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Personal Identity

Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)

(Text as at 14/02/2026 00:41:46)

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Chapter Contents

  1. Abstract1
  2. Methodology2
  3. Introduction3
  4. Note Hierarchy4
  5. Main Text5
  6. Concluding Remarks6
  7. Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed7
  8. Works Read8
  9. Further Reading9
  10. References & Reading List

Abstract
  1. If mind-body substance dualism is false, and we are identical to human animals, then the only possibility for post-mortem existence is some form of bodily resurrection.
  2. Since the body is destroyed at death, it would seem that any resurrected individual could only be a copy of the original. It might think of itself as the resurrected pre-mortem individual, but it would be wrong.
  3. Consideration of arguments by Peter Van Inwagen in this respect.
  4. This chapter is likely to be controversial, so needs to be very carefully argued, and factually correct concerning what is actually believed by intellectually-aware Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists (other religions are available …), unlike what seems to be the case with most swipes against religion.
  5. It also needs to cover other putative forms of post-mortem survival: I’m considering changing the title to “Life After Death”.


Research Methodology

Chapter Introduction12
  1. While I wish in this chapter seriously to consider the religious hope of Resurrection, I do not want to get side-tracked onto matters of Scriptural exegesis, or into evidential matters of whether particular resurrections – specifically of Jesus – happened or not. In this regard, I’m interested only in what believers in resurrection take it to be, and whether they provide any detailed metaphysical account of how it is supposed to work.
  2. As in the chapter on Thought Experiments, this chapter is partly aimed at checking how (my version of) Animalism copes with the projected situations. As such, I may extend this to other posited versions of post-mortem survival, though most are ruled out by the essentially physical nature of the human person as proposed by Animalism.
  3. While not wanting to get too far off topic, especially at the end of the thesis, I want to consider some of the ethical consequences of adopting Animalism with – as I have argued – the lack of hope of post-mortem existence. The topic of “Death and Ethics” is already a bit tangential to my thesis, but there’s a set of questions in which I have an interest and on which I wonder whether my views on Personal Identity have anything to say. These two are the most important:-
    • Why is death bad (for the deceased)?, and
    • Can the dead be harmed (assuming they no longer exist)?
  4. So, we start off with a discussion of Death13, which – like Life (discussed in Chapter 6 – I take to be a biological event (or rather a Process). We touched on Brain Death in Chapter 2. Despite its pragmatic utility (which I suspect is the main motivator for accepting it as a criterion of Death) this idea is rather confused on any Biological View of What We Are.
  5. I will also discuss certain occasional events on the periphery of Death, namely Near Death Experiences14 and Out of Body Experiences15. Do these events have anything to say about “where we’re going”, in the first case, or what we are, in the second?
  6. Getting closer to Death itself, I need to discuss Persistent Vegetative States16. From an Animalist perspective, such persons are not dead – any more than (though this may be more controversial) the brain-dead are dead – but whether they should be kept alive is (I would claim) primarily a pragmatic issue to do with the use of resources, coupled with consideration of what life is like – if there is anything – for those in such a state.
  7. Then we get to the meat of the Chapter – discussion of Life after Death17. What is it supposed to involve, where is it enjoyed, and how do we get there? Clearly, there are many options. The question is are any of them possible – and, better – actual?
  8. The two options I consider are Resurrection18 and Reincarnation19. In both cases, the big question is what makes it the case that the individual Resurrected or Reincarnated is the same individual as the one who died. I suspect ‘nothing’ in the absence of a Soul, though much argumentation is required to reach this conclusion in the face of objections and various suggestions for possible mechanisms.
  9. We discussed Uploading to a Computer as a (bare) possibility for Life after Death in the Previous Chapter.
  10. In this regard, we need to discuss the possible interim states between Death and putative post-mortem survival. I need to discuss Corpses20, which – in some of the easiest cases – are (supposed to be) the mediators of continuity of identity between Death and Resurrection. Corpses also cause philosophical worries – on many physicalist accounts of Personal Identity – about where they “come from” and whether “we” end up as Corpses.
  11. We need to discuss the possibility of Disembodied Existence21 (which I imagine is the Interregnum22 for Reincarnation) together with a reconsideration of Intermittent Objects discussed in Chapter 5.
  12. Finally, we need to reflect on the consequences of Life after Death, which is usually taken to be Immortality23 (though supporters of the ‘conditional immortality’ position in Christianity have Resurrection followed by destruction for those found unworthy of eternal life).
  13. Before doing so, I will reflect on the supposed difficulty – displayed by Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilych24 – of truly and practically accepting the inevitability of our own deaths, whatever logic and the facts may dictate.
  14. But, is Immortality really something to be desired? Reflection on the Makropulos Case25 suggests that an infinite life would be unbearably tedious, even though at each possible terminus we might want to live on.


Note Hierarchy
  1. Death26
    1. Near Death Experiences27
    2. Out of Body Experiences28
    3. Persistent Vegetative State29
  2. Life After Death30
    1. Resurrection31
    2. Reincarnation32
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses33
    2. Disembodied Existence34
    3. Interregnum35
  4. Immortality36
    1. Ivan Ilych37
    2. Makropulos Case38


Main Text
  1. Death39
    1. Death is important to our study because we’re considering our persistence conditions40, whether we consider ourselves to be
      1. Human Persons41.
      2. Human Animals42 (members of the species homo sapiens43), or
      3. Human Beings44
      and death would seem to be the terminus of such existence45.
    2. That this is so has often been resisted, which is why we must consider such matters as:-
      1. Resurrection46,
      2. Reincarnation47, and
      3. Disembodied Existence48.
    3. Death should be considered a biological event, or maybe – better – a process49. It is the termination of life50, which is also a biological process, though usually a longer one.
    4. Other forms of – and terminations of – existence51 may be termed “life” or “death”, but these are metaphorical expressions used by analogy with biological life or death. So, is the resurrection52 life – if there is one – really “life” or a continued and enhanced form of existence53? Also, is the “second death” really “death”? I suppose we would allow alternative metabolisms to count as “life54”, so that an Android55 that maintained itself might be said to be “alive”; and, consequently, the destruction of such a being might be classified as “death”. A case for this is made in "Lyons (Siobhan) - Death and the Machine: Intersections of Mortality and Robotics".
    5. A particular case of the above is Brain Death56. It’s a large question for Animalists57 – and for holders of the Psychological View58 – whether Brain59 Death is really death, or whether it is (for holders of the PV60) the death (or end) of the Person61.
    6. As a spin-off from the (alleged) Corpse Problem62 for animalism63 (see "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", p. 81 for this objection to animalism64) we need to discuss the process65 of dying – the transition from life66 to death. Just when does death occur (for human animals67)?
    7. No doubt there is a degree of vagueness68 here (though ascribing ‘vagueness’ to such a ‘terminal’ event as death seems counter-intuitive).
    8. Consideration of whether we should fear death, or the process69 of dying, is probably beyond the bounds of this Thesis. However, for a comforting account of the normal process of dying in old age, see this “short” from the BBC: BBC: Dying is not as bad as you think. The author – a medical doctor (Kathryn Mannix – she’s now written "Mannix (Kathryn) - With the End in Mind: How to Live and Die Well") – talks about the “good death” and the process of dying in your bed being not so scary. The dying drift in and out of consciousness70 and return from unconsciousness feeling much as after a refreshing sleep, so we know the coma doesn’t feel frightening and isn’t noticed when it happens. The “death rattle” shows just how relaxed you were. Normal dying is a really gentle process.
    9. Would that were the way for all, rather than as the result of a rather painful trauma71 when you’re not ready to go.
    1. Near Death Experiences72
      1. NDEs, if they are experiences of anything veridical:-
        1. Offer a serious challenge to those who deny the possibility or actuality of life after death73,
        2. Appear to offer support for non-physicalist accounts of the mind and
        3. Cause problems for animalists74 by lending support to alternative accounts of what we are75 – maybe souls76.
      2. Most of the phenomena – which I need to document and comment on (see "Wikipedia - Near-death experience") – can probably be explained by the usual “dying brain” / anoxia / endorphins suggestions, though this can be rather facile – partly because not all NDEs are had by those near death77, but also because the dying brain78 might not be up to the job of having (and remembering79) scenes of such alleged clarity. However, see "Jarrett (Christian) - Ketamine trips are uncannily like near-death experiences", which reports on a study that makes a detailed connection between the experiences of Ketamine (and LSD) users and NDE-reports.
      3. I have my doubts about when such experiences actually occur – but the suggestion that they occur when the experiencer is “coming round” doesn’t seem to be popular.
      4. A difficult situation to “explain away” is where the NDE-experiencer claims to see something (while having an Out of Body Experience80) they could not have seen under normal circumstances.
      5. Further “awkward” cases to dispose of are where experiences analogous to the NDE are had by / shared with friends / relatives of the dying. I presume these accounts should be rejected out of hand, along with all other incredible reports of exotic parapsychological phenomena. The Fenwicks give a sympathetic hearing to (the then) recent results of parapsychological research – but in an undocumented way and showing unawareness that the claims are of slight (though allegedly statistically significant) deviations from chance, not of the exotic phenomena exhibited in the accounts of NDEs. See "Fenwick (Peter) & Fenwick (Elizabeth) - The Truth in the Light: An Investigation of Over 300 Near-Death Experiences", which also rejects the “shoe” case, but for different reasons to that on the Infidels site ("Augustine (Keith) - Hallucinatory Near-Death Experiences"): see also OBEs81.
      6. See "IANDS - Journal of Near-Death Studies". A wealth of material to download for free.
      7. Recently (December 2025) I’ve been challenged to make something of the case of George G. Richie:-
        → "Ritchie (George G.), Sherrill (Elizabeth) - Return from Tomorrow", and
        → "Ritchie (George G.) - Ordered to Return: My Life After Dying"
    2. Out of Body Experiences82
      1. As is the case with Near Death Experiences83, which sometimes include them, OBEs offer various challenges to physicalist84 accounts of the mind85, and to animalist86 accounts of what we are87.
      2. OBEs may or may not be a concomitant of an NDE. They seem sometimes to occur during other crisis times of illness.
      3. An example – see "BBC, Burgess (Gary) - Why do we know so little about ME?" – was given in March 2018 by a reporter suffering from Myalgic Encephalomyelitis, also known as ME, or Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS). He stated quite casually, without any self-consciousness about the prima facie absurdity of his account – “In the middle of a piece about maternity and paternity benefits, during the 6pm news programme, I had the most wonderful sensation. I left my body, was suddenly up in the studio ceiling, and was looking down on myself, the presenters, and all of the camera crew. I was having an out-of-body experience.”
      4. The question is – of course – whether these experiences are of anything outside the mind88. Do they really prove that something like a soul89 can wander out of the body90?
      5. A difficult situation to “explain away” is where the NDE-experiencer claims – as in the example above – to see something (while having an Out of Body Experience) they could not have seen under normal circumstances. The difficulty with evaluating such reports is that they are either vague and unsurprising, or anecdotal and hard to verify – so the presumption is that they aren’t veridical.
      6. There’s a famous “shoe” case where no follow-up seems to have been possible. There’s a (naturally sceptical) page on Infidels.org ("Augustine (Keith) - Hallucinatory Near-Death Experiences") which references this “shoe” case amongst others.
      7. The case of our reporter is surprisingly off-hand for such a surprising claim. "Blackmore (Susan) - Beyond the Body" asserts that 10% of people claim to have had OBEs. Maybe most also believe in immaterial souls91, and think that most other people do likewise. So, they may claim more than they strictly observed as a way of making their experience seem more important than those of rival accounts. Rather than thinking they are distorting the evidence-base for this phenomenon, they may simply take it as a fact, and want to share in the glamour associated with having experienced it. Much like alien abduction.
    3. Persistent Vegetative State92
      1. For information on what a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) actually is, see for example "Wikipedia - Persistent vegetative state". Note that the Wikipedia article uses the PVS acronym to stand for a Permanent Vegetative State.
      2. It’s never clear whether any such state is permanent, whereas it is clear that it is persistent. In the UK, the state becomes legally “permanent” after 12 months, and the term “continuous” is used in preference to “persistent”.
      3. The medical definition is given there as “A wakeful unconscious state that lasts longer than a few weeks”. Despite the (occasional) wakefulness, there is a “complete lack of cognitive function”.
      4. The interest in the Persistent Vegetative State within the topic of Personal Identity is that when in a PVS the attributes of personhood93 are not in evidence – and maybe not capable of being evidenced – so that it is possible to argue that the individual94 in the PVS is no longer a person95. It thus provides the opportunity to pull apart such prima facie co-referential terms as Human Person96 and Human Being97 (or Human Animal98).
      5. One may wonder why PVS is used in philosophical Thought experiments99 rather than Coma (a more severe condition). I suppose the issue is that in a PVS the brain-stem100 is substantially intact (whatever other brain-damage has been incurred), so that no life-support is required other than feeding tubes. In irreversible comas, the brain-stem may be so severely damaged that the basic functions of the organism101 cannot be carried on without life102 support. Consequently, there’s no debate whether those in a PVS are animals103, whereas it might be argued that those on life support in an irreversible coma are not. Hence, while the PVS definitely distinguishes human animals104 from human persons105 (according to most definitions), irreversible coma might not.
      6. I had originally put “vegetative functions” (rather than simply “functions”) above, but I’m unconvinced that any activity above cellular level ought to be classed as “vegetative”; but I think the Aristotelian classification is often adopted, where “animal” functions are those involving locomotion and the like, rather than nutrition, respiration, etc.
      7. I have discussed PVSs in my reviews of the following papers, amongst others:-
        → "Baillie (James) - What Am I?",
        → "Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood",
        → "Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter",
        → "Olson (Eric) - Precis of 'The Human Animal'", and
        → "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?"
  2. Life After Death106
    1. Here we must discuss possible ways in which post-mortem107 survival108 might be actualised, namely:-
      1. Resurrection109,
      2. Reincarnation110, or
      3. Immortality111 of the Soul112.
    2. To this list might be added the collection of hopeful possibilities expected by the Transhumanists113.
    3. We will discuss here broad issues rather than the specifics of the particular options.
    4. We need to discuss whether life114 after death115 – in the sense of eternal, or at least unending, life – is to be desired, though this can mostly be hived off to the Makropulos Case116.
    5. I’m not interested in cases of resuscitation, which are commonplace these days. The paradigm cases I’m interested in are after the total – or near-total – destruction of the body117.
    6. Resuscitation is probably best dealt with under the head of Near Death Experiences118, but see
      1. "Moody (Raymond A.) - Life After Life", and
      2. "Moody (Raymond A.) - The Light Beyond".
    7. Mark Johnston thinks (in "Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death") that there’s a forensic119 need for post-mortem survival120 of some sort, as otherwise there’s no incentive to be good, and hopes to provide it by a radical redefinition of what the person121 is. But this strikes me as changing the subject.
    8. "Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death" is a comprehensive sceptical attack on the possibility of post mortem survival.
    1. Resurrection122
      1. Belief in a resurrection to paradise has occasionally pernicious effects and is also important to millions of non-explosive Americans. Consequently, the metaphysical123 possibility124 of the resurrection of beings like us125 is very important.
      2. This Thesis will aim to prove that resurrection requires substance dualism126.
      3. I will need to ensure I understand just what is believed by intellectually-respectable Jews, Christians and Muslims (though the topical believers are not amongst the ranks of the intellectually-respectable).
      4. Some discussion will be had about the orthodox Christian view being that there is no continuity of matter127 (the conundrum about the person consumed by cannibals was early recognised), and that the resurrection body128 is said to be in some sense a “spiritual” body.
      5. The locus classicus for the canonical Christian account of resurrection is in St. Paul’s 1st Letter to the Corinthians, Chapter 15, on which I’m preparing a commentary129.
      6. A good place to start for an understanding of what resurrection meant to Christians prior to the modern era is "Bynum (Caroline) - Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200 - 1336".
      7. The best place to start evaluating contemporary Christian philosophical views on the metaphysical possibility of resurrection is "Gasser (Georg), Ed. - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?".
      8. One thing that strikes me is that the resurrection of Christ, taken to be the guarantee of our own resurrection, is no such thing in the sense of “showing it can be done”. The physical130 and metaphysical issues in resurrecting Jesus (or Lazarus, or Jairus’s daughter, or any recently-deceased131 person whose body132 is substantially intact) are much less than in the case of those whose bodies have been destroyed. Indeed, it might one day be possible133 to resurrect the recently-deceased134 by way of microscopic repair; at least this seems conceivable, whereas the resurrection of a human being whose body has become dispersed and whose parts have been recycled doesn’t even seem to make sense (on a materialist135 account of what we human persons136 are).
    2. Reincarnation137
      1. "Perrett (Roy W.) - Rebirth" makes a case for the metaphysical coherence of the traditional Indian account of rebirth – preferring the term “Rebirth” to “Reincarnation” because Buddhists deny the existence of an eternal Soul138, which may be presupposed by the concept of Reincarnation.
      2. My intuition139 is that – as well as doubts about its actual occurrence – Reincarnation suffers from even more philosophical problems from the perspective of personal identity than does resurrection itself.
      3. However, I’m substantially ignorant of the detailed philosophy and theology underpinning these ideas, though have read the rebuttal "Edwards (Paul) - Reincarnation: A Critical Examination".
      4. The topic is addressed negatively in the following works:-
        → "Edwards (Paul) - Reincarnation: A Critical Examination",
        → "Angel (Leonard) - Is There Adequate Empirical Evidence for Reincarnation? An Analysis of Ian Stevenson’s Work",
        → "Ransom (Champe) - A Critique of Ian Stevenson’s Rebirth Research",
        → "Smythe (Ingrid Hansen) - Objections to Karma and Rebirth: An Introduction", and maybe
        → "Penelhum (Terence) - 'Reincarnation'".
      5. I have only just bought – and therefore haven’t read – "Stevenson (Ian) - Children Who Remember Previous Lives: A Question of Reincarnation", much ridiculed by Edwards and others.
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses140
      1. The “Corpse Problem”
        • Corpses are troublesome141 for animalism142, which alleges (correctly in my view) that corpses are not animals143.
        • The claim is that, at death144, something ontologically145 new comes on the scene – because a corpse has different persistence146 conditions147 (those of masses of matter148) to those of organisms149.
        • Some philosophers – eg. Fred Feldman, in "Feldman (Fred) - The Survival of Death" – disagree. Feldman claims that we survive150 death151, but – rather disappointingly – as a corpse, which solves the “corpse problem”, but at the cost – most likely – of saying that we are bodies152 rather than organisms153.
        • The problem if we don’t survive death as our corpses – it is said – is to answer the question where the corpse comes from, and to answer the objection that if it was there all along – as a “corpse-to-be” – then we have a situation where we have two things of different sorts154 in the same place155 at the same time.
        • If this is taken seriously, then it can be used against the form of the animalist’s “too many thinkers156” argument.
        • I’m willing to accept that this “thinking animal” argument is unsound. However, just how the analogy would work for the “corpse-to-be” needs to be spelled out. The corpse has the persistence conditions157 of a mass of matter158. What are the persistence conditions159 of the “corpse-to-be”? If they are those of an organism160, then the corpse-to-be cannot be the same individual161 as the corpse. The Constitution View162 might be happy with this situation, promoting the idea that persons are constitute by bodies163 (rather than organisms) but what about Animalism?
        • I think the issue is again a parallelism in argumentation (the fetus problem for the CV versus the corpse problem for Animalism). We don’t need to follow this argumentative line.
      2. Resurrection
        • Corpses are probably also important for most Christian materialists164 who hope for some form of resurrection165.
        • If there is a corpse to be resurrected166, it is easier to see how identity is preserved than if we have total destruction. This is obviously so in the case of resuscitation, but even where we have a real case of death167 – not just clinical death, or brain death168, but real death with a bit of mouldering – there is some physical thing that is responsible for preserving identity.
    2. Disembodied Existence169
      1. As an Animalist170, I don’t hold out much hope for disembodied existence for such beings as ourselves171.
      2. It is true that most people, most of the time, seem to have thought it possible – or even certain. Presumably it is closely related to the view that we are – or at least have – immortal172 souls173 that survive the death174 of our bodies175. Maybe there are alternative “possibilities” to explain the origins of the belief. But there are worries whether disembodied existence is even coherent for concrete particulars.
      3. Note that “disembodied” is sometimes used for “disembodied brains”. Since the brain176 is part of the body177, I cover such possibilities under Brains In Vats178.
      4. There is some overlap between this topic and at least one topic in Transhumanism179. The idea behind Uploading180 seems to be that we are “patterns in information181 space” (Andy Clark) and these “patterns” could – in principle – be uploaded182 to a computer183. The entities resulting from such uploads would appear to be disembodied, at least if their experience (assuming that they are conscious184) is of having simulated bodies185 they don’t really have, as in The Matrix. But, all this illusion aside, are these minds186 actually disembodied, or are their “bodies187” (parts of) the computer188 that “runs” them?
    3. Interregnum189
      1. This is a term of art for the (supposed) period between death190 and reincarnation191, of which this is a sub-topic. I think the term is due to Paul Edwards.
      2. The problem with this period – whatever it is called – is that it may seem to imply intermittent existence192.
      3. Alternatively, it has to rely on some alternative substrate for the existence193 of which there is little or no evidence.
      4. The obvious candidate is a substantial soul194. However, it seems that orthodox Hinduism thinks of a rather tenuous “astral body” as providing the link.
      5. That said, the same issue arises for any post-mortem survival195 that is alleged to follow the total destruction of the body196. At least reincarnation197 has some tenuous evidence in its favour, whereas there are – as far as I’m aware – no claimed occurrences of the resurrection198 of a totally-destroyed body199.
      6. I suppose that theists might claim that the information200 that constitutes201 a person202 is held in the mind of God during the interregnum.
  4. Immortality203
    1. In the Biblical Christian tradition, God is the only being with natural immortality (see 1 Timothy 6:16 “God … who alone is immortal”, NIV), but Plato (and his Platonising Christian followers) had it that the (human) soul204 is also naturally immortal. The Biblical view – at least on some interpretations – is rather that God gives or denies immortality to whoever he wishes (and there is consequently no need to eternally roast the immortal souls of the wicked).
    2. St. Paul has it that “the perishable must clothe itself with the imperishable, and the mortal with immortality” (1 Corinthians 15:53, NIV). This is in the context of the resurrection205 of the just dead206 (or the metamorphosis207 of the just living) at the return of Christ.
    3. In the context of identity theory, it is doubtful whether the very same thing can at one time be perishable and at another time immortal, because a thing’s persistence conditions208 are taken to be essential209 properties210 of the sort211 it is, and a single thing cannot change sort212,213.
    4. As such, (as "Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death" notes), natural immortality of the soul214 is the only hope for post-mortem survival215. But this hope is itself dashed by the lack of empirical evidence for the existence of the substantial216 soul217, immortal or otherwise.
    5. It does seem incongruous to talk about post-mortem immortality – how can something that has died be immortal? The idea, no doubt, is that it is the body218 that the soul219 occupied that was mortal. Hence, the soul220 needs a new immortal body221 to be clothed with. That seems to be the Pauline picture, though debated by the “Conditional Immortality” people.
    6. The Transhumanists222 hope that Uploading223 to a computer224 might lead to indefinitely extended life225, though this is hardly immortality. Indefinite identity-preserving life extensions might be possible using repair-microbots.
    7. In all this, I’m talking about the persistence of the individual226. I’m not talking about “immortality” in the sense of “undying fame”. As Woody Allen quipped (I’m not sure where this is from, but see Woody Allen: Immortality) – “I don't want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve immortality through not dying. I don't want to live on in the hearts of my countrymen; I want to live on in my apartment”.
    8. "Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality" argues that we wouldn’t even want immortality, but I’m not convinced. However, a bad immortality – uploading227 to an evil computer228, for instance – would be worse than no immortality, though some (eg. Miguel De Unamuno) are not even convinced of that. This topic is covered further under the Makropulos Case229.
    9. Of course, if animalism230 is the correct account of personal identity, immortality is not on offer, though if the transhumanists231 succeed, and an alternative account of personal identity is correct, an indefinite extension of life might be possible.
    1. Ivan Ilych232
      1. Tolstoy’s short novella "Tolstoy (Leo) - The Death of Ivan Ilyich" tends to feature in discussions on the philosophy of death233.
      2. I first came upon it via "Kagan (Shelly) - The nature of death (continued); Believing you will die". The contention in Kagan’s lecture was that Tolstoy’s novella taught that no-one really expects to die, an idea Kagan rejects.
      3. My own view is that this isn’t really what the novella is about, but is rather about how we should live our lives – or at least how we should not live them.
      4. In this Note, I intend to consider two main questions:-
        1. Does Tolstoy suggest that no-one really expects to die?
        2. What is the aim of the novella?
      5. As I’m not a literary critic, I’ll be somewhat briefer with regards to the second question than Tolstoy’s work deserves.
      6. The explicit passage on the expectation of death is where Ivan – on hearing that he is about to die – observes that the syllogism beginning “all men are mortal” applies to “all men”, but not specifically to him.
      7. Of course, no-one really believes they are immortal234 (or, at least, that they are not going to die) but the reality of personal death235 is pushed so far into the background that it is hardly taken into account in our plans (other than in the making of rather impersonal provisions), until it is just around the corner. Our plans always extend infinitely on, without the explicit acknowledgement until the last possible minute that we – and more urgently our faculties – will not continue on for ever, and that we need to eke out our time more carefully.
      8. No doubt this is especially true of the young, but I can vouch for the fact that it’s still true of at least one person aged 62236.
    2. Makropulos Case237
      1. This discussion is slightly off-topic, in that the focus isn’t on whether there is, in fact, any such thing as immortality238 (for human beings239).
      2. Rather, it is whether immortality – again for embodied human beings – would be desirable (or, indeed, tolerable).
      3. This discussion will investigate the controversy started in 1973 by "Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality".
      4. Williams’s conclusion – needless to say – is that immortality is not tolerable, though his reasoning is rather subtle.
      5. Thoughts on the value – or disvalue – of immortality240 tie in with the evil – or lack of evil – of death241. Some discussions of the disvalue of death mention the Makropulos Case in that regard.
      6. Ultimately, all discussion of the evils of death242 will fall under this Note.
      7. Since animalism243 strongly implies that “death is the end of us”, this may be important.


Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now discussed everything on our Agenda, we now in our next Chapter244 make our conclusions.
  2. This is work in progress245.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed246
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. I have segregated those works on the core topic of Resurrection that are from a religio-philosophical perspective from those that are pure philosophy. In general, those written by professional philosophers are in the latter section, even if addressed to a religious audience.
  3. The motivation for some of the works is as follows:-
    • Gasser is the most important work I need to address.
    • Wright’s big book (hopefully) supplies all there is from the Christian side – even though the focus is on a specific – and theologically and metaphysically special – resurrection.
    • Bynum and Gillman provide background information from the Christian and Jewish perspectives, respectively.
    • Badham is a rather elementary Christian discussion, and may be rejected.
    • Corcoran is an important survey, already included in the reading for a couple of other Chapters.
    • Edwards, Flew and Penelhum are useful surveys of older material, which is useful just to read for the appropriate background. There is some considerable overlap in the selections.
    • I suppose I need to discuss death itself, hence Kagan, McMahan, Regan & Wyatt – though skipping the ethical bits.
    • Perrett and Tippler may be a little off-centre, and I may reject them on closer inspection.
    • The other individual papers – especially those by van Inwagen and Shoemaker – are probably important, but justification is to be supplied.
  4. Many aspects of these and other works will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.


Works on this topic that I’ve actually read249, include the following:-
  1. Death
    1. Death250
    2. Near Death Experiences255
    3. Out of Body Experiences256
    4. Persistent Vegetative State258
  2. Life After Death
    1. Life After Death264
    2. Resurrection266
    3. Reincarnation270
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses271
    2. Disembodied Existence274
    3. Interregnum276
  4. Immortality
    1. Immortality277
    2. Ivan Ilych279
    3. Makropulos Case281

A further reading list might start with:-
  1. Death
    1. Death282
    2. Near Death Experiences287
    3. Out of Body Experiences289
    4. Persistent Vegetative State292
  2. Life After Death
    1. Life After Death294
    2. Resurrection298
    3. Reincarnation301
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses302
    2. Disembodied Existence303
    3. Interregnum306
  4. Immortality
    1. Immortality307
    2. Ivan Ilych308
    3. Makropulos Case309


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 12: Footnote 71:
  1. Consider (random examples at a time in 2018) Wikipedia: Ray Wilkins & Wikipedia: Eric Bristow dying of cardiac arrest “before their time”, plus far too many young blacks (and those mistaken for being young blacks) dying from puncture wounds.
Footnote 236:
  1. When I originally wrote this in February 2016.
Footnote 246: Footnote 252: Footnote 253: Footnote 257: Footnote 260: Footnote 283: Footnotes 284, 286: Footnote 285: Footnote 290: Footnote 293: Footnote 295: Footnote 296: Footnote 299: Footnote 300: Footnote 304: Footnote 305: Footnote 310:

Live Version of this Archived Note

Date Length Title
02/03/2026 07:10:34 66750 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)

Table of 12 Earlier Versions of this Note (of 18)

Date Length Title
06/07/2023 00:43:12 63772 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
28/09/2022 10:24:58 63495 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
16/05/2022 21:18:43 63358 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
11/04/2022 00:01:26 31827 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
01/10/2021 13:17:46 30597 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
29/03/2021 19:23:31 21607 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
22/03/2021 00:28:48 17715 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
08/02/2021 18:10:05 9890 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
29/12/2019 12:57:36 10132 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
18/04/2019 18:18:43 10126 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
05/04/2016 23:19:41 9859 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
07/10/2015 00:27:22 9636 Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)


This version updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
14/02/2026 00:41:46 None available Thesis - Chapter 00 (Preface)


Summary of Notes Links from this Page

1 Corinthians: 15 2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal Androids Animalism (7) Animalism - Objections (3)
Animals (2) Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity) Baillie - What Am I? Body (14) Brain (4)
Brain Death (2) Brains in Vats Bynum - Resurrection of the Body (Preface + Introduction) Christian Materialism Coincidence
Computers (4) Consciousness (2) Constitution Constitution View Continuity
Corpses (9) Daniel Dennett – Conditions of Personhood Death (17) Disembodied Existence (6) Dualism
Existence (4) Fine - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter (4) Forensic Property Homo Sapiens Human Animals (4)
Human Beings (3) Human Persons (3) Immortality (10) Individual (3) Information (2)
Intermittent Objects Interregnum (5) Intuition Ivan Ilych (6) Life (6)
Life After Death (10) Makropulos Case (7) Matter (3) Memory Metamorphosis (2)
Metaphysics Mind (3) Modality (3) Near Death Experiences (7) Olson - Immanent Causation and Life After Death (3)
Olson - Persons and Bodies - Response Olson - The Human Animal (Precis) Olson - What Are We? Souls Ontology Organisms (4)
Out of Body Experiences (7) Persistence Persistence Criteria (5) Persistent Vegetative State (5) Person (5)
Physical Continuity Physicalism (2) Process Metaphysics (3) Properties Psychological View (2)
Reincarnation (9) Resurrection (12) Rosenberg - Thinking Clearly About Death: Prefaces & Prelude Russell - Do We Survive Death? Sortals (4)
Souls (11) Status: Thesis Dashboard (2022: December) Strawson - Why I Have No Future Substance Survival
Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) (11) Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion) Thesis - Method & Form Thinking Animal Argument Thought Experiments
Transhumanism (4) Uploading (4) Vagueness What are We? (4) Works Read - Explanation

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Summary of Note Links to this Page

Thesis - Chapter 00 (Preface) Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11  

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