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Personal Identity

Phase Sortals

(Text as at 12/08/2007 10:17:46)

*** THIS IS NOT THE LATEST VERSION OF THIS NOTE ***

Using Howard Robinson’s terminology ("Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Stanford)"), the Ultimate Sort of a thing is that property¹ without which the thing ceases to exist. A Phase Sortal can lose the property that defines the phase without ceasing to exist. Ultimate Sorts are presumably the same as Baker’s Primary Kinds², though I can’t remember if she has an analogue of a Phase Sortal. The standard example is of a human being³ (as the Ultimate Sort) and the child (as a Phase Sortal). So, is personhood⁴ an attribute of a human being, like “childhood”, that a human being can either possess or lack, or are persons ontologically⁵ separate from “their” human beings?

Suggestion that X is “no more than” Y isn’t intended to imply unimportance. Rather, simply that persons might not be kinds⁶, or substances⁷, but that personhood might be a property of substances (of animals⁸, for instance).

What about “periodic” phase sortals such as “student”? A human being can “pop in and out of” studenthood by registering or deregistering, but he can’t do this with childhood. Which model suits personhood? All roads seem to lead to Wiggins (Snowdon refers to him a lot in the context of Animalism, though I seem to remember that Olson thinks Wiggins isn’t a true Animalist, but a supporter of the psychological view). I need to read "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance" and "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed" with some urgency; also, maybe, "Wiggins (David) - Metaphysics: Substance" in "Grayling (Anthony), Ed. - Philosophy 1 - A Guide Through the Subject".