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Personal Identity

Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)

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Chapter Contents

  1. Abstract1
  2. Methodology2
  3. Introduction3
  4. Note Hierarchy4
  5. Main Text5
  6. Concluding Remarks6
  7. Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed7
  8. Works Read8
  9. Further Reading9
  10. References & Reading List

Abstract
  1. A discussion of the arguments against animalism, as given by those of anti-animalist persuasion and defended by the principal animalists (with a focus on Eric Olson), with a critique.


Research Methodology

Chapter Introduction12
  1. There is effectively a 1-1-match between this Chapter and the Note Animalism – Objections13, though I imagine that this Chapter will be more focussed and less exploratory than that Note.
  2. The main objections to Animalism are those of incredulity to the Animalist claim that “matters of psychology are irrelevant to personal identity”, when most philosophers have thought – and still do think – that it’s constitutive of it. As I’ve said previously and often – this is to confuse What Matters to us with What we Are.
  3. Then we have the Brain Transplant Intuition – that we go with our brains. It is very difficult to resist this intuition – for reasons I’ve given under my Note on Forward Psychological Continuity, though Eric Olson insists that the Animalist must deny it as a brain isn’t an Organism.
  4. Then, there are awkward pathological cases where it’s not clear quite what the animalist should say. I’ve collected these under the Note on Dicephalus14.
  5. Finally, there’s the question of what’s going on during Pregnancy15, which Animalists have allegedly failed to address. Is the Fetus16 a part of the mother? If so, we’d have a case of Fission at birth. Traditionalists would deny this, so the problem ‘goes away’, but it needs to be considered carefully from the actual biology (covered in the previous Note and those on Zygotes17 and Embryos18).
  6. I’ve also included the topic of Abortion19 as part of this Chapter, though it’s maybe either misplaced, or not sufficiently relevant.


Note Hierarchy
  1. Animalism20. Excluded21
  2. Arguments against Animalism22
  3. Dicephalus23
  4. Pregnancy24
    1. Zygote25
    2. Embryos26
    3. Fetuses27
    4. Abortion28


Main Text
  1. Arguments against Animalism29
    1. In "Olson (Eric) - Human Atoms" - as cited in "Bailey (Andrew M.) - The Elimination Argument" - Olson mentions four “favourite objections”, though these strike me as being rather feeble, and I suspect them of being straw men: they may be favoured by objectors, but are also Olson’s ‘favourites’ as they are easy to bat away. I will assess them later in this Note:-
      1. If you were an animal, you would be identical with your body (or at any rate with some human body). But no human body can think or feel or act, as you can.
      2. Persons and animals have different persistence conditions: the organism that is your body could outlive you (if you lapsed into a persistent vegetative state), or you could outlive it (if your brain were transplanted and the rest of you destroyed). But a thing cannot outlive itself.
      3. Persons and animals have different criteria of synchronic identity: any human animal could be associated with two different persons at once (as cases of split personality). Thus, no person is an animal.
      4. These experiences – the ones I am having now – are essentially mine. But they are only contingently associated with any particular animal. Hence, I have a property that no animal has.
    2. The above paper is intended, however, to rebut the argument against animalism in "Lowe (E.J.) - Subjects of Experience", which has the unlikely consequence that we are “mereological atoms”.
    3. Otherwise, a convenient starting-point for reviewing objections to Animalism is in "Olson (Eric), Etc. - Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'". The symposium starts with "Olson (Eric) - Precis of 'The Human Animal'", a very brief account that hardly does what it says on the tin. Otherwise, the symposium contains the following papers:-
      1. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics"
      2. "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity"
      3. "Zimmerman (Dean) - Problems for Animalism"
      4. "Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman"
      5. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Response to Eric Olson"
    4. "Hudson (Hud) - I am Not an Animal!" argues against animalism via the “Elimination Argument”. "Bailey (Andrew M.) - The Elimination Argument" seeks to rebuff it.
    5. The objections from the above papers may be listed as follows. I intend to elucidate and answer these objections – or supply and critique Olson’s answers – below, though some may require – or be already covered by – their own Notes appearing later in this Chapter or elsewhere:-
      1. Baker’s ‘Big Tent Metaphysics’
      2. Markosian’s ‘Mummy’ problem
      3. Markosian’s ‘Corpse Problem’
      4. Markosian’s ‘Salamander Problem’
      5. Zimmerman’s critique of Olson’s Master Argument30.
      6. Zimmerman’s presentation of Chisholm’s Entia Successiva Argument.
      7. Zimmerman’s ‘Vagueness of Animals’ Argument.
      8. Hudson’s ‘Elimination’ Argument.
    6. Elselijn Kingma has accused animalists of not taking Pregnancy31 as an important issue for Animalism. She thinks that the Fetus32 is a part of the mother. My view is that animals can share parts, as seems to be necessary for Conjoined Twins33, which are another supposed objection to animalism if it could be successfully argued that there is only one animal in these cases.
    7. Otherwise, objections – which may be eaten up by the papers above – include:-
      1. A spin-off from the alleged irrelevancy of psychology for human identity is the need to deny the Brain Transplant34 intuition – that “I go where my brain goes”. The Transplant Intuition has been defended from an animalist perspective in "Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence".
      2. TBA …
    Detailed Discussion of Objections
    1. No body can think or feel:
      • Olson doesn’t think we are identical to Bodies35 but to Human Animals36, with are Organisms. The early modern discussion of Personal Identity took off when Locke – for the sake of the argument – supposed that ‘mere matter’ could think, in the absence of a soul or other thinking substance. Olson spends considerable effort in his numerous presentations of the Thinking Animal Argument37 to demonstrate that animals – let alone human animals – can think.
    2. Persons and animals have different persistence conditions: a thing cannot outlive itself.:
      • This objection assumes that Person38 and Human Animal39 are both substance sortals, whereas the Animalist claims that ‘Person’ is an honorific (or phase sortal) applied to the substance sortal ‘human animal’. Some persons – presumably God and angels – are essentially persons, but human beings aren’t – they can survive being no longer persons. The objection begs the question against Animalism.
      • The question of Brain Transplants40 is a serious objection, and is covered under the Note of that title, and later on in this Note.
    3. Any human animal could be associated with two different persons at once :
      • This objection should be covered by my Note on Multiple Personality Disorder41. We could describe this sad situation as some sort of mental jumble and deny that two persons really exist.
    4. My experiences are essentially mine but are only contingently associated with any particular animal:
      • The experiences are ‘had’ by the substance that ‘has’ them – in this case the human animal. If they were uploaded42 to a computer, they would be ‘had’ by that computer (or partition thereof). They would be copies of your experience had by something other than you.
    5. Baker’s ‘Big Tent Metaphysics’:
      • The objection:
        1. I’ve not had time to precis Baker’s long paper: "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics". For now, …
        2. The most obvious objection is to the initial implausibility of Animalism’s basic contention that – because I was once a fetus43 and may one day suffer from dementia or end up in a Persistent Vegetative State44 – psychological continuity45 or connectedness46 can have nothing to do with my persistence criteria47. Animalists can be accused of not taking persons sufficiently seriously48.
      • Olson’s Response:
        1. Olson kicks off by noting how he and Baker forever seem to talk past and misrepresent one another.
          1. Olson doesn’t deny the existence of people; he just claims that they have the same identity conditions as cats.
            • As usual, Olson uses the term PEOPLE, which the uninitiated might consider to be equivalent to the plural of the term PERSON, but which he means to be equivalent to the term HUMAN ANIMAL (or maybe HUMAN BEING). He avoids using the term of art PERSON because he thinks introducing the term PERSON as distinct from (say) HUMAN BEING prejudges the case against animalism – but I don’t think it does. At least you shouldn’t legislate any view out of existence by completely ignoring the opposition’s terms of art. So, Olson doesn’t deny the existence of people (human beings) but he does deny the existence of (human) persons, if they are supposed to be entities other than human animals.
          2. Olson also accepts the existence of chairs and flowers, things that an earlier draft of Baker’s paper implied that he’d left out of his metaphysics.
            • This is in a footnote, and a discussion of artefacts appears later in paper. From the footnote it appears that Olson is not a reductionist. However, I’m not sure about this, or even if it’s relevant. What I think he does deny is the existence of artefacts – in the same way that he denies the existence of persons – if they are understood as ontologically separable from the matter – or organisms – that are co-located with them (I keep wanting to say “that constitute them”, though not necessarily in Baker’s technical sense). So, he would deny that a wooden table can gradually metamorphose49 into one of metal, in the same way that he denies that a person can gradually metamorphose50 into a machine. That said, PERSON and MACHINE might be seen as belonging to different categories. What doesn’t metamorphose51 into the machine is the human animal. By Baker’s lights, the person isn’t metamorphosing at all. But this is just the same old disagreement as to what exists. Olson also think there’s something fishy about tables in the first place.
          3. Olson doesn’t ignore all that’s distinctive and non-biological about our careers, he just denies that they are relevant to or identity conditions.
            • But Olson does ignore Baker’s ontological claims: namely, that there’s an ontological difference between human persons and human animals. As I’ve said elsewhere, I think Olson should argue that he has already taken this ontological difference into account by acknowledging that human animals are members of the species homo sapiens whose typical members have a FPP52 during extended portions of their lives. Then he hasn’t missed anything out. He can still deny that the very same FPP53 is transferable, if he wants to (though I don’t think he does) but he doesn’t deny its existence and importance.
        2. Olson now considers Baker’s claim that she might gradually metamorphose54 into an inorganic machine, provided it had her FPP55. Olson denies that denying this is “totally ad hoc”. He’s argued that Baker is a biological organism, and both he and Baker are agreed that a biological organism cannot come to be an inorganic one.
          • Just what is wrong with metamorphosis56 or cyborgisation? That a thing cannot change its primary kind? This is because the persistence conditions of a thing are sortal-relative – cf. Wiggins. Could we deny this? The alternative is to insist that the cyborg is a whittled-down (“maximally mutilated”) human being with inorganic bits attached. This option isn’t open in the case of metamorphosis57 into a machine, as there’s no residual “luz bone” to provide continuity. Cf. Chisholm. What if the machine was so finely constituted that it had the same persistence conditions as an organism?
        3. Olson thinks that Baker misdescribes her own view, because while she claims to believe that she is an animal, she can’t really believe this as it has unacceptable logical consequences when combined with her other views. That is, you can’t simultaneously hold:-
          1. That you are an animal,
          2. That the persistence conditions of an animal are such that an animal starts off as a fetus and may end up a vegetable, and
          3. That you weren’t a fetus.
        4. Olson presses the point: Baker says that while I’m an animal, I’m not merely an animal. Olson parses that as “x is F, but x is not merely F”. He doesn’t really spell it out (though he does refer to “the second conjunct”), but from the inferences he draws (that if every F is G, then x is G; ie. he has taken it that Fx) it appears that he takes it that “but x is not merely F” should be understood as “and x is H”, so that from (Fx and Hx) we get Fx. The example for F is “a philosopher”; but surely this isn’t a primary kind term, so Baker is bound to object.
          • Just what kind of “is” is involved in the case “x is a philosopher” – not the “is” of identity – but didn’t Jen Hornsby say that all “is”s reflect property-attribution? Look58 this up. Part of the trouble here is that what follows from all this logic depends on whether the property attributed is a primary kind term. If it is, and we have both Fx and Gx, then we have F = G, for instance. That’s why F = “Human Animal” and G = “Person” are problematical. But nothing interesting follows from Olson’s example where G = “Philosopher”.
          • It’s clear (to me) that these objections only work if Baker uses “is” univocally in her sentences “I am an x”. But she doesn’t. When she says “I am an animal” she means “I am constituted by, but not identical to, and animal”. When she says “I am a person”, she means “I am identical to a person” (she probably muddies the waters by saying “I am most fundamentally a person”). Olson does recognise this but doesn’t take it seriously. He says “When Baker says that I am an animal, she means that an animal “constitutes” me.” However, he doesn’t take constitution seriously – he says the details don’t matter – but they do. He parses constitution as saying that I (a person) and an animal (a different thing to me) are co-located. Baker denies this, though whether her account of constitution really allows for this denial is a moot point.
        5. Now Olson gets to the real substance of the matter. He says that Baker doesn’t believe that I have the property of being an animal – because if she did, she would have to admit that I was once a fetus. Instead, she believes that I have the property of being constituted by an animal. And, yes – she does believe that. So, I suspect that all the tedious logical spelling out is a complaint that Baker shouldn’t use “is” equivocally. The equivocation disguises the fact that she doesn’t really believe that she is an animal in the way that Olson believes she is. Olson is of course correct in this analysis.
        6. Olson makes an analogy – which he takes to illustrate the sort of error Baker is making. We might say that (in the Biblical epic) Charlton Heston is Moses – but we wouldn’t thereby by claiming that he really is Moses, only that he’s acting a part. If someone did make the claim that CH really is M, they wouldn’t be in agreement with the normal speaker. The way the analogy is supposed to work is that Olson (but not Baker) is making the claim that Baker really is an animal. Baker is only saying something like that she is playing the role of an animal. I’m not sure that Baker would accept this. Her account of constitution has it that the relationship between the thing constituted (the person) and the thing constituting (the animal) is much closer than this role-play.
        7. Finally, Olson turns his attention to Big Tent Metaphysics (BTM):-
          1. Baker says that “reality and value go together” and that every property that is distinctive (D) or significant (S) determines a natural kind. However, if she just meant “metaphysically D or S”, then she’d be saying something trivial, so just what does she mean? Olson takes it that it’s something D or S to us, and that’s my understanding too. He adds “in any way”, which may be taking things a bit far, though Baker does owe us an account of just how D or S a trait has to be in order to generate a new primary kind. Olson seems to be claiming that for Baker, all D or S properties are essential – and she’d probably agree – but unless she’s to claim that all properties are essential (in which case there could be no persistence through change), she has to give a (non-circular) account of essential properties.
          2. Olson says (rightly) that it is this BTM that leads Baker to claim that we’re not really organisms, just constituted by them. Baker finds the FPP59 S & D. So, anything with a FPP60 is an essential kind. “Person” is shorthand for “thing with a FPP”61, so Persons are an essential kind, and have their defining property – an FPP62 – essentially. Since organisms don’t have FPPs63 essentially, Persons can’t be organisms. So far, so good.
          3. For Baker, the person and the organism are distinct things – numerically different – yet they aren’t separate things. Olson has two problems with this – just what does “separate” mean, and how do I know which I am?
          4. Olson says (rightly) that there are lots of things we are interested in, and picks just the one I think represents an ontological watershed – sentience. Where I am is a sentient being who (or that) isn’t essentially a person as sentient beings don’t necessarily have FPPs64. Amusingly, Olson claims that Baker needs a Big Tent because she has a lot of things to fit into it. I don’t know how Baker answers this question. Presumably she must allow that we have a Sentient and a Person co-located and both constituted by the Human Animal. If her logic of constitution works at all, it won’t have a problem with this as there is still only one thing present – but she might have to change the direction of focus. The one things present is the human Animal, which constitutes both the Sentient and the Person. If we say there is something that is most fundamentally a Sentient, and another thing that is most fundamentally a Person, don’t we have 2 things – but we always seemed to have two things, because we had the thing that is most fundamentally a Human Animal as well as the Person, so maybe it all works out somehow.
          5. Olson now asks why we should accept BTM (note this is independent, I think, of accepting the CV). He gives Baker’s argument … which is really just the assertion that metaphysics isn’t worth doing unless it treats of everything we find significant – ie. that it say something to say about Persons, artefacts and Sentients as such.
            • Note 1: Olson has to deny the existence of artefacts as such (ie. as things over an above the lumps of matter that make them up) because otherwise he ends up with overpopulation just as in the TA argument. Or so it would seem. I need to check65.
            • Note 2: Does Metaphysics really treat all organisms alike? Members of the species Homo Sapiens in general have interesting properties that members of other species don’t, or at least not to the same degree (maybe an important distinction). Is this a metaphysical fact, or something that only biology, or psychology, is interested in? Surely the fact that there is such a thing as (self-) consciousness (or sentience) is a metaphysical fact?
          6. Olson is unmoved. He makes an analogy between Physics and Metaphysics. Physics doesn’t deal with Persons as such – it treats them as lumps of matter – but Physics is worth doing, for all that. I’m not sure I’m moved by that argument, either. The special sciences are agreed to be a partial view (except by reductionists, who would claim that everything is really just matter in motion, and that physics misses nothing out). However, metaphysics is supposed to deal with everything that exists. I suppose it can’t just leave things out – if it doesn’t want to include them, it must deny that they exist. That’s just what Olson does – he does deny that persons exist – but only if they are thought of as anything other than animals with peculiar properties.
          7. Olson ends by rejecting the claim that there is something about metaphysics that requires it to capture all the categories that are important outside of metaphysics, because he doesn’t know what that something is.
      • My adjudication:
        1. As Olson admits, Olson and Baker talk past one another in a most frustrating way. I think Olson is most at fault for not taking Baker (let alone persons in general) seriously enough.
    6. Markosian’s ‘Mummy’ problem:
      • The objection:
        1. A man lives, is mummified, and subsequently the particles of the mummy are rearranged to form a living woman, with no psychological continuity.
        2. Markosian thinks we can draw two conclusions from the Mummy Thought Experiment (TE):-
          1. There is a single thing that was once a man and ends up as a woman.
          2. The man and woman at the termini of the TE are different people.
        3. He thinks (rightly) that Olson must deny that these conclusions can be simultaneously true. In fact, Olson probably ought to consider the first claim to be false but the second true. The first claim is doubtful because mummies aren’t organisms, so we have a double metamorphosis66. However, as for Markosian’s second claim, while Olson denies that psychology has anything to do with personal identity claims, if the persons at the TE termini aren’t the same animal, then they aren’t the same person (in the sense of the same animal) either.
        4. Markosian thinks this denial of joint truth is a problem for Olson, in that it implies that there is a “same person” relation other than Olson’s. In his reply67, Olson seems willing to accept this point. But I don’t think he would agree with Markosian that he thereby mischaracterises the problem of personal identity. While he’s willing to allow a non-identity-preserving “same person” relation, he insists that if we’re talking about the logical relation for the identity of human persons, then we have only one relation – his animalist characterisation.
        5. Markosian’s point is spoilt somewhat by his choice of TE. It’s not at all clear that we have Olson’s “same person” relation in play here, as it’s not clear that we have the “same animal” relation. However, if Markosian had chosen a different TE – something like his Salamander case, but without metamorphosis68, we would have the issue he wants to raise. Ie. if we had Fred gradually changing into Jane – or something like Michael Jackson’s antics – then we might have same animal / different person. But this depends on how the “same person” relation is supposed to work. It’s not clear to me that there would be a difference of FPP69 here, so Baker might say that we had identity of person in this case also, so there’s no wedge between the two accounts, at least not in this TE (there are still fetus-type problems – if these are taken to be problems rather than advantages of the animalist account).
      • Olson’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
    7. Markosian’s ‘Corpse Problem’:
      • Animalists are said to have a “corpse problem70”. Because I am co-located with my “corpse-to-be”, the Animalist is hoist by his own petard, in that he has the analogue of the “fetus problem71” he alleges against the72 Psychological View73.
      • Markosian’s argument, Olson’s Response and my adjudication are covered exhaustively in my Note on Corpses74 above and in Chapter 11. That Note also details further discussions of the matter.
    8. Markosian’s ‘Salamander Problem’:
      • The objection:
        1. Ned is a (male) human person who gradually morphs into salamander called Sally while remaining conscious. Subsequently, Sally morphs back into a human female person, Lucy, different from Ned in every important way.
        2. Markosian thinks this TE represents a problem for both the BV and Psychological approach.
        3. There are a number of important points about the TE, which may or may not cast doubt on its validity:-
          1. “Remaining conscious throughout”: why is this important? Surely the consciousness of a salamander is very different from that of a fully-functional human person.
          2. “very slow metamorphosis”75: just why is the “slowness” important? To provide an analogy with the career of a single object over time which changes its properties? Time is needed for their consolidation? Is any consolidation really possible at the human / salamander boundary? Are we exposed to sorites76 paradoxes?
          3. “Differing in every important way”: however much Ned and Lucy differ, it is as nothing compared with how either of them differ from Sally (the salamander). Just what is an “important” difference – important to whom? This comes up in Baker’s alleged “important” ontological differences.
        4. So, why is this a problem for the BV? Markosian thinks those holding the BV are committed to saying that Ned and Lucy are the same person, whereas Markosian thinks they are obviously not. I’m not sure (from the BV perspective) that this is much of an advance on the Mummy problem. At least there is biological continuity, but it’s of the wrong sort. The salamander is not a human animal, so there’s no reason to think that Ned and Lucy are the same human animal any more than I am Caesar if made from Caesar’s atoms.
        5. And why is it a problem for the PV77? Because there is psychological continuity. But is there? Markosian tries to stipulate that there is, but can there really be psychological continuity between a human being and a salamander? Of some sort, but not of the FPP-preserving78 sort that Baker would require – after all, the salamander (presumably) has no FPP79. And, we are to presume, though this is unclear despite the stipulation that Ned and Lucy are as different as could be, Ned and Lucy don’t share the same FPP80, so aren’t the same person for Baker. So, while there may be a problems for the standard PV81, there isn’t one for the CV or the BV – not unless they accept the possibility of intermittent objects and identify Ned and Lucy contrary to their own requirements.
        6. Markosian thinks that proponents of either the BV or the PV82 have problems with the Salamander, because there is both biological and psychological continuity – but proponents of either view insist that the continuity has to be of the right sort, and why should they agree that this TE provides the right sort – it doesn’t appear to, though maybe others might (eg. if we just missed out the salamander step, and had Ned morph directly into Lucy. Why did he not adopt this ploy? If he had, I presume the responses would have been:-
          1. Baker (CV): would probably deny that Ned and Lucy have the same FPP83; still the wrong sort of psychological continuity.
          2. PV84: don’t know; too many varieties
          3. Olson (BV): As Olson cares naught for psychological factors in matters of identity, he would admit that (indeed, claim that) Ned and Lucy are the same person, provided the morphing convinced him that they are the same human animal. He might admit that they are not the same person in some sense, provided “same person” isn’t an identity-preserving relation.
        7. Markosian now makes 4 claims, all of which he takes to be true. I consider them all false!
          1. The thing that is Ned persists throughout the story.
          2. Ned survives the events of the story.
          3. This is a story about a thing that begins its career as a person, that later becomes a salamander, and that eventually comes to be a person again.
          4. Both Sally and Lucy really are identical to Ned.
        8. While Markosian thinks all these claims true, and is happy to call the relationships between Ned, Sally and Lucy “object identity” or even “organism identity”, he doesn’t want to call it “personal identity” (PI). He thinks there must be some other relation that is worth calling PI that does not relate Ned to Sally or Ned to Lucy.
        9. There are several things that could be said of all this:-
          1. Markosian seems perilously close to the heresy of relative identity.
          2. As noted above, the wrong sort of continuity (whether biological or psychological) is involved in the Salamander TE, so none of the above 4 claims need be accepted.
          3. Identity claims need to latch on to the SORT to which the persistent is claimed to belong. Since this (and the Mummy) example involve change of sort, there is no identity between the termini.
          4. The only possible continuant is “mass of matter” – but no organism – which continually exchanges matter with its environment – can be thought of as a mass of matter. The mass of matter that was (in some sense of “constituted”, at some arbitrary point in time) Ned would be highly dispersed by the time Lucy came on the scene, so Lucy cannot be claimed to be identical to Ned in that sense.
          5. Olson agrees that there is some non-identity-preserving relation called “personal identity” involved here (or in other less odd cases). He just denies that it has anything to do with “identity”.
        10. Markosian’s conclusion from the Salamander example is that both the BV and PV85 are false, though he doesn’t know what the right view of Personal Identity is. It is not clear to me why he doesn’t invoke his “episodes of personhood” account as a possible solution.
      • Olson’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
    9. Zimmerman’s critique of Olson’s Master Argument86:
      • The objection:
        1. Zimmerman takes the argument from a recent (but unspecified87) paper by Olson. If I am alone in the room:-
          1. There is a human animal in the room.
          2. Any human animal in the room is thinking.
          3. You are the only thinking being in the room.
            Therefore,
          4. You are a human animal.
        2. In support of the premises, Zimmerman glosses as follows:-
          1. The human animal in the room has biological and not psychological persistence conditions (PCs).
          2. The human animal has a brain, doing what your brain is doing – ie. thinking. As always, it is the reference of “you” that is important here. Presumably different entities substituted for “you” (once we’ve decided what “you” are) would “have” brains in different senses.
          3. If multiple entities were present, all thinking the same thoughts, how would you know which you are? This is Olson’s epistemological argument.
          4. So you have biological and not psychological PCs.
        3. Zimmerman notes that this argument is of the following schema:-
          1. There is a human-shaped F in the room.
          2. Any human-shaped F in the room is thinking.
          3. You are the only thinking being in the room.
            Therefore,
          4. You are an F.
        4. For some reason, Zimmerman doesn’t have the conclusion, as is warranted, as “You are a human-shaped F”. This is because the conclusion in the original argument just has “human animal” rather than “human-shaped human animal”. Presumably this is firstly for brevity (can human animals be other than human-shaped? Maybe they can if they are maximally-mutilated – ie. brains aren’t human-shaped) and due to the fact that the original argument doesn’t mention shapes at all. Now clearly, any human-shaped F is an F, but some Fs can’t (presumably) be human-shaped.
        5. This may be important when we consider other things that Zimmerman suggests might be substituted for F:-
          1. Mere Body: while the animal presumably does not exist after its death, its body does, and did also exist pre-mortem. So, we can substitute “body” for F, as in "Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?". Note that this paper was also quoted by Markosian88, so must be judged to contain a cogent argument.
          2. Psychological Person (PP): but, I ask, is a PP, qua PP, shaped like anything? Just what is a PP if it isn’t a human animal? We are referred to Shoemaker, though we’re not given a reference89 (though Zimmerman does say that Shoemaker’s latest thoughts on the matter are in "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Physical Realization"). It seems that Shoemaker accepts the Master argument with F = PP. Zimmerman asks “Is there something now shaped like this body but that would survive the transfer of the cerebrum? If so, and if an animal can’t, then there is another candidate, call it a “psychological person”;”. I’m not clear quite what Shoemaker (as expounded by Zimmerman) has in mind here, and nor does Olson in his reply, but the details may not matter. I’d thought that Shoemaker would propose that the psychological person is the cerebrum, which isn’t exactly human-shaped, and isn’t what Zimmerman says. There’s a whole bunch of stuff by Shoemaker I ought to review90, in addition to "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Physical Realization", for instance:- Be this as it may, the consequence for Shoemaker is that because he accepts this argument in its entirety (with PP substituted for F), but in its original form (with “human animal” substituted for F) he accepts premises (1) and (3), yet denies the conclusion (4, that you are a human animal), he has to deny (3) – that human animals think – and indeed in his later work (we’re referred to "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Physical Realization") he argues that no animal with a sufficiently complex psychology thinks. This seems paradoxical, though less paradoxical than claiming that it’s only human animals that don’t think. What is supposed to do the thinking is something else in the vicinity of the animal’s body that has psychological persistence conditions. Zimmerman doesn’t say what Shoemaker considers these PPs to be (or what his criteria of personhood are). I need to follow91 this up.
          3. Mere Hunk of Matter: this is related to Chisholm’s arguments, though only loosely by the sound of things.
            • We are referred to Chisholm’s “Is There a Mind-Body Problem?”, (from which I’ve reviewed the excerpted version – follow this link92 – "Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'"). I think Chisholm distinguishes between entia nonsuccessiva, for which strict and philosophical93 identity conditions apply, and entia successiva for which we just talk as if there was identity, when in fact there is not. I had thought that mere hunks of matter would fall into the latter category, but it seems we’re to think of the actual particles that make them up – which are only temporarily locally assembled. Chisholm seems to think there is some material core (analogous to the Rabbinic Luz bone), which preserves the identity of material persons, but isn’t clear on what it is (this is an empirical matter).
            • Zimmerman notes all this and equates a “mere hunk of matter” with an ens nonsuccessivum. Entia successiva are dealt with in the next section of Zimmerman’s paper
            • Anyway, the bottom line is that – according to Zimmerman – Chisholm has (1), (3) and not-(4), leading to not-(2) – and (Zimmerman says) dualism.
            • I don’t suppose it matters what Chisholm thought, because Zimmerman’s point is that if we plug F = “mere hunk of matter” in Olson’s schema – with the rider that the PCs of a “mere hunk of matter” require mereological essentialism – the conclusion is that “you” are a “mere hunk of matter” – something that was, and will shortly be, scattered. Because this is absurd, Chisholm denies (2), and claims that “you” are either a tiny particle or a monad.
            • Zimmerman claims that Olson says (where94?) that this is “the most impressive sort of argument for dualism he knows”. Zimmerman “is inclined to agree”, but is looking for a better one. Two things might be said about this.
            • Firstly, Zimmerman seems to think that philosophy is just a tool for thinking up clever arguments to justify his pre-philosophical prejudices (I’ve a feeling someone else95 said that recently).
            • Secondly, what have monads or tiny particles got to do with dualism? I’d thought Chisholm was arguing for (a rather odd form of) materialism96 – which just goes to show what a waste of time it is reading one (or part of one) of a philosopher’s papers in isolation. However, I suppose the argument is that if the human animal isn’t thinking, then something else – presumably something immaterial – must be; this is interesting given that Chisholm seems to think that there is some identity-preserving physical thing present, though presumably not one capable of thinking.
        6. The bottom line of all this is that Olson’s Master Argument stinks, because its form allows for rival candidates.
      • Olson’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
        1. This is covered in my note on the Thinking Animal Argument97, which featured in Chapter 6.
    10. Zimmerman’s presentation of Chisholm’s Entia Successiva Argument:
      • The objection:
        1. The purpose of this discussion is to raise the question whether Olson can assume that animals exist. Basically, in answering the first problem he has to deny the existence of lots of common-sense objects like undetached heads, and mere chunks of matter. But, if he’s willing to give up on common sense, what is his justification that he can believe his eyes when he sees a human animal in the room? Again, Zimmerman compares Olson’s argument form with another – due to Chisholm – for the negation of Olson’s conclusion. Chisholm’s argument approximates to:-
          1. If you are a human animal, then there is a mere hunk of matter in the room shaped like an animal only if the mere hunk of matter in question is thinking.
          2. There is a mere hunk of matter in the room, shaped like a human animal; that recently was and soon will be scattered.
          3. So, you are a human animal only if the mere hunk of matter in question is thinking.
          4. You are the one and only thinking being in the room.
          5. You are not a mere hunk of matter.
          6. Therefore, the mere hunk of matter is not thinking.
          7. Therefore, you are not a human animal.
        2. This argument invites comment (mine or Zimmerman’s, as indicated):-
          1. Chisholm/Zimmerman justifies this by the usual Olson arguments – the hunk of matter has a brain …
          2. Olson denies the existence of any such thing. Also, the scattered object98 doesn’t think, does it? The thinking is done by a better-connected object (the animal, not the hunk). Also, there’s a distinction to be made between the hunk (the mereological sum of atoms) and the animal’s body – which has PCs like those of an artefact, but not those of an animal or a hunk. Of course, Olson denies the existence of bodies as well.
          3. This follows from (1) & (2).
          4. One of Olson’s core claims.
          5. Again, a core Olson claim.
          6. Follows from (4) and (5); Olson would deny this claim, if he believed the mere hunk existed. In that case, he’d have to deny (4).
          7. Follows from (3) and (6); Zimmerman notes that the same argument applies not just to animals, but to any “gross physical objects” that can gain or lose parts. Why99 is this so?
        3. I did not fully understand100 Zimmerman’s use of Chisholm, and need to follow it up later. But in any case, Zimmerman draws the following conclusions:-
          1. If Olson accepted the existence of the various alternatives, he’d have to say (based in this argument form; at least with equal justification) that he was not an animal, but one of the alternatives. Therefore, he adopts what he calls “biological minimalism” and denies that the alternative candidates – whether mere hunks of matter, bodies or psychological persons – exist.
          2. Biological Minimalism: was first expounded in "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings" and is supported by "Merricks (Trenton) - Objects and Persons". Olson has to deny that coincident objects of these sorts exist – and in particular that there exist undetached proper parts of me that are big enough to become me if other parts are removed.
          3. The point here is that if undetached heads – say – exist, then my head exists right now, and if – per impossibile – my head were to become detached and placed on life support, it would have a good claim to be me. But right now, my undetached head isn’t me, because it’s a proper part of me (the whole human animal); so – if undetached heads exist, we would have two thinking things more or less where I am located – which is one too many by Olson’s lights.
          4. Hence Olson goes along with Van Inwagen in denying the DAUP (Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts; see:- .
          5. On this analysis note that Olson need not be troubled by feet (because a foot is not a candidate for being me); but see "Olson (Eric) - Dion's Foot" and "Olson (Eric) - Why I Have No Hands". Maybe Olson is just being consistent – if heads don’t exist, then hands and feet ought not to exist either.
          6. Zimmerman has something further to say about Olson’s views on Mere Hunks of Matter, but I couldn’t understand what his point was. He says that (from Olson’s perspective) there shouldn’t be the sort of things that would cease to exist because of merely extrinsic changes – changes in what’s attached to them.
        4. Zimmerman now asks what the consequences are for Olson of denying the existence of brains, rocks or clouds, given that we really seem to interact with such things? Zimmerman thinks that this stance undermines Olson’s first premise in his Master Argument – that there is a human animal in the room. What are the reasons Olson gives for thinking, when he is alone in the room, that there is an animal in the room?
        5. Zimmerman thinks Olson just uses common sense (though he doesn’t use the term). What are the alternatives? Zimmerman doesn’t think it can be a tacit appeal to biology, because Olson denies the existence of mere hunks of matter, despite the prestige of physics – and (in the case of psychological persons) despite the prestige of psychology (at least given some future predictive power of neuroscience). Zimmerman concludes this section with an elegant argument:-
          1. He grants Olson that we have no immaterial parts, and that “you” are located in the vicinity of your whole body.
          2. He also grants Olson that thinking cannot be done by a plurality, so that you (the thinker) must be a (single) object made of the parts in the vicinity of your body. What is the favourite candidate?
          3. Olson claims this is the human animal, since we know there are such things.
          4. But, prior to Olson’s arguments, we would also have said we knew there exist lots of other macroscopic objects – such as lumps of clay, statues, organs, … and all sorts of other things we can tell exist simply by looking around. But once this conviction is shaken, why should we think animals exist?
      • Olson’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
        1. Presumably this is associated with "Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'", which I cover in Chapter 11 and the Note on Resurrection101.
    11. Zimmerman’s ‘Vagueness of Animals’ Argument:
      • The objection:
        1. Zimmerman wants to provoke Olson into addressing vagueness, but the following argument which (when combined with Olson’s 3rd premise – that “you” are the only thinking thing in the room) gives an argument against animalism:-
          1. Animals are vague objects, which means that there are very many hunks of matter with an equal right to be identified with each animal.
          2. If I am an animal, there are very many hunks of matter with an equal right to be identified with me.
          3. If these hunks have an equal claim to be me, then either each of them is conscious, or only one is
          4. They can’t each be conscious, because there’s only one thinker
          5. It is implausible to suppose that just one is conscious
          6. So, it is false that there exist all these hunks of matter with an equal right to be me.
            So,
          7. I am not an animal.
        2. Zimmerman adds the following riders in support of the premises and arguments:-
          1. Zimmerman claims that “this” – presumably “that these hunks have equal right” – is a crucial component of either “semantic indecision” or “epistemic” theories of vagueness. I need to follow102 up on these theories.
          2. Follows from (2).
          3. No further comment.
          4. This depends on Olson’s “too many minds” objections.
          5. Zimmerman thinks this another “Olson-ish” claim.
          6. Follows from (3), (4) & (5).
          7. Follows from (2) and (6).
        3. My thoughts on these premises and arguments are as follows:-
          1. That does “identified” mean? Not “identical”, because the PCs of animals and hunks of matter differ. So, presumably, the thought is that one hunk or another constitutes (in some sense) the current temporal phase (in some sense) of the animal? Also, what does Zimmerman mean by “each animal”? It sounds as though he’s saying not only that we have lots of hunks present, but also lots of animals. Presumably he just means that for any particular animal, there are lots of hunks – and that we’re only considering one animal (as commonly conceived) in this case. Having said that, why give priority to the animal? There are definitely lots of hunks present (they are defined cleanly by mereological considerations if we adopt mereological essentialism), so presumably a particular hunk could claim to instantiate lots of different animals, if we were to allow animals to overlap – though this might depend on how fuzzy we allow our animals to be – it might be the case that if “two” animals overlap in any way, we have one animal – though pathological cases – eg. the dicephalus or less radically conjoined individuals – make this suggestion implausible.
          2. I “am” an animal if identical to one, rather than constituted by one.
          3. I couldn’t see why there were only two possibilities. Might not “some” be conscious, rather than one or all, at least at this stage in the argument?
          4. The whole argument is of the form “valid ad hominem” – attempting to show inconsistencies in Olson’s arguments. However, in his reply, Olson claims that if these hunks of matter existed, he would admit that they think. I’m not sure how the logic of this works. Is his foundational problem the epistemological one – that if they all thought, I wouldn’t know which he was, or the plain metaphysical one – wastage? I presume it’s the latter – Olson doesn’t want this plurality whether they think or not, but if they do exist, we have extra problems.
          5. This “argument from idempotency” arises a lot – and seems perfectly legitimate – it is, for instance, an objection to “closest continuer” theories of personal identity when there are lots of equally-qualified candidates (as in the botched teletransportation TE). Baker doesn’t seem to accept it, however. She says, somewhere103, that in reduplication104 cases, “I’d just know” which one maintained my FPP105 – though I’ve no idea how (and nor has she).
          6. No further comment.
          7. No further comment.
        4. Zimmerman thinks that Olson would deny (1), and therefore (2). Unfortunately, Premise (1) isn’t atomic. Olson accepts that animals are vague objects (despite the arguments of "Evans (Gareth) - Can There Be Vague Objects?" (and probably others) claiming that such objects are illogical). He just denies that each mereological sum that has a claim to constitute an animal does so. It strikes me (and this is indeed Zimmerman’s point) that if animals are vague objects, then there’s only one of them where an animal is commonly presumed to be, whereas if they aren’t vague, then there are lots of mostly-overlapping ones. Anyway, the reason Zimmerman gives for Olson’s rejection of (1) is that (for Olson) “the vagueness of the boundaries of an animal cannot be a matter of there being many hunks of matter that are equally good candidates for being the animal”, which seems fair. Zimmerman thinks this leads to problems, and rules out certain popular accounts of vagueness, namely:-
          1. Semantic indecision among many things with only slightly different spatiotemporal boundaries, or
          2. Timothy Williamson’s epistemicism, since it too requires many good candidates in (nearly) the same place at the same time.
            The reason is that Olson insists that there’s only one thing present. Therefore, Zimmerman thinks Olson has to choose between:-
          3. Merricks: There is just one thing there, and it is superprecise, and
          4. Van Inwagen: There is just one thing there, and it fades out, objectively.
        5. Zimmerman gives no precise references for any of this, other than gesturing towards "Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness" (and John Hawthorne’s Epistemicism and Semantic Plasticity (Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 2, 2006), which I don’t yet possess), but I presume the following are likely candidates, which I need to follow106 up:-
          1. Semantic indecision: My database has no references to this, so will need to check with "Keefe (Rosanna) & Smith (Peter) - Theories of Vagueness".
          2. Timothy Williamson’s epistemicism: presumably "Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness as Ignorance" would be a good place to start?
          3. Merricks’ superprecision: try "Merricks (Trenton) - Composition and Vagueness"?
          4. Van Inwagen: "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Composition", Olson’s preferred solution.
        6. Zimmerman’s worries are that neither of the accounts of vagueness available to Olson seems appropriate for animals. I don’t have enough background107 in theories of vagueness to understand or evaluate what he has to say. The points he makes are that:-
          1. The vagueness of animals – of the spatial boundaries of its body and the temporal boundaries of its life – seems similar to that of artefacts such as ships or natural features such as mountains.
          2. Artefacts and natural features do not seem best dealt with by positing super-precision or objective fade-outs.
          3. He alleges that the super-precision Olson needs is much worse that Williamson’s variety. Olson needs “exactly one object, its parts somehow very different from all the other collections of parts that almost make up a ship, a mountain, …”. I can’t comment on this – yet108.
          4. Both the lone candidates of Merricks’ superprecision and Van Inwagen’s fade-outs are incompatible with:-
            • Vagueness being resolved by linguistic revision, or
            • People being able validly to draw boundaries in different places.
            … unless we are idealists (ie. immaterialists), which neither Olson nor Zimmerman are.
        7. These points, and especially the point about idealism, were lost109 on me.
      • Olson’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
    12. Hudson’s ‘Elimination’ Argument:
      • The objection:
      • Bailey’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
    13. Pregnancy and Conjoined Twins:
      • Both these issues are discussed later in this chapter under the Notes:-
        → Pregnancy110
        → Dicephalus111
    14. The Brain Transplant Intuition:
      • The objection:
      • Madden’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
        1. This is discussed in my Note on Brain Transplants112.
    15. Lowe’s ‘Mereological Atoms’ Argument:
      • The objection:
      • Olson’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
        1. This may be associated with Zimmerman’s presentation of Chisholm’s Entia Successiva Argument above. I’ve not read Olson’s paper yet.
  2. Dicephalus113
    1. This Note is more general that Dicephalus, but I can’t think of a better title. There are several related pathological conditions in which the number of animals114 and the number of individuals115 may fail to align. In order of increasing severity of the “condition”:-
      1. Conjoined Twins: "Wikipedia - Conjoined Twins". Varies from a fairly loose conjunction of individuals, who may be separated, to more severe forms with shared organs and limbs. This article is of interest not least because it discusses the issue of fission116 versus fusion117, with the latter now the favourite suggestion.
      2. Craniopagus: "Wikipedia - Craniopagus Twins". The babies are joined at the skull. Contrast the case where both twins are persons118 with the degenerate case "Wikipedia - Craniopagus Parasiticus".
      3. Polycephaly: "Wikipedia - Polycephaly". Animals or humans with apparently more than one head. Dicephaly is the limiting case. Usually an extreme version of conjunction. See, for example, BBC - Rare two-headed snake. Note that the description “two headed” seems more plausible in the case of reptiles than humans, given their presumed reduced mental experience. That said, given that dicephaly is – according to this article – a case of incomplete fission119 of an original single individual – this descriptive decision may be correct.
      4. Diprosopus: "Wikipedia - Diprosopus".
        1. Animals, including humans, with two faces. There may be one or two brains, but only one skull. The important thing – and what differentiates the diprosopus from the dicephalus – is that there is much less duplication of body parts, so it is very much two brains sharing one body – though it can also be the relatively superficial – though tragic – case of one brain, one body and two faces.
        2. For more on diprosopus120 see:-
        3. The Mail Online diprosopus article above quotes the following “Medical Facts” from the Embryo Project Encyclopedia:
          • The rare condition diprosopus is also known as craniofacial duplication.
          • Diprosopus refers to a baby born with a single torso, normal limbs and facial features, which are duplicated121 to a degree.
          • In mild instances the baby may have a duplicated nose and the eyes may be spaced far apart. But in extreme cases the entire face can be replicated122, hence the name diprosopus - Greek for two-faced.
          • Most babies born with diprosopus are stillborn, and there are fewer than 50 cases documented since 1864.
          • Where a baby is born with two complete identical faces, the condition is considered a rare variant of conjoined twinning.
          • But while conjoined twinning is the result of an incomplete separation of two embryos, diprosopus is caused by abnormal activity of the protein Sonic Hedgehog (SHH).
          • The protein is responsible for signalling craniofacial patterning during embryonic development, and among other things governs the width of facial features.
          • Where the protein is found in excess, a baby will have wider facial features, and in extreme cases it can cause the duplication of those features.
          • Diprosopus can be detected via ultrasound in pregnancy, or via CT scanning.
          • One of the first indications of the condition is the detection of abnormally high amount of amniotic fluid present within the amniotic sac.
          • There is currently no treatment to cure the condition and because of its rarity few treatment options or corrective surgery techniques exist.
        4. This doesn’t seem to explain why there should be two brains, however. An actual search of the Encyclopedia delivers a much briefer and less informative article.
    2. All these situations – and in particular the paradigm case of dicephalus, wherein it appears that we have a human animal123 with two heads – are often cited as a prima facie problems for Animalism124.
    3. The claim is that while we have multiple persons125, we only have a single animal126, so the animalist127 claim that persons are numerically identical to their organisms128 is false.
    4. Of course, the above claim is somewhat bald. Animalism129 – at least in the form expounded by Eric Olson – has no truck with psychology130 as necessary for our persistence131. While Olson often refers to “people” this is just shorthand for “some of us132”, rather than “persons”, the plural of person133.
    5. So, if the animalist claim is that we are human animals, then the question is – in the case of dicephalus and related conditions – how many of us134 are present, and how many human animals135 are present. Animalism136 needs the numbers to be equal.
    6. That said, these cases add to the prima facie case for animalism – that we are human animals – as our animal nature is pointed out by the unfortunate errors that have arisen during the gestation of the animal.
    7. The cases under consideration have the advantage over standard Thought Experiments137, in that they are real-life cases. What is actual must be possible, and a standard argument against TEs is thereby avoided, namely that some of them, at least – whatever our intuitions may say – may not in fact be possible138 because the TEs are under-described.
    8. That said, there’s still a temptation to push the boundaries, and to consider cases in this general area that are not actual yet are not quite as science-fiction as the usual TEs139.
    9. Cases of dicephalus are fairly rare, and often one “twin” is degenerate (contrast "Wikipedia - Craniopagus Parasiticus" with "Wikipedia - Dicephalic Parapagus Twins") so it’s not clear that we have two persons140 or two of “us141”. However, the case of the dicephalus twins142, Abigail and Brittany Hensel, where one body appears to be coordinated by two brains (see "Wikipedia - Abby and Brittany Hensel") shows that this is not necessarily the case. Here we definitely have two persons143, but maybe only one animal144. This is probably a real-life case of either incomplete fission145 or of fusion146.
    10. There are two issues with these cases:-
      1. How should they be best described?
      2. How should the animalist respond?
    11. Description:
      1. I need to research this further, but it seems to me that we have a sliding scale of pathological cases – from that of Siamese twins (who are often fairly loosely connected, and can often be surgically separated) to the much more extreme cases of diprosopus.
      2. I presume, also, that we can have either fission147 or fusion148, or indeed both serially – as the case may be – an empirical matter.
      3. In the case of (incomplete) fission149, the twins150 will be identical, as the situation is one where the twinning process has not completed.
      4. But (I imagine) we can also have a case of fusion151, where the twin-embryos152 – whether identical or fraternal – that were separate have subsequently partially fused. Note that if the twins are identical, we will have had a case of fission153 followed by fusion154. I don’t know whether there have been any actual cases of this.
    12. Response:
      1. The most likely response from the animalist155 is that the dicephalus is not a single organism156, but two organisms that share some body-parts.
      2. The force of the arguments in this kind of case depends on “relevant similarity” – if the dicephalus-case is sufficiently similar to the general case, it can be used to show things about the general case. But this claim can be rejected.
      3. In the case of diprosopus, it is more difficult to claim that there are two organisms157. Now – in practice – there are never two persons158 either (as in all the 30-odd cases recorded since 1860, the condition has proved quickly fatal, so there were no persons159 present). But this might not always be so. Also, Lynne Rudder Baker might claim that the rudimentary persons were indeed persons160 – as there was a possibility that they would develop into robust persons. Failing that, it might be the case in the future there is a case where the diprosopus survives to develop personality161. There does seem to have been an actual case of survival into adulthood, but there was only one person, and one disfigured individual. Finally, we have to decide how to describe the situation where there is one brain stem but two ‘brains162’ (presumably two sets of cerebral hemispheres163). There don’t seem to have been any actual cases of this in humans, but there might have been164.
  3. Pregnancy165
    1. At first sight, this topic sounds utterly tangential to my research interests, but I’ve included it because Elselijn Kingma complained – in "Kingma (Elselijn) - BUMP: Better Understanding the Metaphysics of Pregnancy (B1)" – that "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology" contained not even a footnote on the topic of pregnancy and the metaphysical issues it raises, in particular for animalism166.
    2. Following Kingma, the discussion will focus on the relationship throughout pregnancy between the mother and the fetus167. The key question is whether the fetus is a part of the mother or is a separate individual168 inside her. Additionally, we need to consider whether this status changes as pregnancy progresses.
    3. I have to admit immediately that (contra Kingma) – my initial view169 is that the relationship is more “bun” (the “container model”) than “bump” (the “part model”), though this separation seems clearer as pregnancy progresses, following the implantation of the Zygote170 (prior to which there is clear separation – though I suppose we might consider the zygote a small bundle of maternal cells, despite their genetic distinction – a situation that occurs in other cases).
    4. It looks like Kingma’s view is of pregnancy as a case of fusion171 (at the point of implantation of the Zygote; I will discuss the ontological status of the zygote shortly) followed by fission172 (at birth).
    5. Another point to consider is the possibility of technological developments to enable gestation in an artificial uterus (see Wikipedia: Artificial womb). Would the same arguments imply that the fetus is a part of the machine? Is this plausible?
    6. Having said all the above, just what is the problem for animalism?
    • Zygote173
      1. A Zygote ("Wikipedia - Zygote") – is the immediate post-fertilisation product.
      2. In humans, the zygote develops by division until it implants as the embryo174. Until then it is called a pre-embryo ("Wikipedia - Pre-embryo"); a morula (Wikipedia: Morula) after 4 divisions – 16 blastomeres – and a blastocyst ("Wikipedia - Blastocyst") by the 5th day. The implanted embryo is called a fetus175 after 11 weeks.
      3. In the philosophy of personal identity, the question arises when the human being176 or the human person177 arises. Additionally – and relatedly – was I178 ever a zygote (or an embryo179, or a fetus180).
      4. Most philosophers agree that a zygote isn’t a person181, because it does not possess the appropriate psychological182 attributes.
      5. Many philosophers contend that a human zygote isn’t a human being183 either – in that it hasn’t the appropriate set of organs.
      6. In addition, the question whether I was ever a zygote is complicated by two considerations:-
        1. Twinning184: is a special case of fission185. Why should the zygote be numerically identical to one – rather than the other – of a pair of monozygotic twins? Modal186 considerations apply if I am in fact not a monozygotic twin.
        2. Difference over the definition – or maybe ontological187 category – of “person188”. Some philosophers insist that an individual189 can be a person190 on account of its expected future capacities191, or actual or once anticipated past capacities, irrespective of its present capacities.
      7. A question raised by the philosophy of Pregnancy192 is – in the case of human beings and mammals generally – what is the ontological status of the Zygote? Is this bundle of free-floating cells a part of the mother or is it a separate individual? It is genetically diverse from the vast majority of the mother’s cells, which would suggest a separate individual – but there are cases of Micro-Chimerism193 where genetically-diverse cells would be considered part of the mother (I suppose).
      8. As a footnote, in single-celled animals the zygote may constitute the entire animal. I once had “necessarily asexually-reproducing” here. The Wikipedia entry has it that such single-celled organisms reproduce asexually by mitosis. But if all such organisms arise in this way, in what way are they correctly described as “zygotes” which involves the “yoking together” of two distinct and differentiated gamete cells? Is it possible that some organisms reproduce both sexually and asexually? And – if so (as I believe) – is it true in this case? Do I care?
    • Embryos194
      1. In humans, the immediate post-fertilization product – the zygote195 – develops by division until it implants as the embryo ("Wikipedia - Embryo"). It is called a fetus196 after 11 weeks.
      2. In the philosophy of personal identity, the question arises when the human being197 or the human person198 arises. Additionally – and relatedly – was I ever an embryo?
      3. Most philosophers agree that an embryo isn’t a person199, because it does not possess the appropriate psychological200 attributes201.
      4. Many philosophers contend that a human embryo isn’t a human being202 either – in that it hasn’t the appropriate set of organs.
      5. In addition, the question whether I was ever an embryo is complicated by differences over the definition – or maybe ontological category – of “person203”, as was noted in the discussion of Zygote204.
    • Fetuses205
      1. A Fetus is a developing but unborn mammal subsequent to implantation and some further development. See my notes on Zygotes206 and the Embryo207.
      2. In humans, the implanted embryo ("Wikipedia - Embryo") is called a fetus ("Wikipedia - Fetus") after 11 weeks which remains the favoured term of reference until the individual208’s birth – whether full-term or induced – when it is referred to as a neonate (or a baby!). Referring to the fetus as a “baby” is tendentious but common in the pro-life movement.
      3. Fetuses feature a lot in the philosophy of personal identity. Are they persons209, or merely potential persons, given that they probably fail the conditions for personhood210?
      4. Was I211 ever a fetus? At least, was I an early-term fetus?
      5. This latter question is addressed by animalists212 – who think that we were indeed fetuses – as a poser for supporters of the psychological view213 (or constitution view214) of personal identity (since fetuses lack psychological connectedness215 to adult persons, and even lack psychological continuity216 to them on the presumption that early-term fetuses lack all psychological experience).
      6. But, it’s also alleged as a problem for animalism217, or at least a matter that has not been properly addressed by them. What was the relation of the fetus to its mother. Was the mother merely a container, or was the fetus a proper part218 of the mother, who thereby fissioned219 on the baby’s birth? See Elselijn Kingma and "Finn (Suki) - Bun or bump?".
      7. It strikes me that220 the “fission at birth” view is too implausible – the fetus – especially near term – certainly looks like an independent being that’s being hosted on life support by the mother.
      8. So, maybe we can come to a compromise understanding whereby the fissioning221 happens earlier, though the separation would clearly be more vague222 than the cutting of the umbilical cord. ‘Viability’ would be an appropriate point – something like 21-24 weeks’ gestation – though the earliest viability depends on the state and availability of medical technology (see Wikipedia: Fetal viability).
    • Abortion223
      1. The morality of abortion is a large and important issue, but is not my major concern except insofar as it impinges on the topic of Personal Identity.
      2. Our views on Personal Identity will have an impact on our views of the morality of abortion, though not in any straightforward manner.
      3. More importantly – and regrettably so in my opinion – views on the morality of abortion can have an impact on one’s views of personal identity. This is the wrong way round, and violates the fact / value distinction. While ethical, political or religious224 views might influence our preference for certain metaphysical views, they should not constrain our actual beliefs, which should be responses to how things are, and to which our other beliefs should conform, however disappointing that might be.
        1. This remark assumes that there is a “way things are” that is independent of the desires and motivations of human beings. This is denied by – for instance – Yuval Noah Harari; but see – for a robust realist view – "Blackburn (Simon) - Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed".
        2. I do not wish to deny that our ethical, political and religious views can be responses to how things are, just that they were often responses to how things seemed to us – or to people we respected – at formative times of our lives, and then got entrenched and we remain impervious to evidence to the contrary.
      4. I’ll leave further discussion for now. Enough to say that I’ll not intend to wade in too far into this moral morass, though I will need to review the foundational papers on the moral implications of abortion.
      5. The note on Pregnancy225 raises questions of what (to put it rather positively) abortion actually achieves. According to the standard “container model”, abortion kills a distinct, though temporarily dependent, being. However, according to the “parthood model”, abortion only removes a part of the whole (removing the so-called “foster” from the “gravida”: see "Kingma (Elselijn) - Were You Part of Your Mother?").


Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now discussed the arguments against Animalism, we now in our next Chapter226 turn to the arguments against the Constitution View.
  2. This is work in progress227.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed228
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. I’ve not been overly careful to segregate the reading-list of this Chapter from that of Chapter 6231. I will address the segregation in due course. There will, in any case, be some overlap.
  3. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.


Works on this topic that I’ve actually read232, include the following:-
  1. Arguments against Animalism233
  2. Dicephalus249
  3. Pregnancy
    1. Pregnancy251
    2. Zygote252
    3. Embryos253
    4. Fetuses254
    5. Abortion258

A further reading list might start with:-
  1. Arguments against Animalism261
  2. Dicephalus265
  3. Pregnancy
    1. Pregnancy267
    2. Zygote270
    3. Embryos271
    4. Fetuses273
    5. Abortion274


In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 12: Footnote 21: Footnote 72:
  1. Olson alleges the ‘Fetus Problem against the Constitution View, but he misunderstands the CV’s position.
Footnote 120:
  1. All this needs tidying up.
  2. It’s probably best to take the Wikipedia article in full and link it to these reports and extract the relevant biological facts and cut out all the social stuff that is irrelevant to the metaphysical issues.
Footnote 228: Footnote 257: Footnote 259: Footnote 260: Footnote 268: Footnote 269: Footnote 272: See, in particular, Footnote 275: Footnote 276: Footnote 277:

Table of the Previous 12 Versions of this Note: (of 16)

Date Length Title
14/02/2026 00:41:46 43752 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
06/07/2023 00:43:12 38053 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
28/09/2022 10:24:58 37420 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
11/05/2022 18:59:02 37015 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
11/04/2022 00:01:26 15713 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
01/10/2021 13:17:46 15009 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
29/03/2021 19:23:31 8093 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
22/03/2021 00:28:48 4462 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
08/02/2021 16:13:26 4021 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
18/04/2019 18:18:43 4005 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
05/04/2016 23:19:41 3764 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)
04/04/2015 00:17:17 3494 Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)


Note last updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
06/09/2026 04:46:14 None available Thesis - Chapter 00 (Preface)

Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Abortion Animalism Animalism - Objections Animals Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)
Awaiting Attention (Write-ups) Baker - Review - Olson - What Are We? Baker - The Coherence Of the Constitution View of Human Persons Baker - The Human Animal: Big-Tent Metaphysics Baker - The Human Animal: Response to Olson
Baker - What Am I? Body Brain Brain Death Brain Transplants
Cerebrum Chimera Chisholm - Which Physical Thing Am I? Connectedness vs Continuity Constitution View
Constitution View - Objections Corpses Counting Persons Dicephalus Duplication
Embryo Ferner - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity Fetuses First-Person Perspective Fission
Fusion Human Animals Human Beings Human Persons I
Individual Intuition Jen_080317 (Baker) Logic of Identity Markosian - The Human Animal: Three Problems for Olson
Mereology Metamorphosis Modality Multiple Personality Disorder Noonan - Persons and Bodies - Response
Olson - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman Olson - The Human Animal (Precis) Olson - The Human Animal: Reply to Markosian Olson - What Are We? Animals Olson - What Are We? Brains
Olson - What Are We? What Now? Ontology Organisms Persistence Persistence Criteria
Persistent Vegetative State Person Personality Physicalism Pregnancy
Properties Psychological Continuity Psychological View Psychology Religion
Replication Resurrection Scattered Objects Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity Sorites
Status: Thesis Dashboard (2026: September) Taking Persons Seriously Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism) Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View)
Thesis - Method & Form Thinking Animal Argument Thought Experiments Twinning Uploading
Vagueness What are We? Works Read - Explanation Zimmerman - The Human Animal: Objections Zygote

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Life After Death Origins PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3 Status: Thesis Dashboard (2026: September), 2 Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)
Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) Thesis - Personal Identity Thinking Animal Argument
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10        

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author Title Medium Extra Links Read?
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection) Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Life After Death Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Origins Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Personal Identity Paper High Quality Abstract   Yes
Todman (Theo) Thesis - Thinking Animal Argument Paper Medium Quality Abstract   Yes


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Kingma (Elselijn) BUMP: Better Understanding the Metaphysics of Pregnancy (B2) Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Southampton University Website Yes
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Martin (Michael G.F.), Ed. Mind - 114/453 (January 2005) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Bibliographical details to be supplied 11%
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Mulgan (Tim) Critical Notice of Jeff McMahan's The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Sep2004, Vol. 34 Issue 3, p443-459, 17p Yes
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Noonan (Harold) Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Philosophical Quarterly, 1998, Vol. 48 Issue 192, p302, 17p; Yes
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Olson (Eric) Dion's Foot Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Journal of Philosophy 94, No. 5 (May, 1997), 260-265 Yes
Olson (Eric) Human Atoms Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, No 3, pp. 396-406; September 1998 33%
Olson (Eric) On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract O'Hear (Anthony), Ed. - Mind, Self and Person, 2015: 39-56 Yes
Olson (Eric) Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson) Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) Low Quality Abstract Bibliographical details to be supplied 16%
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Olson (Eric) Why I Have No Hands Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Theoria 61 (1995): 182-197 Yes
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Puhl (Klaus) Review of Klaus Petrus's 'On Human Persons' Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2004 33%
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Rodger (Daniel), Blackshaw (Bruce P.) & Wilcox (Clinton) Why arguments against infanticide remain convincing Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Bioethics. 2018;00:1–5 Yes
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Shoemaker (David) The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part III, Chapter 15, pp. 303-327 24%
Shoemaker (Sydney) Are Selves Substances? Paper - Cited Shoemaker - Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Chapter 2 No
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Shoemaker (Sydney) Persons and Personal Identity Paper - Cited High Quality Abstract Kim & Sosa - A Companion to Metaphysics Yes
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Shoemaker (Sydney) Self, Body, and Coincidence Paper - Cited Medium Quality Abstract Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, Vol. 73: 1999, 287-306 Yes
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Snowdon (Paul) Some Objections to Animalism Paper - Cited Low Quality Abstract Petrus - On Human Persons, 2003 Yes
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