kripke (Saul) - Identity and Necessity" is suggested by "Wasserman (Ryan) - Material Constitution".
• It seems a muddle: it’s more related to the problem of temporary intrinsics (ie. of persistence through change) than to constitution.

Footnote 23: See "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View".

Footnote 28: TEs and (initially) Lockean intuitions.

Footnote 30:

• Snowdon alludes to Locke’s day and night persons as a precursor, and
• notes that "Wilkes (Kathleen) - Thought Experiments" - but what about "Wilkes (Kathleen) - Multiple Personality and Personal Identity" - supports the pluralist interpretation.

Footnote 36: Olson seems to think this claimed – ie. that the BV implies I can fit into a hat-box, and so on

Footnote 38:

• I’ve not heard this terminology before, though Snowdon claims it is “sometimes” used. It doesn’t seem to be appropriate, as the focus isn’t on living but thinking. It’s true by definition that persons think, but it’s not clear that “living” – a biological phenomenon – is something that persons – qua persons – do.
• Olson refers to it as the “too many thinkers”, “too many minds” or “thinking animal” problem (Click here for Note).
• Others refer to it as Olson’s “Master Argument”.

Footnote 39: This seems to be resolved – an animal is an organism, but a corpse is just an organised lump of matter. Organisms and corpses have different persistence conditions.

Footnote 41:

• Snowdon doesn’t explicitly say this, but it’s my take on what he probably means.

Footnote 42:

• Again, it’s not 100% clear to me what Snowdon means.
• It could be that he means we’re a long way from knowing that Animalism is true, or that we are a long way from knowing that our true nature differs from that of “merely special” animals.
• Either “take” is probably of a correct stance to take on the matter.

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
13/08/2015 23:55:41	None available	None

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Abbreviations	Animalism	Animalism - Objections	Animalists	Animals
Body	Body Criterion	Brain Criterion	Brain Transplants	Bundle Theories
Criteria of Identity	Dualism	Essentialism	Hume	Leibniz
Locke	Modality	Multiple Personality Disorder	Occam's Razor	Organisms
Person	Properties	Psychological Criterion	Psychological View	Quasi-Memory
Self	Souls	Thinking Animal Argument	Thought Experiments

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Animalism	Animalism - Arguments For	Animalism - Objections	Brain Criterion	Brain Transplants
Bundle Theories	Human Beings	Hume	Logic of Identity	Modality
Multiple Personality Disorder	Properties	Psychological Criterion	Quasi-Memory, 2, 3	Self
Self-Consciousness	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2, 3	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)
Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time), 2	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It), 2, 3	Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2, 3	Thesis - Personal Identity
Thesis - References, 2	Thinking Animal Argument	Thought Experiments	Wantons	What are We?

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Animalism	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Animalism - Arguments For	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Animalism - Objections	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Brain Criterion	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Brain Transplants	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Bundle Theories	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Human Beings	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Hume	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Logic of Identity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Modality	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Multiple Personality Disorder	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Personal Identity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Properties	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Criterion	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Quasi-Memory	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - References	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Self	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Self-Consciousness	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Thinking Animal Argument	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Thought Experiments	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Wantons	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - What Are We?	Paper		Yes

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Angel (Leonard)	Since Physical Formulas are Not Violated, No Soul Controls the Body	Paper - Cited	Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 16	No
Armstrong (David)	A Materialist Theory of the Mind	Book - Cited	Armstrong (David) - A Materialist Theory of the Mind	3%
Ayers (Michael R.)	Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	26%
Ayers (Michael R.)	Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy	Paper - Cited	Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 25, pp. 278-292	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View	Book - Cited	Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View	Yes
Cassam (Quassim)	Self and World	Book - Cited	Cassam (Quassim) - Self and World	0%
Cockburn (David), Ed.	Human Beings	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	7%
Garrett (Brian)	Personal Identity and Self-consciousness	Book - Cited	Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness	Yes
Gill (Christopher)	The Person and the Human Mind: issues in ancient and modern philosophy	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	3%
Johnston (Mark)	Human Beings	Paper - Cited	Journal of Philosophy, Volume 84, Issue 2 (Feb 1987), 59-83	Yes
Kim (Jaegwon)	What Could Pair a Nonphysical Soul to a Physical Body?	Paper - Cited	Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 13	No
Kripke (Saul)	Identity and Necessity	Paper - Cited	Loux - Metaphysics - Contemporary Readings	10%
Loux (Michael), Ed.	Metaphysics - Contemporary Readings	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	1%
Lowe (E.J.)	A Survey of Metaphysics	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	No
Lowe (E.J.)	Substantial Change and Spatiotemporal Coincidence	Paper - Cited	Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics, Chapter 4	No
Mackie (J.L.)	Identity and Diversity	Paper - Cited	Mackie - Problems from Locke, Chapter 5	No
Mackie (J.L.)	Problems from Locke	Book - Cited	Mackie (J.L.) - Problems from Locke	No
Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith)	The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	15%
Nagel (Thomas)	Mind and Body	Paper - Cited	Nagel (Thomas) - A View from Nowhere, Chapter 3	Yes
Nagel (Thomas)	The Objective Self	Paper - Cited	Nagel (Thomas) - A View from Nowhere, Chapter 4	Yes
Nagel (Thomas)	The View from Nowhere	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	Personal Identity	Book - Cited	Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity	Yes
Olson (Eric)	The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology	Book - Cited	Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach	Paper - Cited	The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 3, pp. 42-72	Yes
Papineau (David)	There is No Trace of Any Soul Linked to the Body	Paper - Cited	Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 15	No
Parfit (Derek)	How We Are Not What We Believe	Paper - Cited	Parfit - Reasons and Persons, January 1986, pp. 219-245(27).	Yes
Parfit (Derek)	Reasons and Persons	Book - Cited	Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons	Yes
Rosenthal (David), Ed.	The Nature of Mind	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	10%
Ryle (Gilbert)	The Concept of Mind	Book - Cited	Ryle (Gilbert) - The Concept of Mind	Yes
Shand (John)	Central Issues of Philosophy	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	35%
Shand (John)	Central Issues of Philosophy	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	35%
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Personal Identity: a Materialist Account	Paper - Cited	Shoemaker & Swinburne - Personal Identity, 1984, pp. 67-132	22%
Shoemaker (Sydney) & Swinburne (Richard)	Personal Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	11%
Smart (J.C.C.)	Sensations and Brain Processes	Paper - Cited	Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind	Yes
Smith (Peter) & Jones (O.R.)	The Philosophy of Mind - An Introduction	Book - Cited	Smith (Peter) & Jones (O.R.) - The Philosophy of Mind - An Introduction	No
Snowdon (Paul)	Personal Identity and Brain Transplants	Paper - Cited	Cockburn - Human Beings, 1991	Yes
Snowdon (Paul)	Persons, Animals, and Ourselves	Paper - Cited	Christopher Gill, Ed, The Person and the Human Mind, 1990	Yes
Snowdon (Paul)	The Self and Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	Shand (John) - Central Issues of Philosophy, Chapter 9	Yes
Snowdon (Paul)	The Self and Personal Identity	Paper - Referencing	Shand (John) - Central Issues of Philosophy, Chapter 9	Yes
Strawson (Peter)	Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	4%
Strawson (Peter)	Persons	Paper - Cited	Strawson - Individuals, Chapter 3	No
Strawson (Peter)	Self, Mind and Body	Paper - Cited	Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind	No
Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean)	Persons: Human and Divine	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	3%
Wasserman (Ryan)	Material Constitution	Paper - Cited	Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2009-2013	No
Wiggins (David)	Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed, 2001, Chapter 7	48%
Wiggins (David)	Sameness and Substance Renewed	Book - Cited	Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed	16%
Wilkes (Kathleen)	Multiple Personality and Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), pp. 331-348	13%
Wilkes (Kathleen)	Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Wilkes (Kathleen)	Thought Experiments	Paper - Cited	Wilkes - Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments, Chapter 1	Yes
Williams (Bernard)	Are Persons Bodies?	Paper - Cited	Williams - Problems of the Self (1970)	Yes
Williams (Bernard)	Personal Identity and Individuation	Paper - Cited	Williams - Problems of the Self	33%
Williams (Bernard)	Problems of the Self	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	37%
Wilson (David L.)	Nonphysical Souls Would Violate Physical Laws	Paper - Cited	Martin & Augustine - The Myth of an Afterlife, Part 2, Chapter 14	No
Wong (Hong Yu)	Cartesian Psychophysics	Paper - Cited	Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persons: Human and Divine	4%

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