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Personal Identity
Brain State Transfer
(Text as at 14/03/2018 14:38:24)
*** THIS IS NOT THE LATEST VERSION OF THIS NOTE ***
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Plug Note1
- The idea that we can, even in principle, copy the information from a brain2 to a backup device and then restore it to another (or the same) brain - as in "Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future" - without changing the identity of that brain seems fanciful to me.
- This is partly because I am antipathetic to functionalism3. The information stored in brains appears to be in highly distributed representations along connectionist lines rather than according to classical AI. The very physical structure4 of the brain changes along with what it represents. There is no simple software / hardware distinction in a realistic psychology5 of human beings6.
- Consequently, this is a case of an under-specified TE7 that Kathleen Wilkes so objects to. When we try to flesh out the details, we find that the TE doesn’t really work. Any backup will need to be molecule by molecule to retain the informational richness of the original, and consequently any restore will not really simply modify the existing brain, but will destroy it and replace it with a replica8 of the brain whose contents are supposedly being transferred. It will not simply feed information into a pre-existing brain.
- Hence, I now think that Williams’s intuitions about the post-transfer A-body-person remaining a “mixed up” A-person are incorrect. Nor does A-body-person end up as B, but as a fusion of a confused replica of B’s brain and A’s body9. The situation is best described as a transplant10 of (maybe only part of) a replica of B’s brain into A-body-person’s head.
- This topic is related to other Notes, including:-
→ Transhumanism11, and
→ Uploading12.
- Note that “uploading” differs from – and builds on – BSTs because it requires the person’s psychology and phenomenal consciousness to be realised (I would say merely simulated) on a digital computer, making a two-phase project, whereas BSTs – superficially at least – just require the copying phase.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read13, include14 the following:-
- "Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue", Dainton
- "Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel", Ehring
- "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings", Johnston
- "Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future", Williams
- The categorised reading-list doesn’t provide much, though there must be many references in the literature. Many will mention BSTs only in passing. So, for now, the reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity (Stanford, 2015)", Olson
- "Perry (John) - Williams on The Self and the Future", Perry
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account", Shoemaker
- This is mostly a place-holder15.
In-Page Footnotes
Footnote 1:
- A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
Footnote 4:
- Of course, even in a digital computer there are physical changes to the various gates and storage media.
- But there is no growing or disassembling of connections.
Footnote 13:
- Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
- My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.
Footnote 14:
- I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
- Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.
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