Theo Todman's Web Page - Notes Pages
Personal Identity
Methuselah
(Text as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12)
Plug Note1
- Thesis Text:
- David Lewis’s Methuselah thought experiment2 - in "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity" - seems to be a reductio ad absurdum of the psychological connectedness3 approach to personal identity.
- I’m unimpressed by Lewis4’s solution. Firstly, can there really be an uncountable infinity of persons5 residing in a single body6? But why not? Lewis thrived on pressing credibility so we might let this pass.
- The “no prudential concern for the future” argument also seems to be another reductio of the connectedness approach. If I’m not the same person as the future occupant of my body, why make provisions for him. Yet, he’ll share my first-person perspective7 and I’ll be psychologically continuous8 with him.
- Of course, Lewis’s model (of a 137-year cut-off for psychological connectedness) is admittedly too crude. Parfit9 sees temporally extended persons as persons of reduced degree10, according to the degree of connectedness. However, this seems to destroy the natural growth and maturation of the person.
- I’m still the same person as was my immature self, even though most of my hopes and desires have changed. If I’m in control of my life, I own these changes, brought them about, and often think them for the good.
- What about where I don’t own them, but regret my corruption (moral and physical)? It’s still my corruption that I regret. I’m the same human being11.
- It depends what concept12 we want to use the term “person” for. We always have to distinguish personality13 from persons.
- Finally, consider Saul Kripke on individuation by origin14. Is this a possible objection to overlapping persons? If a person’s origin is what individuates15 him, how is it possible for persons to have vague16,17 origins as in an un-simplified Methusalah case? There are two issues here that need spelling out.
References
- Relevant Works cited above:
- "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity", 1983, Internal PDF Link, Read
- For a Page of Links18 to this Note, Click here.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read19, include the following:-
- A further reading list might start with:-
- For a list of Works that have been considered, but have missed the cut for inclusion in this Section of my Thesis, see the following:-
- Read: No items to list.
- Further Reading: No items to list.
- This is mostly a place-holder20.
Table of the Previous 9 Versions of this Note:
Summary of Notes Referenced by This Note
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Summary of Notes Citing This Note
| Bodily Continuity |
Connectedness vs Continuity |
Lewis, 2 |
PID Note, Book & Paper Usage, 2, 3 |
Psychological Continuity |
| Psychological Criterion |
Research - Proposal |
Status: Personal Identity (2025 - December) |
Status: Priority Task List (2026 - February) |
Status: Summary (2025 - December) |
| Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What are We?) |
Thesis - Personal Identity, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
Website Generator Documentation - Functors, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 |
|
To access information, click on one of the links in the table above.
Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Extra Links |
Read? |
| Noonan (Harold) |
Identity and Determinacy |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Parfit (Derek) |
Summary of Discussion |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Perry (John) |
The Importance of Being Identical |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Bodily Continuity |
Paper  |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 01 (Introduction) |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Chapter 02 (What Are We?) |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Connectedness vs Continuity |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Lewis |
Paper |
2 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Personal Identity |
Paper |
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 |
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Continuity |
Paper |
|
Yes |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Psychological Criterion |
Paper |
|
Yes |
References & Reading List
| Author |
Title |
Medium |
Source |
Read? |
| Briggs (Rachael) & Nolan (Daniel) |
Utility Monsters for the Fission Age |
Paper - Cited |
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume96, Issue3, September 2015, Pages 392-407 |
No |
| Butkovic (Ana) |
Does Identity Really Matter? Parfit vs Lewis |
Paper - Cited |
ResearchGate, 2010 |
6% |
| Lewis (David) |
Philosophical Papers Volume I |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Lewis (David) |
Survival and Identity |
Paper - Cited |
Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 1: Ontology, Chapter 5 |
Yes |
| Noonan (Harold) |
Identity and Determinacy |
Paper - Cited |
Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 6 |
Yes |
| Noonan (Harold) |
Personal Identity |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
Yes |
| Perry (John) |
The Importance of Being Identical |
Paper - Cited |
Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 8 |
Yes |
| Rorty (Amélie Oksenberg), Ed. |
The Identities of Persons |
Book - Cited (via Paper Cited) |
Bibliographical details to be supplied |
23% |
| So (Paul) |
Lewis’ Personal Identity |
Paper - Cited |
compos mentis: Undergraduate Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (1): 63–72. 2014 |
No |
| Todman (Theo) |
Thesis - Methuselah |
Paper - By Subtopic |
|
Yes |
Text Colour Conventions
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026