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Personal Identity

Animalism - Objections

(Work In Progress: output at 30/08/2026 23:32:38)

Plug Note¹

• Thesis Text:
  1. In "Olson (Eric) - Human Atoms" - as cited in "Bailey (Andrew M.) - The Elimination Argument" - Olson mentions four “favourite objections”, though these strike me as being rather feeble, and I suspect them of being straw men: they may be favoured by objectors, but are also Olson’s ‘favourites’ as they are easy to bat away. I will assess them later in this Note:-
     1. If you were an animal, you would be identical with your body (or at any rate with some human body). But no human body can think or feel or act, as you can.
     2. Persons and animals have different persistence conditions: the organism that is your body could outlive you (if you lapsed into a persistent vegetative state), or you could outlive it (if your brain were transplanted and the rest of you destroyed). But a thing cannot outlive itself.
     3. Persons and animals have different criteria of synchronic identity: any human animal could be associated with two different persons at once (as cases of split personality). Thus, no person is an animal.
     4. These experiences – the ones I am having now – are essentially mine. But they are only contingently associated with any particular animal. Hence, I have a property that no animal has.
  2. The above paper is intended, however, to rebut the argument against animalism in "Lowe (E.J.) - Subjects of Experience", which has the unlikely consequence that we are “mereological atoms”.
  3. Otherwise, a convenient starting-point for reviewing objections to Animalism is in "Olson (Eric), Etc. - Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'". The symposium starts with "Olson (Eric) - Precis of 'The Human Animal'", a very brief account that hardly does what it says on the tin. Otherwise, the symposium contains the following papers:-
     1. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics"
     2. "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity"
     3. "Zimmerman (Dean) - Problems for Animalism"
     4. "Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman"
     5. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Response to Eric Olson"
        
  4. "Hudson (Hud) - I am Not an Animal!" argues against animalism via the “Elimination Argument”. "Bailey (Andrew M.) - The Elimination Argument" seeks to rebuff it.
  5. The objections from the above papers may be listed as follows. I intend to elucidate and answer these objections – or supply and critique Olson’s answers – below, though some may require – or be already covered by – their own Notes appearing later in this Chapter or elsewhere:-
     1. Baker’s ‘Big Tent Metaphysics’
     2. Markosian’s ‘Mummy’ problem
     3. Markosian’s ‘Corpse Problem’
     4. Markosian’s ‘Salamander Problem’
     5. Zimmerman’s critique of Olson’s Master Argument².
     6. Zimmerman’s presentation of Chisholm’s Entia Successiva Argument.
     7. Zimmerman’s ‘Vagueness of Animals’ Argument.
     8. Hudson’s ‘Elimination’ Argument.
        
  6. Elselijn Kingma has accused animalists of not taking Pregnancy³ as an important issue for Animalism. She thinks that the Fetus⁴ is a part of the mother. My view is that animals can share parts, as seems to be necessary for Conjoined Twins⁵, which are another supposed objection to animalism if it could be successfully argued that there is only one animal in these cases.
  7. Otherwise, objections – which may be eaten up by the papers above – include:-
     1. A spin-off from the alleged irrelevancy of psychology for human identity is the need to deny the Brain Transplant⁶ intuition – that “I go where my brain goes”. The Transplant Intuition has been defended from an animalist perspective in "Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence".
     2. TBA …
        

  ---

  Detailed Discussion of Objections
  1. No body can think or feel:
     • Olson doesn’t think we are identical to Bodies⁷ but to Human Animals⁸, with are Organisms. The early modern discussion of Personal Identity took off when Locke – for the sake of the argument – supposed that ‘mere matter’ could think, in the absence of a soul or other thinking substance. Olson spends considerable effort in his numerous presentations of the Thinking Animal Argument⁹ to demonstrate that animals – let alone human animals – can think.
  2. Persons and animals have different persistence conditions: a thing cannot outlive itself.:
     • This objection assumes that Person¹⁰ and Human Animal¹¹ are both substance sortals, whereas the Animalist claims that ‘Person’ is an honorific (or phase sortal) applied to the substance sortal ‘human animal’. Some persons – presumably God and angels – are essentially persons, but human beings aren’t – they can survive being no longer persons. The objection begs the question against Animalism.
     • The question of Brain Transplants¹² is a serious objection, and is covered under the Note of that title, and later on in this Note.
  3. Any human animal could be associated with two different persons at once :
     • This objection should be covered by my Note on Multiple Personality Disorder¹³. We could describe this sad situation as some sort of mental jumble and deny that two persons really exist.
  4. My experiences are essentially mine but are only contingently associated with any particular animal:
     • The experiences are ‘had’ by the substance that ‘has’ them – in this case the human animal. If they were uploaded¹⁴ to a computer, they would be ‘had’ by that computer (or partition thereof). They would be copies of your experience had by something other than you.
  5. Baker’s ‘Big Tent Metaphysics’:
     • The objection:
       1. I’ve not had time to precis Baker’s long paper: "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics". For now, …
       2. The most obvious objection is to the initial implausibility of Animalism’s basic contention that – because I was once a fetus¹⁵ and may one day suffer from dementia or end up in a Persistent Vegetative State¹⁶ – psychological continuity¹⁷ or connectedness¹⁸ can have nothing to do with my persistence criteria¹⁹. Animalists can be accused of not taking persons sufficiently seriously²⁰.
     • Olson’s Response:
       1. Olson kicks off by noting how he and Baker forever seem to talk past and misrepresent one another.
          1. Olson doesn’t deny the existence of people; he just claims that they have the same identity conditions as cats.
             • As usual, Olson uses the term PEOPLE, which the uninitiated might consider to be equivalent to the plural of the term PERSON, but which he means to be equivalent to the term HUMAN ANIMAL (or maybe HUMAN BEING). He avoids using the term of art PERSON because he thinks introducing the term PERSON as distinct from (say) HUMAN BEING prejudges the case against animalism – but I don’t think it does. At least you shouldn’t legislate any view out of existence by completely ignoring the opposition’s terms of art. So, Olson doesn’t deny the existence of people (human beings) but he does deny the existence of (human) persons, if they are supposed to be entities other than human animals.
          2. Olson also accepts the existence of chairs and flowers, things that an earlier draft of Baker’s paper implied that he’d left out of his metaphysics.
             • This is in a footnote, and a discussion of artefacts appears later in paper. From the footnote it appears that Olson is not a reductionist. However, I’m not sure about this, or even if it’s relevant. What I think he does deny is the existence of artefacts – in the same way that he denies the existence of persons – if they are understood as ontologically separable from the matter – or organisms – that are co-located with them (I keep wanting to say “that constitute them”, though not necessarily in Baker’s technical sense). So, he would deny that a wooden table can gradually metamorphose²¹ into one of metal, in the same way that he denies that a person can gradually metamorphose²² into a machine. That said, PERSON and MACHINE might be seen as belonging to different categories. What doesn’t metamorphose²³ into the machine is the human animal. By Baker’s lights, the person isn’t metamorphosing at all. But this is just the same old disagreement as to what exists. Olson also think there’s something fishy about tables in the first place.
          3. Olson doesn’t ignore all that’s distinctive and non-biological about our careers, he just denies that they are relevant to or identity conditions.
             • But Olson does ignore Baker’s ontological claims: namely, that there’s an ontological difference between human persons and human animals. As I’ve said elsewhere, I think Olson should argue that he has already taken this ontological difference into account by acknowledging that human animals are members of the species homo sapiens whose typical members have a FPP²⁴ during extended portions of their lives. Then he hasn’t missed anything out. He can still deny that the very same FPP²⁵ is transferable, if he wants to (though I don’t think he does) but he doesn’t deny its existence and importance.
       2. Olson now considers Baker’s claim that she might gradually metamorphose²⁶ into an inorganic machine, provided it had her FPP²⁷. Olson denies that denying this is “totally ad hoc”. He’s argued that Baker is a biological organism, and both he and Baker are agreed that a biological organism cannot come to be an inorganic one.
          • Just what is wrong with metamorphosis²⁸ or cyborgisation? That a thing cannot change its primary kind? This is because the persistence conditions of a thing are sortal-relative – cf. Wiggins. Could we deny this? The alternative is to insist that the cyborg is a whittled-down (“maximally mutilated”) human being with inorganic bits attached. This option isn’t open in the case of metamorphosis²⁹ into a machine, as there’s no residual “luz bone” to provide continuity. Cf. Chisholm. What if the machine was so finely constituted that it had the same persistence conditions as an organism?
       3. Olson thinks that Baker misdescribes her own view, because while she claims to believe that she is an animal, she can’t really believe this as it has unacceptable logical consequences when combined with her other views. That is, you can’t simultaneously hold:-
          1. That you are an animal,
          2. That the persistence conditions of an animal are such that an animal starts off as a fetus and may end up a vegetable, and
          3. That you weren’t a fetus.
       4. Olson presses the point: Baker says that while I’m an animal, I’m not merely an animal. Olson parses that as “x is F, but x is not merely F”. He doesn’t really spell it out (though he does refer to “the second conjunct”), but from the inferences he draws (that if every F is G, then x is G; ie. he has taken it that Fx) it appears that he takes it that “but x is not merely F” should be understood as “and x is H”, so that from (Fx and Hx) we get Fx. The example for F is “a philosopher”; but surely this isn’t a primary kind term, so Baker is bound to object.
          • Just what kind of “is” is involved in the case “x is a philosopher” – not the “is” of identity – but didn’t Jen Hornsby say that all “is”s reflect property-attribution? Look³⁰ this up. Part of the trouble here is that what follows from all this logic depends on whether the property attributed is a primary kind term. If it is, and we have both Fx and Gx, then we have F = G, for instance. That’s why F = “Human Animal” and G = “Person” are problematical. But nothing interesting follows from Olson’s example where G = “Philosopher”.
          • It’s clear (to me) that these objections only work if Baker uses “is” univocally in her sentences “I am an x”. But she doesn’t. When she says “I am an animal” she means “I am constituted by, but not identical to, and animal”. When she says “I am a person”, she means “I am identical to a person” (she probably muddies the waters by saying “I am most fundamentally a person”). Olson does recognise this but doesn’t take it seriously. He says “When Baker says that I am an animal, she means that an animal “constitutes” me.” However, he doesn’t take constitution seriously – he says the details don’t matter – but they do. He parses constitution as saying that I (a person) and an animal (a different thing to me) are co-located. Baker denies this, though whether her account of constitution really allows for this denial is a moot point.
       5. Now Olson gets to the real substance of the matter. He says that Baker doesn’t believe that I have the property of being an animal – because if she did, she would have to admit that I was once a fetus. Instead, she believes that I have the property of being constituted by an animal. And, yes – she does believe that. So, I suspect that all the tedious logical spelling out is a complaint that Baker shouldn’t use “is” equivocally. The equivocation disguises the fact that she doesn’t really believe that she is an animal in the way that Olson believes she is. Olson is of course correct in this analysis.
       6. Olson makes an analogy – which he takes to illustrate the sort of error Baker is making. We might say that (in the Biblical epic) Charlton Heston is Moses – but we wouldn’t thereby by claiming that he really is Moses, only that he’s acting a part. If someone did make the claim that CH really is M, they wouldn’t be in agreement with the normal speaker. The way the analogy is supposed to work is that Olson (but not Baker) is making the claim that Baker really is an animal. Baker is only saying something like that she is playing the role of an animal. I’m not sure that Baker would accept this. Her account of constitution has it that the relationship between the thing constituted (the person) and the thing constituting (the animal) is much closer than this role-play.
       7. Finally, Olson turns his attention to Big Tent Metaphysics (BTM):-
          1. Baker says that “reality and value go together” and that every property that is distinctive (D) or significant (S) determines a natural kind. However, if she just meant “metaphysically D or S”, then she’d be saying something trivial, so just what does she mean? Olson takes it that it’s something D or S to us, and that’s my understanding too. He adds “in any way”, which may be taking things a bit far, though Baker does owe us an account of just how D or S a trait has to be in order to generate a new primary kind. Olson seems to be claiming that for Baker, all D or S properties are essential – and she’d probably agree – but unless she’s to claim that all properties are essential (in which case there could be no persistence through change), she has to give a (non-circular) account of essential properties.
          2. Olson says (rightly) that it is this BTM that leads Baker to claim that we’re not really organisms, just constituted by them. Baker finds the FPP³¹ S & D. So, anything with a FPP³² is an essential kind. “Person” is shorthand for “thing with a FPP”³³, so Persons are an essential kind, and have their defining property – an FPP³⁴ – essentially. Since organisms don’t have FPPs³⁵ essentially, Persons can’t be organisms. So far, so good.
          3. For Baker, the person and the organism are distinct things – numerically different – yet they aren’t separate things. Olson has two problems with this – just what does “separate” mean, and how do I know which I am?
          4. Olson says (rightly) that there are lots of things we are interested in, and picks just the one I think represents an ontological watershed – sentience. Where I am is a sentient being who (or that) isn’t essentially a person as sentient beings don’t necessarily have FPPs³⁶. Amusingly, Olson claims that Baker needs a Big Tent because she has a lot of things to fit into it. I don’t know how Baker answers this question. Presumably she must allow that we have a Sentient and a Person co-located and both constituted by the Human Animal. If her logic of constitution works at all, it won’t have a problem with this as there is still only one thing present – but she might have to change the direction of focus. The one things present is the human Animal, which constitutes both the Sentient and the Person. If we say there is something that is most fundamentally a Sentient, and another thing that is most fundamentally a Person, don’t we have 2 things – but we always seemed to have two things, because we had the thing that is most fundamentally a Human Animal as well as the Person, so maybe it all works out somehow.
          5. Olson now asks why we should accept BTM (note this is independent, I think, of accepting the CV). He gives Baker’s argument … which is really just the assertion that metaphysics isn’t worth doing unless it treats of everything we find significant – ie. that it say something to say about Persons, artefacts and Sentients as such.
             • Note 1: Olson has to deny the existence of artefacts as such (ie. as things over an above the lumps of matter that make them up) because otherwise he ends up with overpopulation just as in the TA argument. Or so it would seem. I need to check³⁷.
             • Note 2: Does Metaphysics really treat all organisms alike? Members of the species Homo Sapiens in general have interesting properties that members of other species don’t, or at least not to the same degree (maybe an important distinction). Is this a metaphysical fact, or something that only biology, or psychology, is interested in? Surely the fact that there is such a thing as (self-) consciousness (or sentience) is a metaphysical fact?
          6. Olson is unmoved. He makes an analogy between Physics and Metaphysics. Physics doesn’t deal with Persons as such – it treats them as lumps of matter – but Physics is worth doing, for all that. I’m not sure I’m moved by that argument, either. The special sciences are agreed to be a partial view (except by reductionists, who would claim that everything is really just matter in motion, and that physics misses nothing out). However, metaphysics is supposed to deal with everything that exists. I suppose it can’t just leave things out – if it doesn’t want to include them, it must deny that they exist. That’s just what Olson does – he does deny that persons exist – but only if they are thought of as anything other than animals with peculiar properties.
          7. Olson ends by rejecting the claim that there is something about metaphysics that requires it to capture all the categories that are important outside of metaphysics, because he doesn’t know what that something is.
     • My adjudication:
       1. As Olson admits, Olson and Baker talk past one another in a most frustrating way. I think Olson is most at fault for not taking Baker (let alone persons in general) seriously enough.
  6. Markosian’s ‘Mummy’ problem:
     • The objection:
       1. A man lives, is mummified, and subsequently the particles of the mummy are rearranged to form a living woman, with no psychological continuity.
       2. Markosian thinks we can draw two conclusions from the Mummy Thought Experiment (TE):-
          1. There is a single thing that was once a man and ends up as a woman.
          2. The man and woman at the termini of the TE are different people.
       3. He thinks (rightly) that Olson must deny that these conclusions can be simultaneously true. In fact, Olson probably ought to consider the first claim to be false but the second true. The first claim is doubtful because mummies aren’t organisms, so we have a double metamorphosis³⁸. However, as for Markosian’s second claim, while Olson denies that psychology has anything to do with personal identity claims, if the persons at the TE termini aren’t the same animal, then they aren’t the same person (in the sense of the same animal) either.
       4. Markosian thinks this denial of joint truth is a problem for Olson, in that it implies that there is a “same person” relation other than Olson’s. In his reply³⁹, Olson seems willing to accept this point. But I don’t think he would agree with Markosian that he thereby mischaracterises the problem of personal identity. While he’s willing to allow a non-identity-preserving “same person” relation, he insists that if we’re talking about the logical relation for the identity of human persons, then we have only one relation – his animalist characterisation.
       5. Markosian’s point is spoilt somewhat by his choice of TE. It’s not at all clear that we have Olson’s “same person” relation in play here, as it’s not clear that we have the “same animal” relation. However, if Markosian had chosen a different TE – something like his Salamander case, but without metamorphosis⁴⁰, we would have the issue he wants to raise. Ie. if we had Fred gradually changing into Jane – or something like Michael Jackson’s antics – then we might have same animal / different person. But this depends on how the “same person” relation is supposed to work. It’s not clear to me that there would be a difference of FPP⁴¹ here, so Baker might say that we had identity of person in this case also, so there’s no wedge between the two accounts, at least not in this TE (there are still fetus-type problems – if these are taken to be problems rather than advantages of the animalist account).
     • Olson’s Response:
     • My adjudication:
  7. Markosian’s ‘Corpse Problem’:
     • Animalists are said to have a “corpse problem⁴²”. Because I am co-located with my “corpse-to-be”, the Animalist is hoist by his own petard, in that he has the analogue of the “fetus problem⁴³” he alleges against the₄₄ Psychological View⁴⁵.
     • Markosian’s argument, Olson’s Response and my adjudication are covered exhaustively in my Note on Corpses⁴⁶ above and in Chapter 11. That Note also details further discussions of the matter.
  8. Markosian’s ‘Salamander Problem’:
     • The objection:
       1. Ned is a (male) human person who gradually morphs into salamander called Sally while remaining conscious. Subsequently, Sally morphs back into a human female person, Lucy, different from Ned in every important way.
       2. Markosian thinks this TE represents a problem for both the BV and Psychological approach.
       3. There are a number of important points about the TE, which may or may not cast doubt on its validity:-
          1. “Remaining conscious throughout”: why is this important? Surely the consciousness of a salamander is very different from that of a fully-functional human person.
          2. “very slow metamorphosis”⁴⁷: just why is the “slowness” important? To provide an analogy with the career of a single object over time which changes its properties? Time is needed for their consolidation? Is any consolidation really possible at the human / salamander boundary? Are we exposed to sorites⁴⁸ paradoxes?
          3. “Differing in every important way”: however much Ned and Lucy differ, it is as nothing compared with how either of them differ from Sally (the salamander). Just what is an “important” difference – important to whom? This comes up in Baker’s alleged “important” ontological differences.
       4. So, why is this a problem for the BV? Markosian thinks those holding the BV are committed to saying that Ned and Lucy are the same person, whereas Markosian thinks they are obviously not. I’m not sure (from the BV perspective) that this is much of an advance on the Mummy problem. At least there is biological continuity, but it’s of the wrong sort. The salamander is not a human animal, so there’s no reason to think that Ned and Lucy are the same human animal any more than I am Caesar if made from Caesar’s atoms.
       5. And why is it a problem for the PV⁴⁹? Because there is psychological continuity. But is there? Markosian tries to stipulate that there is, but can there really be psychological continuity between a human being and a salamander? Of some sort, but not of the FPP-preserving⁵⁰ sort that Baker would require – after all, the salamander (presumably) has no FPP⁵¹. And, we are to presume, though this is unclear despite the stipulation that Ned and Lucy are as different as could be, Ned and Lucy don’t share the same FPP⁵², so aren’t the same person for Baker. So, while there may be a problems for the standard PV⁵³, there isn’t one for the CV or the BV – not unless they accept the possibility of intermittent objects and identify Ned and Lucy contrary to their own requirements.
       6. Markosian thinks that proponents of either the BV or the PV⁵⁴ have problems with the Salamander, because there is both biological and psychological continuity – but proponents of either view insist that the continuity has to be of the right sort, and why should they agree that this TE provides the right sort – it doesn’t appear to, though maybe others might (eg. if we just missed out the salamander step, and had Ned morph directly into Lucy. Why did he not adopt this ploy? If he had, I presume the responses would have been:-
          1. Baker (CV): would probably deny that Ned and Lucy have the same FPP⁵⁵; still the wrong sort of psychological continuity.
          2. PV⁵⁶: don’t know; too many varieties
          3. Olson (BV): As Olson cares naught for psychological factors in matters of identity, he would admit that (indeed, claim that) Ned and Lucy are the same person, provided the morphing convinced him that they are the same human animal. He might admit that they are not the same person in some sense, provided “same person” isn’t an identity-preserving relation.
       7. Markosian now makes 4 claims, all of which he takes to be true. I consider them all false!
          1. The thing that is Ned persists throughout the story.
          2. Ned survives the events of the story.
          3. This is a story about a thing that begins its career as a person, that later becomes a salamander, and that eventually comes to be a person again.
          4. Both Sally and Lucy really are identical to Ned.
       8. While Markosian thinks all these claims true, and is happy to call the relationships between Ned, Sally and Lucy “object identity” or even “organism identity”, he doesn’t want to call it “personal identity” (PI). He thinks there must be some other relation that is worth calling PI that does not relate Ned to Sally or Ned to Lucy.
       9. There are several things that could be said of all this:-
          1. Markosian seems perilously close to the heresy of relative identity.
          2. As noted above, the wrong sort of continuity (whether biological or psychological) is involved in the Salamander TE, so none of the above 4 claims need be accepted.
          3. Identity claims need to latch on to the SORT to which the persistent is claimed to belong. Since this (and the Mummy) example involve change of sort, there is no identity between the termini.
          4. The only possible continuant is “mass of matter” – but no organism – which continually exchanges matter with its environment – can be thought of as a mass of matter. The mass of matter that was (in some sense of “constituted”, at some arbitrary point in time) Ned would be highly dispersed by the time Lucy came on the scene, so Lucy cannot be claimed to be identical to Ned in that sense.
          5. Olson agrees that there is some non-identity-preserving relation called “personal identity” involved here (or in other less odd cases). He just denies that it has anything to do with “identity”.
       10. Markosian’s conclusion from the Salamander example is that both the BV and PV⁵⁷ are false, though he doesn’t know what the right view of Personal Identity is. It is not clear to me why he doesn’t invoke his “episodes of personhood” account as a possible solution.
     • Olson’s Response:
     • My adjudication:
  9. Zimmerman’s critique of Olson’s Master Argument⁵⁸:
     • The objection:
       1. Zimmerman takes the argument from a recent (but unspecified⁵⁹) paper by Olson. If I am alone in the room:-
          1. There is a human animal in the room.
          2. Any human animal in the room is thinking.
          3. You are the only thinking being in the room.
             Therefore,
          4. You are a human animal.
       2. In support of the premises, Zimmerman glosses as follows:-
          1. The human animal in the room has biological and not psychological persistence conditions (PCs).
          2. The human animal has a brain, doing what your brain is doing – ie. thinking. As always, it is the reference of “you” that is important here. Presumably different entities substituted for “you” (once we’ve decided what “you” are) would “have” brains in different senses.
          3. If multiple entities were present, all thinking the same thoughts, how would you know which you are? This is Olson’s epistemological argument.
          4. So you have biological and not psychological PCs.
       3. Zimmerman notes that this argument is of the following schema:-
          1. There is a human-shaped F in the room.
          2. Any human-shaped F in the room is thinking.
          3. You are the only thinking being in the room.
             Therefore,
          4. You are an F.
       4. For some reason, Zimmerman doesn’t have the conclusion, as is warranted, as “You are a human-shaped F”. This is because the conclusion in the original argument just has “human animal” rather than “human-shaped human animal”. Presumably this is firstly for brevity (can human animals be other than human-shaped? Maybe they can if they are maximally-mutilated – ie. brains aren’t human-shaped) and due to the fact that the original argument doesn’t mention shapes at all. Now clearly, any human-shaped F is an F, but some Fs can’t (presumably) be human-shaped.
       5. This may be important when we consider other things that Zimmerman suggests might be substituted for F:-
          1. Mere Body: while the animal presumably does not exist after its death, its body does, and did also exist pre-mortem. So, we can substitute “body” for F, as in "Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?". Note that this paper was also quoted by Markosian⁶⁰, so must be judged to contain a cogent argument.
          2. Psychological Person (PP): but, I ask, is a PP, qua PP, shaped like anything? Just what is a PP if it isn’t a human animal? We are referred to Shoemaker, though we’re not given a reference⁶¹ (though Zimmerman does say that Shoemaker’s latest thoughts on the matter are in "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Physical Realization"). It seems that Shoemaker accepts the Master argument with F = PP. Zimmerman asks “Is there something now shaped like this body but that would survive the transfer of the cerebrum? If so, and if an animal can’t, then there is another candidate, call it a “psychological person”;”. I’m not clear quite what Shoemaker (as expounded by Zimmerman) has in mind here, and nor does Olson in his reply, but the details may not matter. I’d thought that Shoemaker would propose that the psychological person is the cerebrum, which isn’t exactly human-shaped, and isn’t what Zimmerman says. There’s a whole bunch of stuff by Shoemaker I ought to review⁶², in addition to "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Physical Realization", for instance:-
             • "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Are Selves Substances?"
             • "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Brown-Brownson Revisited"
             • "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account"
             • "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Personal Identity"
             • "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology'"
             • "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Self, Body, and Coincidence"
             Be this as it may, the consequence for Shoemaker is that because he accepts this argument in its entirety (with PP substituted for F), but in its original form (with “human animal” substituted for F) he accepts premises (1) and (3), yet denies the conclusion (4, that you are a human animal), he has to deny (3) – that human animals think – and indeed in his later work (we’re referred to "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Physical Realization") he argues that no animal with a sufficiently complex psychology thinks. This seems paradoxical, though less paradoxical than claiming that it’s only human animals that don’t think. What is supposed to do the thinking is something else in the vicinity of the animal’s body that has psychological persistence conditions. Zimmerman doesn’t say what Shoemaker considers these PPs to be (or what his criteria of personhood are). I need to follow⁶³ this up.
          3. Mere Hunk of Matter: this is related to Chisholm’s arguments, though only loosely by the sound of things.
             • We are referred to Chisholm’s “Is There a Mind-Body Problem?”, (from which I’ve reviewed the excerpted version – follow this link⁶⁴ – "Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'"). I think Chisholm distinguishes between entia nonsuccessiva, for which strict and philosophical⁶⁵ identity conditions apply, and entia successiva for which we just talk as if there was identity, when in fact there is not. I had thought that mere hunks of matter would fall into the latter category, but it seems we’re to think of the actual particles that make them up – which are only temporarily locally assembled. Chisholm seems to think there is some material core (analogous to the Rabbinic Luz bone), which preserves the identity of material persons, but isn’t clear on what it is (this is an empirical matter).
             • Zimmerman notes all this and equates a “mere hunk of matter” with an ens nonsuccessivum. Entia successiva are dealt with in the next section of Zimmerman’s paper
             • Anyway, the bottom line is that – according to Zimmerman – Chisholm has (1), (3) and not-(4), leading to not-(2) – and (Zimmerman says) dualism.
             • I don’t suppose it matters what Chisholm thought, because Zimmerman’s point is that if we plug F = “mere hunk of matter” in Olson’s schema – with the rider that the PCs of a “mere hunk of matter” require mereological essentialism – the conclusion is that “you” are a “mere hunk of matter” – something that was, and will shortly be, scattered. Because this is absurd, Chisholm denies (2), and claims that “you” are either a tiny particle or a monad.
             • Zimmerman claims that Olson says (where⁶⁶?) that this is “the most impressive sort of argument for dualism he knows”. Zimmerman “is inclined to agree”, but is looking for a better one. Two things might be said about this.
             • Firstly, Zimmerman seems to think that philosophy is just a tool for thinking up clever arguments to justify his pre-philosophical prejudices (I’ve a feeling someone else⁶⁷ said that recently).
             • Secondly, what have monads or tiny particles got to do with dualism? I’d thought Chisholm was arguing for (a rather odd form of) materialism⁶⁸ – which just goes to show what a waste of time it is reading one (or part of one) of a philosopher’s papers in isolation. However, I suppose the argument is that if the human animal isn’t thinking, then something else – presumably something immaterial – must be; this is interesting given that Chisholm seems to think that there is some identity-preserving physical thing present, though presumably not one capable of thinking.
       6. The bottom line of all this is that Olson’s Master Argument stinks, because its form allows for rival candidates.
     • Olson’s Response:
     • My adjudication:
       1. This is covered in my note on the Thinking Animal Argument⁶⁹, which featured in Chapter 6.
  10. Zimmerman’s presentation of Chisholm’s Entia Successiva Argument:
      • The objection:
        1. The purpose of this discussion is to raise the question whether Olson can assume that animals exist. Basically, in answering the first problem he has to deny the existence of lots of common-sense objects like undetached heads, and mere chunks of matter. But, if he’s willing to give up on common sense, what is his justification that he can believe his eyes when he sees a human animal in the room? Again, Zimmerman compares Olson’s argument form with another – due to Chisholm – for the negation of Olson’s conclusion. Chisholm’s argument approximates to:-
           1. If you are a human animal, then there is a mere hunk of matter in the room shaped like an animal only if the mere hunk of matter in question is thinking.
           2. There is a mere hunk of matter in the room, shaped like a human animal; that recently was and soon will be scattered.
           3. So, you are a human animal only if the mere hunk of matter in question is thinking.
           4. You are the one and only thinking being in the room.
           5. You are not a mere hunk of matter.
           6. Therefore, the mere hunk of matter is not thinking.
           7. Therefore, you are not a human animal.
        2. This argument invites comment (mine or Zimmerman’s, as indicated):-
           1. Chisholm/Zimmerman justifies this by the usual Olson arguments – the hunk of matter has a brain …
           2. Olson denies the existence of any such thing. Also, the scattered object⁷⁰ doesn’t think, does it? The thinking is done by a better-connected object (the animal, not the hunk). Also, there’s a distinction to be made between the hunk (the mereological sum of atoms) and the animal’s body – which has PCs like those of an artefact, but not those of an animal or a hunk. Of course, Olson denies the existence of bodies as well.
           3. This follows from (1) & (2).
           4. One of Olson’s core claims.
           5. Again, a core Olson claim.
           6. Follows from (4) and (5); Olson would deny this claim, if he believed the mere hunk existed. In that case, he’d have to deny (4).
           7. Follows from (3) and (6); Zimmerman notes that the same argument applies not just to animals, but to any “gross physical objects” that can gain or lose parts. Why⁷¹ is this so?
        3. I did not fully understand⁷² Zimmerman’s use of Chisholm, and need to follow it up later. But in any case, Zimmerman draws the following conclusions:-
           1. If Olson accepted the existence of the various alternatives, he’d have to say (based in this argument form; at least with equal justification) that he was not an animal, but one of the alternatives. Therefore, he adopts what he calls “biological minimalism” and denies that the alternative candidates – whether mere hunks of matter, bodies or psychological persons – exist.
           2. Biological Minimalism: was first expounded in "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings" and is supported by "Merricks (Trenton) - Objects and Persons". Olson has to deny that coincident objects of these sorts exist – and in particular that there exist undetached proper parts of me that are big enough to become me if other parts are removed.
           3. The point here is that if undetached heads – say – exist, then my head exists right now, and if – per impossibile – my head were to become detached and placed on life support, it would have a good claim to be me. But right now, my undetached head isn’t me, because it’s a proper part of me (the whole human animal); so – if undetached heads exist, we would have two thinking things more or less where I am located – which is one too many by Olson’s lights.
           4. Hence Olson goes along with Van Inwagen in denying the DAUP (Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts; see:-
              • "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts",
              • "Carter (William) - In Defense of Undetached Parts",
              • "Parsons (Josh) - Dion, Theon, and DAUP", and
              • "Burke (Michael) - Is My Head a Person?")
              .
           5. On this analysis note that Olson need not be troubled by feet (because a foot is not a candidate for being me); but see "Olson (Eric) - Dion's Foot" and "Olson (Eric) - Why I Have No Hands". Maybe Olson is just being consistent – if heads don’t exist, then hands and feet ought not to exist either.
           6. Zimmerman has something further to say about Olson’s views on Mere Hunks of Matter, but I couldn’t understand what his point was. He says that (from Olson’s perspective) there shouldn’t be the sort of things that would cease to exist because of merely extrinsic changes – changes in what’s attached to them.
        4. Zimmerman now asks what the consequences are for Olson of denying the existence of brains, rocks or clouds, given that we really seem to interact with such things? Zimmerman thinks that this stance undermines Olson’s first premise in his Master Argument – that there is a human animal in the room. What are the reasons Olson gives for thinking, when he is alone in the room, that there is an animal in the room?
        5. Zimmerman thinks Olson just uses common sense (though he doesn’t use the term). What are the alternatives? Zimmerman doesn’t think it can be a tacit appeal to biology, because Olson denies the existence of mere hunks of matter, despite the prestige of physics – and (in the case of psychological persons) despite the prestige of psychology (at least given some future predictive power of neuroscience). Zimmerman concludes this section with an elegant argument:-
           1. He grants Olson that we have no immaterial parts, and that “you” are located in the vicinity of your whole body.
           2. He also grants Olson that thinking cannot be done by a plurality, so that you (the thinker) must be a (single) object made of the parts in the vicinity of your body. What is the favourite candidate?
           3. Olson claims this is the human animal, since we know there are such things.
           4. But, prior to Olson’s arguments, we would also have said we knew there exist lots of other macroscopic objects – such as lumps of clay, statues, organs, … and all sorts of other things we can tell exist simply by looking around. But once this conviction is shaken, why should we think animals exist?
      • Olson’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
        1. Presumably this is associated with "Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'", which I cover in Chapter 11 and the Note on Resurrection⁷³.
           
  11. Zimmerman’s ‘Vagueness of Animals’ Argument:
      • The objection:
        1. Zimmerman wants to provoke Olson into addressing vagueness, but the following argument which (when combined with Olson’s 3rd premise – that “you” are the only thinking thing in the room) gives an argument against animalism:-
           1. Animals are vague objects, which means that there are very many hunks of matter with an equal right to be identified with each animal.
           2. If I am an animal, there are very many hunks of matter with an equal right to be identified with me.
           3. If these hunks have an equal claim to be me, then either each of them is conscious, or only one is
           4. They can’t each be conscious, because there’s only one thinker
           5. It is implausible to suppose that just one is conscious
           6. So, it is false that there exist all these hunks of matter with an equal right to be me.
              So,
           7. I am not an animal.
        2. Zimmerman adds the following riders in support of the premises and arguments:-
           1. Zimmerman claims that “this” – presumably “that these hunks have equal right” – is a crucial component of either “semantic indecision” or “epistemic” theories of vagueness. I need to follow⁷⁴ up on these theories.
           2. Follows from (2).
           3. No further comment.
           4. This depends on Olson’s “too many minds” objections.
           5. Zimmerman thinks this another “Olson-ish” claim.
           6. Follows from (3), (4) & (5).
           7. Follows from (2) and (6).
        3. My thoughts on these premises and arguments are as follows:-
           1. That does “identified” mean? Not “identical”, because the PCs of animals and hunks of matter differ. So, presumably, the thought is that one hunk or another constitutes (in some sense) the current temporal phase (in some sense) of the animal? Also, what does Zimmerman mean by “each animal”? It sounds as though he’s saying not only that we have lots of hunks present, but also lots of animals. Presumably he just means that for any particular animal, there are lots of hunks – and that we’re only considering one animal (as commonly conceived) in this case. Having said that, why give priority to the animal? There are definitely lots of hunks present (they are defined cleanly by mereological considerations if we adopt mereological essentialism), so presumably a particular hunk could claim to instantiate lots of different animals, if we were to allow animals to overlap – though this might depend on how fuzzy we allow our animals to be – it might be the case that if “two” animals overlap in any way, we have one animal – though pathological cases – eg. the dicephalus or less radically conjoined individuals – make this suggestion implausible.
           2. I “am” an animal if identical to one, rather than constituted by one.
           3. I couldn’t see why there were only two possibilities. Might not “some” be conscious, rather than one or all, at least at this stage in the argument?
           4. The whole argument is of the form “valid ad hominem” – attempting to show inconsistencies in Olson’s arguments. However, in his reply, Olson claims that if these hunks of matter existed, he would admit that they think. I’m not sure how the logic of this works. Is his foundational problem the epistemological one – that if they all thought, I wouldn’t know which he was, or the plain metaphysical one – wastage? I presume it’s the latter – Olson doesn’t want this plurality whether they think or not, but if they do exist, we have extra problems.
           5. This “argument from idempotency” arises a lot – and seems perfectly legitimate – it is, for instance, an objection to “closest continuer” theories of personal identity when there are lots of equally-qualified candidates (as in the botched teletransportation TE). Baker doesn’t seem to accept it, however. She says, somewhere⁷⁵, that in reduplication⁷⁶ cases, “I’d just know” which one maintained my FPP⁷⁷ – though I’ve no idea how (and nor has she).
           6. No further comment.
           7. No further comment.
        4. Zimmerman thinks that Olson would deny (1), and therefore (2). Unfortunately, Premise (1) isn’t atomic. Olson accepts that animals are vague objects (despite the arguments of "Evans (Gareth) - Can There Be Vague Objects?" (and probably others) claiming that such objects are illogical). He just denies that each mereological sum that has a claim to constitute an animal does so. It strikes me (and this is indeed Zimmerman’s point) that if animals are vague objects, then there’s only one of them where an animal is commonly presumed to be, whereas if they aren’t vague, then there are lots of mostly-overlapping ones. Anyway, the reason Zimmerman gives for Olson’s rejection of (1) is that (for Olson) “the vagueness of the boundaries of an animal cannot be a matter of there being many hunks of matter that are equally good candidates for being the animal”, which seems fair. Zimmerman thinks this leads to problems, and rules out certain popular accounts of vagueness, namely:-
           1. Semantic indecision among many things with only slightly different spatiotemporal boundaries, or
           2. Timothy Williamson’s epistemicism, since it too requires many good candidates in (nearly) the same place at the same time.
              The reason is that Olson insists that there’s only one thing present. Therefore, Zimmerman thinks Olson has to choose between:-
           3. Merricks: There is just one thing there, and it is superprecise, and
           4. Van Inwagen: There is just one thing there, and it fades out, objectively.
        5. Zimmerman gives no precise references for any of this, other than gesturing towards "Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness" (and John Hawthorne’s Epistemicism and Semantic Plasticity (Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 2, 2006), which I don’t yet possess), but I presume the following are likely candidates, which I need to follow⁷⁸ up:-
           1. Semantic indecision: My database has no references to this, so will need to check with "Keefe (Rosanna) & Smith (Peter) - Theories of Vagueness".
           2. Timothy Williamson’s epistemicism: presumably "Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness as Ignorance" would be a good place to start?
           3. Merricks’ superprecision: try "Merricks (Trenton) - Composition and Vagueness"?
           4. Van Inwagen: "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Composition", Olson’s preferred solution.
        6. Zimmerman’s worries are that neither of the accounts of vagueness available to Olson seems appropriate for animals. I don’t have enough background⁷⁹ in theories of vagueness to understand or evaluate what he has to say. The points he makes are that:-
           1. The vagueness of animals – of the spatial boundaries of its body and the temporal boundaries of its life – seems similar to that of artefacts such as ships or natural features such as mountains.
           2. Artefacts and natural features do not seem best dealt with by positing super-precision or objective fade-outs.
           3. He alleges that the super-precision Olson needs is much worse that Williamson’s variety. Olson needs “exactly one object, its parts somehow very different from all the other collections of parts that almost make up a ship, a mountain, …”. I can’t comment on this – yet⁸⁰.
           4. Both the lone candidates of Merricks’ superprecision and Van Inwagen’s fade-outs are incompatible with:-
              • Vagueness being resolved by linguistic revision, or
              • People being able validly to draw boundaries in different places.
                
              … unless we are idealists (ie. immaterialists), which neither Olson nor Zimmerman are.
        7. These points, and especially the point about idealism, were lost⁸¹ on me.
      • Olson’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
  12. Hudson’s ‘Elimination’ Argument:
      • The objection:
      • Bailey’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
  13. Pregnancy and Conjoined Twins:
      • Both these issues are discussed later in this chapter under the Notes:-
        → Pregnancy⁸²
        → Dicephalus⁸³
        
  14. The Brain Transplant Intuition:
      • The objection:
      • Madden’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
        1. This is discussed in my Note on Brain Transplants⁸⁴.
  15. Lowe’s ‘Mereological Atoms’ Argument:
      • The objection:
      • Olson’s Response:
      • My adjudication:
        1. This may be associated with Zimmerman’s presentation of Chisholm’s Entia Successiva Argument above. I’ve not read Olson’s paper yet.

References

• Relevant Works cited above:
  1. "Bailey (Andrew M.) - The Elimination Argument", 2014, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 89%
  2. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics", 2008, Write-Up Note⁸⁵, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read
  3. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Response to Eric Olson", 2008, Write-Up Note⁸⁶, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read
  4. "Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'", 1998, Write-Up Note⁸⁷, Read
  5. "Hudson (Hud) - I am Not an Animal!", 2007, Read = 22%
  6. "Lowe (E.J.) - Subjects of Experience", 1996, Book, Read = 3%
  7. "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity", 2008, Write-Up Note⁸⁸, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read
  8. "Olson (Eric) - Human Atoms", 1998, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
  9. "Olson (Eric) - Precis of 'The Human Animal'", 2008, Write-Up Note⁸⁹, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read
  10. "Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman", 2008, Write-Up Note⁹⁰, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read
  11. "Olson (Eric), Etc. - Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'", 2008, Book, Read
  12. "Zimmerman (Dean) - Problems for Animalism", 2008, Write-Up Note⁹¹, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read⁹², include the following:-
  • Dicephalus & Conjoined Twins⁹³:
    1. "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases", 2007, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
  • Corpses⁹⁴:
    1. "Carter (William) - Death and Bodily Transfiguration", 1984, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    2. "Carter (William) - Will I Be a Dead Person?", 1999, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    3. "Francescotti (Robert) - Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity", 2005, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    4. "Hershenov (David) - Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity", 2005, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Mackie (David) - Personal Identity and Dead People", 1999, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    6. "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem", 2004, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    7. "Olson (Eric) - The Person and the Corpse", 2015, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
  • General:
    1. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics", 2008, Write-Up Note⁹⁵, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    2. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Response to Eric Olson", 2008, Write-Up Note⁹⁶, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    3. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson", 2008, Write-Up Note⁹⁷, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    4. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?", 2005, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Belshaw (Christopher) - My Beginnings", 2006, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    6. "Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism (SEP)", 2014, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    7. "Blatti (Stephan), Ed. - The Lives of Human Animals", 2014, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Burke (Michael) - Is My Head a Person?", 2003, Annotations
    9. "Campbell (Scott) - Can You Survive a Brain-Zap", 2004, Annotations
    10. "Carter (William) - In Defense of Undetached Parts", 1983
    11. "Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'", 1998, Write-Up Note⁹⁸
    12. "Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism", 1998, Annotations
    13. "Garrett (Brian) - Some Thoughts on Animalism", 2003, Annotations
    14. "Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?", 1987, Annotations
    15. "Mackie (David) - Going Topless", 1998, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    16. "Madden (Rory) - Human Persistence", 2016, Internal PDF Link
    17. "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity", 2008, Write-Up Note⁹⁹, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    18. "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands", 2014, External Link
    19. "Noonan (Harold) - Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy", 1998, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    20. "Noonan (Harold) - Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie", 2001, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    21. "Noonan (Harold) - Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'", 2001, Write-Up Note¹⁰⁰, Annotations
    22. "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem", 2015, Internal PDF Link
    23. "Olson (Eric) - Dion's Foot", 1997, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    24. "Olson (Eric) - On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings", 2015, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    25. "Olson (Eric) - Precis of 'The Human Animal'", 2008, Write-Up Note¹⁰¹, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    26. "Olson (Eric) - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman", 2008, Write-Up Note¹⁰², Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    27. "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Animals", 2007, Write-Up Note¹⁰³, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    28. "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Brains", 2007, Write-Up Note¹⁰⁴, Internal PDF Link
    29. "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? What Now?", 2007, Write-Up Note¹⁰⁵, Internal PDF Link
    30. "Olson (Eric) - Why I Have No Hands", 1995, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    31. "Olson (Eric), Etc. - Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'", 2008, Book
    32. "Parsons (Josh) - Dion, Theon, and DAUP", 2004, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    33. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Personal Identity"
    34. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology'", 1999, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    35. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Self, Body, and Coincidence", 1999, Annotations
    36. "Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants", 1991, Annotations
    37. "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Bodies", 1995, Annotations
    38. "Snowdon (Paul) - Some Objections to Animalism", 2003
    39. "Snowdon (Paul) - The Self and Personal Identity", 2009, Write-Up Note¹⁰⁶
    40. "Steinhart (Eric) - Persons Versus Brains: Biological Intelligence in Human Organisms", 2001, Annotations
    41. "Unger (Peter) - The Survival of the Sentient", 2000, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    42. "Zimmerman (Dean) - Problems for Animalism", 2008, Write-Up Note¹⁰⁷, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
• A further reading list might start with:-
  • Corpses¹⁰⁸:
    1. "Hershenov (David) - The Death of a Person", 2006, External Link, Internal PDF Link
  • General:
    1. "Ayer (A.J.) - The Meaning of Life", 1991, No Abstract
    2. "Bailey (Andrew M.) - The Elimination Argument", 2014, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 89%
    3. "Berglund (Stefan) - Animalism", 1995
    4. "Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds. - Animalism: Introduction", 2016, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 58%
    5. "Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit", 1993, Book, Read = 1%
    6. "Ferner (Adam) - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity", 2014, Write-Up Note¹⁰⁹, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 127%
    7. "Hershenov (David) - Olson's Embryo Problem", 2002, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Hershenov (David) - The Problematic Role of ‘Irreversibility’ in the Definition of Death", 2003, External Link, Internal PDF Link
    9. "Hudson (Hud) - I am Not an Animal!", 2007, Read = 22%
    10. "Lowe (E.J.) - Subjects of Experience", 1996, Book, Read = 3%
    11. "Madden (Rory) - Thinking Parts", 2016, Internal PDF Link, Read = 18%
    12. "Merricks (Trenton) - Composition and Vagueness", 2005, Internal PDF Link
    13. "Merricks (Trenton) - Objects and Persons", Book, Read = 7%
    14. "Moran (Alexander P.) - Animalism and the Thinking Parts Problem", 2016, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
    15. "Noller (Jorg) - Beyond Animalism and Constitutionalism: The Person as A Form of Life", Undated, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
    16. "Olson (Eric) - Human Atoms", 1998, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
    17. "Olson (Eric) - The Remnant-Person Problem", 2016, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
    18. "Olson (Eric) - The Role of the Brainstem in Personal Identity", 2016, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 22%
    19. "Parfit (Derek) - We Are Not Human Beings", 2016, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 43%
    20. "Petrus (Klaus), Ed. - On Human Persons", 2003, Book, Read = 73%
    21. "Puhl (Klaus) - Review of Klaus Petrus's 'On Human Persons'", 2004, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 33%
    22. "Reid (Mark D.) - A Case in Which Two Persons Exist in One Animal", 2016, Read = 42%
    23. "Shoemaker (David) - The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism", 2016, Internal PDF Link, Read = 24%
    24. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Physical Realization", Book
    25. "Snowdon (Paul) - Animalism and the Unity of Consciousness", 2014, Read = 7%
    26. "Snowdon (Paul) - Multiple Personality Disorder", 2014, Read = 33%
    27. "Toner (Patrick) - Hylemorphic animalism", 2011, Internal PDF Link, Read = 13%
    28. "Tzinman (Rina) - Memory, Organisms and the Circle of Life", 2018, Internal PDF Link, Read = 8%
    29. "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings", Book, Read = 27%
    30. "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts", 1981, Internal PDF Link
    31. "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Composition", 1990, No Abstract
  • Pregnancy¹¹⁰:
    1. "Damschen (Gregor), Gomez-Lobo (Alfonso) & Schonecker (Dieter) - Sixteen Days? A Reply to B. Smith and B. Brogaard on the Beginning of Human Individuals", 2006, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 22%
    2. "Gomez-Lobo (Alfonso) - Sortals and Human Beginnings", 2004, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 5%
    3. "Oderberg (David) - The Metaphysical Status of the Embryo: Some Arguments Revisited", 2008, Internal PDF Link, Read = 8%
    4. "Smith (Barry) & Brogaard (Berit) - Sixteen Days", 2003, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 7%

  ---

• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
  1. Read: No items to list.
  2. Further Reading: No items to list.
• This is mostly a place-holder¹¹¹.

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In-Page Footnotes:

Footnote 44:

1. Olson alleges the ‘Fetus Problem against the Constitution View, but he misunderstands the CV’s position.

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Table of the Previous 12 Versions of this Note: (of 14)

Date	Length	Title
06/07/2023 00:43:12	8201	Animalism - Objections
28/09/2022 10:24:58	7662	Animalism - Objections
11/05/2022 18:59:02	6836	Animalism - Objections
11/02/2021 11:29:46	6357	Animalism - Objections
04/12/2019 23:36:58	4334	Animalism - Objections
30/11/2019 22:58:05	4333	Animalism - Objections
29/04/2018 11:02:24	4787	Animalism - Objections
28/04/2018 00:07:12	3357	Animalism - Objections
10/04/2017 23:38:24	2068	Animalism - Objections
18/12/2010 19:58:05	733	Animalism - Objections
18/08/2009 20:39:50	738	Animalism - Objections
26/11/2007 23:25:26	622	Animalism - Objections

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
06/09/2026 04:18:39	None available	Animalism

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Awaiting Attention (Write-ups)	Baker - Review - Olson - What Are We?	Baker - The Human Animal: Big-Tent Metaphysics	Baker - The Human Animal: Response to Olson
Body	Brain Transplants	Chisholm - Which Physical Thing Am I?	Connectedness vs Continuity	Constitution View
Corpses	Dicephalus	Duplication	Ferner - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity	Fetuses
First-Person Perspective	Human Animals	Logic of Identity	Markosian - The Human Animal: Three Problems for Olson	Metamorphosis
Multiple Personality Disorder	Noonan - Persons and Bodies - Response	Olson - Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman	Olson - The Human Animal (Precis)	Olson - The Human Animal: Reply to Markosian
Olson - What Are We? Animals	Olson - What Are We? Brains	Olson - What Are We? What Now?	Persistence Criteria	Persistent Vegetative State
Person	Physicalism	Plug Note Apologia	Pregnancy	Psychological Continuity
Psychological View	Resurrection	Scattered Objects	Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity	Sorites
Taking Persons Seriously	Thinking Animal Argument	Uploading	Works Read - Explanation	Zimmerman - The Human Animal: Objections

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Animalism, 2, 3	Animalists	Bodily Continuity	Body Criterion	Cartesian Ego
Commissurotomy, 2	Constitution View - Objections	Corpses	Death, 2	Dicephalus
Fetuses	Matter	Methuselah	Olson - What Are We? Animals, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Olson - What Are We? The Question
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Psychological View	Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity	Status: Personal Identity (2026 - June), 2, 3, 4	Status: Priority Task List (2026 - July), 2, 3, 4
Status: Summary (2026 - June), 2, 3, 4	Supervenience	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2, 3, 4	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)
Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It), 2	Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2	Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection), 2, 3
Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion)	Thesis - Current Stance	Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22	Thinking Animal Argument	Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Bailey (Andrew M.)	The Elimination Argument	Paper	2, 3, 4
Bailey (Andrew M.) & Thornton (Allison Krile)	The feeling animal	Paper
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	When Do Persons Begin and End?	Paper	2	Yes
Blatti (Stephan)	Animalism (SEP)	Paper		Yes
Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds.	Animalism: Introduction	Paper
Blatti (Stephan), Ed.	The Lives of Human Animals	Paper		Yes
Collings (Evangelian)	Animalism has a pregnancy problem	Paper
Duncan (Matt)	Animalists on the run	Paper
Duncan (Matt)	I Think, Therefore I Persist	Paper		Yes
Francescotti (Robert)	Who are 'We'? Animalism and conjoined twins	Paper
Garrett (Brian)	Animalism and Reductionism	Paper		Yes
Hermida (Margarida)	Thought experiments, sentience, and animalism	Paper
Luzio (Hugo) & Santos (Ricardo)	Animalism and Dicephalus: The Psychological Disunity Solution	Paper
Madden (Rory)	Thinking Parts	Paper
Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric)	Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands	Paper		Yes
Moran (Alexander P.)	Animalism and the Thinking Parts Problem	Paper	2
Olson (Eric)	Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem	Paper	2	Yes
Olson (Eric)	The Remnant-Person Problem	Paper	2
Olson (Eric)	Thinking Animals and the Constitution View	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Animals	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? The Question	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? What Now?	Paper		Yes
Petrus (Klaus), Ed.	On Human Persons	Book	2, 3, 4
Puhl (Klaus)	Review of Klaus Petrus's 'On Human Persons'	Paper	2
Reid (Mark D.)	A Case in Which Two Persons Exist in One Animal	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Sharpe (Kevin W.)	Animalism and Person Essentialism	Paper
Shoemaker (David)	The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism	Paper	2, 3
Skrzypek (Jeremy)	Conjoined twins share no parts	Paper
Snowdon (Paul)	Animalism and the Unity of Consciousness	Paper	2, 3
Snowdon (Paul)	Some Objections to Animalism	Paper		Yes
Snowdon (Paul)	The Self and Personal Identity	Paper		Yes
Thornton (Allison Krile)	Disembodied Animals	Paper
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Animalism	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Animalists	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Bodily Continuity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Body Criterion	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Cartesian Ego	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?)	Paper	2, 3, 4	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 08 (Arguments against Animalism)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 09 (Arguments against the Constitution View)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Commissurotomy	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Constitution View - Objections	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Corpses	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Current Position	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Death	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Dicephalus	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Fetuses	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Matter	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Methuselah	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Personal Identity	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological View	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Supervenience	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Thinking Animal Argument	Paper		Yes
Toner (Patrick)	Hylemorphic animalism	Paper
Toner (Patrick)	Hylemorphic animalism and conjoined twins	Paper
Wilson (Jack)	Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities	Paper		Yes
Yang (Eric T.)	Unrestricted animalism and the too many candidates problem	Paper

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Ayer (A.J.)	The Meaning of Life	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	2%
Ayer (A.J.)	The Meaning of Life	Paper - Cited	Ayer - The Meaning of Life	No
Bailey (Andrew M.)	The Elimination Argument	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Studies 168 (2014): 475-482	56%
Bailey (Andrew M.)	The Elimination Argument	Paper - Referencing	Philosophical Studies 168 (2014): 475-482	56%
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Big-Tent Metaphysics	Paper - Cited	Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil)	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Response to Eric Olson	Paper - Cited	Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil)	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	Review of 'What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology' by Eric T. Olson	Paper - Cited	Mind, 117:1120-1122, 2008	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	When Do Persons Begin and End?	Paper - Cited	Distinguished Faculty Lecture, December 5, 2005	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	When Do Persons Begin and End?	Paper - Referencing	Distinguished Faculty Lecture, December 5, 2005	Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc.	E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Belshaw (Christopher)	My Beginnings	Paper - Cited	The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 371-389	Yes
Berglund (Stefan)	Animalism	Paper - Cited	Berglund - Human and Personal Identity (PhD Dissertation, Lund University), Chapter 3, 1995, pp. 44-60	No
Berglund (Stefan)	Human and Personal Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	1%
Bermudez (Jose Luis), Marcel (Anthony) & Eilan (Naomi), Eds.	The Body and the Self	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	4%
Blatti (Stephan)	Animalism (SEP)	Paper - Cited	Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2014	Yes
Blatti (Stephan)	Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007): 595–608	Yes
Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds.	Animalism: Introduction	Paper - Cited	Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Chapter 1, pp. 1-30	58%
Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds.	Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	22%
Blatti (Stephan), Ed.	The Lives of Human Animals	Paper - Cited	The Southern Journal of Philosophy Volume 52, Spindel Supplement, 2014	Yes
Blatti (Stephan), Ed.	The Lives of Human Animals	Paper - Referencing	The Southern Journal of Philosophy Volume 52, Spindel Supplement, 2014	Yes
Bradley (Ben), Feldman (Fred) & Johansson (Jens)	The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	7%
Braine (David)	The Human Person: Animal and Spirit	Book - Cited	Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit	1%
Burke (Michael)	Is My Head a Person?	Paper - Cited	Petrus - On Human Persons, 2003	Yes
Campbell (Scott)	Can You Survive a Brain-Zap	Paper - Cited	Theoria, 2004; 70(1): 22-27	Yes
Carter (William)	Death and Bodily Transfiguration	Paper - Cited	Mind, 1984, 412-418	Yes
Carter (William)	In Defense of Undetached Parts	Paper - Cited	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 1983, 126-143	Yes
Carter (William)	Will I Be a Dead Person?	Paper - Cited	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mar99, Vol. 59 Issue 1, p167, 5p;	Yes
Chisholm (Roderick)	Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'	Paper - Cited	Van Inwagen & Zimmerman - Metaphysics: The Big Questions, 1998	Yes
Cockburn (David), Ed.	Human Beings	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	7%
Damschen (Gregor), Gomez-Lobo (Alfonso) & Schonecker (Dieter)	Sixteen Days? A Reply to B. Smith and B. Brogaard on the Beginning of Human Individuals	Paper - Cited	Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Apr. 2006, 31.2, pp. 165-175	22%
Evans (Gareth)	Can There Be Vague Objects?	Paper - Cited	Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Oct., 1978), p. 208	Yes
Ferner (Adam)	Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity	Paper - Cited	PhD Thesis, Birkbeck, 2014	98%
Francescotti (Robert)	Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Explorations, Mar2005, Vol. 8 Issue 1, p69-81, 13p	Yes
Garrett (Brian)	Animalism and Reductionism	Paper - Cited	Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 2	Yes
Garrett (Brian)	Personal Identity and Self-consciousness	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Garrett (Brian)	Some Thoughts on Animalism	Paper - Cited	Petrus - On Human Persons, 2003	Yes
Gomez-Lobo (Alfonso)	Sortals and Human Beginnings	Paper - Cited	Medicine and Metaphysics Conference, University of Buffalo, November, 2004	5%
Hershenov (David)	Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	Mind, 114, Number 453, 1 January 2005, pp. 31-59(29).	Yes
Hershenov (David)	Olson's Embryo Problem	Paper - Cited	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80, Number 4, December 01, 2002, pp. 502-511(10)	No
Hershenov (David)	The Death of a Person	Paper - Cited	Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Apr. 2006, 31.2, pp. 107-120	No
Hershenov (David)	The Problematic Role of ‘Irreversibility’ in the Definition of Death	Paper - Cited	Bioethics, 17.1, Feb2003, pp. 89-100, 12p	No
Hudson (Hud)	I am Not an Animal!	Paper - Cited	Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Persons: Human and Divine	22%
Keefe (Rosanna) & Smith (Peter)	Theories of Vagueness	Paper - Cited	Keefe - Vagueness: A Reader	88%
Keefe (Rosanna) & Smith (Peter)	Vagueness: A Reader	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	13%
Lockwood (Michael)	When Does a Life Begin?	Paper - Cited	Lockwood - Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, 1987	Yes
Lockwood (Michael), Ed.	Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	29%
Lowe (E.J.)	Subjects of Experience	Book - Cited	Lowe (E.J.) - Subjects of Experience	3%
Mackie (David)	Going Topless	Paper - Cited	Ratio 11.2, Sep1998, p125, 16p	Yes
Mackie (David)	Personal Identity and Dead People	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Studies 95, Number 3, September 1999, pp. 219-242(24).	Yes
Madden (Rory)	Human Persistence	Paper - Cited	Philosophers’ Imprint, Vol. 16, No. 17, September 2016	Yes
Madden (Rory)	Thinking Parts	Paper - Cited	Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part II, Chapter 9, pp. 180-207	18%
Markosian (Ned)	Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil)	Yes
Marshall (Richard)	Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	37%
Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric)	Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands	Paper - Cited	Marshall (Richard) - Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers	Yes
Martin (Michael G.F.), Ed.	Mind - 114/453 (January 2005)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	11%
Martin (Michael G.F.), Ed.	Mind - 114/455 (July 2005)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	No
Merricks (Trenton)	Composition and Vagueness	Paper - Cited	Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 615-637(23)	No
Merricks (Trenton)	Objects and Persons	Book - Cited	Merricks (Trenton) - Objects and Persons	7%
Moran (Alexander P.)	Animalism and the Thinking Parts Problem	Paper - Cited	Personal website.	17%
Noller (Jorg)	Beyond Animalism and Constitutionalism: The Person as A Form of Life	Paper - Cited	Retrieved from Academia.edu	17%
Noonan (Harold)	Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Quarterly, 1998, Vol. 48 Issue 192, p302, 17p;	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Quarterly, 2001, Vol. 51 Issue 202, p83, 8p	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'	Paper - Cited	Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View"	Yes
Oderberg (David)	The Metaphysical Status of the Embryo: Some Arguments Revisited	Paper - Cited	Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2008): 263-76	8%
O'Hear (Anthony), Ed.	Mind, Self and Person	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	35%
Olson (Eric)	Animalism and the Corpse Problem	Paper - Cited	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82, No. 2, pp. 265-274; June 2004	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem	Paper - Cited	J. Fonseca and J. Gonçalves, eds., Philosophical Perspectives on the Self, Peter Lang 2015: 21-40	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Dion's Foot	Paper - Cited	Journal of Philosophy 94, No. 5 (May, 1997), 260-265	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Human Atoms	Paper - Cited	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, No 3, pp. 396-406; September 1998	33%
Olson (Eric)	On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings	Paper - Cited	O'Hear (Anthony), Ed. - Mind, Self and Person, 2015: 39-56	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	16%
Olson (Eric)	Precis of 'The Human Animal'	Paper - Cited	Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil)	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Replies to Baker, Markosian & Zimmerman	Paper - Cited	Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil)	Yes
Olson (Eric)	The Person and the Corpse	Paper - Cited	Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death; ed. Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, and Jens Johansson (OUP, 2015), pp. 80-96	Yes
Olson (Eric)	The Remnant-Person Problem	Paper - Cited	Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part II, Chapter 7, pp. 145-161	33%
Olson (Eric)	The Role of the Brainstem in Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	A. Blank, ed., Animals: New Essays, Philosophia 2016: 291-302	22%
Olson (Eric)	What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Animals	Paper - Cited	What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 2 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.)	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Animals	Paper - Referencing	What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 2 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.)	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Brains	Paper - Cited	What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 4 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.)	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? The Question	Paper - Referencing	What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 1 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.)	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? What Now?	Paper - Cited	What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Chapter 9 (November 2007: Oxford University Press.)	Yes
Olson (Eric)	Why I Have No Hands	Paper - Cited	Theoria 61 (1995): 182-197	Yes
Olson (Eric), Etc.	Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'	Book - Cited	Olson (Eric), Etc. - Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'	Yes
Parfit (Derek)	We Are Not Human Beings	Paper - Cited	Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part I, Chapter 2, pp. 31-49	43%
Parsons (Josh)	Dion, Theon, and DAUP	Paper - Cited	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85 (2004)	Yes
Petrus (Klaus), Ed.	On Human Persons	Book - Cited	Petrus (Klaus), Ed. - On Human Persons	73%
Puhl (Klaus)	Review of Klaus Petrus's 'On Human Persons'	Paper - Cited	Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2004	33%
Puhl (Klaus)	Review of Klaus Petrus's 'On Human Persons'	Paper - Referencing	Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2004	33%
Reid (Mark D.)	A Case in Which Two Persons Exist in One Animal	Paper - Cited	Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part III, Chapter 12, pp. 253-265	42%
Shand (John)	Central Issues of Philosophy	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	35%
Shoemaker (David)	The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism	Paper - Cited	Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part III, Chapter 15, pp. 303-327	24%
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Are Selves Substances?	Paper - Cited	Shoemaker - Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Chapter 2	No
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Brown-Brownson Revisited	Paper - Cited	Monist, Oct2004, Vol. 87 Issue 4, p573-593, 21p;	No
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Personal Identity: a Materialist Account	Paper - Cited	Shoemaker & Swinburne - Personal Identity, 1984, pp. 67-132	22%
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Persons and Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	Kim & Sosa - A Companion to Metaphysics	Yes
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Physical Realization	Book - Cited	Shoemaker (Sydney) - Physical Realization	No
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology'	Paper - Cited	Nous, Sep99, Vol. 33 Issue 3, p496, 9p;	Yes
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Self, Body, and Coincidence	Paper - Cited	Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, Vol. 73: 1999, 287-306	Yes
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	2%
Shoemaker (Sydney) & Swinburne (Richard)	Personal Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	11%
Smith (Barry) & Brogaard (Berit)	Sixteen Days	Paper - Cited	Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Feb. 2003, 28.1, pp. 45-78	7%
Snowdon (Paul)	Animalism and the Unity of Consciousness	Paper - Cited	Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, Ourselves - Chapter 8	7%
Snowdon (Paul)	Multiple Personality Disorder	Paper - Cited	Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, Ourselves - Chapter 7	33%
Snowdon (Paul)	Personal Identity and Brain Transplants	Paper - Cited	Cockburn - Human Beings, 1991	Yes
Snowdon (Paul)	Persons, Animals, and Bodies	Paper - Cited	Bermudez, Marcel & Eilan - The Body and the Self, 1995	Yes
Snowdon (Paul)	Persons, Animals, Ourselves	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	21%
Snowdon (Paul)	Some Objections to Animalism	Paper - Cited	Petrus - On Human Persons, 2003	Yes
Snowdon (Paul)	The Self and Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	Shand (John) - Central Issues of Philosophy, Chapter 9	Yes
Steinhart (Eric)	Persons Versus Brains: Biological Intelligence in Human Organisms	Paper - Cited	Biology and Philosophy, Volume 16, Number 1, January 2001, pp. 3-27(25).	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)	Paper - Referencing		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Commissurotomy	Paper - Referencing		Yes
Toner (Patrick)	Hylemorphic animalism	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Studies, Vol. 155, No. 1 (August 2011), pp. 65-81	13%
Tzinman (Rina)	Memory, Organisms and the Circle of Life	Paper - Cited	Valerio Buonomo (ed.), The Persistence of Persons. Studies in the metaphysics of personal identity over time: pp. 243-273 (2018)	8%
Unger (Peter)	The Survival of the Sentient	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 14, Oct2000, p325, 24p	Yes
Van Inwagen (Peter)	Material Beings	Book - Cited	Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings	27%
Van Inwagen (Peter)	Ontology, Identity and Modality: Essays in metaphysics	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	17%
Van Inwagen (Peter)	The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts	Paper - Cited	Van Inwagen - Ontology, Identity and Modality, Part II: Identity, Chapter 5, 1981	No
Van Inwagen (Peter)	The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Composition	Paper - Cited	Van Inwagen - Material Beings; 1990; Ch. 17	No
Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean)	Metaphysics: The Big Questions	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	17%
Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean)	Persons: Human and Divine	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	4%
Williamson (Timothy)	Vagueness	Book - Cited	Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness	4%
Williamson (Timothy)	Vagueness as Ignorance	Paper - Cited	Williamson (Timothy) - Vagueness, Chapter 7	No
Wilson (Jack)	Beyond Horses and Oak Trees: A New Theory of Individuation for Living Entities	Paper - Referencing	Wilson, Jack - Biological Individuality: The identity and Persistence of Living Entities; 1999, Chap. 1, pp. 1-21	Yes
Wilson (Jack)	Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities	Book - Referencing (via Paper Referencing)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Zimmerman (Dean)	Problems for Animalism	Paper - Cited	Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil)	Yes
Zimmerman (Dean) & Gendler (Tamar Szabo), Eds.	Monist Special Issue: Personal Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	2%

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Text Colour Conventions

1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026
2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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