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Personal Identity

Person

(Text as at 16/06/2010 08:57:07)

*** THIS IS NOT THE LATEST VERSION OF THIS NOTE ***


(For the live version and other versions of this Note, see the tables at the end)


I must first consider whether the debate on personal identity has been hijacked by a term (whose meaning has changed over time) that can now be dispensed with? Wiggins claims that the Greeks had no term for “person” (I need to re-read the paper by "Trendelenberg (Adolf) - A Contribution to the History of the Word Person" to double-check this). Have we always secretly been talking about human animal identity (probably referring to human beings1 rather than human animals) when we thought we were talking about something separate, namely persons?

I need to start with some conceptual2 analysis, though this may lead to somewhat arbitrary (ie. merely semantic3 or culture-relative) conclusions if PERSON isn’t a natural kind4 concept. I accept Locke’s5 conceptual distinction between Human Beings6 (“Men”), Persons and Substances7. I accept Locke’s assertion that the rational parrot would be a person, but not a man – the latter essentially involving particular physical characteristics, the former specific mental characteristics.

Can any purely mentalistic definition of the concept PERSON, such as Locke’s definition of a person as …

… be correct? I suspect not, because of the corporeal aspects we take as being essential to our self-image. But, when we think of ourselves in this corporeal way, is this qua ANIMAL or qua PERSON. But then, this “qua-ing” can lead to relative8 identity, and shows how difficult it is for me, at least, to maintain the strict logic9 of identity in these discussions. Some further, fairly random, thoughts:-I will probably start with Dennett’s six criteria of personhood (see "Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood") … … in investigating what persons are. See the following essay19.



Live Version of this Archived Note

Date Length Title
14/04/2026 03:53:17 19604 Person


Table of the 2 Earlier Versions of this Note

Date Length Title
26/11/2007 23:25:26 3715 Person
12/08/2007 10:17:46 2587 Person


Table of the 9 Later Versions of this Note

Date Length Title
06/07/2023 00:43:12 19209 Person
20/09/2022 11:24:00 18604 Person
01/05/2022 18:20:10 18277 Person
02/07/2021 20:32:38 16950 Person
16/02/2021 01:00:29 15711 Person
30/12/2020 10:58:05 11027 Person
30/11/2019 22:58:05 6262 Person
14/07/2019 18:05:46 6146 Person
11/03/2018 20:19:41 5449 Person



This version updated Reading List for this Topic Parent Topic
16/06/2010 08:57:07 Person Research - Proposal



Summary of Notes Links from this Page

Animals Concepts Consciousness Daniel Dennett – Conditions of Personhood Death
Human Beings (2) Individual Intermittent Objects Locke Logic of Identity
Natural Kinds Persistence Criteria Personality Relative Identity Self
Semantics Substance Thought Experiments    

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Summary of Note Links to this Page

Aeon Papers - Summary Document, 2, 3, 4 Androids Animal Rights, 2, 3, 4 Animalism Animals, 2, 3, 4, 5
Artifacts Baker, 2 Biological Criterion, 2 Bodily Continuity, 2, 3 Brain
Brain Criterion, 2 Cartesian Ego, 2, 3 Cerebrum, 2 Chimera Clinical Observations
Computers Concepts Connectedness vs Continuity, 2, 3 Consciousness Constitution View - Objections
Counting Persons, 2 Degrees of Personhood, 2 Dicephalus, 2, 3 Embryo Essentialism
Fetuses First-Person Perspective, 2, 3 Fission, 2 Forensic Property, 2, 3 Free Will
Homo Sapiens Human Beings, 2 Human Persons, 2, 3 Intermittent Objects Jen_071112 (Thesis Chapter Breakdown)
Johnston - Human Beings, 2, 3, 4, 5 Language of Thought Lewis Methuselah, 2 Multiple Personality Disorder
Natural Kinds, 2 Non-Human Persons, 2 Ontology, 2 Origins Persistence
Persistent Vegetative State Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1 Psychological Continuity Psychological Continuity - Forward, 2 Quasi-Memory
Reductionism Self, 2, 3 Ship of Theseus Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity Sorites
Sortals Substance Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?), 2, 3, 4, 5 Thesis - Current Stance, 2
Thesis - Outline Unity of the Person Vagueness, 2 What are We? Zombies
Zygote, 2        

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