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Personal Identity

Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)

(Work In Progress: output at 12/02/2026 20:42:43)

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Chapter Contents

  1. Abstract1
  2. Methodology2
  3. Introduction3
  4. Note Hierarchy4
  5. Main Text5
  6. Concluding Remarks6
  7. Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed7
  8. Works Read8
  9. Further Reading9
  10. References & Reading List

Abstract
  1. A discussion of the arguments against animalism, as given by those of anti-animalist persuasion and defended by the principal animalists (with a focus on Eric Olson), with a critique.


Research Methodology

Chapter Introduction12
  1. There is effectively a 1-1-match between this Chapter and the Note Animalism – Objections13, though I imagine that this Chapter will be more focussed and less exploratory than that Note.
  2. The main objections to Animalism are those of incredulity to the Animalist claim that “matters of psychology are irrelevant to personal identity”, when most philosophers have thought – and still do think – that it’s constitutive of it. As I’ve said previously and often – this is to confuse What Matters to us with What we Are.
  3. Then we have the Brain Transplant Intuition – that we go with our brains. It is very difficult to resist this intuition – for reasons I’ve given under my Note on Forward Psychological Continuity, though Eric Olson insists that the Animalist must deny it as a brain isn’t an Organism.
  4. Then, there are awkward pathological cases where it’s not clear quite what the animalist should say. I’ve collected these under the Note on Dicephalus14.
  5. Finally, there’s the question of what’s going on during Pregnancy15, which Animalists have allegedly failed to address. Is the Fetus16 a part of the mother? If so, we’d have a case of Fission at birth. Traditionalists would deny this, so the problem ‘goes away’, but it needs to be considered carefully from the actual biology (covered in the previous Note and those on Zygotes17 and Embryos18).
  6. I’ve also included the topic of Abortion19 as part of this Chapter, though it’s maybe either misplaced, or not sufficiently relevant.


Note Hierarchy
  1. Animalism20. Excluded21
  2. Arguments against Animalism22
  3. Dicephalus23
  4. Pregnancy24
    1. Zygote25
    2. Embryos26
    3. Fetuses27
    4. Abortion28


Main Text
  1. Arguments against Animalism29
    1. A convenient starting-point for reviewing objections to Animalism is in "Olson (Eric), Etc. - Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'", reviewed in this Note30.
    2. The most obvious objection is to the initial implausibility of Animalism’s basic contention that – because I was once a fetus31 and may one day be a vegetable32 – psychological continuity33 or connectedness34 can have nothing to do with my persistence criteria35. Animalists can be accused of not taking persons sufficiently seriously36.
    3. Additionally, Animalists are said to have a “corpse problem37”. Because I am co-located with my “corpse-to-be”, the Animalist is hoist by his own petard, in that he has the analogue of the “fetus problem38” he alleges against the Constitution View39.
    4. A spin-off from the alleged irrelevancy of psychology for human identity is the need to deny the Brain Transplant40 intuition – that “I go where my brain goes”. The Transplant Intuition has been defended from an animalist perspective in "Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence".
    5. In "Olson (Eric) - Human Atoms", Olson mentions four “favourite objections”, though these strike me as being rather feeble, and I suspect them of being straw men:-
      1. If you were an animal, you would be identical with your body (or at any rate with some human body). But no human body can think or feel or act, as you can.
      2. Persons and animals have different persistence conditions: the organism that is your body could outlive you (if you lapsed into a persistent vegetative state), or you could outlive it (if your brain were transplanted and the rest of you destroyed). But a thing cannot outlive itself.
      3. Persons and animals have different criteria of synchronic identity: any human animal could be associated with two different persons at once (as cases of split personality). Thus, no person is an animal.
      4. These experiences – the ones I am having now – are essentially mine. But they are only contingently associated with any particular animal. Hence, I have a property that no animal has.
    6. The above paper is intended, however, to rebut the argument against animalism in "Lowe (E.J.) - Subjects of Experience", which have the unlikely consequence that we are “mereological atoms”.
    7. "Hudson (Hud) - I am Not an Animal!" argues against animalism via the “Elimination Argument”, which I’m yet to investigate and understand. "Bailey (Andrew M.) - The Elimination Argument" seeks to rebuff it.
    8. Elselijn Kingma has accused animalists of not taking Pregnancy41 as an important issue for Animalism. She thinks that the Fetus42 is a part of the mother. My view is that animals can share parts, as seems to be necessary for Conjoined Twins43, which are another supposed objection to animalism if it could be successfully argued that there is only one animal in these cases.
  2. Dicephalus44
    1. This Note is more general that Dicephalus, but I can’t think of a better title. There are several related pathological conditions in which the number of animals45 and the number of individuals46 may fail to align. In order of increasing severity of the “condition”:-
      1. Conjoined Twins: "Wikipedia - Conjoined Twins". Varies from a fairly loose conjunction of individuals, who may be separated, to more severe forms with shared organs and limbs. This article is of interest not least because it discusses the issue of fission47 versus fusion48, with the latter now the favourite suggestion.
      2. Craniopagus: "Wikipedia - Craniopagus Twins". The babies are joined at the skull. Contrast the case where both twins are persons49 with the degenerate case "Wikipedia - Craniopagus Parasiticus".
      3. Polycephaly: "Wikipedia - Polycephaly". Animals or humans with apparently more than one head. Dicephaly is the limiting case. Usually an extreme version of conjunction. See, for example, BBC - Rare two-headed snake. Note that the description “two headed” seems more plausible in the case of reptiles than humans, given their presumed reduced mental experience. That said, given that dicephaly is – according to this article – a case of incomplete fission50 of an original single individual – this descriptive decision may be correct.
      4. Diprosopus: "Wikipedia - Diprosopus".
        1. Animals, including humans, with two faces. There may be one or two brains, but only one skull. The important thing – and what differentiates the diprosopus from the dicephalus – is that there is much less duplication of body parts, so it is very much two brains sharing one body – though it can also be the relatively superficial – though tragic – case of one brain, one body and two faces.
        2. For more on diprosopus51 see:-
        3. The Mail Online diprosopus article above quotes the following “Medical Facts” from the Embryo Project Encyclopedia:
          • The rare condition diprosopus is also known as craniofacial duplication.
          • Diprosopus refers to a baby born with a single torso, normal limbs and facial features, which are duplicated52 to a degree.
          • In mild instances the baby may have a duplicated nose and the eyes may be spaced far apart. But in extreme cases the entire face can be replicated53, hence the name diprosopus - Greek for two-faced.
          • Most babies born with diprosopus are stillborn, and there are fewer than 50 cases documented since 1864.
          • Where a baby is born with two complete identical faces, the condition is considered a rare variant of conjoined twinning.
          • But while conjoined twinning is the result of an incomplete separation of two embryos, diprosopus is caused by abnormal activity of the protein Sonic Hedgehog (SHH).
          • The protein is responsible for signalling craniofacial patterning during embryonic development, and among other things governs the width of facial features.
          • Where the protein is found in excess, a baby will have wider facial features, and in extreme cases it can cause the duplication of those features.
          • Diprosopus can be detected via ultrasound in pregnancy, or via CT scanning.
          • One of the first indications of the condition is the detection of abnormally high amount of amniotic fluid present within the amniotic sac.
          • There is currently no treatment to cure the condition and because of its rarity few treatment options or corrective surgery techniques exist.
        4. This doesn’t seem to explain why there should be two brains, however. An actual search of the Encyclopedia delivers a much briefer and less informative article.
    2. All these situations – and in particular the paradigm case of dicephalus, wherein it appears that we have a human animal54 with two heads – are often cited as a prima facie problems for Animalism55.
    3. The claim is that while we have multiple persons56, we only have a single animal57, so the animalist58 claim that persons are numerically identical to their organisms59 is false.
    4. Of course, the above claim is somewhat bald. Animalism60 – at least in the form expounded by Eric Olson – has no truck with psychology61 as necessary for our persistence62. While Olson often refers to “people” this is just shorthand for “some of us63”, rather than “persons”, the plural of person64.
    5. So, if the animalist claim is that we are human animals, then the question is – in the case of dicephalus and related conditions – how many of us65 are present, and how many human animals66 are present. Animalism67 needs the numbers to be equal.
    6. That said, these cases add to the prima facie case for animalism – that we are human animals – as our animal nature is pointed out by the unfortunate errors that have arisen during the gestation of the animal.
    7. The cases under consideration have the advantage over standard Thought Experiments68, in that they are real-life cases. What is actual must be possible, and a standard argument against TEs is thereby avoided, namely that some of them, at least – whatever our intuitions may say – may not in fact be possible69 because the TEs are under-described.
    8. That said, there’s still a temptation to push the boundaries, and to consider cases in this general area that are not actual yet are not quite as science-fiction as the usual TEs70.
    9. Cases of dicephalus are fairly rare, and often one “twin” is degenerate (contrast "Wikipedia - Craniopagus Parasiticus" with "Wikipedia - Dicephalic Parapagus Twins") so it’s not clear that we have two persons71 or two of “us72”. However, the case of the dicephalus twins73, Abigail and Brittany Hensel, where one body appears to be coordinated by two brains (see "Wikipedia - Abby and Brittany Hensel") shows that this is not necessarily the case. Here we definitely have two persons74, but maybe only one animal75. This is probably a real-life case of either incomplete fission76 or of fusion77.
    10. There are two issues with these cases:-
      1. How should they be best described?
      2. How should the animalist respond?
    11. Description:
      1. I need to research this further, but it seems to me that we have a sliding scale of pathological cases – from that of Siamese twins (who are often fairly loosely connected, and can often be surgically separated) to the much more extreme cases of diprosopus.
      2. I presume, also, that we can have either fission78 or fusion79, or indeed both serially – as the case may be – an empirical matter.
      3. In the case of (incomplete) fission80, the twins81 will be identical, as the situation is one where the twinning process has not completed.
      4. But (I imagine) we can also have a case of fusion82, where the twin-embryos83 – whether identical or fraternal – that were separate have subsequently partially fused. Note that if the twins are identical, we will have had a case of fission84 followed by fusion85. I don’t know whether there have been any actual cases of this.
    12. Response:
      1. The most likely response from the animalist86 is that the dicephalus is not a single organism87, but two organisms that share some body-parts.
      2. The force of the arguments in this kind of case depends on “relevant similarity” – if the dicephalus-case is sufficiently similar to the general case, it can be used to show things about the general case. But this claim can be rejected.
      3. In the case of diprosopus, it is more difficult to claim that there are two organisms88. Now – in practice – there are never two persons89 either (as in all the 30-odd cases recorded since 1860, the condition has proved quickly fatal, so there were no persons90 present). But this might not always be so. Also, Lynne Rudder Baker might claim that the rudimentary persons were indeed persons91 – as there was a possibility that they would develop into robust persons. Failing that, it might be the case in the future there is a case where the diprosopus survives to develop personality92. There does seem to have been an actual case of survival into adulthood, but there was only one person, and one disfigured individual. Finally, we have to decide how to describe the situation where there is one brain stem but two ‘brains93’ (presumably two sets of cerebral hemispheres94). There don’t seem to have been any actual cases of this in humans, but there might have been95.
  3. Pregnancy96
    1. At first sight, this topic sounds utterly tangential to my research interests, but I’ve included it because Elselijn Kingma complained – in "Kingma (Elselijn) - BUMP: Better Understanding the Metaphysics of Pregnancy (B1)" – that "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology" contained not even a footnote on the topic of pregnancy and the metaphysical issues it raises, in particular for animalism97.
    2. Following Kingma, the discussion will focus on the relationship throughout pregnancy between the mother and the fetus98. The key question is whether the fetus is a part of the mother or is a separate individual99 inside her. Additionally, we need to consider whether this status changes as pregnancy progresses.
    3. I have to admit immediately that (contra Kingma) – my initial view100 is that the relationship is more “bun” (the “container model”) than “bump” (the “part model”), though this separation seems clearer as pregnancy progresses, following the implantation of the Zygote101 (prior to which there is clear separation – though I suppose we might consider the zygote a small bundle of maternal cells, despite their genetic distinction – a situation that occurs in other cases).
    4. It looks like Kingma’s view is of pregnancy as a case of fusion102 (at the point of implantation of the Zygote; I will discuss the ontological status of the zygote shortly) followed by fission103 (at birth).
    5. Another point to consider is the possibility of technological developments to enable gestation in an artificial uterus (see Wikipedia: Artificial womb). Would the same arguments imply that the fetus is a part of the machine? Is this plausible?
    6. Having said all the above, just what is the problem for animalism?
    • Zygote104
      1. A Zygote ("Wikipedia - Zygote") – is the immediate post-fertilisation product.
      2. In humans, the zygote develops by division until it implants as the embryo105. Until then it is called a pre-embryo ("Wikipedia - Pre-embryo"); a morula (Wikipedia: Morula) after 4 divisions – 16 blastomeres – and a blastocyst ("Wikipedia - Blastocyst") by the 5th day. The implanted embryo is called a fetus106 after 11 weeks.
      3. In the philosophy of personal identity, the question arises when the human being107 or the human person108 arises. Additionally – and relatedly – was I109 ever a zygote (or an embryo110, or a fetus111).
      4. Most philosophers agree that a zygote isn’t a person112, because it does not possess the appropriate psychological113 attributes.
      5. Many philosophers contend that a human zygote isn’t a human being114 either – in that it hasn’t the appropriate set of organs.
      6. In addition, the question whether I was ever a zygote is complicated by two considerations:-
        1. Twinning115: is a special case of fission116. Why should the zygote be numerically identical to one – rather than the other – of a pair of monozygotic twins? Modal117 considerations apply if I am in fact not a monozygotic twin.
        2. Difference over the definition – or maybe ontological118 category – of “person119”. Some philosophers insist that an individual120 can be a person121 on account of its expected future capacities122, or actual or once anticipated past capacities, irrespective of its present capacities.
      7. A question raised by the philosophy of Pregnancy123 is – in the case of human beings and mammals generally – what is the ontological status of the Zygote? Is this bundle of free-floating cells a part of the mother or is it a separate individual? It is genetically diverse from the vast majority of the mother’s cells, which would suggest a separate individual – but there are cases of Micro-Chimerism124 where genetically-diverse cells would be considered part of the mother (I suppose).
      8. As a footnote, in single-celled animals the zygote may constitute the entire animal. I once had “necessarily asexually-reproducing” here. The Wikipedia entry has it that such single-celled organisms reproduce asexually by mitosis. But if all such organisms arise in this way, in what way are they correctly described as “zygotes” which involves the “yoking together” of two distinct and differentiated gamete cells? Is it possible that some organisms reproduce both sexually and asexually? And – if so (as I believe) – is it true in this case? Do I care?
    • Embryos125
      1. In humans, the immediate post-fertilization product – the zygote126 – develops by division until it implants as the embryo ("Wikipedia - Embryo"). It is called a fetus127 after 11 weeks.
      2. In the philosophy of personal identity, the question arises when the human being128 or the human person129 arises. Additionally – and relatedly – was I ever an embryo?
      3. Most philosophers agree that an embryo isn’t a person130, because it does not possess the appropriate psychological131 attributes132.
      4. Many philosophers contend that a human embryo isn’t a human being133 either – in that it hasn’t the appropriate set of organs.
      5. In addition, the question whether I was ever an embryo is complicated by differences over the definition – or maybe ontological category – of “person134”, as was noted in the discussion of Zygote135.
    • Fetuses136
      1. A Fetus is a developing but unborn mammal subsequent to implantation and some further development. See my notes on Zygotes137 and the Embryo138.
      2. In humans, the implanted embryo ("Wikipedia - Embryo") is called a fetus ("Wikipedia - Fetus") after 11 weeks which remains the favoured term of reference until the individual139’s birth – whether full-term or induced – when it is referred to as a neonate (or a baby!). Referring to the fetus as a “baby” is tendentious but common in the pro-life movement.
      3. Fetuses feature a lot in the philosophy of personal identity. Are they persons140, or merely potential persons, given that they probably fail the conditions for personhood141?
      4. Was I142 ever a fetus? At least, was I an early-term fetus?
      5. This latter question is addressed by animalists143 – who think that we were indeed fetuses – as a poser for supporters of the psychological view144 (or constitution view145) of personal identity (since fetuses lack psychological connectedness146 to adult persons, and even lack psychological continuity147 to them on the presumption that early-term fetuses lack all psychological experience).
      6. But, it’s also alleged as a problem for animalism148, or at least a matter that has not been properly addressed by them. What was the relation of the fetus to its mother. Was the mother merely a container, or was the fetus a proper part149 of the mother, who thereby fissioned150 on the baby’s birth? See Elselijn Kingma and "Finn (Suki) - Bun or bump?".
      7. It strikes me that151 the “fission at birth” view is too implausible – the fetus – especially near term – certainly looks like an independent being that’s being hosted on life support by the mother.
      8. So, maybe we can come to a compromise understanding whereby the fissioning152 happens earlier, though the separation would clearly be more vague153 than the cutting of the umbilical cord. ‘Viability’ would be an appropriate point – something like 21-24 weeks’ gestation – though the earliest viability depends on the state and availability of medical technology (see Wikipedia: Fetal viability).
    • Abortion154
      1. The morality of abortion is a large and important issue, but is not my major concern except insofar as it impinges on the topic of Personal Identity.
      2. Our views on Personal Identity will have an impact on our views of the morality of abortion, though not in any straightforward manner.
      3. More importantly – and regrettably so in my opinion – views on the morality of abortion can have an impact on one’s views of personal identity. This is the wrong way round, and violates the fact / value distinction. While ethical, political or religious155 views might influence our preference for certain metaphysical views, they should not constrain our actual beliefs, which should be responses to how things are, and to which our other beliefs should conform, however disappointing that might be.
        1. This remark assumes that there is a “way things are” that is independent of the desires and motivations of human beings. This is denied by – for instance – Yuval Noah Harari; but see – for a robust realist view – "Blackburn (Simon) - Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed".
        2. I do not wish to deny that our ethical, political and religious views can be responses to how things are, just that they were often responses to how things seemed to us – or to people we respected – at formative times of our lives, and then got entrenched and we remain impervious to evidence to the contrary.
      4. I’ll leave further discussion for now. Enough to say that I’ll not intend to wade in too far into this moral morass, though I will need to review the foundational papers on the moral implications of abortion.
      5. The note on Pregnancy156 raises questions of what (to put it rather positively) abortion actually achieves. According to the standard “container model”, abortion kills a distinct, though temporarily dependent, being. However, according to the “parthood model”, abortion only removes a part of the whole (removing the so-called “foster” from the “gravida”: see "Kingma (Elselijn) - Were You Part of Your Mother?").


Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now discussed the arguments against Animalism, we now in our next Chapter157 turn to the arguments against the Constitution View.
  2. This is work in progress158.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed159
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. I’ve not been overly careful to segregate the reading-list of this Chapter from that of Chapter 6162. I will address the segregation in due course. There will, in any case, be some overlap.
  3. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.


Works on this topic that I’ve actually read163, include the following:-
  1. Arguments against Animalism164
  2. Dicephalus178
  3. Pregnancy
    1. Pregnancy180
    2. Zygote181
    3. Embryos182
    4. Fetuses183
    5. Abortion187

A further reading list might start with:-
  1. Arguments against Animalism190
  2. Dicephalus194
  3. Pregnancy
    1. Pregnancy196
    2. Zygote199
    3. Embryos200
    4. Fetuses202
    5. Abortion203


In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 12: Footnote 21: Footnote 51:
  1. All this needs tidying up.
  2. It’s probably best to take the Wikipedia article in full and link it to these reports and extract the relevant biological facts and cut out all the social stuff that is irrelevant to the metaphysical issues.
Footnote 159: Footnote 186: Footnote 188: Footnote 189: Footnote 197: Footnote 198: Footnote 201: See, in particular, Footnote 204: Footnote 205: Footnote 206:

Table of the Previous 12 Versions of this Note: (of 16)

Date Length Title
14/02/2026 00:41:46 43752 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
06/07/2023 00:43:12 38053 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
28/09/2022 10:24:58 37420 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
11/05/2022 18:59:02 37015 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
11/04/2022 00:01:26 15713 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
01/10/2021 13:17:46 15009 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
29/03/2021 19:23:31 8093 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
22/03/2021 00:28:48 4462 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
08/02/2021 16:13:26 4021 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
18/04/2019 18:18:43 4005 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
05/04/2016 23:19:41 3764 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
04/04/2015 00:17:17 3494 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)


Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
02/03/2026 07:12:37 None available Thesis - Chapter 00 (Preface)

Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Abortion Animalism Animalism - Objections Animals Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)
Baker - Review - Olson - What Are We? Baker - The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons Baker - The Human Animal: Big-Tent Metaphysics Baker - The Human Animal: Response to Olson Baker - What Am I?
Brain Brain Death Brain Transplants Cerebrum Chimera
Connectedness vs Continuity Constitution View Constitution View - Objections Corpses Counting Persons
Dicephalus Duplication Embryo Ferner - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity Fetuses
Fission Fusion Human Animals Human Beings Human Persons
I Individual Intuition Jen_080317 (Baker) Markosian - The Human Animal: Three Problems for Olson
Mereology Modality Noonan - Persons and Bodies - Response Olson - The Human Animal Abstracta Symposium Olson - The Human Animal: Reply to Baker
Olson - What Are We? Animals Olson - What Are We? Brains Olson - What Are We? What Now? Ontology Organisms
Persistence Persistence Criteria Persistent Vegetative State Person Personality
Pregnancy Properties Psychological Continuity Psychological View Psychology
Religion Replication Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity Status: Thesis Dashboard (2026: March) Taking Persons Seriously
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism) Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View) Thesis - Method & Form Thought Experiments
Twinning Vagueness What are We? Works Read - Explanation Zimmerman - The Human Animal: Objections
Zygote        

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Life After Death Origins PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2 Status: Thesis Dashboard (2026: March), 2 Thesis - Chapter 00 (Preface)
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) Thesis - Personal Identity
Thinking Animal Argument Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10      

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.



Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Life After Death Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Origins Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Personal Identity Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Preface Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Thinking Animal Argument Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes


References & Reading List

Author Title Medium Source Read?
Anscombe (G.E.M.) Were You a Zygote? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Anscombe (G.E.M) - Human Life, Action and Ethics Yes
Anscombe (G.E.M.), Geach (Mary), Gormally (Luke), Eds. Human Life, Action and Ethics Book - Cited Anscombe (G.E.M.), Geach (Mary), Gormally (Luke), Eds. - Human Life, Action and Ethics 10%
Bailey (Andrew M.) The Elimination Argument Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Studies 168 (2014): 475-482 56%
Baird (Robert M.) & Rosenbaum (Stuart E.), Eds. The Ethics of Abortion: Pro-Life Vs. Pro-Choice Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Baird (Robert M.) & Rosenbaum (Stuart E.), Eds. - The Ethics of Abortion: Pro-Life Vs. Pro-Choice 2%
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Big-Tent Metaphysics Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil) Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Response to Eric Olson Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil) Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson Paper - Cited Mind, 117:1120-1122, 2008 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder) When Do Persons Begin and End? Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Distinguished Faculty Lecture, December 5, 2005 Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View' Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied Yes
Belshaw (Christopher) My Beginnings Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 371-389 Yes
Bermudez (Jose Luis), Marcel (Anthony) & Eilan (Naomi), Eds. The Body and the Self Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 4%
Blackburn (Simon) Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Blackburn (Simon) - Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed Yes
Blatti (Stephan) Animalism (SEP) Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2014 Yes
Blatti (Stephan) Animalism and its Implications Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract OU Website (now deleted) Yes
Blatti (Stephan) Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007): 595–608 Yes
Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds. Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Medium Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 22%
Blatti (Stephan), Ed. The Lives of Human Animals Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract The Southern Journal of Philosophy Volume 52, Spindel Supplement, 2014 Yes
Boonin (David) A Defense of Abortion Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Boonin (David) - A Defense of Abortion 1%
Bradley (Ben), Feldman (Fred) & Johansson (Jens) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 7%
Braine (David) The Human Person: Animal and Spirit Book - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit 1%
Brody (Baruch) Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life : a Philosophical View Book - Cited Low Quality Abstract Brody (Baruch) - Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life : a Philosophical View 4%
Brody (Baruch) Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life: Introduction Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Brody - Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life : a Philosophical View, 1975, Introduction Yes
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