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Personal Identity

Brain State Transfer

(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)

Plug Note¹

• Thesis Text:
  1. The idea behind a Brain State Transfer is that we can – at least in principle as a Thought Experiment² – copy the Information³ from a Brain⁴ to a backup device and then restore it to another (or the same) brain – as in "Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future" – without changing the identity of that brain.
  2. This seems fanciful to me, as I’m sure it does to most people not enticed by Transhumanism⁵, but seems to be a natural Intuition⁶ to them.
  3. My scepticism is partly because I am antipathetic to functionalism⁷. The Information⁸ stored in Brains⁹ appears to be in highly distributed representations along connectionist lines rather than according to classical AI. The very physical structure and topology of the brain changes along with what it represents. There is no simple software / hardware distinction in a realistic Psychology¹⁰ of Human Beings¹¹. Of course, even in a digital Computer¹² there are physical changes to the various gates and storage media. But there is no growing or disassembling of connections.
  4. Consequently, this is a case of an under-specified TE¹³ that Kathleen Wilkes so objects to. When we try to flesh out the details, we find that the TE doesn’t really work. Any backup will need to be molecule by molecule to retain the informational richness of the original, and consequently any restore will not really simply modify the existing brain, but will destroy it and replace it with a replica¹⁴ of the brain whose contents are supposedly being transferred. It will not simply feed information¹⁵ into a pre-existing brain.
  5. Hence, I now think that Bernard Williams’s intuitions¹⁶ about the post-transfer A-body-person remaining a “mixed up” A-person are incorrect. Nor does A-body-person end up as B, but as a fusion¹⁷ of a replica¹⁸ of B’s brain¹⁹ and A’s body²⁰. The situation is best described as a transplant²¹ of (maybe only part of) a replica of B’s brain into A-body-person’s head. A-body-person may end up confused, but only because – it seems to him – he’s obtained a new body.
  6. Of course, this TE²² retains all the difficulties associated with Brain Transplants²³. A particular brain²⁴ is wired up to control a particular body²⁵, and won’t work adequately with a new one.
  7. Note that “uploading”²⁶ differs from – and builds on – BSTs because it requires the person²⁷’s psychology²⁸ and phenomenal consciousness²⁹ to be realised (I would say merely simulated) on a digital computer³⁰, making a two-phase project, whereas BSTs – superficially at least – just require the copying phase.

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  Further Remarks
  1. This topic is related to other Notes, including:-
     • Brain Transplants³¹
     • Transhumanism³², and
     • Uploading³³

References

• Relevant Works cited above:
  1. "Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future", 1999, Write-Up Note³⁴, Annotations, Internal PDF Link, Read
• For a Page of Links³⁵ to this Note, Click here.
• Works on this topic that I’ve actually read³⁶, include the following:-
  • General:
    1. "Campbell (Scott) - Can You Survive a Brain-Zap", 2004, Annotations
    2. "Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue", 2014
    3. "Ehring (Douglas) - Personal Identity and Time Travel", 1987, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    4. "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings", 1987, Write-Up Note³⁷, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    5. "Long (Douglas) - The Bodies of Persons", 1974, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    6. "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands", 2014, External Link
    7. "Noonan (Harold) - The Self and the Future", 2003, Annotations
    8. "Odegard (Douglas) - Personal and Bodily Identity", 1969, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    9. "Roache (Rebecca) - A Defence of Quasi-Memory", 2006, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
    10. "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Bodies", 1995, Annotations
    11. "Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future", 1999, Write-Up Note³⁸, Annotations, Internal PDF Link
• The categorised reading-list doesn’t provide much, though there must be many references in the literature. Many will mention BSTs only in passing. So, for now, a further reading list might start with:-
  • General:
    1. "Agar (Nicholas) - Functionalism and Personal Identity", 2003, Internal PDF Link, Read = 6%
    2. "Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity (Stanford, 2015)", 2017, External Link, Internal PDF Link, Read = 15%
    3. "Perry (John) - Williams on The Self and the Future", 2002
    4. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Functionalism and Personal Identity - a Reply", 2004, Internal PDF Link, Read = 22%
    5. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account", 1984, Read = 22%

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• For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
  1. Read: No items to list.
  2. Further Reading: No items to list.
• This is mostly a place-holder³⁹.

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Table of the Previous 9 Versions of this Note:

Date	Length	Title
20/09/2022 11:24:00	4665	Brain State Transfer
15/05/2022 13:19:12	4223	Brain State Transfer
07/02/2021 19:46:34	3717	Brain State Transfer
09/09/2020 19:35:02	3233	Brain State Transfer
14/03/2018 14:38:24	4052	Brain State Transfer
03/02/2018 18:44:38	3303	Brain State Transfer
18/08/2009 20:39:50	1539	Brain State Transfer
26/11/2007 23:25:26	1095	Brain State Transfer
12/08/2007 10:17:46	1089	Brain State Transfer

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Note last updated	Reading List for this Topic	Parent Topic
06/07/2023 00:43:12	Brain State Transfer	Thought Experiments

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Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note

Awaiting Attention (Personal Identity)	Body	Brain	Brain Transplants	Computers
Consciousness	Functionalism	Fusion	Human Beings	Information
Intuition	Johnston - Human Beings	Note Links Explanation	Person	Plug Note Apologia
Psychology	Replication	Thought Experiments	Transhumanism	Uploading
Williams - The Self and the Future	Works Read - Explanation

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Summary of Notes Citing This Note

Aeon Papers	Animalism	Body	Brain	Brain Transplants
Closest Continuer	Information	Johnston - Human Beings	Noonan - Persons and Bodies - Response	Olson - What Are We? Animals
Olson - What Are We? The Question	PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3	Reduplication Objections	Research - Proposal	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?), 2
Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion)	Thesis - Current Stance
Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Uploading	Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.

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Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note

Author	Title	Medium	Extra Links	Read?
Agar (Nicholas)	Functionalism and Personal Identity	Paper
Campbell (Scott)	Rapid Psychological Change	Paper
Dainton (Barry)	Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue	Paper		Yes
Ehring (Douglas)	Personal Identity and Time Travel	Paper	2	Yes
Hains (Brigid) & Hains (Paul)	Aeon: 2019+	Paper		Yes
Johnston (Mark)	Human Beings	Paper		Yes
Kingma (Elselijn)	Were You Part of Your Mother?	Paper		Yes
Lawrance (John)	Hosting Andrew	Book		Yes
Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric)	Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands	Paper		Yes
Monti (Alessandro)	A stable sense of self is rooted in the lungs, heart and gut	Paper		Yes
Noonan (Harold)	Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'	Paper		Yes
Noonan (Harold)	The Possibility of Reincarnation	Paper
Olson (Eric)	Psychology and Personal Identity	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	The Human Animal: Introduction	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? Animals	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	What Are We? The Question	Paper		Yes
Olson (Eric)	Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach	Paper		Yes
Perry (John)	A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality	Book		Yes
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Functionalism and Personal Identity - a Reply	Paper
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Animalism	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Body	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Brain	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Brain Transplants	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?)	Paper	2	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 04 (Basic Metaphysical Issues)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 10 (Thought Experiments)	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Chapter 12 (Conclusion)	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Closest Continuer	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Current Position	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Information	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Personal Identity	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Reduplication Objections	Paper		Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Uploading	Paper		Yes
Van Inwagen (Peter)	Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity	Paper	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9	Yes

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References & Reading List

Author	Title	Medium	Source	Read?
Agar (Nicholas)	Functionalism and Personal Identity	Paper - Cited	Nous, Mar2003, Vol. 37 Issue 1, p52-70, 19p;	6%
Bermudez (Jose Luis), Marcel (Anthony) & Eilan (Naomi), Eds.	The Body and the Self	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	4%
Campbell (Scott)	Can You Survive a Brain-Zap	Paper - Cited	Theoria, 2004; 70(1): 22-27	Yes
Dainton (Barry)	Self: Philosophy In Transit	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	7%
Dainton (Barry)	Self: Philosophy In Transit: Prologue	Paper - Cited	Dainton (Barry) - Self: Philosophy In Transit, Prologue	Yes
Ehring (Douglas)	Personal Identity and Time Travel	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Nov., 1987), pp. 427-433	Yes
Johnston (Mark)	Human Beings	Paper - Cited	Journal of Philosophy, Volume 84, Issue 2 (Feb 1987), 59-83	Yes
Lawrance (John)	Hosting Andrew	Book - By Subtopic	Lawrance (John) - Hosting Andrew	Yes
Lawrance (John)	Hosting Andrew	Paper - By Subtopic	Lawrance (John) - Hosting Andrew	Yes
Long (Douglas)	The Bodies of Persons	Paper - Cited	Journal of Philosophy 71, No. 10 (May 30, 1974), 291-301	Yes
Marshall (Richard)	Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	37%
Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric)	Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands	Paper - Cited	Marshall (Richard) - Philosophy at 3:AM: Questions and Answers with 25 Top Philosophers	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	Personal Identity	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	Yes
Noonan (Harold)	The Self and the Future	Paper - Cited	Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 10	Yes
Odegard (Douglas)	Personal and Bodily Identity	Paper - Cited	Philosophical Quarterly, 1969, 69-71	Yes
O'Hear (Anthony), Ed.	Philosophy - 81/316 (April 2006)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	18%
Olson (Eric)	Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson)	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	16%
Olson (Eric)	Personal Identity (Stanford, 2015)	Paper - Cited	Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Summer 2017	15%
Perry (John)	Identity, Personal Identity and the Self	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Perry (John) - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self	3%
Perry (John)	Williams on The Self and the Future	Paper - By Subtopic	Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 6	No
Roache (Rebecca)	A Defence of Quasi-Memory	Paper - Cited	Philosophy - 81/316 (April 2006), pp. 323-356	Yes
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Personal Identity: a Materialist Account	Paper - By Subtopic	Shoemaker & Swinburne - Personal Identity, 1984, pp. 67-132	22%
Shoemaker (Sydney)	Persons and Personal Identity	Paper - By Subtopic	Kim & Sosa - A Companion to Metaphysics	Yes
Shoemaker (Sydney) & Swinburne (Richard)	Personal Identity	Book - By Subtopic (via Paper By Subtopic)	Shoemaker (Sydney) & Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity	11%
Snowdon (Paul)	Persons, Animals, and Bodies	Paper - Cited	Bermudez, Marcel & Eilan - The Body and the Self, 1995	Yes
Todman (Theo)	Thesis - Brain State Transfer	Paper - By Subtopic		Yes
Williams (Bernard)	Problems of the Self	Book - Cited (via Paper Cited)	Bibliographical details to be supplied	37%
Williams (Bernard)	The Self and the Future	Paper - Cited	Williams - Problems of the Self	Yes

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1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026

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