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Personal Identity

Intermittent Objects

(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)

• Thesis Text:
  0. This topic is to be discussed under at least six heads, as follows …
  1. Artifacts¹
     • Are the classic cases of possibly intermittent objects, in that many small artefacts can be disassembled and then reassembled, and it is usually thought that the reassembled object is numerically identical to the original.
     • But it is not clear whether the watch (say) ceases to exist when disassembled for cleaning, or whether it continues to exist in a scattered² state. The recipient of a bag of watch-parts would still consider they had received their watch back, even if annoyed at having to reassemble it themselves.
     • But, as with all things artifactual, there’s a question whether our intuitions³ are conventional⁴ and could be otherwise. My gut-feel⁵, however, is that disassembled artifacts just exist in a disassembled, scattered state, rather than ceasing to exist. Hence, disassembled artifacts are examples of scattered objects⁶ rather than of intermittent objects.
     • I suppose the counterargument might be that artifacts are the things they are for functional reasons, but does a disassembled thing have a function (or, at any rate, the same function it had when assembled)? I imagine we could say that an object might be delivered in kit-form, and then assembled, and it is probably arbitrary (or can be stipulated) whether the kit is of the same kind as the object or not.
     • The Write-up⁷ of "Carter (William) - Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission" will cover all this in more detail.
  2. Persons⁸
     • When it comes to Persons, it’s the possession of certain capacities, not the present exercise of them, that qualifies an individual as a person.
     • David Wiggins holds the view that a person is one who belongs to a kind whose typical members possess some open-ended list of properties.
     • In that case, a foetus or someone in a PVS⁹ would still be a person. They would not “intermit” while in that state.
     • However, on a “present capacity” view, they would not qualify as persons in such a state, and a person might have intermittent existence. For instance, if I were to fall into, and then recover from, a PVS I would not be a person when in the PVS, but would on recovery again be a person, and (importantly) the same person.
     • So, someone like Baker¹⁰ might be committed to persons as intermittent objects because she thinks of human persons as ontologically separate from the human animals that constitute them.
     • However, an animalist like Olson¹¹ would not be so committed. For the animalist, it’s the animal that’s the persisting thing, and the animal persists throughout the PVS.
     • I’m not sure what Olson’s view is of the ontological status of persons (I don’t think he considers them a kind); they are just individuals of another kind (most notably human animals) with special, maybe temporary, properties.
  3. Phase Sortals¹²
     • My view is that human persons are phase¹³ sortals¹⁴ of human animals.
     • So, I side with Olson against Baker in the controversy about what Persons are.
     • While persons are ontologically significant, this does not bring into being a new kind – namely ‘PERSON’ but raises the status of the kind whose typical members are persons (and of the individuals who are persons, of course).
     • So, I do not think that persons – at least persons falling under the kind HUMAN ANIMAL – can have intermittent existence. A fetus or a human animal in a PVS remains the same human animal.
  4. Constitution¹⁵
     • I’ve not yet discussed intermittent objects under either this head¹⁶, or that of Baker’s Constitution View¹⁷, but will do, eventually.
     • The possibility of intermittent objects is covered in passing in two overlapping and incomplete reviews of "Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter": a Write-up¹⁸ and an Essay¹⁹.
     • The possibility is also raised in my discussion²⁰ of "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity" which – while ostensibly addressed to Olson – also discusses the Constitution View.
  5. Scattered Objects²¹
     • The topic of physical continuity²² addresses – amongst much else – both scattered objects²³ and intermittent objects, the former intermitting in space, the latter in time (and maybe in space as well).
     • So, if persons are things constituted by other things, then the person intermits during a PVS, but there is no physical discontinuity.
     • But, as Baker believes, the very same person can be constituted by different bodies at different times, then there must necessarily be persistence in the absence of spatio-temporal continuity, which it usually taken as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for persistence.
     • This leads on to our next topic.
  6. Resurrection²⁴
     • The possibility of Resurrection²⁵ is the main reason for my interest in intermittent objects.
     • Clearly, if we are to claim that the very same individual who died is resurrected somewhere else (maybe not a place as such, though it is difficult to envisage bodies that are not at places) at some other time (or not in time – but similar worries apply) then we have an intermittent object.
     • This process (or fiat) would also seem to involve some sort of metamorphosis²⁶, though maybe the Constitution View does not worry about such things, as it is the constituted person that persists, not the constituting body.
       

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  Further Remarks:
  1. I allude to the possibility of intermittent existence in these Notes:-
     1. Artifacts²⁷,
     2. Persons²⁸,
     3. Phase Sortals²⁹,
     4. Constitution³⁰,
     5. Scattered Objects³¹,
     6. Resurrection³².
        

References

• Relevant Works cited above:
  1. "Carter (William) - Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission", 1983, Write-Up Note³³, Internal PDF Link, Read
  2. "Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter", 2003, Write-Up Note³⁴, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read
  3. "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity", 2008, Write-Up Note³⁵, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read
• For a Page of Links³⁶ to this Note, Click here.
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read³⁷, include the following:-
  • Aeon:
    1. "Aeon - Video - The return of the takhi", 2023, External Link
    2. "The Week, Rufford (Nick) - Could the woolly mammoth be brought back from the dead?", 2022, External Link
  • General:
    1. "Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke on 'Masses of Matter'", 1991, Annotations
    2. "Carter (William) - Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission", 1983, Write-Up Note³⁸, Internal PDF Link
    3. "Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Preface to the Second Printing", 1989
    4. "Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter", 2003, Write-Up Note³⁹, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Hazlett (Allan) - Disassembly and Destruction", 2006, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    6. "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings", 1987, Write-Up Note⁴⁰, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    7. "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity", 2008, Write-Up Note⁴¹, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Immortality", 2009
    9. "Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time", 1968, Annotations, External Link, Internal PDF Link
• A further reading list might start with:-
  • General:
    1. "Beck (Simon) - Let's Exist Again (Like We Did Last Summer)", 2001, Internal PDF Link
    2. "Corcoran (Kevin) - Dualism, Materialism and the Problem of Post Mortem Survival", 2009, Internal PDF Link, Read = 17%
    3. "Dau (Paulo) - Part-Time Objects", 1986, No Abstract
    4. "Hershenov (David) - The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection", 2003, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 5%
    5. "Johnston (Mark) - Is Heaven a Place We Can Get To?", 2010, Read = 78%
    6. "Lowe (E.J.) - Identity Over Time and Change Of Composition", 2002
    7. "Merricks (Trenton) - There Are No Criteria For Identity Over Time", 1998, Internal PDF Link
    8. "Oderberg (David) - Fission, Intermittence and the Primitiveness of Identity", 1993
    9. "Patton (Michael F.) - Full-Time Objections to Part-Time Objects", 1991
    10. "Simons (Peter) - Temporary Parts and Intermittent Existence", 1987

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• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
  1. Read: No items to list.
  2. Further Reading: No items to list.

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Table of the Previous 8 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
20/09/2022 11:24:00	7272	Intermittent Objects
01/05/2022 18:20:10	6824	Intermittent Objects
12/02/2021 23:58:34	6681	Intermittent Objects
04/07/2018 18:31:41	7754	Intermittent Objects
04/07/2014 22:46:34	5503	Intermittent Objects
18/12/2010 19:58:05	652	Intermittent Objects
26/11/2007 23:25:26	640	Intermittent Objects
12/08/2007 10:17:46	80	Intermittent Objects

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
06/07/2023 00:43:12	Intermittent Objects	Logic of Identity

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Artifacts	Baker	Carter – Artifacts of Theseus	Constitution	Constitution View
Convention	Fine - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter	Fine - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter (Essay)	Intuition	Johnston - Human Beings
Markosian - The Human Animal: Three Problems for Olson	Metamorphosis	Note Links Explanation	Olson	Persistent Vegetative State
Person	Phase Sortals	Physical Continuity	Resurrection	Scattered Objects
Sortals	Works Read - Explanation

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Aeon Papers - Summary Document: 2017-2018	Artifacts	Baker - Materialism with a Human Face	Baker - The First-Person Perspective	Dracula
Existence	Interregnum	Johnston - Human Beings	Life	Olson - What Are We? Animals, 2, 3
Olson - What Are We? The Question	Person	Phase Sortals	Physical Continuity	PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3, 4
Psychological Continuity - Forward	Scattered Objects	Status: Personal Identity (2025 - December), 2	Status: Priority Task List (2026 - February), 2	Status: Summary (2025 - December), 2
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues), 2, 3, 4	Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)
Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)	Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)	Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14	Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Aeon	Video - The undying hydra	Paper		Yes
Ayers (Michael R.)	Locke on 'Masses of Matter'	Paper		Yes
Baker (Lynne Rudder)	The First-Person Perspective	Paper		Yes
Beck (Simon)	Let's Exist Again (Like We Did Last Summer)	Paper
Brennan (Andrew)	Discontinuity and Identity	Paper
Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence)	Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality	Paper		Yes
Cooper (John)	Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Preface to the Second Printing	Paper		Yes
Corcoran (Kevin)	Dualism, Materialism and the Problem of Post Mortem Survival	Paper
Hershenov (David)	The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection	Paper
Johnston (Mark)	Human Beings	Paper		Yes
Johnston (Mark)	Is Heaven a Place We Can Get To?	Paper	2, 3, 4
Lockwood (Michael)	When Does a Life Begin?	Paper		Yes
Lowe (E.J.)	Identity Over Time and Change Of Composition	Paper
Merricks (Trenton)	There Are No Criteria For Identity Over Time	Paper
Oderberg (David)	Fission, Intermittence and the Primitiveness of Identity	Paper
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Animals	Paper	2, 3	Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? The Question	Paper		Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Immortality	Paper	2	Yes
Simons (Peter)	Temporary Parts and Intermittent Existence	Paper
The Week, Rufford (Nick)	Could the woolly mammoth be brought back from the dead?	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Artifacts	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 03 (What is a Person?)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Paper	2, 3, 4	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 05 (Persistence and Time)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Dracula	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Existence	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Interregnum	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Life	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Person	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Personal Identity	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Phase Sortals	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Physical Continuity	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Psychological Continuity - Forward	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Scattered Objects	Paper		Yes
Wiggins (David)	On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time	Paper		Yes
Wright (N.T.)	The Resurrection of the Son of God: Preface, Bibliography & Indexes	Paper		Yes

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Aeon	Video - The return of the takhi	Paper - Cited	Aeon, 13 July 2023	Yes
Arnold (Keith)	The Subject of Radical Change	Paper - By Subtopic	Philosophical Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (May, 1978), pp. 395-401	Yes
Ayers (Michael R.)	Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	26%
Ayers (Michael R.)	Locke on 'Masses of Matter'	Paper - Cited	Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 18, pp. 207-215	Yes
Beck (Simon)	Let's Exist Again (Like We Did Last Summer)	Paper - Cited	South African Journal of Philosophy, 2001, Vol. 20 Issue 2, p159, 12p;	No
Brennan (Andrew)	Discontinuity and Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Nous, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Jun., 1987), pp. 241-260	6%
Burke (Michael)	Cohabitation, Stuff and Intermittent Existence	Paper - By Subtopic	Mind, 89, No. 355, Jul., 1980, pp. 391-405	No
Carter (William)	Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission	Paper - Cited	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61.3 (September 1983)	Yes
Cooper (John)	Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-dualism Debate	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	23%
Cooper (John)	Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Preface to the Second Printing	Paper - Cited	Cooper (John) - Body, Soul and Life Everlasting, 1989, Preface	Yes
Corcoran (Kevin)	Dualism, Materialism and the Problem of Post Mortem Survival	Paper - Cited	Kevin Timpe (Ed.), Arguing About Religion (Routledge, 2009)	17%
Dau (Paulo)	Part-Time Objects	Paper - Cited	Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, pp. 450-474	No
Ellis (Brian)	Australasian Journal of Philosophy - 61.3 (September 1983)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	83%
Fine (Kit)	The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter	Paper - Cited	Mind - 112/446 (April 2003)	Yes
French (Peter), Uehling (Theodore) & Wettstein (Howard)	Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	No
Gilmore (Cody)	In Defence of Spatially Related Universals	Paper - By Subtopic	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81: 420-428 (September 2003)	No
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul)	Aeon: Q-S	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	29%
Hazlett (Allan)	Disassembly and Destruction	Paper - Cited	The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 3, Coming into Being and Passing Away (July 2006), pp. 418-433	Yes
Hershenov (David)	The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of Resurrection	Paper - Cited	Faith and Philosophy, 20:1, January 2003, 24-36	5%
Johnston (Mark)	Human Beings	Paper - Cited	Journal of Philosophy, Volume 84, Issue 2 (Feb 1987), 59-83	Yes
Johnston (Mark)	Is Heaven a Place We Can Get To?	Paper - Cited	Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death, 2010	78%
Johnston (Mark)	Surviving Death	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	13%
Lowe (E.J.)	A Survey of Metaphysics	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	No
Lowe (E.J.)	Identity Over Time and Change Of Composition	Paper - Cited	Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics, Chapter 2	No
Markosian (Ned)	Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	Abstracta Special Issue I – 2008 (Brazil)	Yes
Martin (Michael G.F.), Ed.	Mind - 112/446 (April 2003)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	50%
Merricks (Trenton)	There Are No Criteria For Identity Over Time	Paper - Cited	Noûs, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 106-124	No
Oderberg (David)	Fission, Intermittence and the Primitiveness of Identity	Paper - Cited	Oderberg - The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time, 1993, Chapter 7	No
Oderberg (David)	The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	3%
Olson (Eric), Etc.	Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Patton (Michael F.)	Full-Time Objections to Part-Time Objects	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Papers 20, 1991, 173-181	No
Rea (Michael), Ed.	Material Constitution - A Reader	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	41%
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Shoemaker (David)	Personal Identity and Immortality	Paper - Cited	Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction, 2009, Chapter 1	Yes
Simons (Peter)	Parts: A Study in Ontology	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	2%
Simons (Peter)	Temporary Parts and Intermittent Existence	Paper - Cited	Simons - Parts: A Study in Ontology, 1987, Chapter 5	No
The Week, Rufford (Nick)	Could the woolly mammoth be brought back from the dead?	Paper - Cited	The Week, 12 February 2022	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Intermittent Objects	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes
Wiggins (David)	On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time	Paper - Cited	Rea - Material Constitution - A Reader	Yes

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