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Personal Identity
Consciousness
(Text as at 26/11/2007 23:25:26)
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Note that in the philosophy of personal identity, a saltation is usually diagnosed between the phenomenal consciousness of the higher (and maybe lower) animals, and self-consciousness2 (ie. awareness of self3), usually assumed to be the preserve of human beings only.
Lynne Rudder Baker alleges an ontological change (an ontological novelty) when beings with a first-person perspective4 come on the scene. I think first-person perspective is the same as a consciousness of self, though I suspect that if the non-human great apes are found to have the latter, she would allege the ontological novelty occurs with the arrival of the former, taken to be a more profound awareness.
I think the real ontological novelty arises with the emergence of phenomenally conscious beings, and that consciousness of self is a culturally-acquired phenomenon (though – despite the Buddhist attempt to eradicate it – a universal one).
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| 26/11/2007 23:25:26 |
Consciousness |
Person |
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