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Personal Identity
Natural Kinds
(Text as at 26/11/2007 23:25:26)
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Is the concept of a PERSOn1 a natural kind concept? Can PERSON be analysed in terms of other concepts, or do we presuppose it? See, for example, "Madell (Geoffrey) - The Identity of the Self" for the alleged unanalysability of the concept PERSON. Maybe I should cover under this head whether SENTIENT BEING (or RATIONAL BEING) is the natural kind concept, and that PERSON, with its social / legal / moral overtones, is something cultures assign. Even so, the concept HUMAN ANIMAL2 is really the natural kind concept, exemplars of which gains or lose the properties3 of sentience, rationality, and even the first-person perspective4.
When does a natural kind come into existence? Natural kinds are concepts, and such questions are controversial. Side-step this question and simply talk about when the concept becomes instantiated.
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