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Personal Identity
Person
(Text as at 16/06/2010 08:57:07)
*** THIS IS NOT THE LATEST VERSION OF THIS NOTE ***
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I must first consider whether the debate on personal identity has been hijacked by a term (whose meaning has changed over time) that can now be dispensed with? Wiggins claims that the Greeks had no term for “person” (I need to re-read the paper by "Trendelenberg (Adolf) - A Contribution to the History of the Word Person" to double-check this). Have we always secretly been talking about human animal identity (probably referring to human beings1 rather than human animals) when we thought we were talking about something separate, namely persons?
I need to start with some conceptual2 analysis, though this may lead to somewhat arbitrary (ie. merely semantic3 or culture-relative) conclusions if PERSON isn’t a natural kind4 concept. I accept Locke’s5 conceptual distinction between Human Beings6 (“Men”), Persons and Substances7. I accept Locke’s assertion that the rational parrot would be a person, but not a man – the latter essentially involving particular physical characteristics, the former specific mental characteristics.
Can any purely mentalistic definition of the concept PERSON, such as Locke’s definition of a person as …
- “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places” ("Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity" - Essay II.27.2),
… be correct? I suspect not, because of the corporeal aspects we take as being essential to our self-image. But, when we think of ourselves in this corporeal way, is this qua ANIMAL or qua PERSON. But then, this “qua-ing” can lead to relative8 identity, and shows how difficult it is for me, at least, to maintain the strict logic9 of identity in these discussions. Some further, fairly random, thoughts:-
- We must not ignore potential differences between the Person, the Self10 and the Individual11.
- I doubt the truth of the contention that one’s Self is the sum of one’s projects, one’s individual “identity”12.
- We must also note the potential for degrees of personhood.
- Are persons essentially sentient? Or rational? And is rationality, like the mental generally, overstated by philosophers whose favourite habitat it is?
- What about temporal gaps13 in sentience & rationality in the life of an individual – does the person pop in and out of existence?
- What about legal persons: not companies, but the comatose, who still have estates (but then so do the deceased14)?
- How important is “person”, as against “sentient being15” in my research concerns? The Cartesians denied sentience to animals16 and until recently there has been a down-playing of the capacities of animals, particularly their emotional capacities. Consequently, the persistence criteria17 for sentient non-humans may not have been given the focus they ought. I suspect that many of the thought experiments18 work just as well if we drop some of the more onerous requirements of personhood in such contexts. Some of the thought experiments play on the thought of “being tortured tomorrow”. While animals may not have the concept TOMORROW, I presume the higher animals have some capacity for anticipating future ills about to befall them. I wonder whether my research concerns should be about all beings that care about the future, whether or not they have a clear concept of it as their future.
I will probably start with Dennett’s six criteria of personhood (see "Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood") …
- rationality,
- intentionality – “predicated of”
- intentionality – “adopted towards”
- reciprocation of the personal stance,
- verbal communication and
- consciousness
… in investigating what persons are. See the following essay19.
Live Version of this Archived Note
| Date |
Length |
Title |
| 14/04/2026 03:53:17 |
19604 |
Person |
Table of the 2 Earlier Versions of this Note
| Date |
Length |
Title |
| 26/11/2007 23:25:26 |
3715 |
Person |
| 12/08/2007 10:17:46 |
2587 |
Person |
Table of the 9 Later Versions of this Note
| Date |
Length |
Title |
| 06/07/2023 00:43:12 |
19209 |
Person |
| 20/09/2022 11:24:00 |
18604 |
Person |
| 01/05/2022 18:20:10 |
18277 |
Person |
| 02/07/2021 20:32:38 |
16950 |
Person |
| 16/02/2021 01:00:29 |
15711 |
Person |
| 30/12/2020 10:58:05 |
11027 |
Person |
| 30/11/2019 22:58:05 |
6262 |
Person |
| 14/07/2019 18:05:46 |
6146 |
Person |
| 11/03/2018 20:19:41 |
5449 |
Person |
Summary of Notes Links from this Page
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above (if any).
Summary of Note Links to this Page
| Aeon Papers - Summary Document, 2, 3, 4 |
Androids |
Animal Rights, 2, 3, 4 |
Animalism |
Animals, 2, 3, 4, 5 |
| Artifacts |
Baker, 2 |
Biological Criterion, 2 |
Bodily Continuity, 2, 3 |
Brain |
| Brain Criterion, 2 |
Cartesian Ego, 2, 3 |
Cerebrum, 2 |
Chimera |
Clinical Observations |
| Computers |
Concepts |
Connectedness vs Continuity, 2, 3 |
Consciousness |
Constitution View - Objections |
| Counting Persons, 2 |
Degrees of Personhood, 2 |
Dicephalus, 2, 3 |
Embryo |
Essentialism |
| Fetuses |
First-Person Perspective, 2, 3 |
Fission, 2 |
Forensic Property, 2, 3 |
Free Will |
| Homo Sapiens |
Human Beings, 2 |
Human Persons, 2, 3 |
Intermittent Objects |
Jen_071112 (Thesis Chapter Breakdown) |
| Johnston - Human Beings, 2, 3, 4, 5 |
Language of Thought |
Lewis |
Methuselah, 2 |
Multiple Personality Disorder |
| Natural Kinds, 2 |
Non-Human Persons, 2 |
Ontology, 2 |
Origins |
Persistence |
| Persistent Vegetative State |
Personal Identity and Moral Action. T1 |
Psychological Continuity |
Psychological Continuity - Forward, 2 |
Quasi-Memory |
| Reductionism |
Self, 2, 3 |
Ship of Theseus |
Snowdon - The Self and Personal Identity |
Sorites |
| Sortals |
Substance |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?), 2, 3, 4, 5 |
Thesis - Current Stance, 2 |
| Thesis - Outline |
Unity of the Person |
Vagueness, 2 |
What are We? |
Zombies |
| Zygote, 2 |
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To access information, click on one of the links in the table above (if any).
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026