# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**CHAPTER 1 (MIND)** ......................................................................................................................... 2  
1. **PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND THE STUDY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA** ........................................... 2  
2. **PERSPECTIVES AND POINTS OF VIEW** ......................................................................................... 3  
3. **PERSPECTIVES AND THEIR OBJECTS** ........................................................................................... 4  
4. **THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPTS OF INTENTIONALITY AND INTENSION** ...................................... 5  
5. **DIRECTEDNESS AND INTENTIONAL OBJECTS** .............................................................................. 6  
6. **ASPECTUAL SHAPE AND INTENTIONAL CONTENT** ......................................................................... 7  
7. **THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY** ............................................................................................. 9  
8. **THE STRUCTURE OF INTENTIONALITY** ....................................................................................... 11  

**CHAPTER 2 (BODY)** ......................................................................................................................... 14  
9. **INTERACTION BETWEEN MIND AND BODY** .............................................................................. 14  
10. **SUBSTANCE, PROPERTY, EVENT** .................................................................................................. 14  
11. **THE ‘INTELLIGIBILITY’ OF MENTAL CAUSATION** ......................................................................... 16  
12. **PHYSICS AND PHYSICALISM** ...................................................................................................... 17  
13. **THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION FOR DUALISTS** ............................................................. 19  
14. **THE IDENTITY THEORY** ............................................................................................................. 20  
15. **REDUCTIONISM** ........................................................................................................................ 21  
16. **AGAINST THE IDENTITY THEORY: ANTI-REDUCTIONISM** ......................................................... 22  
17. **THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION FOR NON-REDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM** ......................... 24  
18. **EMERGENCE** ................................................................................................................................ 25  
19. **PHYSICALISM AS THE SOURCE OF THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM** ............................................. 27  

**CHAPTER 3 (CONSCIOUSNESS)** ....................................................................................................... 30  
21. **THE CONSCIOUS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS** .................................................................................. 30  
22. **THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INTENTIONAL AND THE QUALITATIVE** ............................... 31  
23. **QUALIA** ..................................................................................................................................... 32  
24. **THE INTENTIONALITY OF BODILY SENSATION** .......................................................................... 33  
25. **STRONG INTENTIONALISM AND WEAK INTENTIONALISM** ...................................................... 37  
26. **PHYSICALISM, CONSCIOUSNESS AND QUALIA** .......................................................................... 39  
27. **THE EXPLANATORY GAP** .......................................................................................................... 40  
28. **THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT EXAMINATED** .......................................................................... 41  
29. **ZOMBIES** .................................................................................................................................. 44  
30. **THE PROSPECTS FOR EXPLAINING CONSCIOUSNESS** ............................................................. 45  

**CHAPTER 4 (THOUGHT)** .................................................................................................................... 46  
31. **THOUGHTS AND BELIEFS** .......................................................................................................... 46  
32. **CONSCIOUSNESS AND BELIEF** .................................................................................................. 47  
33. **PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES** ...................................................................................................... 48  
34. **THE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE THESIS** .................................................................................. 50  
35. **DE RE AND DE DICTO ATTITUDES** .............................................................................................. 51  
36. **INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM** ............................................................................................. 53  
37. **THE ARGUMENT FOR EXTERNALISM** ......................................................................................... 55  
38. **DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT** ....................................................................................................... 58  
39. **THE PROSPECTS FOR EXPLAINING THOUGHT** ......................................................................... 59  

**CHAPTER 5 (PERCEPTION)** ............................................................................................................... 60  
40. **THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION** .................................................................................................. 60  
41. **THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION** .............................................................................................. 60  
42. **PERCEPTION AS A FORM OF INTENTIONALITY** ......................................................................... 63  
43. **THE PHENOMENAL CHARACTER OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE** .............................................. 64  
44. **INVERTED SPECTRUM, INVERTED EARTH** ................................................................................ 66  
45. **PERCEPTION AS NON-CONCEPTUAL** ......................................................................................... 69
1. Philosophy of Mind and the Study of Mental Phenomena

- We have a view of ourselves which is not strictly scientific, and which includes concepts of mental phenomena, maybe vague and confused but common to all societies. We view ourselves as conscious, rational beings with a perspective on the world, and with needs, commitments, emotions and values.
- By denying that this knowledge is scientific, all Crane means is that it is not specialist knowledge, but something we all learn as we mature in society. Some philosophers refer to this body of knowledge as Folk Psychology, a term with pejorative connotations Crane dislikes and will therefore avoid, though the referent of the term exists.
- We also have a truly scientific understanding of our place in the world, which requires specialist knowledge that’s not common to all societies, though most of its assertions are. Crane’s list of scientific factors relates to our biological instantiation and evolutionary history, but with no specific mention of neuroscience (or of physics).
- What’s the relation between these two ways of thinking? To what extent is what we think we know about ourselves compatible with what science tells us? To what extent could science correct these beliefs – could it say that there was no such thing as thought, and if it did how should we think of ourselves?
- One of the traditional concerns of the philosophy of mind is to analyse what we mean by our non-scientific self-concepts. To what do we commit ourselves by claiming to be rational creatures, etc.? This is an essential prerequisite for answering questions relating this conception to the scientific one.
- Crane disagrees with Rorty’s view that our concept of the mind is a disorderly collection of ideas, claiming unity to be supplied by the concept of intentionality, the mind’s directedness on its objects and the distinctive mark of all and only mental phenomena. Though it has its origins in Aristotle and mediaeval philosophy, Crane will refer to intentionality as Brentano’s thesis, without thereby accepting his philosophy as a whole or his detailed account of intentionality.
- Brentano’s thesis is currently, in Crane’s view, mistakenly rejected because it cannot account for consciousness; Crane thinks the objectors have the wrong view of consciousness (see Chapter 3 for a corrective).
- Don’t we need to compare mental with intentional things and discover that they are identical? Without an understanding of the mental independent of the concept of intentionality, this comparison is either vacuous (because “mental” means “intentional”) or impossible (since we’ve no idea what the mental is).
- Crane defends himself against this view that Brentano’s thesis is vacuous without an independent understanding of the mental. He says that the objection presupposes that we don’t have a rough-and-ready understanding of what a mind is, one that can be sharpened by applying the concept of intentionality. It’s as though we had to start our theorising about the mark of the mental completely in the dark about what we mean by “mind”, “mental” and such-like, with the mark of

---

1 This seems to commit Crane to allowing that computers and thermostats have mental phenomena (but we’ll have to see what he says about Dennett).
the mental given by an explicit definition of the term “mind”. This isn’t so, for if it were, we wouldn’t be able to recognise whether or not a definition of mind were true. We have a rough conception of our subject matter, and what we’re after is not explicit definition but a sufficiently clear and detailed description of mental phenomena for us to recognise them as the descriptions of the thing we have this approximate conception of.

- Crane gives the example due to Dennett of the analogy between Brentano’s and Church’s theses. The latter says that every effective procedure or algorithm can be performed by a Turing machine. It reduces the fuzzy-but-useful mathematical notion of an effective procedure to a more precise notion of a Turing machine, one of equivalent scope but greater power.

- We can’t hope for quite such a success as Church’s, as the idea of intentionality is vague or intractable in places, but not all vague ideas can be sharpened to the same degree. Our scope must be guided by the phenomena.

2. **Perspectives and Points of View**

- We distinguish between things that are merely alive, and those that have minds. Crane claims that the distinction consists in the latter having a *perspective* – a *point of view* on things. Things are a certain way for a minded creature, which has a world, its world. Simple in principle, but hard to make precise. Things without a world are still part of the world, and those with a world do not all have different worlds. Perspectives can be on the same world.

- Crane’s use of “perspective” is partly metaphorical and partly vague – applying to the standpoint of a person or subject – but he thinks we all know what he means. Similarly with “point of view”, which approximates to opinion or belief. However, having a perspective is not having a belief – it is not a state of mind but a condition for being in a state of mind.

- Perspectives are vague in the philosophical sense of not having sharp boundaries. It’s not clear which creatures have perspectives: it may be there’s no fact of the matter, no sharp boundary between mindedness and lack of a perspective (fish, maybe; bacteria, no). There’s no need to solve this problem provided vagueness of perspective and mind run in parallel.

- The question whether a shrimp has a mind is a good one, but irrelevant here – though there are contexts in which it is relevant (eg. whether it’s wrong to eat oysters alive turns on whether there’s anything like an oyster’s perspective). The sceptic might argue that we can never know enough about an oyster to know whether it has a perspective.

- Our question here is more fundamental than questions of what it’s permissible to eat; it’s *what is it* that we are wondering about when we wonder whether an oyster has a mind. We don’t need to address the sceptical question – how we know whether anything has a mind – to address this one. Crane acknowledges that all we see of one another is bodily movement, or hear sounds, so how can we ever really know that others are minded? If your perspective is hidden behind your behaviour, how do I ever really know whether a rock has a perspective?

---

2 Leibniz would have daffodils having points of view, though not conscious ones.

3 Is this metaphysical or epistemological vagueness? Is having a perspective a yes/no affair for the organism with or without one? Can you have a little bit of a perspective?

4 Since rocks have no behaviour?
• The sceptical question takes it for granted that we know what a perspective is, and then asks what has one – how do we know that another has this? Maybe this question rests on deep misunderstandings about knowledge or perspectives, but we won’t know until we know what a perspective is.

• We start by drawing a distinction between those living things that clearly have a perspective and those that clearly don’t. For those in the middle, questions of mind exactly parallel questions of perspective – does this mean that the two terms are practically synonymous, so that no new light can be shed on mind by the use of perspectives? Crane thinks not. Starting from perspectives we can introduce the concept that unifies the phenomena of mind and forms the basic subject matter of the philosophy of mind – that of intentionality. Crane claims that this, the mind’s directedness on its objects, is common to all mental phenomena.

3. Perspectives and their Objects

• Crane now turns to two aspects of the analogy between the literal (pictorial representation) and metaphorical meanings of perspective.
  1. There’s a distinction between the perspective itself and the things presented in, from or within that perspective.
  2. Things are presented in a certain way. We don’t, in Nagel’s expression, have a view from nowhere, but from a certain place and time. A.W. Moore uses the term perspectival of an outlook iff there is some other possible outlook that it excludes. Pictures essentially present things under a certain aspect. Aspect marks any feature evidently presented.

• (1) shows that in any state of mind there’s something that’s presented and something that the state is directed at. States of mind have objects, the essential feature of intentionality.

• (2) shows the necessary partiality or “aspectual” character of intentionality. Crane gives examples of spies presenting themselves as kindly Latin masters, or boats full of holes presented as seaworthy.

• Presentation need not be visual, but may be auditory or simply “thinking”. Unconscious presentations are reserved for later.

• Crane follows Searle in using the terms directedness and aspectual shape. So, Brentano’s Thesis reduces to: all and only mental phenomena have directedness and aspectual shape.

• “Mental phenomena” is a broad category, covering all that goes on mentally in the life of a minded creature (whether a person or not) and includes both events and states. Most of the book is an exercise in phenomenology – how minds appear to those who have them – though not in Husserl’s sense of “bracketing” reality outside the mind and merely treating of the phenomena.

• Intentionalism – the view that all mental phenomena exhibit intentionality – is controversial. Some philosophers think that some bodily sensations (such as pains) involve neither directedness nor aspectual shape; others that certain moods lack directedness (being unhappy about nothing in particular). Crane rejects the.

---

5 What does this mean?
6 What’s the relevance of these examples?
7 Where?
8 Hence the importance of the question of pains being (mis-)perceptions of bodily damage.

theo@theotodman.com 07/07/2003 Page 4 of 71
view of such philosophers that the essence of mind isn’t exhausted by the talking about the creature’s perspective (he will argue his case in Chapter 3).

4. **The Origin of the Concepts of Intentionality and Intension**

- In the middle ages, *intentio* was used as a technical term for a *concept* or notion, arising from Aristotle’s *noema* (via the Arabic), but literally means a stretching (which led Anscombe to claim a parallel between stretching a bow and one’s mind to aim at something). The *intentio* is the object that is before the mind and at which it aims.
- There are now two senses of *concept*, the logical and psychological. Concepts are what logical relations hold between as well as being components of states of mind. To mediaeval philosophers, first intentions were concepts that applied to particular objects, while second intentions applied to first intentions and were thought by some to be the subject matter of logic. Aquinas was interested in concepts in the psychological sense, developing Aristotle’s view that the mind takes on the form of the perceived object. According to Aquinas, the very same thing – the occurrence of the form of a goat – makes your thought of a goat a thought of a goat as makes a goat a goat. There are different instantiations of the form – *esse naturale* (the goat) and *esse intentionale* (the thought of the goat).
- *Objects*. Descartes distinguishes (in the Third Meditation) between formal and objective reality, arguing that a cause must have as much reality as its effects by distinguishing between the formal reality of the cause of an idea and the idea’s objective reality. Formal reality is just reality, whereas objective reality is confusingly the content of the idea, considered as an idea. The objective reality of an idea is its intentionality, what it is about.
- Hobbes rejected intentionality along with everything else Scholastic.
- Port Royal Logic distinguished between the extension of a term – the class to which the term applies – and its comprehension – what is understood by someone who understands it.
- Leibniz used *intension* instead of *comprehension*. The more general a term – the larger its extension – the less specific the intension. The more general idea has fewer degrees of reality.
- Today, *intensional* and *extensional* apply to contexts within languages. A context is *extensional* if two principles of inference – (1) substitution of co-refering terms and (2) existential generalisation – apply. If either of these principles fails, the context is intensional. Crane gives examples of (1) – beliefs about George Orwell not necessarily applying to Eric Blair – but examples of (2) are held over until the next section. Extensional contexts are those in which truth or falsehood depends solely on the extensions of the expressions involved, while in an intensional context truth or falsehood depends on how the extensions are conceived.
- Frege distinguished the *reference* of an expression from the *sense*, the mode of presentation of the reference; eg. the same man Orwell is presented (referenced)

---

9 Why? Think this through.
10 So, what makes a goat a goat is the form of the goat, and this is just what makes a thought of a goat a thought of a goat.
11 Re-read, and note this in my cross-references document.
by the senses of either George Orwell or Eric Blair. There can be logical as well as psychological intensional contexts – modal operators can be intensional; logical properties in intensional contexts are sensitive to the way they are described. Logics that account for this are called intensional logics.

- Brentano distinguished psychology from physiology and philosophy by its subject matter (mental phenomena vs the body vs abstruse questions). Mental phenomena differ from physical phenomena because they exhibit “the intentional inexistence of an object”; mental phenomena are intentional – they have objects.
- Chisholm and Quine seem to have muddled up what Brentano had to say, which was that mental phenomena are irreducibly intentional, not that intensional language is irreducible to extensional.
- The conflation of intentionality with intensionality has led to nothing but confusion. Contra Chisholm, intensionality cannot be a sufficient criterion for the presence of intentionality since there are intensional contexts that have nothing to do with intentionality.
- Crane isn’t defending the irreducibility of intentional phenomena to physical phenomena, since one could hold that all mental phenomena are physical. Instead, he claims that what makes them mental is their intentionality.

5. **Directedness and Intentional Objects**

- *Intensionality* does have relevance to the mind since it relates to reasoning – how concepts relate to one another – which is a mental activity. It is still, however, important to distinguish it from *intentionality*.
- *Directedness* is the idea that intentional states have objects. Searle’s view is that these objects are objects like any other, not shadowy intermediates that come between the world and the mind, and have no peculiar ontological status at all.
- Crane, while in broad agreement where the thing thought about is a physical thing, thinks there are two problems with Searle’s view.
  1. Some objects of thought – eg. the 1st World War – are events, not things in the ordinary sense.
  2. Other objects of thought – eg. Pagasus – do not exist.
- Hence, Crane denies that intentional objects are ordinary objects in any sense.
- Crane distinguishes between *substantial* objects and *schematic* objects. The former can be physical objects or abstract objects (such as numbers). The latter are such as *objects of attention* or *grammatical objects*, neither of which have any particular nature but simply occupies a certain position or stands in a certain relation.
- One could argue that intentional objects are substantial – Searle’s rejected shadowy intermediaries – such as *ideas in our minds* or *representations in our heads*. While Crane admits that when we think about ideas, then ideas are the intentional objects of our thoughts. However, when we think of (say) *people*, the person, not the idea of the person, is the intentional object – though again, he

---

12 We need examples – look up in *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*.
13 What does this mean? See the beginning of §8, where “intentional inexistence” is defined as “the existence of the intentional object in the state of mind itself”.
14 So, what’s the issue?
15 Need an example.
16 *Peculiar* is an ambiguous word – Crane himself thinks that intentional objects have no *particular* status, and this (rather than *odd*) is the sense Searle may mean (like “peculiar people” in the AV sense).
admits that ideas may be part of what enables us to think about them (discussed further in §8). Consequently Crane agrees with Searle in rejecting the substantial interpretation of intentional objects.

- However, Crane differs from Searle in thinking that intentional objects, while admittedly not shadowy intermediaries, are not thereby objects in the ordinary sense. They don’t belong to any metaphysically unified category, may not exist, and can be indeterminate. The latter thought is due to Anscombe (“The Intentionality of Sensation”) who claims (contra Russell in “On Denoting”) that in thinking of “a man” I need not think of a man of any particular height

  17 So, intentional objects, unlike abstract objects, have no nature of their own, and are schematic rather than substantial objects. He quotes Jerry Valberg to the effect that we can replace “object” by “thing” in the phrase “physical object”, but not in the phrases “object of experience”, “object of attention” or “intentional object”.

- Anscombe – in the above classic paper – first made the connection between intentional and grammatical objects. Crane, while accepting the analogy, doesn’t accept that intentional objects are grammatical direct objects.

- So, Crane – rather uninformatively – says that an intentional object is what a thought is about; that on which the mind is directed when in an intentional state, (though he points out that there is no reason to think that there is only ever one intentional object of a state of mind).

- Crane’s primary reason for denying that intentional objects form a kind of objects is that they may not exist. In this, he accepts Quine’s thesis that to be a thing is to exist. This provides the link with the second characteristic intensionality, namely existential generalisation. From “Vladimir thinks that Pegasus flies”, we cannot deduce that “there is some x such that Vladimir thinks that x flies”.

- Not all intensional states – for instance knowledge – uncontroversially display a failure of existential generalisation; if I know or see someone, they must exist. Similarly for certain kinds of object-directed emotions – such as love – and certain kinds of belief-reports (believing that x is a spy entails the existence of x). There is disagreement about knowledge, which may be a composite of a thought about something combined with its existence

  19 I’m not clear what this means.

- There are two views on directedness: (1) that there are two kinds of directedness – the intensional and the extensional – and (2) that these are just two ways of reporting or describing directedness. Crane prefers the latter view.

6. Aspectual Shape and Intentional Content

- The basic idea of aspectual shape – a term taken from Searle – is that in any intentional state, the objects on which the mind is directed are presented in a certain way. This is similar to visual perception, where things are perceived under a certain aspect.

- One cannot think of something without thinking of it in a certain way. Crane describes Frege’s theory of sense as the mode of presentation of the reference, and Gareth Evans’ explanation that in order to understand utterances containing a
singular term in a language, one must think of its reference in a particular way, as must every other competent user of the language.

- It’s important to note that the aspect is not a shadowy intermediary that is itself presented, but just the mode of presentation of the real thing, the reference. One’s thoughts of the object are still direct.
- Crane seems to suggest that one can become aware of the aspect of presentation – the way someone is looking at you – which then itself has aspectual shape.
- So, it scarcely makes sense to talk of a “bare” presentation of an object.
- Crane quotes Frege’s “Moon and telescope” passage from *On Sense and Reference*, in which Frege distinguishes three things – the sense of a term, its reference, and the idea associated with the term. The moon itself represents the reference, the image within the telescope the sense and the retinal image the idea. For Frege, ideas are individual and private whereas senses are public, because the particular perspective of the sense can be shared. This is Frege’s anti-psychologism about sense.
- Frege’s example is subject to misunderstanding, because it looks as though there’s a more direct “naked eye” view of the moon, but the point of aspectual shape is that there is no such thing as a “pure reference”, so the “naked eye” view is just another standpoint.
- Crane doesn’t want to commit himself to Frege’s anti-psychologism, and his lack of place for intentional objects. While following Frege in some respects, he doesn’t use Frege’s terminology in describing the phenomenon of aspectual shape, since it’s wrong to describe it in ways that make certain accounts of it impossible.
- Aspectual shape links in with intensionality. Crane’s example is of my belief that Napoleon died on St. Helena: substitution of co-referring expressions doesn’t always preserve the truth-value of a belief reports, or reports of other intentional states. Eg. If I’m sufficiently ignorant, I might not believe that “the ex-husband of Josephine died on an island in the Atlantic”.
- Crane repeats that there are two ways of reporting intentional states – the intensional and the extensional – not two kinds of intentional state. Oedipus wanted to marry his mother: this is an example of a true statement that doesn’t attempt to capture the subject’s perspective (he wouldn’t have expressed it that way himself). The intensional ascriptions of intentional states are those that are sensitive to the subject’s own perspective.
- Crane recognises the complexity of the link between intensionality and intensionality. Intensionality is neither necessary nor sufficient for intentionality, though this doesn’t imply that there are intentional states that lack aspectual shape:

(1) The failure of existential generalisation reflects the fact that the objects of some intentional states may not exist.
(2) The failure of substitutivity expresses the aspectual shape of intensional states.

There are exceptions, however:

(1) Some ascriptions of intentional states do guarantee the existence of their object.
(2) Some ascriptions of intentional states don’t care about the subject’s perspective.
7. **The Problem of Intentionality**

- Intensional objects are schematic rather than substantial, are not _things_ and do not form a metaphysical kind.
- In the case where the thought is about something that exists, Crane distinguishes between intensional objects and real objects themselves (“Carter-as-thought-about” vs “Carter”). Carter would be unaffected even if I’d never thought about him.
- Crane allows intentional objects not to exist (in the case where intentional states are about things that don’t exist). Searle, on the other hand, allows some intentional states not to have objects. Crane rejects Searle’s view because it doesn’t account for what makes such states _intentional_ – what can they be _about_ without an intentional object? Crane thinks that _thing thought about, object of thought and intentional object_ are of a piece, and that we can’t do without the first two, so must have the third.
- There is no such thing as the class of intentional objects, since the members of a class must exist. Consequently, not all intentional states are relations to intentional objects, since the relata in a relation must exist.
- There is a complication in fiction. “Desdemona loves Othello” is a disguised statement about the fiction itself … “In Shakespeare’s _Othello_ …”.
- The _problem of intentionality_ is this problem of the relation between things, some of which might not exist. Crane denies the first of the following propositions but thinks the other two undeniable:
  1. All thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things the thoughts are about (7).
  2. Relations entail the existence of their relata (4).
  3. Some thoughts are about things that don’t exist (4).
- Proposition (3) is obvious – but note that thoughts aren’t about the _idea_ of the object. The idea of God exists even if God doesn’t.
- Proposition (2) has been denied. Some deny Quine’s thesis that there are no things that do not exist; of the things there are, some exist and others do not. There are, on this view, real things that do not exist _– there are_ quantifies over non-existent objects.
- The denial of (2) gives a simple and elegant solution to the problem of intentionality, so why not accept its denial? Real ≠ existent, so we always have a real object of an intentional state. Crane himself uses the expression that some things don’t exist. We also use the term “object” of non-physical things such as mental or abstract objects.
- Crane agrees with Russell that logic – being concerned with the real world – can no more admit a unicorn than can zoology. The Quine-Russell view is that “exists” is a quantifier, not a first-level predicate; but Crane thinks this implausible that “exists” is never a predicate (Crane gives no argument, just a reference to Evans’ _The Varieties of Reference_, Ch. 10)\(^21\). We have to get our minds around two categories of real objects – the existent and the non-existent. Both lions and unicorns have four legs and a tail, yet one exists and the other

---

\(^21\) Look this up.
doesn’t. Either existence is a primitive property, or subject to further analysis (eg. it is restricted to existence in space-time). Neither approach is promising.

• Crane isn’t aware of any plausible knock-down refutation of non-existent objects, though we are referred to David Lewis’ clarification in Allism and noneism. Crane rejects the view that there are non-existent objects, though he cannot refute it.

• But, hasn’t Crane said that some intentional objects don’t exist? Yes, but he doesn’t mean by this that there are some real, but non-existent, intentional objects. Rather, that an intentional state can be “about unicorns”, without there being anything corresponding to the quoted words, which have no reference.

• Crane gives a reason for why he insists on there being intentional objects in all cases, even those that don’t exist. Thoughts about Zeus and about Pegasus are not the same, which they would be if they were both about “nothing”. What makes the ideas different? Crane uses the notion of intentional object to express this – it being the response to the question “what are you thinking about” – Zeus in one case, Pegasus in another.

• Given that there can be objects of thought that don’t exist, are these objects real? If they are, we can have all thoughts as relations to their objects, but at the cost of admitting the reality of non-existent objects. The other horn of the dilemma would make all such thoughts indistinguishably about nothing and thoughts cannot consist in relations to them. However, if the thought is about an existing thing, then the intentional object is something real.

• So, (1) must be false, because intentional objects are not, as such, things. So, the following must be true:

NOT-(1): Not all thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things the thoughts are about.

… though some thoughts may involve relations.

Externalism: some intentional states are broad – some thoughts are relations to existing objects.

Internalism: all intentional states are narrow – no thoughts involve relations to the real things they are about.

• Possible examples of broad mental states: knowledge, seeing, thoughts about perceived objects (“that F is a G”), thoughts metaphysically dependent on causal relations between thinker and object. Knowledge is a factive state, entailing that the content of the state expresses a truth.

• The Internalist view doesn’t deny that thoughts are often about real things. He only that being in an intentional state always entails the existence of the thing it is about. A thought is narrow when it doesn’t entail the existence of its object.

---

22 Unicorns exist in the culture; Sherlock Holmes exists in Conan-Doyle’s novels (and Sherlock “may exist in the culture). Physical things exist in space-time. Note that it’s not the ideas that we’re claiming exist – the idea of a unicorn has no legs.

23 Why no the latter?

24 Look this up.

25 Note that the quotes are in the right place. The point isn’t that unicorns don’t exist, but that the intentional object of a thought about unicorns doesn’t exist.

26 Ie. the relation is only to their intentional contents [see the end of this chapter] (not to intentional objects, which may not exist). (ie. to Frege’s senses?). Check this out!

27 Otherwise, we would only have false belief, not knowledge.

28 Crane often slips in “thing”, while seeming to agree that “thing” implies “existence”.

theo@theotodman.com 07/07/2003 Page 10 of 71
“This apple looks tasty” doesn’t entail the existence of the apple, according to the internalist. The thought is not a relation to the apple.

- To make sense of narrow thoughts we need (a) that there can be a thought without any real thing thought about and (b) that the existence of the thinker and the thing thought about (the apple) doesn’t entail a relation between them of thinking. Internalism distinguishes between (i) whether a real thing is the object of a thought and (ii) whether the existence of that thing is essential to the thought. If it is possible to have a thought in the absence of its object, then the thought is not broad, but this doesn’t imply the actual thought has no object.

- Crane points out a different problem of intentionality – that of giving an account of it in physicalist terms, which presupposes the truth of physicalism. Crane’s problem doesn’t take a stand on physicalism.

- There are three solutions to Crane’s problem of thought about the non-existent that Crane has considered, yet found none entirely satisfactory. (a) Deny that such thought is possible. (b) Assert that it is only possible if there exists a realm of non-existent objects. (c) Deny that all intentional states are relations to real things. Crane supports (c).

8. The Structure of Intentionality

- Crane summarises his new terminology. Since, according to intentionalism, all mental states have directedness and aspectual shape, all mental states have correspondingly intentional objects and intentional content.

- Crane quotes from Brentano – Crane agrees that four terms Brentano uses are the same way of saying the same thing:
  (a) intentional inexistence
  (b) relation to a concept
  (c) direction upon an object
  (d) immanent objectivity.

  By (a) Brentano means the existence of the intentional object in the state of mind itself. This doesn’t mean that all we think about are mental entities in our minds, but that the object individuates the state of mind – different intentional object, different state of mind. (d) derives from the Cartesian “objective reality” – the mental state’s having an object is immanent in the state itself. All four just refer to the fact that mental states have intentional objects, which is Brentano’s thesis that Crane defends in this book, since Brentano doesn’t distinguish between (i) relation to a content and (ii) direction upon an object.

- Brentano’s student Kazimir Twardowski did form this distinction, which is required because:

---

29 Is Object used ambiguously here, as real object and intentional object? No! We’re talking about a thought with a real object (an apple), but it would be the same thought (?) even if the apple was an illusion. In that case, the intentional object (the apple; as presented with aspectual shape) doesn’t exist.

30 Is Crane an Internalist? No … because of NOT-(1).

31 With whom? What’s Brentano saying?

32 What about intentional objects that don’t exist?

33 This seems to ignore aspectual shape, which ought also to be involved in individuation? No – because the object has aspectual shape.

34 I’m not sure how useful Crane’s excursions into Brentano exegesis are, since he admits that he doesn’t share his metaphysical assumptions! Also, what’s the consequence of Brentano’s failure to make this distinction?
(a) there are many ways a mind can be directed on an intentional object (so directedness isn’t enough), and

(b) aspectual shape isn’t enough because by definition it is an aspect under which the intentional object is presented.

- It is a confusion to ask which of the object or content is to be ascribed to an intentional state, since verbalising the intentional state needs to be done in a particular way. In saying what the reference is, we have to choose a particular way of saying it (Dummett on Frege). Using words to give the intentional object also gives away the contents of your state of mind. Example of “that charming restaurant in Capri” – giving the content also gives the object.

- This doesn’t mean intentional objects are redundant, because there are many ways of thinking about the same thing. Example of “Bratislava” and “Pozsony”, where we know how to establish the truth of the identity statement “Bratislava” = “Pozsony”. Problems arise where the intentional object doesn’t exist (as in Geach’s example of villagers thinking of the “same” witch). Crane isn’t worried – there’s no reason to think there’s any fact of the matter, and all we have to go on is sameness of words. It’s only when the intentional object does exist that there’s a decision procure.

- Crane’s use of “content” is broader than in much contemporary philosophy, which takes content to be propositional – something that’s capable of being true or false. However, “St. Petersburg” isn’t true or false, and the orthodox view would be to construe all intentional states as propositional attitudes – ie. to reconstrue thoughts about St. Petersburg in propositional form as “St. Petersburg is F”.

- While agreeing that many intentional states are propositional, Crane rejects the view that all are. Prima facie, loving or hating someone, or contemplating or thinking about an object are paradigm cases of non-propositional intentional attitudes.

- Even giving the content of an intentional state doesn’t fully individuate it, for we may both imagine and remember our restaurant. The states of mind differ despite having the same content. Crane’s thesis was:

Subject $\rightarrow$ Directedness/Presentation $\rightarrow$ Object/Content

We need to distinguish between different kinds of presentation or directedness (which are the converse of one another). Crane borrows the term intentional modes from Searle, warning us not to confuse this with Frege’s mode of presentation, which will hereafter be ignored.

- Because we don’t need to mention the intentional object if we’ve mentioned the intentional content, we can therefore re-describe the general structure of intentionality, which Crane will hereafter assume, as:

Subject $\rightarrow$ Intentional Mode $\rightarrow$ Content

- Intentional modes are the relations one stands in to the contents of one’s intentional states. Examples are propositional attitudes such as belief and hope, as well as other intentional modes such as desire, thought, intention, perception, love,
fear, regret, pity, … So, a person’s intentional state is individuated by two things – the intentional mode and the intentional content, the latter fixing the intentional object.

- So, intentionality does have a relational structure – not as a relation to objects of thought (let alone intentional objects, which may not exist) but to intentional contents. The content of an intentional state must always exist. Crane argues as follows: the intentional object of a thought is what the thought is about, which may not exist. So, sometimes what you are thinking about is, strictly speaking, nothing. However, it makes no sense to say that the content of a thought is nothing – we can distinguish between what someone is thinking about, which may not exist, and what someone is thinking, which must. One can be thinking about nothing (the object) but not be thinking nothing (the content).

- We can’t say that, in a sense, Pegasus exists because the idea of Pegasus exists because, since our Napoleon-thoughts are not about the idea of Napoleon (but about Napoleon) so our Pegasus-thoughts are not about the idea of Pegasus. Ideas still have a role to play, but aren’t intentional objects. Ideas can be the contents, but not the objects, of one’s thoughts. As Anscombe said, it’s not right to say that X worshipped an idea, but it’s X’s having an idea that gives the proposition X worshipped Y a chance of being true.
Chapter 2 (Body)

9. Interaction between mind and body

- Few things are more obvious than that we are embodied beings. Crane quotes from Descartes’ *Sixth Meditation*[^38], to the effect that the mind is not like a pilot of a ship, intellectually noticing problems, but is intermingled with the body.
- Our relationship with our bodies is immediate and intimate. We have faculties of proprioception and kinesthesia so that we can sense our body’s position and changes in motion without having to look, though brain damage can cause these faculties to be lost.
- Despite Descartes’ insight about the intimate connection between mind and body, he is more famous for espousing dualism; that minds and bodies are separate entities that causally interact. This tension shows up in his thought – I am joined to my body, mind and body are mingled, yet mind and body form a single whole. The dualism denies the relationship that the phenomenological insight of bodily awareness asserts.
- How do mind and body interact? The first answer is “causally”, ie. mental states and events cause physical states and events in the brain, body and external world[^39]. This gives a problem for dualism, though to understand the problem we need to understand better what dualism is.

10. Substance, property, event

- A substance is a unified object, like a person or animal. It has properties (attributes, characteristics, qualities) distinct from it, of which it is the bearer and which belong to and inhere in it. There is a further distinction in 17th century philosophy between attributes and modes. For Descartes, extension is the characteristic attribute of material substance, and the way in which a particular piece of matter is extended is a mode, or modification, of extension.
- Dualism refers to the number of kinds of substance. Descartes thought that each mind was a separate substance, of the same kind, while there was only one extended substance, of a second kind.
- A particular is an unrepeatable, singular entity located at only one place at a particular time. Substances that are particulars (eg. tigers) persist through changes in their properties; things happen to them. Particular things that are not substances (eg. floods) are events and consist in changes to other things.
- A thing persists if it is wholly present at each moment of its existence. Floods are not wholly present, tigers are. It is an open question whether people are substances – some, such as Parfit and Lewis, have denied that persons are substances in the

[^38]: Add to cross-reference list, and review Descartes.
[^39]: And, similarly, physical events cause mental events.
[^40]: Independent of what?
sense considered here – but Crane doesn’t address the matter here, nor is he defending this stance\(^{41}\).

- The other key aspect of a substance is independent existence. A thing is a substance if it is independent of all other things\(^{42}\). According to Descartes, a mind is independent of all other minds and bodies. Only Spinoza took dependence on God to its logical conclusion by positing only one substance, both numerically and of kind.

- According to Descartes, while mind and body are as a matter of fact joined in a **substantial union**, they *could* exist separately.

- Some monists are close to dualism in holding that monism is a *contingent* truth; i.e. that while, in point of fact, there is only one sort of thing, there are possible worlds in which there could be two, with minds and bodies separated. Crane notes that the problem is not with one or two but with **thing**\(^{43}\).

- There are two alternatives:
  1. The monist can deny that disembodied minds are possible, and monism is not contingent, or
  2. The monist can allow there to be possible worlds in which a mind like mine is disembodied, but deny that such a mind would be *me*, since *I* am essentially embodied. So, while any embodied mind cannot become disembodied, the idea of a disembodied being is a metaphysical possibility.

- Descartes didn’t hold that minds are made of one kind of **stuff** and bodies of another because, for him, while bodies are divisible, minds are not (and being made of stuff implies divisibility).

- For Descartes, beliefs and desires are modes of the mental attribute of thought, while emotions and sensory perceptions are attributable only to the substantial union of mind and body.

- We can ignore the calumny (eg. Churchland’s) that dualists believe that minds are formed of some ghostly ectoplasm about which we know nothing, since no significant philosopher has held this view.

- Cartesian substance dualism is contrasted with property dualism – that there are two sorts of properties, mental and physical, even though they are properties of one substance. There are two forms:
  1. **Strawson**: the human body or person is the substance
  2. **Nagel**, etc: all substances are physical, but some have mental properties in addition to their physical ones. The mind is\(^{44}\) the brain, but what makes the brain the mind is its mental properties.

- Crane distinguishes between mental **events**, which take time and are dateable, and mental **states** (otherwise referred to as *states of affairs, or facts*).

- Mental **events or acts** are happenings, such as feeling a pain or noticing something or forming a judgement. Mental **states**, like beliefs, are not events and have no temporal parts. Events *have* properties, though they are basic particulars that cannot be further analysed; states *are* properties.

---

\(^{41}\) But see the antepenultimate bullet in this section. Also, it seems odd to say off hand that tigers are substances, yet leave it doubtful whether persons are.

\(^{42}\) Crane also mentions the Aristotelian notion of substances having existential priority over their properties which are instantiated in them. Crane notes that this is not a good modern model as it denies the possibility of uninstantiated properties. Look this up sometime – what *are* they?

\(^{43}\) OK … but what does this mean?

\(^{44}\) What sort of “is”? The “is” of constitution?
Events are distinguished from objects by having temporal parts. Many objects, like people\(^45\), are substances and are wholly present throughout each moment of their existence.

Crane also assumes the existence of universal properties, but remains neutral on whether processes are more than the events that make them up, or whether *tropes* (particularised properties) exist in addition to universals.

The important question is whether any form of dualism can explain the causal interaction of mind and body. It turns out, Crane says, that while the different forms of dualism have different problems, the only real problems for substance dualism are problems for property dualism as well. Hence, the particular form of dualism is not so important, though Crane considers substance dualism first.

11. **The ‘intelligibility’ of mental causation**

There are three possible problem areas with substance dualism that might make mental causation unintelligible:

1. the physical world,
2. mental phenomena, and
3. the causal link itself.

Crane rejects the third option. By referring to mental or psychophysical causation we are talking of something very general – that of mental things making things happen in the physical world. What “making things happen” means, at this level of generality, is answered by a theory of causation, though such theories do not explain the particular mechanisms involved. A couple of alternatives are:

1. counterfactual theories; A causes B just in case B wouldn’t have happened without A, or
2. probabilistic theories; A’s occurrence increases the chance of B’s.

If we find difficulty where A is mental and B is physical, it is not on account of the theory of causation but because of some philosophical concerns about A and B themselves.

Crane notes an exception to this presumption that the particular theory of causation is unproblematical for mental causation. This is if the theory treats causation as a flow of physical energy, for if this theory is correct and minds are not physical, then mental causation is impossible. To escape from the difficulty we must assume either that minds are physical or that there is mental energy (Crane finds the latter idea unattractive).

Fodor\(^46\) addresses both possible remaining problem areas for dualism – the mental and the physical. He makes two points:

1. A non-physical mind has no location in space, so how can it give rise to an effect that does? This is a problem to do with the mind.
2. How can the non-physical give rise to the physical without violating the conservation laws? This is a problem to do with the physical.

Or, so says Crane.

In response to Fodor, Crane agrees that Descartes would indeed hold that the mind has no extension, nor is it located at a dimensionless point.

\(^45\) This seems to ignore Crane’s fence-sitting earlier in this section!

\(^46\) Fodor just seems to pop in from nowhere! Look up the context!
• Why is lack of location a problem? Because causation implies temporal sequencing, and we can’t have location in time without location in space. An object or event must occupy a place in space-time. In addition, why would something located in time but not space cause something to happen where it does, rather than somewhere else – why should my mind move my body rather than someone else’s? Physical causation is either proximate (the ball hitting the window) or, if at a distance, mediated by a force or field that is spatially located. The problem arises from the combination of an uncontroversial claim about causation and a controversial thesis about the mind, that it has no location.

• Crane points out that we are not forced to adopt the view that the mind – mental substance – has no location. The idea of substance simply refers to the possibility of independent existence. Mental because it has mental but no physical properties. If a mental substance can occupy the same space as a physical one, this first objection of Fodor’s to mental causation would disappear.

• Crane doesn’t hold such a substance-dualist view, but used it to show that Fodor’s objection is to a particular form of substance-dualism, that involving non-spatiality. So, making sense of a spatial form of substance dualism would defeat Fodor’s first attack.

• However, this first point is not required if Fodor’s second attack is correct; namely, that physical causation by non-physical substance would violate the laws of physics. In that case it doesn’t matter what sort of non-physical substance we consider; nor, says Crane, whether we consider substance or property dualism. If Fodor’s second argument is correct, any form of dualism fails if the laws of physics are not false.

• Fodor’s second objection, of dualist mental events causing physical events, is not that the very idea is unintelligible, as in the first objection, but that it is inconsistent with other things that we know. So, with what known law of physics is dualistic mental causation incompatible?

12. **Physics and physicalism**

• Dualism – that there are two (kinds of) things – is contrasted with monism; idealism or materialism.

• Modern philosophers refer to physicalism rather than materialism. Often physicalism is used as a synonym for materialism, but Crane thinks there is, in the case of mental causation, an instructive distinction to be made.

• Contemporary monists, unlike Spinoza, say that the world is made of one sort of thing, rather than is a single substance. In the case of materialists this thing is matter, in the case of idealists, ideas; though Russell’s neutral monism was unsure which.

• Fodor wants to contrast materialist monism with physicalism. The former seems to be false, because the world is composed of forces, waves, fields and such like that are not matter. A physicalist, on the other hand, gives an authority role to physics, both epistemological authority in telling us what to believe and ontological authority in telling us what there is. Physics aims at what Quine calls full coverage of the properties and behaviour of anything that has spatio-temporal position, using its quantitative techniques and categories of force, mass, etc. The

---

47 He doesn’t point out here Descartes’ view (raised earlier) of the mind being intermingled with the body.
generality of physics claims that all objects and events in space-time have physical properties and that their behaviour is described or governed by the laws of physics. Physicalism is an extension of the monist principle of the generality of physics in claiming that this is the whole story.

- The whole story does not just mean full coverage but is a doctrine about causation, that everything physical that happens (or is an effect) is a result of purely physical causes in accord with physical law. According to Papineau, the completeness of physics states that every physical event has a physical cause which, given the laws of physics, is sufficient to bring it about.
- This doesn’t mean that physics is complete as a science, just that physical causes (were we to know them all) are sufficient to bring about physical effects.
- A yet stronger claim is the explanatory adequacy of physics. According to David Lewis, this is the claim that there is a body of scientific theories similar to those currently accepted that provides a true and exhaustive account of all physical phenomena. These theories are hierarchical and cumulative, resting on a few simple laws of particle physics similar to those currently accepted by theoretical physics.
- We may reject this latter claim on the reasonable grounds that the special sciences have their own vocabularies and explanatory domains that neither can be nor need be reduced to physics-talk. However, the explanatory autonomy of biology, say, is compatible with both the generality of physics and with the completeness of physics. This is because, on the one hand, biological interactions take place among things with physical properties and do not break the laws of physics and, on the other, biological occurrences have physical causal histories that fix their occurrence.
- According to the completeness of physics, all that is required to explain all the physical effects in the universe are the initial conditions and the laws of nature.
- This seems to imply determinism – that if the history of the universe were replayed it would repeat identically. However, this is not the case, as the laws of physics can be probabilistic, as contemporary physics suggests. In this case a replay does not imply an identical history. Determinism or indeterminism is independent of the question of the completeness of physics. The completeness of physics ought strictly to be expressed as in Papineau as that every physical event is determined, or has its chance determined, by purely physical causes in accord with physical law.
- What physicalism, or the completeness of physics, comes down to depends on the meaning of physical. Crane has treated it as defined by the scope of science aiming at full coverage. Thus, what the physical is like is an empirical matter, unlike the old materialism, which had a relatively a priori view of the properties of matter which modern physics has shown to be incorrect in almost every respect.
- So, is the content of physicalism open ended? This notion is problematical, whether fixed by contemporary physics or some ideal future physics, since in the first case it is false and in the second, empty.
- Physicalism’s response is that we should commit ourselves only to the existence of a particular kind of thing, that which physics says there is. As physics advances our metaphysical commitments may change, but we have no standard other than physics for deciding what exists.
- This view restricts what physicalists should permit themselves to deny – eg. in denying the existence of ghosts or the paranormal. If, as seems somewhat
unlikely, irreducible ghosts or telekinesis came to be seen as essential to explain the phenomena, then they would be absorbed into the ranks of the physical. While physicalists can rightly ignore these possibilities, this view does leave the physical rather open-ended, since we can’t say a priori what the physical is.

- Physicalists think of their doctrine as substantial and informative, so alternative definitions such that the physical is what exists in space and time, or that is causal, can be ruled out since they would make physicalism trivially true even of a substance-dualist position.

- The completeness of physics allows physicalists to make metaphysical claims so that physicalism is not to be empty of content. Physics as it is likely to remain attempts explanations of things in terms of dynamical equations and a limited number of concepts such as force and charge. The metaphysical generalisation of this is the completeness of physics.

- The completeness of physics is essential to physicalism, which allows physics a unique ontological and epistemological position. To deny it is to claim that there could be causes that are not the subject of physical science.

- Getting back to Fodor’s second objection to mental causation of the physical, his point was that it would violate conservation laws. Seen as an expression of the completion of physics, the reason is that any physical effect must have a physical cause, and consequently that any mental causation would have to introduce more energy into the world, so violating the conservation laws.

13. The problem of mental causation for dualists

- The completeness of physics is not a sufficient condition for physicalism, as it allows epiphenominalism, the doctrine that mental states and properties exist but have no causative effects. Be this as it may, the dualist positions we are considering are interactionist.

- The problem with mental causation for dualists is overdetermination. If the physical is sufficient to bring about physical effects, what does the mental add? Causal overdetermination arises where an effect has two causes, each of which would have sufficed on its own to bring about the effect (so overdetermination is to be distinguished from an effect having several causes each of which independently would have been insufficient to produce the effect).

- Overdetermination does not make sense to those committed to a counterfactual view of causation – that A can only be a cause of B if ¬A ⊃ ¬B. Crane considers the case of a victim being killed by two independent assassins.

- Crane thinks that even if overdetermination is possible in the multi-assassin case, and the counterfactual analysis of causation is strictly false, an overdeterministic account of mental causation is unlikely to be correct. Bodily co-ordination would be extraordinary if each time a mental cause of a movement arose, a physical brain event simultaneously arose to cause the same effect. This is in conflict with all we know about the causation of behaviour from experience and common sense\(^\text{48}\).

- From the above we can deduce that it’s the completion of physics that brings about the mind-body problem, not something to do with the mental.

\(^{48}\) Though Leibniz seems to have been happy with it, with his pre-established harmony (and Spinoza similarly).
• So far we’ve assumed substance dualism, but the same problems arise for property dualism where the mental properties are assumed to be causatively efficacious. For all we have assumed is that mental phenomena have physical effects and that these mental causes are distinct from the physical causes of the same effects, and these assumptions, together with the completeness of physics, are what give rise to the problem.

• So adopting the weaker property dualism does not solve the mind-body problem. What would solve it would be to adopt the identity theory of mental and physical causes, that mental causes are identical with physical causes. Mental causes are the same entities as physical causes, doubtless in the brain. Is this once dominant identity theory of mind and brain plausible independently of its solving of the problem of overdetermination?

14. The identity theory

• The identity theory as presented so far only identifies with brain states those mental entities with physical causative properties. On this basis, mental epiphenomena would have no reason to be identified with physical entities. However, most physicalists hold that we know enough about mental phenomena to know that all mental states do have physical effects and so can rule out epiphenomenalism. This is guaranteed by functionalism, which says that mental phenomena are individuated by their causal roles. For functionalism, the concept of a mental state is a causal concept; eg. the concept of perception is of a state of mind typically caused by external objects and having effects such as beliefs in states of affairs. Since, for a functionalist, it is in the nature of mental states to have physical effects, epiphenomenalism is ruled out. This assertion, combined with the assumption of the completeness of physics and the denial of overdetermination gives the identity theory, or so some functionalists (Lewis and Armstrong) argue.

• There are two forms of identity theory, related to two views of causation:

1. Events: Davidson’s view is that causes and effects are events, kinds of particulars, which can be variously described while remaining the same.

2. Properties: Another view of causation holds that causes and effects have to be individuated in a more discriminating manner. We have to say just which properties of the brick were causally efficacious in making it break the window. This view is that properties (or facts, or sundry other variations on this theme) are causes, and that different causally efficacious properties count as different causes. So, a single event or object can have a number of properties, not all of which are efficacious in bringing about the same effect.

• The corresponding two forms of identity theory are:

1. Token (“event”, supported by Davidson). Token-identity theory is consistent with property dualism (events have two kinds of property, mental and physical), and

2. Type (“property”, supported by Armstrong and Lewis). Type-identity theory corresponds to property monism (there are only physical properties, some of which are mental)

• Crane’s view is that causes are properties, because when looking for causes we look for aspects of the situation which make a difference, and aspects are

49 Connect this with the relata of causation in Log&Met.

theo@theotodman.com 07/07/2003 Page 20 of 71
properties or qualities. In this he agrees with Hume, who said that what makes several different objects produce the same effect must be some common property. While events can be causes, this is because of some property they have. From now on, when Crane refers to the identity theory he means the type-identity theory.\footnote{I’d thought that Putnam’s arguments (octopus pain) had put paid to type-type identity theories, so is this a variation on a theme?}

- When the identity theory says that a mental state is identical to some physical state it must be taken seriously. It doesn’t deny the existence of mental states any more than saying “Cicero = Tully” denies that either Cicero or Tully exist. The identity claim is just that they are the very same thing.
- The identity claim is sometimes understood as though the mental (properties or things) is “really” “nothing over and above” the physical, but this is misleading if it can be taken to mean that something is being left out, as though the mental was not self-standing but depended\footnote{Is this supervenience? The point is that, with “really” terminology, we might have not identity, but rather the supervenience of ineliminable mental properties on physical properties in ways that make the mental irreducible to the physical. That is, the mental still can’t stand alone, but is still something over and above the physical so that if we just look at the physical, we’re missing something out. This situation might be true, but it’s not physicalism!} on the physical. Crane thinks it best to avoid the question whether Tully is “really” Cicero.
- The identity theory\footnote{These are Crane’s exact words, which require further pondering! Presumably he’s trying to point out that the identity theory doesn’t make the weaker claim that non-physical things do exist, but underneath it all they are “really” physical.} does deny the existence of mental substances as conceived by the substance-dualist and of mental properties as conceived by the property-dualist, but this does not, in contrast to eliminative physicalism, involve denying the existence of the mental. This latter view is that classifying things as mental is a fundamental mistake. Both theories claim that all the things there are are physical, but eliminative physicalism denies that any physical things are also mental.
- Identity theories are reductive, but this is distinct from elimination. The reduction of genes to DNA does not deny the existence of genes but the elimination of caloric or phlogiston does deny their respective existence.

15. \textbf{Reductionism}

- The identity theory says, not that non-physical things are really physical, but that insofar as it appears that there are non-physical things, these things are physical\footnote{I keep wanting to add “really” before “physical” as warned against by Crane!}. So, the reduction is to demonstrate in what way these non-physical things are physical\footnote{Where? Also, supply quotations for other authors significant enough for Crane to quote.}. We have to be careful in our understanding of the term reduction. It is not like cookery, where a sauce is reduced in quantity. Either a thing is the other thing or it is not: nothing is really something else.
- According to Huw Price\footnote{Where? Also, supply quotations for other authors significant enough for Crane to quote.}, a reduction identifies the entities of one domain with a sub-class of the entities of another. A reduction starts off with a target entity X and finds a reason for identifying it with Y. It tells us something we didn’t know before about X; namely, that it is Y. The standard reductive example from physics is the reduction, by identification, of the temperature of a gas to the mean kinetic energy of its molecules.
- While ontologically, a reduction of A to B involves A=B, this does not exhaust the idea of reduction, for identity is a symmetrical relation while reduction is not,
and there are many identity claims that are not usefully talked of as reductions. What is required is that the reduced phenomenon is made more intelligible by the reducing phenomenon. Just as we understand thermodynamical phenomena better by showing they are identical to mechanical activity, so (it is said) we understand mental properties better by being shown that they are identical with physical properties of the brain.

- Crane points out the distinction between an ontological reduction and an explanatory reduction. The reductive virtues so far examined are explanatory, showing how one theory explains what’s going on in another.
- We can have ontological reduction without explanatory reduction, and vice versa. An example of the former is Davidson’s anomalous monism, where all mental events are held to be physical events, but with no explanatory link between the mental and physical theories. The latter is illustrated by non-reductive physicalism, to be discussed later in this chapter.
- Crane points out that the current climate of opinion in the philosophy of mind is anti-reductivist in principle, even when the distinction between reduction and elimination is made. This prejudice is a mistake if we are talking about explanatory reduction, as an explanatory reduction would involve an advance in knowledge.

16. Against the identity theory: anti-reductionism

- While the identity theory, conceived of as the ontological reduction of mind to body, solves the problem of causal interaction it is widely rejected on account of an argument due to Hillary Putnam. This is that the identity theory must state that two creatures in the same mental state must be in the same physical state. So, if two creatures (eg. Crane and an octopus) are in pain, they must share the same physical property, which is incredible given the number of different organisms and their various physical constitutions. The identity theory will collapse if we can find one state (eg. “is hungry”) in which the physical instantiation in one organism differs from that in another.
- Putnam claims not that the identity theory is impossible, just that it is empirically unlikely that parallel evolution all over the universe would always lead to the same physical correlate to a particular mental state. Putnam’s alternative thesis is that of variable/multiple realisation. Mental states are not identical to physical states but are realised by them, and this realisation is variable from creature to creature.
- There are various responses that identity theorists have made to Putnam. The first is to make mental states species-relative, ie. pain-for-octopuses. Another is that mental predicates are context-sensitive, so that “thinking of Vienna” is not the same for me as for you. A proper reduction of mind must await a taxonomy of mental states to be developed by empirical psychology.
- Crane thinks these are examples of special pleading.
  (1) While we might agree that pain might differ in humans and octopuses, what is common that makes both states pain? If it’s the functional role they play, then why not treat this common feature as pain? If all Putnam needs is one case where the common-sense classification does represent the sharing of a property and where there is variable realisation.
  (2) Putnam needs is one case where the common-sense classification does represent the sharing of a property and where there is variable realisation.

55 And so as requiring uniform physical realisation in all pain-receptive creatures.
• While Crane thinks there are further defences that the identity theorist can offer, he thinks that Putnam’s argument must be accepted. So, the identity theory is false and mental properties are not identical with physical properties. Since the only alternative is that they are distinct, property dualism must be true.  

• Property dualism is not Cartesian dualism and is consistent with non-reductive physicalism, which denies the ontological reduction of properties. Sometimes non-reductive physicalism is referred to, unhelpfully in Crane’s view, as a token identity theory, or token physicalism, in which mental and physical tokens (particulars) are identical even thought types (properties) are not. The token-identity claim can be held by someone who denies the completeness of physics (a necessary condition for physicalism) because all it requires is the denial of particulars without physical properties. The token-identity claim is simply monism rather than physicalism.

• So, a non-reductive version of physicalism must be committed to the completeness of physics. While rejecting the identity of mental and physical properties, it accepts that mental properties depend on physical properties of the brain and elsewhere. This dependence is often expressed in terms of supervenience. A supervenes on B where there is no change in A without a change in B. Aesthetic qualities supervene on physical ones – physical duplicates must be aesthetic duplicates.

• A non-reductive physicalist ought to accept supervenience, but this, augmented by the completeness of physics, isn’t sufficient; for, an epiphenomenalist substance-dualist might also hold this position. The major differences are:
  (1) The non-reductive physicalist asserts the causal efficacy of the mental which the epiphenomenalist denies, and
  (2) Mere supervenience is not a close enough connection between the mental and physical.

• Closeness is a vague concept but can be illustrated by considering constitution. A statue is constituted by the marble that it’s made of, and the relation is one of supervenience, yet the relationship is not of identity, as it is not symmetrical. However, while we understand constitution as it applies to particulars, what does it mean when applied to properties? Currently there is no consensus on what it would be for one property to constitute another, so Crane leaves this question aside.

• Crane points out that:
  (1) if we understood constitution as it applies to properties, and
  (2) if we had good reason to think that mental properties were constituted of physical properties, then
  (3) such an explanation of the supervenience of the mental on the physical would be part of what the physicalist wants.

---

56 So, the identity theory sounds like a good scientific theory (if it is a scientific theory) since it makes bold and potentially falsifiable predictions. That said, behaviour is no good, since robots can function as though in pain; and feelings are private. All we could go on to predicate similar feelings of pain would be similarity of instantiation. (This is a contentious point?).

57 He seems to have left out token-identity theories, rather hastily dismissed on grounds of causation. But, see immediately following re the terminological confusion.

58 Crane refers us to Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 60, for further arguments against the token-identity theory. Read it!

59 See Gibbard!

60 I’m not sure I understand all this.
However, supervenience is still not enough for non-reductive physicalism.

(4) But, we will have a physical explanation of supervenience if the supervenience can be shown to be consequence of some other physicalistic relations between mind and body. This is called Superdupervenience by Horgan\textsuperscript{61}, but Crane thinks it is an example of explanatory reduction. So, all versions of physicalism, even the so-called non-reductive version, are reductive in one sense, even if only explanatorily.

17. The problem of mental causation for non-reductive physicalism

- There’s a tension between the following statements:
  (1) Mental phenomena have effects in the physical world
  (2) All physical effects have physical causes that are sufficient to bring them about (= the completeness of physics)
  (3) Mental and physical causes don’t over-determine their physical effects
  (4) Mental causes are identical with physical causes
  (5) Properties are causes
  (6) Mental properties aren’t identical with physical properties.
- In the above, (4) resolves the over-determination problem, with (5) taking sides with the type-identity theorists, but this is undermined by non-reductive physicalism which proposes (6). Hence, if we want to retain (4) – which is the whole advantage of physicalism – one of the other 5 statements must go.
- Crane sees two possible strategies in response. (A) Detect equivocation in the claims. (B) Provide some extra assumption to make (1) – (3) and (5) – (6) consistent\textsuperscript{62}.
- Taking option (A) first, we can say the point is the kind of explanation. Physical explanations fit things into pre-understood patterns of nature. Mental explanations say why we do things. No conflict. Description of the flight of the cricket ball in physical terms and in terms of the bowler’s aims. So, we don’t need to identify the mental and physical entities as there’s no conflict\textsuperscript{63}. Crane agrees with the analysis, but says it’s irrelevant since we’re talking about causation and not explanation. The completeness of physics implies one special kind of cause, and if non-reductive physicalism rejects this it must reject the completeness of physics, which destroys physicalism.
- Another version of (A) is to tinker with the notion of cause. Either:
  (1) Distinguishing causal relevance from causal efficacy.
  (2) Claiming that mental causes “programme” their effects but without physical causation.
  (3) Treating mental events as structuring but not triggering causes.
Crane thinks tinkering with the notion of mental causation to solve the problem is merely ad hoc.
- Option (B) is more promising. Causation is taken for granted, but non-reductive physicalism is clarified by another claim – a supervenience thesis that the physical (given that it is as it is) metaphysically necessitates the mental. This is a fine distinction – Frank Jackson’s claim is that any physical duplicate of our world is a

\textsuperscript{61}Read Horgan.

\textsuperscript{62}I’d expected “(1) – (6) consistent”, so review this later to see whether this is what Crane means. The question is over (4), which seems to be the point of physicalism
\textsuperscript{63}This seems to reject (4) and be happy with (6).
duplicate *simpliciter*\(^{64}\). Given the way things are physically, the mental couldn’t be otherwise. This differs both from (a) the thesis that physicalism is a necessary truth and from (b) that which claims supervenience to be a contingent relation\(^{65}\).

- Crane describes how mental causation is addressed by treating causation as counterfactual dependence. Defining \(M = \text{mental cause}, E = \text{physical effect}, P = \text{physical cause}\), we have \(\neg M \supset \neg E\). Also, \(\neg P \supset \neg E\). Since M supervenes on P, we have \(\neg M \supset \neg P\).\(^{66}\) P *causally* determines E and *metaphysically* determines M. So, \(\neg M \supset \neg E\) *because* \(\neg M \supset \neg P\). There’s no overdetermination. Whenever a physical cause brings about an effect, a mental cause comes along for the ride.

- Since both identity and necessary supervenience are necessary relations, the mental cannot “float free” and vary independently of the physical, so the mental and physical act in harmony. Necessary supervenience can play the part of Horgan’s Superdupervenience.

- Crane has two objections to this. (a) Unlike identity, we have no good understanding of necessary metaphysical relations, which appear rather mysterious. (b) Metaphysical necessity rules out zombies – physical replicas without mental properties. We’d prefer a solution to the mental causation problem that didn’t involve this strong commitment.

### 18. Emergence

- Crane rejects both the identity theory and necessary supervenience.
- Crane also sidelines as incredible both epiphenomenalism – the denial of (1) – and overdetermination – the denial of (3). He thinks the rejecting (5) is a reasonable view. Treating causes as events allows us not to equate properties but only mental and physical events; effectively, Davidson’s anomalous monism. Crane thinks there is too high a price to pay\(^{68}\) - that of denying that properties of events have anything\(^{69}\) to do with what the events cause. Crane admits that Davidson can accommodate this, because for him properties are merely features of the way things are described, and no-one would claim that the way things are described has anything to do with whether or not they are causes.

- So, we are reduced to denying (2) – the completeness of physics. Crane makes two immediate points:
  - (a) He claims this doesn’t lead to Descartes’ *substance* dualism\(^{70}\), for we could hold the monistic view that all substances have physical properties, so all substances are physical\(^{71}\), yet claim that mental as well as physical causes are needed – so denying the completeness of physics. This amounts to *downward*
causation\textsuperscript{72} from the higher level of the mental to the lower level of the physical.

(b) Brian McLaughlin has explained how downward causation doesn’t violate the laws of mechanics on the supposition that it requires “configurational forces” only exemplified in matter of a certain structural complexity (McLaughlin doesn’t himself believe in such forces). Such forces are unlike universal gravitation, which holds between any two particles. There is no violation of Newton’s laws, because all they say is whatever forces act on particles (whether gravitational, electrical or “configurational”), those particles should move in accord with the laws of mechanics. Crane notes in passing that he doesn’t think we should view causation in terms of forces.

- The situation under consideration – that denies the completeness of physics but affirms monism – is similar to emergentism. Mental properties are emergent properties that emerge out of the properties of matter once it’s crossed a threshold of complexity. We distinguish emergent properties (such as colour\textsuperscript{73}) from resultant properties (such as mass) which are simply additive. Crane thinks the ontological distinction between resultant and emergent properties is often made on the basis of predictability – ie. on the flimsy basis of gaps in our current knowledge.

- Crane proposes an alternative definition of emergence that defines mental properties as emergent physical properties. Ie. what we mean by calling mental properties emergent is just that:
  a) Mental properties are distinct from physical properties, though
  b) They may supervene on these properties, and
  c) They have their own causal efficacy

- The meaning of (c) is given by a standard example of mental causation. A headache (M) causes you to go to the cupboard to get an aspirin (P) when you have brain property B. Saying M causes P is to say \( \neg M \supset \neg P \). It may also be true that \( \neg B \supset \neg P \). Crane thinks its clear from this that B on its own wouldn’t be sufficient for P, though in the circumstances it is – because of M. He claims this isn’t overdetermination, but simply P having more than one cause. Hence, one way of denying the completeness of physics is that a physical cause can be sufficient in the circumstances for an action, provided those circumstances include a mental cause\textsuperscript{74}.

- Crane thinks there’s another explanation.
  \[
  \alpha. \neg M \supset \neg P \\
  \beta. \neg B \supset \neg P 
  \]
  But, he now appeals to David Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals whereby “if A were the case, B would have been the case” is true just in case the closest possible worlds in which A is true are those in which B is true. We then have:
  \( \alpha^* \). In the closest possible worlds where \( \neg M, \neg P \).
  \( \beta^* \). In the closest possible worlds where \( \neg B, \neg P \).

- Given our commitment to mental causation, \( \alpha^* \) is clearly true, but Crane isn’t so sure about \( \beta^* \) because multiple realisation means that a slightly different B might realise M.

\textsuperscript{72} Tie this in with Dupre. Also add this, and causation generally, to my “catena”.
\textsuperscript{73} Why does emergentism violate the completeness of physics? Or, isn’t this what’s being said?
\textsuperscript{74} There’s some weaselling going on here. What’s wrong with B \( \rightarrow M \rightarrow P \) (“\( \rightarrow \)” meaning “causes”).
• So, the truth of $\beta$ and $\beta^*$ depends on whether the world in which a different realiser ($B$) realises the headache ($M$) and still makes me go to the cupboard ($P$) is closer than the world in which there’s no headache-realiser ($\neg B$) at all and I don’t go to the cupboard ($\neg P$).

• As this is complicated, Crane restates it. $M$ has more right to be called a cause than $B$ if the closest world in which $\neg B$ is a world in which a brain state very similar\(^{75}\) to $B$ realises $M$. This is true even if $B$ is sufficient in the circumstances for $P$.

• Hence, we have another reason for denying the completeness of physics; that $B$ is sufficient for $P$, but $M$ is the cause. Crane thinks this is plausible and leaves it for the reader’s consideration. If emergentism is true, the completeness of physics is false; for some effects would not have arisen without mental events. This is exactly what a believer in mental causation ought to expect.

• Papineau thinks that denial of the completeness of physics is a failure to countenance scientific fact, but other philosophers think that this is a metaphysical principle designed to fit the discoveries of science into a metaphysical vision. We could either:
  
  (a) Reject the vision without rejecting the science, or
  (b) insist that the vision doesn’t require the completeness of physics.

  Crane prefers (b) – we are referred to Nancy Cartwright and to Crane’s paper with Mellor\(^{76}\).

• The moral of the chapter is that if we reject ontological reductionism and think the price for accepting non-reductive physicalism too high\(^{77}\), then we’re left rejecting the completeness of physics if we want to believe in mental causation.

• Crane points out a difference between emergentism and non-reductive physicalism with respect to explanation. The former thinks that emergent properties may be brute facts that we should just accept, whereas the latter insists that there must be explanatory reduction\(^{78}\). Both believe that the mental supervenes on the physical.

19. Physicalism as the source of the mind-body problem

• Crane finally considers whether physicalism, far from being the solution to the mind-body problem, is in fact its cause. He quotes Shoemaker who considers that the real mind-body problem isn’t one of causation, but of how Cartesian intuitions can be shorn of dualism or shown to be illusions. That is, how do intentionality, subjectivity, intentionality and other characteristics of the mental fit into an evolutionary picture where minds have the same physico-chemical substrate as the rest of biology in a reality that it is fundamentally physical?

• We’re referred to Nagel and McGinn\(^{79}\). Isn’t it simply an insuperable problem for physicalism that we just can’t understand how anything physical could be conscious?

---

\(^{75}\) I think there needs to be accommodation of vagueness here – what counts as the same $B$, $M$ or $P$? Each of them might be counted the same within margins of error.

\(^{76}\) Need to follow up on both of these.

\(^{77}\) What was this price – no zombies?

\(^{78}\) As previously noted, even non-reductive physicalism is reductive – but not ontologically.

\(^{79}\) I need to follow these up as well.
• Amazement comes naturally, but of itself it has little philosophical value and saying that consciousness inheres in a non-physical thing would hardly ease these worries. Crane gives a Wittgensteinian example – just as it looks the same whether the earth goes round the sun or the sun goes round the earth, so it would seem the same if the mind were the brain or were not the brain. We can’t claim that the mind cannot be the brain because it seems as though it isn’t (because it doesn’t).

• As Lewis has pointed out, it begs the question to say that physicalism leaves something out – the subjective experience. According to Lewis, in *Mad Pain and Martian Pain*[^80], to have a pain and to feel a pain are one and the same thing. So theories of what it is for a state to be painful automatically cover the phenomenal aspect of what it is like to be in such a conscious state. So, we should only say that physical instantiation and causality is irrelevant to the feeling of pain if we think on independent grounds that it is irrelevant to the state being one of pain.

• Many philosophers think we do have independent grounds for doubting that physicalism gives us knowledge of what it is like to be in a conscious state. This is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument, which Crane briefly describes here (but will return to in detail in §28). This does not beg the question against physicalism, which is why Crane discusses it here.

• Crane summarises the argument as:
  1. Mary knows all the physical facts about colour while in the room.
  2. On leaving the room, Mary learns something new about colour.
  3. Therefore, not all facts are physical facts[^81].

• So, we are to conclude from the knowledge argument that in order not to leave something out – knowing what it is like – we must reject physicalism, and Shoemaker’s hope that consciousness can be shown to be part of a fundamentally physical reality is a lost cause.

• We have a dilemma. (a) If the mind is not physical, how can it effect the physical world? (b) If it is physical, how can we explain consciousness?

20. **What does a solution of the mind-body problem tell us about the mind?**

• Summarising, Crane has presented three main strategies for addressing mental causation:
  i. The identity theory (ontological reductionism).
  ii. Non-reductive physicalism (the metaphysically necessary determination of everything by the physical).
  iii. Emergentism.

• The tension is between the completeness of physics, which appears to make mental causation impossible, and the variable realisation of mental states, which scuppers the identity theory. However, Crane points out that even were we to resolve this tension, it would still leaves us knowing little about the mind. If we knew that the mind was physical, we’d still not know what physical properties these mental properties are. And vice versa if the completeness of physics is false and the mind is not physical – we’d still not know what non-physical or emergent properties mental properties are.

[^80]: Read this – the argument looks suspicious to me (though I welcome it).
[^81]: But, if the mental is the physical, then Mary in the room doesn’t know all the physical facts, so this argument does beg the question against physicalism.
• There consequently is more to understanding the mind than solving the mind-body problem. Saying that the mind is (say) physical doesn’t tell us which of the many physical things it is.
### Chapter 3 (Consciousness)

#### 21. The Conscious and the Unconscious

- Crane starts with some orientation. Crane’s intentionalist account of the mental stresses the subject’s perspective, so conscious points of view seem central. However, there are two forms of unconscious perspectives.
  
  (a) Beliefs and such-like, of which we are not currently consciously aware, but which can be brought to consciousness by asking what we believe or think about x.
  
  (b) Deeply unconscious desires which can only be brought to consciousness by therapy such as that developed by Freud.
- Crane will discuss thought and perception in the next couple of chapters. In this one he focuses on:
  
  (i) the nature and explanation of consciousness, and
  
  (ii) how consciousness fits in with his intentionalist account of the mental, in particular on those aspects of consciousness that are deemed problematical for it; namely, the qualitative conscious properties or *qualia*.
- Definitions of consciousness are unenlightening, but we do need a taxonomy of kinds of conscious states and events.
- Crane’s first distinction is between consciousness as awareness of the world and self-consciousness (awareness of oneself being aware of the world). Kant had thought the latter a prerequisite for the former, but some modern philosophers think certain animals are conscious of the world without being self-conscious. Crane remains neutral.
- The second distinction is between:
  
  α. *Transitive* consciousness – consciousness of something or that something is the case, and
  
  β. *Intransitive* consciousness – consciousness *simpliciter* (predicated of individuals – “the patient is conscious” – or of states – “pain is necessarily conscious”).

  Sartre thought (from Husserl) that transitive consciousness was the more fundamental, but others disagree.
- Ned Block distinguishes between *access* consciousness and *phenomenal* consciousness. His definition of phenomenal consciousness (*P-consciousness*) is broad in encompassing experience in the wide sense of thought, wants and emotions as well as sense-experience. P-consciousness is “what it is like”. Nagel famously claimed that an organism has conscious mental states iff there is something it is like to be that organism (notoriously, a bat). Crane is sure that goats and bats are conscious, and that rocks and daffodils aren’t.
- Crane thinks it would be perverse to suggest intentional states are not P-conscious (since intentionality was introduced from the subject’s perspective). The question is whether there are non-intentional P-conscious states.
- Crane turns briefly to Block’s *A-conscious* states, but he will not be greatly concerned with them because it is P-conscious states that are most likely to raise problems for intentionalism. A representation is Access conscious if it is “poised” for use in reasoning and for direct rational control of action and speech. A phenomenon (such as a belief) is access-conscious when it is accessible for use by a subject. Being A-conscious depends not just on the state, but on the state’s
relation to the accessing mechanism. However, with P-consciousness, the situation is more clear cut; states either are, or are not, P-conscious. The A/P distinction is not the same as the transitive/intransitive one, since P-conscious states such as perceptions are consciousness of something.

- Crane isn’t concerned with Block’s claim that there can be A-conscious states of which we’re not P-conscious, and vice versa. While he’s happy with Block’s distinction, his concern is not with A-consciousness, since these are by definition intentional (all A-conscious states are representations, and paradigm cases are propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires). Crane’s question is whether there can be P-conscious states that are non-intentional.

- Crane thinks Block’s A-conscious states arise naturally from the phenomenon of becoming conscious of something. A-consciousness should be distinguished from the notion of higher-order thought (HOT). Some philosophers think HOT is the most basic form of consciousness – a state is conscious when it is the subject of higher-order thought. Thoughts or sensations are conscious when they are being thought about. A state subject to HOT isn’t necessarily A-conscious because it (for instance a sensation) may not be poised for use in reasoning. One could correctly mean by saying that one is conscious of one’s sensations or perceptions that one is thinking about them.

22. The Distinction between the Intentional and the Qualitative

- It is often said, contra the intentionalists, that there are two kinds of mental state – the intentional and the qualitative. So says David Rosenthal in Guttenplan, and Crane calls this doctrine that not all mental states are intentional non-intentionalism.

- Rosenthal thinks of intentional states as those with propositional content. Crane agrees that it’s right to note that not all mental states have propositional content, but denies that this makes them non-intentional (as he argued in §8; thinking in a reverie about his fancy restaurant isn’t propositional).

- Crane quotes Jaegwon Kim – as a representative of non-intentionalist orthodoxy – on what qualitative states are supposed to be. These are mental states with a phenomenal or qualitative aspect – such as sensations (pains that hurt, tickles, patches that seem green), nausea, the way things look or appear – the raw feel.

- Perceptual experiences count as qualitative because there is something it is like to experience them. Yet, Crane points out, there is propositional content as well as qualitative character in experiences of (say) hearing glass breaking.

- Crane claims the above considerations don’t tell us what “qualitative character” is – for there are difference forms of feeling – vision feels different to bodily sensation. He doesn’t think anything is added by saying that sensory perceptions have qualitative features in addition to their being conscious. Qualitative states of mind are just conscious states of mind, and consciousness takes many forms.

- Since propositional attitudes (even other than perception) can be phenomenally conscious, they too can have qualitative features. If the qualitative is just the conscious, many propositional attitudes are qualitative. The fact that some

---

82 So, presumably, knowledge that has been mislaid is not A-conscious until it’s capable of retrieval.

83 This requires more thought. Are we not conscious of sensations we’re not thinking about, or just not A-conscious of them?

84 How does vision “feel”?
propositional attitudes are not conscious just means we need to distinguish between the conscious and the non-conscious mental states, as we knew before considering the qualitative.  

- Crane gives us a dilemma. Either qualitative simply means phenomenally conscious or it doesn’t.

(1) If it does, sensations, perceptions and other propositional attitudes are qualitative and the important distinction is between the conscious and the non-conscious, not between the qualitative and the intentional.

(2) If it doesn’t, what does it mean? Kim says the qualitative applies to what is sensory or is a sensation (not necessarily the same thing, since perception feels different from sensation). Then, many conscious propositional attitudes or episodes are not qualitative, since conscious thoughts don’t have a sensory character. Thus, qualitative states are just one kind of conscious state. Again, the important distinction is between the conscious and the non-conscious, and understanding the qualitative is insufficient to understand consciousness.

- Crane adopts Kim’s sense (2) of the qualitative – mental states whose conscious character is either sensory or like bodily sensation.

23. Qualia

- Some philosophers use qualia just to mean the phenomenal, so a state has qualia iff there is something it is like to be in that state.

- However, to avoid confusion, Crane follows the alternative definition – which is to use the term to pick out the intrinsic but non-intentional properties of conscious experience. This departs from Kim’s equation of qualia with qualitative properties. Crane uses qualitative as a term for sensory properties or those characteristic of bodily sensations, whether or not these have intentional properties, reserving qualia for non-intentional conscious properties.

- So, in Crane’s usage, the relation between the concepts phenomenal, qualitative and qualia is:

  Phenomenal: all phenomenally conscious states, acts or properties.
  Qualitative: sensory states; those phenomenal states, acts or properties with a sensory phenomenal character.
  Qualia: non-intentional properties whose instantiation (partly) explains the phenomenal character of qualitative states.

- Consequently, it is neither:

  (a) tautological to say that one can account for qualitative properties or states in terms of qualia, nor
  (b) self-contradictory to say that one can account for them in terms of intentionality.

Crane will be concerned with the conflict between (a) and (b) – the intentionalist versus non-intentionalist accounts of the qualitative, but must firstly say more on qualia.

---

85 There’s something meandering and spongy about this discussion.
86 I didn’t altogether understand this section, so need to review later.
87 If Crane identifies intentionality as the “mark of the mental”, then there will be no non-intentional properties of conscious experience, and so no qualia in Crane’s sense. But, see an important distinction later in this section.
• What are non-intentional (conscious) mental properties, if that’s what qualia are? Using Crane’s definition of intentionality, non-intentional states have none of\(^\text{88}\) direction, intentional objects, aspectual shape, or a distinction between mode and content.

• There are two accounts of what qualia are properties of:
  (i) Properties of subjects – hence they are mental states;
  (ii) Properties of mental states or events – second-order properties (properties of properties).

So, (i) \( \rightarrow \) the toothache is the quale, whereas (ii) \( \rightarrow \) it’s the naggingness of the toothache that’s the quale.

• This is an important distinction, because while intentionalism must reject (i) it need not reject (ii).

• Weak intentionalism holds that all mental states have some intentionality, but that some of these states have qualitative properties. So, the experience of a toothache has intentionality, because it’s directed on a tooth, but also has specific qualia to account for the particular feeling.

• Strong intentionalism claims that no mental state has any non-intentional mental properties.

• Finally, Crane orients us for the rest of the chapter. The phenomenal character of conscious thought and propositional attitudes is reserved for Chapter 4 (Thought). Crane thinks the best case for non-intentionalism is bodily sensations (rather than perceptual experiences). Consequently the next few sections are devoted to showing that bodily sensations have been mistakenly classified as non-intentional.

### 24. The Intentionality of Bodily Sensation

• We can distinguish between the state of being in pain and the pain felt in that state. “X is in pain” is a one-place predicate giving a property of the subject. “X feels a y in z” is a 3-place predicate where y could be satisfied by other sensation-words and z is satisfied by a part of the body. Crane uses the terms pain-state and pain-object, the latter being the object apparently related to the subject when he is conscious of a pain\(^\text{89}\).

• It is tempting to think that the intentionality of sensation is revealed by the transitivity of the consciousness; one is conscious of a pain in one’s leg. In “X is conscious of Y”, Y is usually the intentional object of X’s consciousness (as when Y is an approaching bus or a knock on the door) so it is natural to think of “X is conscious of a pain” as an intentional relation between X and a pain-object.

• However, Searle and others have pointed out a difference. In the case of busses or knocks on doors, my conscious state is intentional because it makes reference to something outside itself, whereas in the case of a pain, the pain is not intentional because it doesn’t represent anything beyond itself. Crane, however, thinks that Searle’s objection is not decisive because “I am conscious of a pain” can mean at least 3 things:

\(^{88}\) I’m slightly uncomfortable about this – a state would be non-intentional if it failed to possess one of these properties.

\(^{89}\) Crane doesn’t believe in pain-objects, and also insists that intentional objects need not exist. See later.
(1) Awareness of a pain-state: a higher-order awareness of another mental state, with a lower order state as its intentional object (e.g. a belief that one believes that p has one’s belief that p as an object).

(2) If being conscious of a pain is awareness of a pain-object, the pain-state is as intentional as consciousness of a knock on the door. The fact that the pain-object, if it exists, is not intentional is of no more relevance than the non-intentional nature of the knock to the intentionality of the consciousness of the knock.

(3) Being conscious of a pain may simply mean being in pain, but since it is the intentionality of this which is at issue, Searle cannot object to the intentionalist thesis by saying that “I am conscious of a pain” simply means “I am in pain”. He does give a further reason for his objection, namely that pains are not intentional because they represent nothing beyond themselves. But, even if true, this cannot be obvious because a number of philosophers (e.g. Armstrong) have held that pains represent bodily damage.

- Crane thinks a better defence of the intentionality of sensation comes from a better understanding of their location. Having a feeling of a bodily location is essential to normal sensations. Attending to a sensation is attending to the apparent part of the body where the sensation appears to be; not necessarily a precise location (for sensations such as nausea or exhaustion), but the point is that it must be felt somewhere in one’s body. This explains why making sense of a sensation of one’s own ten inches outside one’s left shoulder is so difficult. Phantom limbs are not counter-examples because in this case the body is felt to extend further than in fact it does, so the pain is still felt within the (felt) body.

- Crane thinks that it is more controversial that the apparent location is felt than that there is one. The non-intentionalist may affirm that the felt locations involves two things:

  (1) A quale (sensation), and
  (2) A belief (that the sensation is located at a certain bodily location).

On this view the location is a belief rather than a feeling. Crane thinks this cannot be right, because beliefs held by rational subjects are revisable in the face of other beliefs and further evidence. We would expect the subject to revise the location of where his pain feels to be if it becomes apparent that it does not have that location; but this is not so. A convinced physicalist will believe that sensations are really located in the brain, since he identifies sensations with brain-states. But, having this belief does not make his pain feel as if it’s in his brain, and he’s not irrational to claim that his sensation is in the brain but seems to be in his leg.

- Why, therefore, does the felt location of sensation mean that sensations are intentional? Crane outlined in §§5-6 two essential features of intentionality, namely directedness and aspectual shape. Intentional states involve relations from intentional modes (e.g. beliefs) to intentional contents (e.g. propositions) which together give the nature of the intentional state. Every intentional state has an intentional object at which it is directed and the relation between object and content was described in §8.

- Consequently, for sensations to be genuinely intentional, we must be able to distinguish three things – the intentional object, the mode and the content. Crane analyses the example of a pain in one’s ankle. This is a transitive form of awareness – an awareness of one’s ankle, which is the object of the state and

90 Crane discusses pain-objects at the end of the section.

theo@theotodman.com 07/07/2003 Page 34 of 71
which is presented to one in a certain way. The answer to the question “what is your thought about?” gives the intentional object of your thought. Pains are not about things, so instead of asking what is your pain about, we ask where it hurts, and the answer gives the intentional object of the pain. That there is a relational structure is shown by the distinction between the subject of the experience and the object, the region that hurts; and that there is an intentional object is shown by the mind being directed on that region. As with other intentional objects, there are cases where the object doesn’t exist – in the case of pain, phantom limbs.

- The intentional object of one’s pain is not necessarily presented as it is anatomically. One may have a pain in one’s liver without knowing that the liver’s where the pain is, nor even that one has a liver, but merely that it’s “over here”. This is the aspectual shape of bodily sensations; their objects are presented in certain ways to the exclusion of others, so that two sensation-states could converge on the same object presented in different ways. The content of the sensation-state is how it presents the part of the body as being, so that the content of a phantom-limb pain “in” a leg can correctly be “my leg hurts”.

- The intentional mode is a mode of feeling. Crane draws an analogy between internal and external sensations; pain is a kind of feeling just as seeing is a kind of perceiving. The various ways of feeling one’s body are the intentional modes, which have parts of the body as their intentional objects. Crane doesn’t think this potential proliferation of modes is a problem any more than the proliferation of qualia would be to a theory that used them exclusively to explain differences of consciousness; there may be as many distinct qualia as there are distinct types of bodily sensation.

- Crane favours parts of the body over pain-objects as the intentional objects of pain-states. They are straightforward real things that can be individuated. Pain-objects are obscure in that they would have to be partly like objects (as they can move and return) and partly like events (in that they have duration). Also, paradoxes arise for pain-objects. The following argument is invalid\(^91\), as Block has pointed out:
  1. The pain is in my hand,
  2. My hand is in my pocket, therefore
  3. The pain is in my pocket.

  Why should it be invalid if pains are objects that occupy space and therefore occupy a space containing that space?

- Block’s paradox is puzzling, since it only seems to depend on the transitivity of the relation “x is in y”. Block’s diagnosis is that that “in” is ambiguous, but Tye disagrees on the grounds that (1) is an intensional context\(^92\), and draws analogies with similar invalid inferences arising from intensional contexts containing psychological verbs. For example:
  4. I want to be in City Hall,
  5. City Hall is in a ghetto, therefore
  6. I want to be in a ghetto.

  Crane is not convinced by Tye, since he thinks the invalidity of (4)-(6) is obviously due to the fact that one can represent the object of one’s desire without

\(^{91}\) This discussion is relevant to my essay “Sensations in another’s body”, where the “pain in the pocket” example occurs.

\(^{92}\) Crane has covered intensional contexts in §4; see also the paper by Mary Spencer, *Why the “s” in “Intension”?*. See Tye’s *Ten Problems of Consciousness* for Tye’s discussion.
revealing all the facts about it. While Tye is right that “in” is not ambiguous in this case, there’s no parallel to (1)-(3) where no object is being presented in multiple ways.

• Casati has shown that intensionality is not the explanation of the invalidity of (1)-(3) by the following straightforwardly invalid example. “

(7) The hole is in my trousers,
(8) my trousers are in the cupboard, therefore
(9) the hole is in the cupboard”.

This looks like the same sort of argument as (1)-(3) but with no intensional context. Casati’s explanation is that “in” is ambiguous in this case. In (7) it represents causal or ontological dependence of the hole on the trousers, while in (8) there is no such dependence.

• Crane asks whether this explanation would work for (1)-(3). Could the “in” in (1) represent the causal or ontological dependence of the pain on the hand, which, together with the fact that my hand is not dependent on my pocket explain the ambiguity of (1)-(3)? Crane thinks not, because a pain cannot be ontologically or causally dependent on a phantom limb, and a phantom limb patient could rehearse the argument (1)-(3).

• Crane thinks the right answer is that the pain-state, while not ontologically or causally dependent on the hand, is intentionally individuated by the hand. The pain-state requires an object to complete it, just as a thought does; my pain is individuated by my hand, which is part of what makes it the pain it is. But, just as we can think about a non-existent Pegasus, so I can have a pain in a non-existent hand93. “In” expresses intentional individuation.

• Intentional individuation is not relational, since X can intentionally individuate Y even when X doesn’t exist. This contrasts with causal or ontological dependence. Jackson is right that the phantom limb case shows that sensation-statements don’t essentially relate persons to parts of their body, but wrong to bring in mental objects. The problem is not with the object (body part versus pain-object) but with relation versus intentional individuation94.

• Crane thinks that an advantage of his view is that it allows him to talk of pains being “in” parts of the body without talk of literal pain-objects. Crane is suspicious of pain-objects not only because they are unnecessary, but because not all languages talk about pains as if they were objects, so talk of pain-objects may simply be an artefact of English idiom.

• Crane summarises his reasons for thinking bodily sensations are intentional states:

(1) Sensations involve awareness of the body,
(2) They present parts or regions of the body by means of intentional modes, and
(3) They have a certain aspectual shape.

---

93 Crane says that if we’re worried that saying “I’ve a pain in my hand even when I have no hand” isn’t English, we can substitute “… seem to have …” or “… have a pain in what seems …”, each of which amounts to the same thing. But, the parallel with thought then disappears, as we don’t seem to have a thought about Pegasus or have a thought about what seems to be Pegasus. It’s not clear to me whether this is a problem.

94 Why can’t we have a relation to intentional content?
25. **Strong Intentionalism and Weak Intentionalism**

- Crane gives three explanations of *weak intentionalism*.
  1. While all mental states are intentional, some additionally have non-intentional conscious properties, namely *qualia*, which are higher-order properties of states of mind, properties of properties.
  2. The intentional nature of certain mental states doesn’t exhaust their phenomenal character, which could differ between two experiences sharing the same intentional nature.
  3. Not every phenomenally conscious difference in states of mind is an intentional difference.
- One can be a weak intentionalist about other intentional modes (eg. emotion and perception) but Crane focuses on sensation. He notes that Block, Peacocke and Shoemaker support a weak-intentionalist account of visual perception.
- So, Crane supposes that a weak intentionalist account of pain says that it is an intentional state – awareness of a region of one’s body – but that this isn’t the whole account, because there are additionally qualia, which contribute to how the pain *feels*. The pains in each of one’s ankles might in some sense feel the same (same qualia), but feel to be in different places (different intentional objects).
- For the weak intentionalist, qualia cannot be properties of the part of the body that hurts because they are supposed to be properties of mental states – eg. the naggingness of the toothache. Non-intentionalists assert that certain conscious mental states – pure qualia – have no intentionality at all, so weak intentionalists must deny that pure qualia can exist – and insist that qualia can only be instantiated as properties of properties. So, Crane assumes qualia involved in pain to be properties of the intentional state of being in pain.
- Crane now asks whether awareness of pain involves awareness of one’s own mental state. It seems to be the ankle that’s hurting me, and not as though I’m aware of the location my ankle and additionally feel that my being so aware has a quale. The intentionality and qualitative character of the pain don’t seem to be separable in this way. There’s only one thing going on – awareness of the ankle is *ipso facto* awareness of its hurting. How the ankle feels seems to be a property of the ankle, rather than an intrinsic property of the intentional awareness of the ankle.
- Crane refers to the transparency of experience. Jerry Valberg has pointed out that when one pays attention to one’s experience, “all one finds is the world”. We don’t find anything over and above the redness of a glass of wine when looking for non-intentional properties of the experience. Similarly, in paying attention to one’s pain one pays attention to the object of one’s pain, not to features of the experience. One pays attention (a) to the ankle and (b) to its hurting, and neither is a second-order features of an experience. So, if we to be intentionalists about sensation, we must reject the weak form.
- There are three ways to understand the strong intentionalist claim that the phenomenal character of a sensation consists purely in the state’s intentionality. The conscious character of the state can be located:
  1. In the intentional content, 
  2. In the intentional mode, or

---

95 One can have a second-order worry about the pain (which can itself be pain – mental pain … for instance, will my foot have to be amputated), but this is a different pain.
(c) In both.
Differences in the intentional character and / or mode explain the differences in
the conscious character of the state.

- Crane rejects (b) out of hand. Michael Tye has supported (a), which Crane calls
representationism – the view that pain (say) is a representation of damage to, or
a disturbance in, the body. The consciousness is located in the conscious state of
affairs represented. Crane is unconvinced by this account of pain, noting that pains
differ and that the subject would not be aware of all pains as representing bodily
damage.\footnote{Crane has already notes that Tye includes “bodily disturbance” as an alternative to damage – presumably to cover the standard “headache” counter-examples.}

- While Tye locates differences in the phenomenal character of sensations in the
representational content alone, Crane prefers (c), which involves the intentional
mode along with the content. Crane calls this the perceptual theory, as it treats
bodily sensation as the perception of things going on in one’s body.\footnote{Crane explicitly cites Armstrong here, despite his rejection of Armstrong’s support for the identity theory.}
Crane draws an analogy with visual experience, which – when something is seen – is formed of
both the content (what is experienced – the thing seen) and the intentional mode
(seeing, rather than hearing). So for bodily sensations. In both outer perception
and sensation, consciousness need not reside in the intentional objects of
awareness in order for the state of awareness to be conscious.\footnote{What is Crane’s point? Who would ever have supposed aeroplanes or ankles to be conscious? Why is this point relevant? Is Crane saying that, if we restrict ourselves to (a), the content alone supplies the consciousness, whereas according to (c) it is the mode?}

- We’re interested not just in the objects of awareness, but in intentional content –
not just in the ankle, but “my ankle hurts”. We haven’t fully specified the
phenomenal character of the state until we’ve stated the intentional mode in which
it is presented.\footnote{So, seeing that one’s ankle is broken is a different intentional mode from feeling that it is.}
How do we explain the fact that was a problem for weak intentionalism, that pain seems to be in a part of the body – to be a property of the
body? Isn’t pain a way of being aware of (say) one’s ankle, and so more a relation
than a property?

- Crane explains this by saying that there’s a covert reference to the subject in
saying that the content of a pain in one’s ankle is verbalised as “my ankle hurts” –
it hurts me. So, the body-part doesn’t have an intrinsic property of hurting, but a
relational structure – the content of the sensation is that one’s ankle hurts and the
mode is the feeling. The part of one’s body that hurts is doing something to
oneself and is responsible for one feeling in that way. Paying attention to a pain is
to pay attention to the place which hurts, but this is impossible without attending
to the hurting – the way the bodily location is forcing itself upon oneself.

- Since intentionality is a relation to intentional content rather than to an actual
object, this explains how one can have a pain in one’s ankle while not having an
ankle. The idea of content has two facets:

  (a) capturing the aspect under which the object of the intentional state is
  presented, and

  (b) distinguishing different states in the same mode, even where the
  intentional object doesn’t exist.
So, an intentionalist can’t say that a pain is a relation to a *body part*, but only to an *intentional content* – the way things seem to the subject. Seeming to have a limb is compatible with knowing it doesn’t exist.

- An alternative view would be that pain is always a relation to an existing intentional object, which is the *cause* of the pain in the body or brain. Crane rejects this idea as this would break the connection between the notions (respectively) of an intentional object and of how things appear to the subject (the phenomenology) – since in general the subject would be utterly unaware of the cause. The perceptual theory is trying to capture how things *seem* – causation is another matter.
- Crane claims the novelty of his view lies in locating the phenomenal character of the state partly in the intentional mode. Can we object that he’s simply assuming that some intentional modes are conscious while others are not, and is thus stipulating the phenomenal into existence? Crane thinks this is a confused objection because even those who believe in qualia also assume that some mental states have phenomenal character while others do not (though in their case it is some non-intentional properties rather than intentional states that are by their nature conscious). Neither viewpoint has any alternative but to assume consciousness, for there is no hope of defining it in other terms\(^{100}\).

26. **Physicalism, Consciousness and Qualia**

- Crane now returns to the question whether physicalism can give an account of consciousness. It is often said that conscious experience gives rise to the hard part of the mind-body problem. Crane agrees that this would be so for those who distinguish conscious states from intentional states, wherein a physicalist account of qualia is taken as being more difficult than a physicalist account of intentionality. Hence, it might seem that if the intentionalist physicalist account can do without qualia, the force of this aspect of the mind-body problem is diminished. Crane denies that any such easy escape is possible.
- Crane briefly introduces three arguments against physicalism that he’ll spend the next three sections elaborating and discussing. These are, in what Crane sees as an order of increasing plausibility,
  (a) the *explanatory gap*,
  (b) the *knowledge argument* and
  (c) *zombies*.
  He notes that in none of these arguments is the concept of *qualia* used – only the concept of phenomenal consciousness (which no-one can deny). So, the intentionalist physicalist who has dismissed qualia as in the previous section is no better off than any other physicalist. Additionally, the assumption that the physicalist account of intentionality is less problematical that the physicalist account of qualia is also false. This is because physicalist reductions of intentionality have been dogged by failures to solve the fundamental problems of misrepresentation and error.
- Arguments against physicalism can’t just be the sense of wonder that the wet stuff in the brain can give rise to consciousness. This is an amazing fact, but some facts are amazing. Real philosophical problems for physicalism are raised by the three arguments mentioned above, which Crane summarises below.

\(^{100}\) Crane doesn’t refer to Papineau’s reference to Louis Armstrong and jazz.

theo@theotodman.com

07/07/2003

Page 39 of 71
• **The Explanatory Gap**: raises a problem of physicalism’s *understanding* of consciousness. Physicalism is supposed (according to this argument) to require all phenomena to be susceptible to physicalistic explanation. We explain macroscopic states in terms of microscopic ones and seek to understand how lower-level structure gives rise to higher-level structure. But, we’ve no idea how this sort of explanation could apply to consciousness; why, according to Joseph Levine, “when we occupy certain physico-functional states we experience qualitative character of the sort we do”. The situation seems different for a physicalist understanding of consciousness than it does for the propositional attitudes. In the latter case, functionalism supposes that beliefs and other propositional attitudes are functional states realised in the physical material of the brain. The brain’s causal structure realises the propositional attitudes. So, by fully understanding the brain’s causal structure we’d understand the causal structure of the propositional attitudes with no gap. Even if we don’t accept the functionalist theory, we can at least see that it makes *sense*. However, for phenomenal consciousness, such as seeing red, no such analysis is possible because, it is said – sometime invoking the inverted spectrum argument – seeing red doesn’t *have* a functional analysis. Hence, physicalism doesn’t give the right *sort* of explanation of consciousness, and so is inadequate.

• **The Knowledge Argument**: had been discussed in §19. There is something to know that is not a physical fact. Not all facts are physical facts. In particular, facts about what it is like to be in certain conscious states are not physical facts.

• **Zombies**: we are asked to consider the existence of creatures just like us in all physical respects, but lacking phenomenal consciousness (whatever other mental states they may have). The major premise of the argument is that what is *conceivable* is metaphysically *possible*. Consequently, zombies are metaphysically possible. This – ie, if the *zombie hypothesis* is true – means that physicalism is false, because it claims that the relation between mind and brain is necessary – that it is impossible to have a brain just like you do and not have the mental states you have. Physicalism claims that mental states are either identical with brain states, or necessarily supervene on them. Either way, the relation between mind and brain is metaphysically necessary.

27. **The Explanatory Gap**

• It is obvious, and commonly agreed, that not much is currently known about how the brain causes, sustains and constitutes phenomenal consciousness. The explanatory gap argument, however, goes further and alleges that whatever we learnt about the causation of states of consciousness, this would not close the explanatory gap. This is because, it is alleged by Levine, physicalism must not just supply a physical *description* for mental states and properties, but an *explanation*. This is the doctrine of the explanatory adequacy of physics, which Crane had in §12 advised physicalists to drop as excessively ambitious. Colin McGinn is inspired by Nagel’s belief that one must believe *that* physicalism is true, even while not understanding *how* it is true. So, one might hold that all entities are (at least exhaustively determined by) physical entities, that all events have sufficient physical causes and yet deny that there can even in principle be an *explanation* of

---

101 This is just like one of Descartes’ premises in the *Sixth Meditation* – that what I can clearly and distinctly conceive of can be brought about by God just as I conceive it.

[theo@theotodman.com](mailto:theo@theotodman.com) 07/07/2003 Page 40 of 71
phenomenal consciousness in physical terms. Levine and others are unhappy with this and say that physicalism hasn’t succeeded until it has explained phenomenal consciousness, and that it cannot be a true theory until it’s done so.

- Crane resists this view, even though he admits to being a non-physicalist. The motivation for physicalism was mental causation, to which the simplest solution was the identification of mental and physical causes. Crane thinks that if we’ve succeeded in identifying a mental property with a physical one (M = P), that’s all we need to do. He gives an analogy with other identity claims. Having explained how one person came to have two names, there’s nothing more to do in explaining Cicero = Tully. Similarly, one can explain how a mental state came to be called M, and similarly for P, but there’s no more to be explained if M really is the same entity as P.

- Crane thinks that a causal explanation is usually deemed adequate, but that Levine wants a deductive relation from explanans and explanandum, as when we can supposedly deduce that water is a liquid from knowledge of its molecular structure. Any deductive relation has to be necessary, but the zombie argument claims that this isn’t so for physicalism.

- Hence, there are three assumptions underlying the explanatory gap argument:
  i. Physicalism entails that physics must be explanatorily as well as causally and ontologically adequate.
  ii. The explanation must be deductive, and therefore a necessary relation
  iii. Zombies are metaphysically possible.

- Crane rejects assumptions (i) and (ii), as either very strong claims or uninteresting stipulations about physicalism and explanation. No physicalist need accept them. Assumption (iii) is discussed in §29.

28. The Knowledge Argument Examined

- Crane states the Knowledge Argument in propositional form:
  1. Mary knows all the physical facts about seeing red without having seen red
  2. Mary comes to know something new when she sees red for the first time.
  Therefore
  3. Not all facts are physical facts

- Crane thinks the above premises less controversial than those required for the explanatory gap and zombie arguments. However, since they require us to understand what are physical facts, he now clarifies what he means by “physical” and by “fact”.

- Physical: Crane points out that it doesn’t matter in what language (whether of physics, physiology or psychology) Mary learns about red. Nor would it help were she to use the language of a fully developed dualism, or even Crane’s favourite – emergentism – no such theory would help her to know what it’s like to see red. Knowledge gained in the black and white room, whether physicalist or any other, is book-learning. Lewis \(\rightarrow\) its not just physics lessons that won’t help – no lessons will help.

- Fact: Crane lists three ways philosophers have linked facts to the truth of propositions (we’re referred to Davidson’s “True to the Facts”), but claims that all

---

102 I’m not convinced by this. C/T is just a matter of names, but that’s not true of M/P.
103 Crane doesn’t define what he means by “physical” here, just widens the net of the argument to include all kinds of “book” knowledge, not just physical.
the knowledge argument needs to mean by “fact” is “object of propositional knowledge” (“X knows that p”).

- Crane now examines the argument. Firstly, he looks at its validity. Secondly he looks at the premises. Both validity and premises have been challenged, but Crane can’t find much wrong with either. Unfortunately (for the proponents of the argument), it’s the conclusion he objects to, because, just as for the Explanatory Gap argument, he sees no reason why a physicalist should agree to it as a tenet of physicalism. Hence, he concludes that physicalism survives the Knowledge Argument. We need to spell out (as Crane does) the steps to this conclusion.

**The Validity of the Knowledge Argument**

- Those who reject the argument as invalid do so on the basis that there is equivocation over the word “know”. It is proposed that in the first premise, we’re talking about *propositional* knowledge, but in the second we’re talking about *ability* knowledge. What Mary learns is indeed something new, but only the ability to recognise, imagine or remember experiences of red things. It is widely held that such cognitive abilities cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge. Ability knowledge – eg. “how to ride a bicycle” – is not a fact. So, Mary learns no new facts and physicalism is saved.

- This response is known as the **Ability Hypothesis**, and presupposes two things.
  1. A theoretical claim about the relation between know-how and propositional knowledge: ability knowledge is completely different from, and irreducible to, propositional knowledge.
  2. A specific claim about Mary and the room: Mary doesn’t come to know any new propositions whatever.

- **Claim (1) is questionable**: because no one has ever articulated why abilities are never states of propositional knowledge, and vice-versa. There are many cases where ability knowledge can be reduced without remainder to propositional knowledge. For instance, we can express in propositional terms the ability how to get from A to B. This is important for the knowledge argument, for unless it can be shown that an ability is *never* a state of propositional knowledge, the Ability Hypothesis fails. For, it would then be an open question whether Mary gains propositional knowledge.

- **Claim (2) is also questionable**. Crane thinks it’s even more important to note that, even if it *could* be shown that knowing how to ride a bicycle (say) isn’t a state of propositional knowledge, it’s still not obvious that Mary learns no new propositional knowledge in the story. It looks as though Mary does have propositional knowledge when she says “red looks like this” (a claim that could be false, if someone had cunningly painted a tomato blue). Brian Loar has provided further support for “red looks like this” being a proposition by pointing out that it can be used in reasoning (of the form “if P then Q”). For instance, “if red looks like this, then either it looks like this to dogs or it doesn’t”. This one item of propositional knowledge is sufficient for the knowledge argument to succeed.

- Hence, Crane rejects the Ability Hypothesis and claims the Knowledge Argument is valid. He now turns to the premises.

**The Premises of the Knowledge Argument**

- **Premise (1)**: is not usually disputed by physicalists – ie. that, in the story told, Mary *does* know all the physical facts about colour vision. To deny this, a physicalist would have to maintain that there are some physical *facts* that in
principle cannot be known without certain experiences. Crane agrees that some experiences are required by physical science – it’s the specific experiences he objects to.

- **Premise (2)**: is the one usually objected to. Physicalists claim that Mary doesn’t learn a new fact, but only encounters in a new way something she already knew. This is linked to puzzles about intensionality. Just because I know that Hesperus shines in the evening, but don’t know that Phosphorus shines in the evening, I can’t thereby conclude that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, because knowing is not an extensional context. Similarly, the masked man fallacy: I know my father, I don’t know this masked man, so this masked man is not my father. This view takes it that the fact that Hesperus shines in the evening is the same fact as that Phosphorus shines in the evening (after all, they are the same star, shining and evening!). So, it is said, when Mary knows what red looks like, this is just a new mode of presentation of a fact she knew before.

- Crane rejects this response, because if the parallel is right – and it was the physicalists who introduced it – then Mary learns something new if one learns something new on learning that Hesperus is Phosphorus. But, clearly the whole Hesperus/Phosphorus example, and the distinction between sense and reference – was introduced (in philosophy of language, or wherever) because we do learn something new in this situation. It was a discovery about the heavens that the ancients gained. Since all we mean by “fact” in the Knowledge argument is “object of knowledge”, learning that Hesperus is Phosphorus is to learn a new fact (and so is Mary’s knowing what red looks like).

- So, it is said that Mary, instead of learning a new fact, learns a new presentation of an old fact – but which fact? Crane spells out the physicalist’s case. We need something that can be referred to in more than one way, the relevant fact being knowable in the black and white room. This was that seeing red is just being in brain state B. So we have two terms “seeing red” and “being in brain state B”, both of which pick out a predicate “like this”. While this predicate can only be fully understood by having the experience, yet the experience is the brain state.

- Crane gives another argument on behalf of the physicalist – “Vladimir in the forest”. Vladimir, by looking at his map, deduces that he is on this bridge – but he doesn’t additionally learn a “here-fact” as well ‘I am here’. There are no indexical facts, just indexical sentences made true by non-indexical facts. Maybe Mary’s case is like this? However, Vladimir has learned a new fact in the forest.

- Even so, the bottom line of all this is that Mary does learn something new. So, is physicalism refuted?

**The Conclusion of the Knowledge Argument**

- Crane agrees that, as physicalism is formulated in the argument, physicalism is refuted. Yet no physicalist need accept this version of physicalism, which need not be a thesis about knowledge at all. Physicalism is an ontological thesis whose main success is the explanation of mental causation. The physicalist needs to be committed to the causal completeness of physics, but need have no commitment to physics being explanatorily complete, being able to state all the facts or that all knowledge be expressible without the expresser having to have had particular experiences. Vladimir learns something new in the forest – that he is here. He cannot do this without occupying a certain position, or being the person he is.

---

104 I don’t quite follow the details of this argument, which seems to be irrelevant in any case.
However, the fact that some pieces of knowledge can only be known from a certain perspective doesn’t mean that anything non-physical is required in such situations. There is knowledge that can only be known from a certain point of view. This is not physical knowledge in the Knowledge argument’s sense, but the physicalist need not be concerned, for he can sensibly deny that all knowledge is physical knowledge.

- So, the Knowledge argument has the same weakness as the Explanatory Gap argument in defining physicalism in epistemological terms. So, provided the physicalist doesn’t hold that all knowledge is physical, or that physics must be explanatorily adequate, he has nothing to fear from these two arguments.\(^{105}\)

29. Zombies

- In the Zombie argument, physicalism is defined in purely metaphysical terms that are widely accepted – that the physical metaphysically determines the mental (either because mental phenomena are physical or supervene on the physical). It’s structure is simple, so interest focuses on the premises:
  1. Zombies are conceivable
  2. If zombies are conceivable, then they are metaphysically possible
  3. If zombies are metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false

**Therefore:**
  4. Physicalism is false.

- All agree that the argument is valid and that (3) is true. Crane claims that (1) is fairly uncontroversial and that all the argument centres around (2). There are many ways to respond, but Crane finds none of the responses adequate. Hence, he finds physicalism fails in its account of consciousness, just as it did as an account of mental causation.

- So, what about (1) – are zombies conceivable? All that is required is that we can think of a physical replica of any normally phenomenally conscious creature that lacks phenomenal consciousness. Crane thinks this is clearly conceivable. He sees off spoiling tactics that aim to make the concept of zombies incoherent. These ask us to imagine zombies with the usual array of intentional states, including perceptions, but lacking qualia. Anyone who agrees that purely intentional states can be phenomenally conscious won’t be able to make sense of this. However, this is a red herring, as we’ve no need to get embroiled in what phenomenal consciousness is (says Crane).

- And what about (2)? It is held to be problematical because conceivability is widely held to relate to our concepts, whereas possibility relates to modal reality (which possible worlds there are). These two may come apart so that what in some sense conceivable may not be truly possible. Eg. We might think we can conceive of water not being H\(_2\)O, but it is *not possible* for water not to be H\(_2\)O since water is *necessarily* H\(_2\)O. Similarly, the relation between mind and body may be, contrary to appearances, necessary – so making zombies impossible.

- Crane rejects this defence on Kripkean grounds – we may think we can conceive of water not being H\(_2\)O, but what we are conceiving of isn’t water but only seems like it, because water it necessarily H\(_2\)O. However, when we conceive of zombies

---

\(^{105}\) Crane doesn’t really rub in the point that the Knowledge argument is effective against any theory of the mind, so must have something further wrong with it. Maybe that any theory need not be closed under knowledge or explanation.
we aren’t conceiving of something that only seems as though it lacks the feeling of pain, but really does feel it, because it’s not possible to be in pain and lack the feeling of pain. We cannot conceive of something that is really pain, but does not feel like it\textsuperscript{106}. We can conceive of the zombie not being in pain, but this can’t just be a matter of it seeming to lack the feeling of pain. So, physicalism is false, because the zombie is, ex hypothesi, physically identical to me when I am in pain.

30. The Prospects for Explaining Consciousness

- There’s a common assumption running through all these three arguments – that there’s no conceptual or analytic connection between the concept of consciousness and the physical / non-mental concepts to which it is being reduced. If there were, we wouldn’t be able to imagine a zombie any more than a married bachelor. There would be no explanatory gap if we could give a conceptual analysis of seeing red in terms of its functional role. If there were a conceptual connection between physical and mental facts, Mary would be able to infer mental facts from her knowledge of the physical ones.

- Crane asks what sort of connection there is between physical and mental facts, if it is neither conceptual nor Kripkean a posteriori necessary. His answer is that it is a natural nomological connection. The mental generally, and consciousness in particular, supervenes on the physical brain. This supervenience is contingent, and the mental is distinct from the physical, though nomologically supervening upon it\textsuperscript{107}. The zombie argument overturns the alternative view that the supervenience is metaphysically necessary.

\textsuperscript{106} I’m not convinced by this because I’m not sure of the parallels. The physicalist wants the parallelism, but Crane wants to show the parallelism is only apparent. To whom does the “seeming” occur? It doesn’t seem to the water whether or not it’s H\textsubscript{2}O, it’s us to whom it does or doesn’t seem to be H\textsubscript{2}O. So, the parallel is that it seems to us that the zombie is not in pain, but it’s not possible for something in the same physical state as I am when I’m in pain not to be in pain. Saying it’s not possible to be in pain without feeling pain is irrelevant because this feeling would have to be in the zombie, not in us. We can’t feel another’s pain, so it can’t seem to us whether or not the zombie is in pain. Ex hypothesi, the zombie isn’t in pain, but how can we know? More thought required!

\textsuperscript{107} I can’t see how this is very far from physicalism. Crane claims not to be a physicalist, but does he claim to be a (property) dualist? I need to go right back to the beginning to see just what the physicalist is claiming.
Chapter 4 (Thought)

31. Thoughts and Beliefs

- Crane firstly introduces some terminology by distinguishing between thoughts as acts (that is, thoughts proper) and thoughts as the intentional contents of such acts (that is, ideas).
- Crane notes that much recent philosophy has been interested in propositional attitudes: belief, desire, hope, etc. He rejects the Propositional Attitude Thesis that all intentional states are propositional attitudes, since neither all conscious states, nor all thoughts (ideas), are propositional attitudes.
- Not all thoughts involve the same intentional modes – wondering, imagining and considering are kinds or ways of thinking. Thinking is a determinable concept, of which wondering, imagining and considering are determinates. Crane draws an analogy with another determinable concept – being coloured. Being red is a way of being coloured, which requires being a particular colour and a particular shade, but these are not extras to being coloured.
- The second distinction is between thoughts and beliefs. While “I think that …” can be used as synonymous with “I believe that …”, this doesn’t mean that thoughts and beliefs are identical, since wondering, imagining or considering are not ways of believing. Thoughts and beliefs belong to different metaphysical categories since thoughts are mental acts (and therefore events) while beliefs are dispositions (and therefore states). Crane now defends an important but unorthodox thesis about belief – that there is no such thing as a conscious belief.
- To establish this thesis, Crane discusses belief, which is a state – a property instantiated by a believer. Beliefs aren’t events that happen or have temporal parts. It is the paradigmatic propositional attitude. Beliefs are of the form “belief that p”, where the proposition p is true or false. Beliefs are distinctive in that the attitude – the intentional mode – of belief entails a commitment to the truth of the proposition believed. Belief’s relation to truth – holding something to be true – is central to its concept.
- Belief is related to judgement and assertion. Not all beliefs are formed as a result of judgement – perception, unconscious inference and innateness are alternatives. Belief ↔ Judgement as Intention ↔ Decision. Assertion is the linguistic expression of belief.
- Moore’s paradox is the form “I believe that p, but not-not-p” (ie. the holding of false beliefs). This is not paradoxical in itself – we all hold beliefs that, unbeknownst to us, are false – but we’d never rationally make such a statement. Assertion is the expression of belief, so asserting that not-p is to express my believe that not-p, so it would be irrational simultaneously to assert not-p and my belief that p.
- This isn’t the case with the other attitudes. “I want that p, but not-not-p” isn’t irrational – indeed it would be irrational if p.
- What agents do depends on what they believe, want and intend. Rational agents take account of how they believe the world is. They avoid goals they are unlikely to achieve because the world is against them. Hence, an agent’s beliefs impact both what their goals are and which they try to achieve.
- Beliefs have actual and potential consequences – but don’t have any particular consequences, but only those given other states of mind, especially desires.
The functionalist theory of mind claims that mental states are individuated by their causal roles – the distinctive pattern of their relations to other mental states and to actions. Crane’s ideas are similar to, but independent of, functionalism which:

1. Typically gives a reductive definition of the mental, and
2. Sees the mind as a causal mechanism.

That people act on beliefs and desires is independent of functionalism.

It is obvious that not all your beliefs need be in your stream of consciousness in order to have actual or potential consequences, not even those that are currently guiding your action. Beliefs need not be conscious at all in order to guide action. So, is there a valid distinction between dispositional and occurrent beliefs? If so, since occurrences are events, the conscious (occurrent) beliefs would have to be acts or events, while the non-conscious ones (dispositional) would be mental states. Crane doesn’t doubt belief-states, but denies that there are conscious belief-events.

32. Consciousness and Belief

Crane admits that one is often conscious of the premises – one’s beliefs – on which one forms a judgement, but draws a distinction between being conscious of what you believe and consciously believing. Crane thinks we only come across the former and not the latter.

Crane draws a disanalogy with worrying, which can both be a disposition or state and an event – one can consciously worry about one’s finances for half an hour, and also be in a state of worry about them as manifested by various reactions and preoccupations. However, Crane thinks it makes no sense to say that one was believing \( p \) for a period of time. Crane also claims that “worry can be short-lived and disappear for no reason; belief cannot.”

Crane thinks this is connected to the common notion that there’s no phenomenology to belief – there’s nothing it’s like to believe something. Any phenomenal character doesn’t individuate beliefs, because belief and phenomenology come apart:

(a) One can believe things unconsciously – so things don’t seem any way at all.
(b) Things seeming to be a certain way is often insufficient for belief that they are that way.

Crane seems to agree with Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson that desire (as well as belief) lacks phenomenal features, but rejects the idea that phenomenology is irrelevant to intentionality in general – witness his familiar claims about

---

108 What about coming to believe, or forming a belief?
109 This is difficult, and seems to depend on tense. One can say that one used to believe \( p \), however briefly, but that one was quickly convinced otherwise. But, when one believed \( p \), was one believing \( p \)?
110 He would presumably reject “acts of faith”. Deciding to believe ten impossible things before breakfast is itself impossible.
110 I’m not convinced by this. One can fall out of belief, just as one can fall out of worrying, for subconscious reasons. Beliefs can be just as short-lived as worries – one for a split second believed there was a ghost on the landing, but it was only a shadow. The real distinction seems that one can form a belief, and form a worry; be disposed to believe, and be disposed to worry; be conscious that one has a belief, and of a worry; but not carry on believing in the way that one can carry on worrying. Carrying on fervently asserting that \( p \) sounds more suppressing doubts. Slogans on marches, liturgy, vain repetitions …
111 Just as well, if intentionality is the mark of the mental. However, all mental events and states could have intentionality while not being exhausted by it.
perception, and maybe other kinds of thought. His reason for rejecting the phenomenal character of desires is that the phenomenology is irrelevant to their individuation. A desire for food based on a belief that one will die of starvation is the same desire as that based on hunger-pangs\textsuperscript{112}.

- Crane now considers what it is to be conscious of one’s belief (carefully distinguished from consciously believing). It’s not just consciousness of the propositional content of the belief, for this is true when the proposition is merely entertained, though he thinks some propositions just need to be entertained to be believed\textsuperscript{113}. Does one generally need to be conscious that one believes, as well as that p? Asking whether I believe p is just the same as asking whether p. Being conscious that p differs from being conscious of p. Being conscious that p entails belief, whereas being conscious of p is consistent with mere consideration.

- Crane’s conclusion is that while there is such a thing as being conscious of one’s beliefs, this isn’t the same as consciously believing. Occurrent belief is a myth. However, there is such a thing as occurrent thinking – thinking is an event. Crane now moves on to ask whether all episodes of thinking are propositional attitudes.

### 33. Propositional Attitudes

- The term *propositional attitude* was invented by Russell to mean “S φs that p”, where φ is a psychological verb and p a sentence. However, Crane’s definition is that a propositional attitude is an intentional state (“believing”) or event (“noticing”) whose intentional content can be assessed as true or false. Some clarification of propositional attitudes is required before Crane can address the propositional attitude thesis that all intentional states are propositional attitudes.

- Crane first turns to *propositions*. A proposition is what is expressed by a statement (where a statement is an utterance of a fact-stating sentence) and which is held or believed to be true. Two people believing the same thing believe the same proposition. Propositions are non-derivatively classifiable as true or false, in that their truth-values don’t depend on those of anything else\textsuperscript{114}.

- Crane now asks whether there are truth-value gaps – where sentences that appear to express propositions are neither true nor false (for instance, involving names with no reference or borderline cases of vague terms). We have a choice – either (a) to allow truth-value gaps or (b) to deny that such sentences express propositions. If we adopt approach (b) we need to explain what it is about such sentences that allows them to say something. Someone has made a claim about the world which is neither true nor false, but which is neither empty nor nonsense. We need some proposition-like notion to describe the kind of thing that has been said. Alternative (a) seems simpler – such sentences express propositions, but not all propositions have truth-values – but one would need to say what it is that all propositions have in common, since it’s now not having a definite truth-value. One possibility is to define a proposition as what is expressed by a complete indicative sentence, but we then need an account of indicative sentences which

\textsuperscript{112} This doesn’t seem quite right. The intentional object (food, or eating) is the same, as is the mode (desiring); but, the intentional content – the way the object is presented – seems to differ? Alternatively, maybe the intentional object of hunger pangs is the stomach rather than the food.

\textsuperscript{113} “I exist”, maybe. “I am here now” suffers from BIV scepticism. But, maybe we’re not thinking of sceptical rejoinders here. We do believe some things on first entertaining them, even if the sceptic might try to persuade us that we ought not to do so.

\textsuperscript{114} Other than other propositions in complex propositions.
doesn’t rely on them being true or false. A more metaphysical possibility is to define propositions as purporting to express facts or states of affairs (something having a property at a particular time), where again we need to explain states of affairs independently of truth-value.

- Crane is more interested in the constituent structure of propositions than concerned with the possibility of truth-value gaps. He doesn’t want to be committed to propositions being always true or false.

- Propositional attitude sentences are taken as relations between a subject and a proposition. Crane briefly describes the Russellian and Fregean accounts of the individuation of propositions. The former says that only the objects and properties on which the truth of the proposition depends are important. The latter also takes into account the ways in which these objects and properties are represented by the subject of the attitude.

- Frege considered that a correct semantics should attribute sense to words as well as reference, so that a propositional attitude relates a subject to a proposition (a thought) whose constituents are senses (that is, which are modes of presentation of referents in the world). So, propositions expressing the infallibility of “the Pope” or of “John XXIII” differ, just in case “the Pope” or “John XXIII” differ in sense. “A” and “B” have different senses if it is possible rationally to doubt A = B, or to find the equation informative.

- Russell, however, says that if A = B, then “A is F” and “B is F” express the same proposition. His reasons are twofold, both plausible. (1) A sentence is true if things are as it says they are. (2) The contribution made by a word to the truth conditions of a complex sentence must be the same as that which it makes to a simple sentence embedded in it. This means that since, when A = B, the contribution A makes to “A is F” is the same that B makes to “B is F”, then the contributions that A and B respectively make to “S believes that A is F” and “S believes that B is F” must be the same.

- This isn’t so for the Fregean\textsuperscript{115}, where sense is also involved in determining the contribution of parts of sentences to the truth-value of whole sentences. This allows someone to believe different things about A and B where A = B, but A and B differ in sense. So, it’s not just the ordinary references of terms that determine the truth-values of propositional attitude sentences. This makes it harder for the Fregean to explain the compositionality of propositional attitude sentences – how their truth conditions are derived from those of their parts.

- Crane has an aside on a variant of the Russellian approach that treats a proposition expressed by a sentence S as the set of all possible worlds in which S is true. A and B express different propositions if there is a possible world in which “A is F” is true and “B is F” is false. This doesn’t affect the overall picture\textsuperscript{116}.

- While the Russellian enjoys success with compositionality, he has difficulty explaining our intuitions about propositional attitudes. He’s forced to say that, because Hesperus is Phosphorus, the person who believes Phosphorus shines in the morning automatically believes that Hesperus shines in the morning, even if he sincerely denies it!

- Crane doesn’t quite say (as he ought) that the Russellian approach is clearly wrong, but says that the Russellian theory cannot be the fundamental one for using

\textsuperscript{115} It seems as though Russell is plain wrong, as the examples of the intensionality of belief show.

\textsuperscript{116} If F = “believed to be A by X”, then “A is F” and “B is F” will express different propositions even where A = B.
propositions in a theory of intentionality such as Crane’s. This is because intentional states have \textit{aspectual shape}, and the theory of sense attempts to explain its incorporation into the propositional attitudes. Crane thinks Russellian propositions may have their place, but not everywhere since they are \textit{extensional} whereas Fregean propositions are \textit{intensional}. Crane has previously claimed that intensionality is a symptom of intentional states. Ascribing an attitude while trying to capture the subject’s perspective must ascribe an attitude with Fregean content.

- So, attitudes to propositions are of the format \(S \phi s\) that \(p\), where \(\phi\) can be “thinks”, “hopes”, “believes”, “wishes”, … and so on. There are also propositional attitudes of the format \(S \phi s\) whether \(p\), where \(\phi\) is “wonders”, “speculates”, “considers”, … and such-like.

- Crane considers that desires require special treatment (but only in form) in order to make them obviously propositional attitudes. This is because while we can say “S desires that he will swim the channel” it is more idiomatic to say “S wants to swim the channel”, and “to swim the channel” isn’t a proposition. Similarly for other expressions occurring after verbs of desire, which tend to be objects, events or states of affairs. However, given that we can (always?) paraphrase the natural idiom, we can treat desires as propositional attitudes.

- The propositional attitudes are distinguished from one another by functional or dispositional differences. They differ in the relations or potential connections they bear to one another. Beliefs are related to desires and actions – one does what one \textit{wants} based on what one \textit{believes} to be true. So, Crane claims that the attitudes are individuated by how they depend on and relate to one another. Eg. if one hopes that \(p\), then one desires that \(p\) and believes that now \textit{not}-\(p\).

### 34. The Propositional Attitude Thesis

- The propositional attitude thesis is that all intentional states or acts are propositional attitudes. Crane had argued that it isn’t \textit{essential} to an intentional state that it be a propositional attitude, but this is consistent with their \textit{in point of fact} all being so. However, he’d found the counter-example of bodily sensation, which he claimed was an intentional state without being a propositional attitude. However, he seeks a less controversial example.

- The clearest examples are the object-directed \textit{love} and \textit{hate}. They are clearly intentional, having intentional objects and involving modes and relations. However, their contents are not propositional, and they aren’t reported in the style \(S \phi s\) that \(p\).

- There are several responses open to the defender of the propositional attitude thesis:
  1. Deny the existence of love and hate: this is desperate, denying fundamental elements of normal mental life in order to defend a philosophical thesis.
  2. Deny the existence of love and hate on the grounds of vagueness or lack of clarity: Crane rejects this because the problem is with vague concepts per se and not with love and hate in particular. Desire can be vague. There can be problems counting beliefs and desires. Quine rejects all the attitudes, but Crane thinks we should find the clearest description of the phenomena as they strike us.
  3. Give a \textit{reduction} of love and hate to the “\(S \phi s\) that \(p\)” style in a truth-preserving way: Crane thinks this is impossible, but also unnecessary. An alternative is to say that love/hate statements are made true by propositional
attitudes. If it’s true that A loves B, the facts that make this true are propositional attitudes (the beliefs and desires of the lover).

4. Claim that the truth of ascriptions of love and hate supervene on those of belief: this doesn’t show that love is “really just” belief and desire any more than the supervenienc of the mental on the physical shows that the mental is “really just” the physical. Supervenience is irrelevant to the propositional attitude thesis (or, in case there are no such things as love and hate, is just a version of the already rejected eliminativism)\(^\text{117}\).

- Crane asks why anyone should have believed the propositional attitude thesis in the first place! It is refuted by the phenomenological facts, and attempted defences fail.
  1. *Eliminativism* is no more plausible for the object-directed emotions than for other intentional states,
  2. There has been no plausible *reduction* produced, and
  3. *Supervenience* is either a variant of eliminativism or its truth is irrelevant to the propositional attitude thesis.

- Crane detects a reason for entertaining the propositional attitude thesis in an argument to the effect that intentionality should be considered purely in terms of explaining and rationalising behaviour. However, the argument contains two implausible premises:
  1. Intentionality should not be considered purely in terms of explaining or rationalising *behaviour*, because we must also try to understand the subject’s *point of view*, which doesn’t just figure in behaviour.
  2. It is not the case that only propositional attitudes – beliefs and desires – are relevant to explaining behaviour, because we might act in a certain way because we *hated* someone\(^\text{118}\). Hence, it is false to say that the only intentional states are propositional attitudes.

35. *De Re and De Dicto Attitudes*

- Crane now looks more closely at the intentionality of thoughts, beliefs and other attitudes. The essential features of intentionality are directedness and aspectual shape, well accounted for in Fregean style for propositional attitudes (aspectual shape expressed in terms of mode of presentation of the intentional objects) – but since Crane has rejected the propositional attitude thesis, what about thoughts that aren’t propositional attitudes?

- Crane thinks we can adopt a similar approach – the aspectual shape of the thought is captured by the potential informativeness of propositions containing the constituents of the sub-propositional contents of those thoughts. Crane has already explained how the directedness of a thought is explained by the existence of its intentional object. This, however, is consistent with intentionality being ascribed in a transparent style\(^\text{119}\).

- To explain the remark above, Crane re-introduces his example of Oedipus (from §6). Oedipus wanted to marry his mother, even though this isn’t how he would

\(^{117}\) I didn’t quite follow this.

\(^{118}\) But wouldn’t Freud have reduced hate to some subconscious p-attitude?

\(^{119}\) What does this paragraph mean!?
have expressed it. The ascription\(^{120}\) of intentional states can be extensional, yet it is *intensionality* that is the mark of intentionality.

- Crane thinks it’s important to distinguish between the contents of intentional states and how these states are ascribed, even though there is a relation between the two. Thoughts can be *ascribed* extensionally as well as intensionally and the theory of ascription must accommodate both Russellian and Fregean propositions. However, this liberality of ascription is consistent with a strict view of the *contents* of intentional states – what is going on in the thinker’s mind.

- We now get to the meat of this section – the distinction between *de re* and *re dicto* ascriptions of thoughts, which will explain how we can say that Oedipus wanted to marry his mother, even though no such thought entered his head.

- Crane discusses beliefs. Other intentional attitudes are similar, he says. *De dicto* belief ascription is the common and fundamental form whereby the subject (named or described) is related to a *dictum*, or saying that expresses the proposition, by a “that” clause – “S believed that p”. Crane gives the example:

1. Oedipus believes that the old man in the road is a nuisance.

However, this can be reformulated externally\(^{121}\) by an observer as:

2. That old man in the road: Oedipus believes he is a nuisance.

This – a relational belief ascription – relates Oedipus to a thing (*res*; the old man) and something predicated of him (being a nuisance) rather than to a *dictum* which can be true of false. Hence, such relations are extentional\(^{122}\) in both senses; existential generalisation and substitution of co-referentials. Because the subscriber wouldn’t use the term “the old man” unless he thought there was an old man\(^{123}\), the first sign of extentionality follows:

3. There is someone that Oedipus believes is a nuisance

The second sign of extentionality also follows, wherein Oedipus need not believe that the old man is his father:

4. That old man, Oedipus’s father: Oedipus believes he is a nuisance.

Similarly, we have another pair of sentences concerning Oedipus and his mother. The first is *de re* and the second, with which Oedipus will not want to be associated, is *de dicto*:

5. Concerning Jocasta, Oedipus’s mother: Oedipus wanted to marry her.

\(^{120}\) This “ascription” is an important part of Crane’s argument, because he’s talking about ways third parties can describe what other people believe – rather than saying there are different sorts of belief (*de re* belief and *de dicto* belief). See later in this section.

\(^{121}\) This is important from Crane’s perspective, since he’s talking about beliefs from the perspective of a third party, not from the subjective perspective of the believer.

\(^{122}\) I’m not happy about this – wouldn’t the same argument go through (invalidly) for “Fred believes Santa has a white beard”?

\(^{123}\) What’s wrong with “Santa: Fred believes he has a white beard”? Does this commit me to believing Santa exists?
6. Oedipus wanted it to be the case that he married his mother.

- Some philosophers (e.g., Tyler Burge) have claimed that belief is ambiguous – that there are beliefs de re and beliefs de dicto, but Crane thinks that this doesn’t follow from the story so far. Crane has pointed out a difference between believing and ascribing belief. Crane has simply pointed out that there are ways of ascribing beliefs that relate the believer to the object of belief in an extentional context. Even so, it’s consistent to say that the ascribed belief is a relation to a complete Fregean proposition, the reason being that the intentional object of any mental state is presented under some aspects, thereby excluding others. Consequently, a description of the state would be incomplete without capturing these aspects.

- The central feature of de re ascriptions is that the object of the belief is mentioned outside the scope of the “believes …” clause. For instance:

  There is an object x, such that x = a, and S believes of x that it is F.

S may or not know the name a, and since the ascriber mentions x outside the scope of the psychological verb, he can call it whatever name he likes. Someone is reporting someone else’s state of mind from the outside, relating them to the object of thought by describing it in a way that person might not accept or recognise. This says nothing about there being de re beliefs that are distinct from de dicto ones.¹²⁴

36. Internalism and Externalism

- Crane summarises: de re ascription of thoughts and attitudes doesn’t imply existence of de re intentional states and acts which necessarily involve relations to real intentional objects. In §7, Crane introduced the concepts of broad intentional states for those that entail the real existence of their objects, and narrow ones for those that don’t. Hence, we cannot deduce the existence of broad intentional states from de re ascriptions.

- Crane wants to know whether there can be such things as broad intentional states. This ties in with the debate about mental content between internalists and externalists, which Crane cannot settle here. He’s an internalist, but all he wants to do is not to refute externalism, but only to show that internalism is consistent.

- It looks initially as though externalism is easier to defend, since it claims that thoughts arise from relations – causal or other – with their objects. Thoughts are individuated by the objects and properties in the world that they are about, whose existence ensures the existence of the thoughts.

- Crane rejects as mistaken the supposition that externalism is obviously correct, if this is based on the supposition that no thought could exist without the existence of its intentional object. Firstly, he notes that the individuation of thoughts by what they are about is at the heart of intentionality and was there before

¹²⁴ This paragraph was clear until the last sentence!
¹²⁵ Crane provides no motivation for the terminology. Basically (as we will see) narrow states are those espoused by internalists, who think that thoughts are “in the head”, whereas broad intentional states are believed to exist by externalists who think that thoughts involve their real intentional objects out there in the world, without which they couldn’t exist. Crane is an internalist who doesn’t think there are such things as broad intentional states. While thinking there are always intentional objects, sometimes these don’t exist – it’s only intentional content that always exists.
externalism was invented. Internalists can claim that narrow thoughts are individuated by what they are about, but must deny that this individuation is a relation. This is because the internalist claim is that certain thoughts would remain the same even were their intentional objects not to exist. Intentionalism is a claim about identity conditions of thoughts across possible worlds: a thought about X would be the same state of mind even if X didn’t exist (though they aren’t, of course, committed to the non-existence of most of the objects of thought!).

- So, the task ahead of internalists is to show that individuation still makes sense when used in an essentially non-relational\(^\text{126}\) way.
- To demonstrate that internalist intentionality exists, we must consider thought about the non-existent. While it’s correct to say that these are exceptional cases, it’s only by paying attention to them that we can see how we can have intentional states without a real existing object.
- Developing the intentionalist case involves realising that the real structure of the content of thought might not be what it appears to be. An example of an analysis of the real structure is in Russell’s *Theory of Descriptions*\(^\text{127}\), wherein the correct analysis of a sentence involving a definite description is a quantified sentence “there is exactly one F which is G”. The meaning of a sentence is the proposition it expresses. So, when someone believes the simple proposition “the F is G”, they really believe the quantified one. We don’t distinguish between the surface and real form of a thought, only between the surface form of its expression and the proposition that is its content. It’s possible that the surface form may run through your mind, but Russell has it that the propositional content of your thought is such as “there is exactly one pineapple in the fridge and it must be rotten by now”. Since Russell’s theory is supposed to apply to beliefs, this distinction doesn’t matter – for Crane has already shown that for beliefs, it’s not necessary for anything to run through your mind.
- Russell’s theory makes good sense of lots of thoughts and beliefs about the non-existent. It gives truth conditions to statements containing non-referring descriptions, as in the famous “the present King of France is bald”. The *meaningfulness* of the sentence doesn’t depend on the reference of “present King of France”, only its *truth*. Quine defends the theory by pointing out that we don’t want meaningfulness to depend on casual and undecidable matters of fact. We don’t want to wait for details of Jones’s love life to understand the meaning of \((\exists x)(\text{Jones loves } x)\). We have to wait for investigation to determine the truth of this statement, but its meaningfulness and place in our language is immediately under our control.
- Similarly with belief – the belief is true just in case there is exactly one bald King of France, and false otherwise. The belief, though contingently false, is still meaningful, and doesn’t depend for this meaningfulness on the reality of some non-existent or *subsistent* King. McDowell states\(^\text{128}\) that there’s a wrong idea – the relational conception of intellectual acts – that requires them to stand in relation to possibly non-existent objects. Russell takes the contents of these acts as specifications for these objects, so that if nothing answers to these specifications the contentfulness of the acts isn’t threatened.

\(^{126}\) I thought Crane allowed relations between subject and content?
\(^{127}\) Does Crane fully support Russell’s view?
\(^{128}\) Where?
Here we have a model for internalist intentionality – a case where the “thinkability” of a belief doesn’t depend on the existence of – and hence a relation to – its object. The content of the Russellian description specifies the conditions the intentional object must satisfy in order for the proposition to be true. McDowell puts it that the illusion of a relation to a real object does the work of a real relation to a subsistent object. Crane points out that it’s an illusion of a relation, not of content, which is exactly the idea behind internalist intentionality. The King is the intentional object of thought, and the belief can be about him even though he doesn’t exist. According to the internalist, “X is about Y” doesn’t express a relation.

An objection to Russell’s theory is that the specification of the existential proposition includes reference to properties and relations (being king, being bald). Hence, the theory isn’t properly internalistic since the expressions involve relations to properties, if not to objects. There are two responses:

1. The less committed internalist could admit to internalism about particulars (objects) only and not about properties. So, thought is dependent on no particular object, though it is dependent on the existence of properties.
2. The more committed internalist would commit himself to the possibility of empty property terms. Crane alludes to the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method for the definition of theoretical terms, whereby the predicates of a theory can be meaningful in the absence of any properties corresponding to them. This arises from thinking of the reference of predicates as explained by a network of predicates forming a theoretical structure. We can then replace predicates by variables bound by quantifiers. Crane leaves things hanging since he takes it that he’s shown there is some internalist intentionality, but admits there are more fundamental forms of intentionality that can be given no internalist treatment.129

37. The Argument for Externalism

Externalists may be happy with the above, since they don’t consider internalism to be trivially incoherent. However, they typically employ Putnam’s Twin Earth argument. This argument aims to show that thoughts are not “in the head”. The content of a thought isn’t determined by, nor is it supervenient on, intrinsic properties of body and brain, because it is partly constituted by the objects and properties the thought is about.130

The Twin Earth Argument: involves a thought-experiment in which two physical duplicates (“Twins”) occupy environments that differ in some significant respect. The usual example is an environment like ours, but with what fills their lakes being not H₂O but XYZ. So, when the twins each refer to “water” they refer to two different things and hence are thinking different thoughts. Ex hypothesi, this difference cannot consist in differences in their internal physical or psychological structure. Since they have different thoughts, even though their heads are the same, their thoughts cannot be in their heads.

As presented by Putnam, the argument was tied up with his views on linguistic meaning and natural kinds, which are irrelevant to the argument about

---

129 This is a hard section. Is Crane really an internalist?
130 Hence the motivation for the externalist/internalist terminology.
externalism. Crane strips the argument down to its essence (assuming the coherence\textsuperscript{131} of the Twin Earth story), as follows:

1. The content of a thought determines what the thought is about (what the thought refers to).
2. The Twins are referring to different things when they use the word “water”.
3. Therefore, their thoughts have different content (from (1) & (2), since if A determines B, then a difference in B \(\rightarrow\) a difference in A\textsuperscript{132}).
4. Therefore, the Twins are thinking different thoughts (since thoughts are individuated by their contents).
5. Since the Twins are physical duplicates, but differ in their thoughts, their thoughts cannot be determined by the physical nature of their bodies and heads.
6. Therefore, their thoughts are not “in their heads”.

- Externalists normally claim thoughts to be partly constituted by the actual objects thought about.
- The above argument is valid, and Crane thinks that only the first two premises are doubtful, though in the end the internalist must come down to attacking premise (1), since premise (2), while dubious in the case of water, is OK in other instances.
- Firstly, Crane considers the argument against premise (2) – are the twins really referring to different things when they refer to “water”? We might say that the twins don’t know that there are two kinds of water – and what’s wrong with there being two kinds of water, in any case. There are two kinds of jade (jadeite and nephrite) and two kinds of water (H\textsubscript{2}O and D\textsubscript{2}O), with no non-stipulative reason not to call them both “water”. If we were to find that there were several forms of what we call water with different microstructures, we wouldn’t stop calling all but one of them “water”. Crane says there’s nothing in our linguistic intuitions or practices to tell us now what we’d do in such a circumstance, so why should we be sure that XYZ isn’t water? So, both H\textsubscript{2}O and XYZ are water, and the Twins are using a single, common concept that they express with the word “water”. Internalists can in this manner short-circuit the Twin Earth argument by characterising the sense in which the Twins share mental states\textsuperscript{133}.

- Unfortunately, this approach cannot work in general, because the internalist would have to show that it could not be the case that things could seem the same to the Twins, yet their thoughts refer to different things. Crane thinks this is impossible to show, for all acknowledge that the underlying reality may differ from perceptual appearance, and we only need one such case for the externalist to triumph. Crane comes up with one himself: the Twins may respectively be thinking of Vladimir and Twin-Vladimir, who, despite being indistinguishable, are different people. All Putnam’s argument needs is running with the case of some qualitatively indistinguishable doppelganger that differs from the original in some essential way, and the internalist cannot show that this couldn’t be the case\textsuperscript{134}.

\textsuperscript{131} This is a big assumption. Could the twins really be physical duplicates – couldn’t we dig our heels in and claim that if they were physical duplicates they must be thinking the same thought, and if they aren’t thinking the same thought, they can’t be physical duplicates. Is this similar to the ascription versus thinking debate? One twin would be 70% XYZ – is this just a quibble that’s not relevant?
\textsuperscript{132} This is correct. We can’t have B \(\rightarrow\) A\textsubscript{1} and B \(\rightarrow\) A\textsubscript{2}.
\textsuperscript{133} I’m not quite clear what Crane means here.
\textsuperscript{134} Why so reticent? Hasn’t Crane just provided a cast-iron counter-example with Twin Vladimir? Or is this controversial or begging the question (eg. Locke’s idea of personal identity being bound up with memory).
• Crane calls premise (1) the Content Determines Reference (CDR) principle. This is a theoretical rather than common sense notion – namely, that the content of a thought reaches out to its reference such that if the reference had been different, so would the content. It is a version of Frege’s “sense determines reference” – since sense is a mode of presentation of reference, grasping sense grasps reference. Sense is tied to reference, with different references having different sense.

• However, Crane thinks this cannot be true for indexical thoughts. In these cases it’s far from obvious that the content – in the sense of what is grasped by someone who understands the thought – determines the reference. Crane considers Alice and Bob in two distinct places each thinking “it’s really hot here”. Since “here” differs in reference, the CDR principle means that their thoughts must differ in content. Crane thinks this implausible, on the grounds that both are thinking about where they are in the “here” way and so we can argue that their thoughts have the same content, despite the differing references of “here”. There is an obvious similarity in the thoughts, despite the difference – so is the content different or the same?

• Crane argues that in some sense it’s an academic argument how we use the word “content” and whether or not it’s the same. However, in one sense it does matter, because we want to say that Bob and Alice’s thought are similar in that they are thinking of where they are in the same kind of way, which ties in with content being the aspectual shape of an intentional act. Given this, Crane thinks, the CDR principle loses general applicability, because it means that any indexical thoughts that differ in place, time or person differ in content. Crane thinks it implausible to deny that the contents of the thoughts of any two “here” or “now” thinkers have anything in common.

• On the presumption that this argument is valid, Crane moves on to question the application of the CDR principle in the Twin Earth case. He thinks he’s shown, at least for indexicals, that it’s not always plausible to deduce from the fact that we’re thinking about different things that there is thereby difference of content. The internalist can argue that the Twins do share content even though they differ in reference (H$_2$O and XYZ), and that we need to modify the CDR principle so that content determines reference only relative to a context. The Twins’ thoughts share content, but because their contexts differ, their thoughts differ in reference. Crane claims this isn’t an ad hoc principle because it’s needed in the indexical case.

• The CDR-defender may rightly admit that there is sameness of content (for one meaning of “content”) in the indexical case, but he thereby seriously weakens the Twin Earth argument unless he can show that the Twins’ case is significantly different, so their thoughts don’t share content. Unless he can do this, he must admit that in one sense of “content” the Twins’ thoughts are in their heads, while in another they aren’t. This will then lead to debates about which sense of “content” is the best, and in which circumstances. Consequently, the Twin Earth

---

135 “I am here now” contains 3 indexicals. If the first two vary, wouldn’t we expect the content of the thought to vary? The 3rd (time) indexical is more difficult – wouldn’t we expect this thought, if thought again 10 seconds later, to be the same, more or less, as the original. Similarly with place – if Bob and Alice were standing next to one another, their thoughts would have much in common, but not if one is in a disco and the other in a jungle. Also, does the CDR imply no commonality of thought? And, are indexicals the only counter-example? It’s not very convincing.

136 I think Crane’s wrong about the indexical “it’s hot here” case. The thought does differ unless the “here” is elided to give “it’s hot” rather than being a serious thought about “here”.

theo@theotodman.com

07/07/2003

Page 57 of 71
argument isn’t a knock-down argument against internalism, but introduces us to broad or externalist states via the unrestricted\(^{137}\) CDR principle. Rejecting the universal application of the CDR principles leaves us with no reason to accept externalism unrestrictedly.

- So, the Twins share narrow intentional states, with narrow content, but this isn’t some special kind of content that’s all in the head, not fully intentional or inexpressible. Narrow content is what thoughts share once we abstract from the contextual features (the difference between H\(_2\)O and XYZ) that the Twin Earth argument focuses on.

- **Crane summarises:** since the Twin Earth argument depends on the unrestricted CDR principle, which internalists may legitimately reject because of the indexicals, it doesn’t refute internalism. CDR only relative to a context. Similarly, the response to the Twin Earth argument doesn’t prove there are no broad intentional states, and Crane now goes on to consider whether there are any.

### 38. Demonstrative Thought

- We might imagine that descriptive thoughts (“the F”) are internalistic but that demonstrative thoughts (“that F”) cannot be. Crane now sketches an internalist account of demonstrative thoughts.

- We are to consider perceptual demonstrative thoughts or judgements about this or that object in the environment. It’s generally agreed that such thoughts “eg. that pineapple is rotting” are irreducible to purely descriptive thoughts, and so cannot fall prey to Russell’s quantification\(^{138}\). The reason for this is the inadequacy of any description to provide equivalent cognitive significance and truth conditions, leaving a thinker with reason to doubt that (say) *that pineapple* satisfies the description.

- Crane agrees with Strawson that it’s plausible that, unless there were some such demonstrative thoughts irreducible to descriptions, nothing would bind our thought to the objects in the world that they are about (rather than to simulacra).

- Crane summarises this plausible claim:
  1. No purely descriptive or quantificational thought is equivalent in content or cognitive significance to a demonstrative one.
  2. Unless there are some such demonstrative thoughts about the perceived environment, even our descriptive or quantificational thoughts wouldn’t be anchored to the real world.

  Crane doesn’t dispute these claims (nor discuss what “anchored” means).

- However, he notes that these claims would refute global internalism (“all thoughts are narrow”) only if it’s impossible to give an internalist account of demonstrative thought. However, Crane’s aim isn’t to defend global internalism, but only to show the coherence of internalist intentionality. He thinks that the internalist can accept both the above claims by understanding demonstrative thought in descriptive-indexical form rather than purely in descriptive terms. According to Searle, the truth conditions of “That F is G” are given by “the F which is related to me in such-and-such a way is G” rather than a description of the form “The F which is H is G”, where H is context independent.

---

\(^{137}\) I.e. not tempered by context, as Crane proposes.

\(^{138}\) Connect this with the defence of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions in Log&Met. The reason given by Crane for the problem isn’t quite the usual one (of failure of uniqueness).
• We are to imagine Alice looking at a pineapple, but Bob having a perfect hallucination of one. The externalist has to say that, in contrast to Alice, Bob is having no determinate thought at all when he says “that pineapple is rotting” because no object features in the truth conditions as the reference to “that pineapple”. The internalist can say that they are both having the same thought, whose truth conditions are given by the proposition “the pineapple in front of me is rotting”. We wouldn’t ascribe to Bob the thought that “that pineapple is rotting”, but Crane has already distinguished between thoughts and the conditions for their ascriptions, so Bob’s thought can still be the same as Alice’s.

• Hence, the internalist response to demonstrative thought is similar to its response to the Twin Earth argument – thoughts only get their references when the thinker is in a context. Nevertheless, the content of the thought can be considered to be what is in common between the thinkers in their respective contexts, whether Earth versus Twin Earth, or veridical versus hallucinatory perceptions. The content is common because the subjects’ perspectives – how it seems to are – are relevantly the same. According to the internalist, psychological similarity consists in similarity in how things seem to the subject\textsuperscript{139}.

39. The Prospects for Explaining Thought

• Crane hasn’t given an account of the intentionality of thought in physicalist or naturalist terms. This usually comes down to giving necessary (and usually sufficient) conditions for one thing to represent another in terms of their causal interrelations. Crane discusses this in Mechanical Mind. He hasn’t discussed it here because he rejects physicalism. However, this rejection doesn’t remove the appeal of explanatory reductionism, which would represent an advance in knowledge. However, we should be sceptical because causation is a relation between cause and effect, and Crane has rejected relations generally holding between thoughts and their objects. Crane doesn’t think the prospects are good for making the reductive project work within the context of intentionality as he has outlined it here.

\textsuperscript{139} So, thoughts are the same if they seem so to the subject(s). This seems reasonable, but how do we ever know, given the privacy of subjective thought?
Chapter 5 (Perception)

40. The Problem of Perception

- Crane says that this chapter is about the intentionality of perception, and not about either:
  1. The psychology of perception: the mechanism whereby the different senses convey information about the perceived environment to the brain.
  2. The epistemology of perception: how perception gives knowledge of the world, eg. giving us reasons for beliefs.
- An intentionalist theory of mind needs to say something about how the various states of mind are differentiated or are similar, for instance perception versus belief and sensation. We also need to investigate and seek to understand the phenomenal character of perception. This philosophical study isn’t in conflict with the psychological investigation of mechanisms, but focuses on the characteristics required of anything labelled perception, a harder task than might be expected. Crane claims that the problems are phenomenological – relating to our perceptual experience – and independent of psychological and epistemological questions.
- Crane focuses on visual perception and finds a conflict between two plausible intuitions:
  1. **Immediacy**: when aware of a material object in the world, we are immediately aware – our awareness isn’t mediated by awareness of something else\(^\text{140}\) that is not a material object. Here, visual experience differs from the other sensory modalities. A smell may well be physical, but it is not obviously an object (says Crane), even though what it is a smell of, and which the smell makes us aware of, is a physical object. Smells (and sounds) are intentional objects, but a physical thing that is an intentional object need not be a physical object. While we can coherently say that we smell by smelling a smell, or hear by hearing a sound, we don’t see by seeing a look. Catching a glimpse isn’t seeing a glimpse\(^\text{141}\). Seeing is unmediated (Crane deals with the “television” counterexample by saying that in that case one is immediately aware of the television)\(^\text{142}\).
  2. **The Phenomenal Principle**: when one experiences something as F, there is something F that one is experiencing, whether this be “something red” or “a goldfinch” or such-like.
- The conflict between these two principles arises when we consider hallucinations, giving rise to the argument from illusion against the intentionality of perception, covered in the next section. A theory of the intentionality of perception also needs to address the difference between perception and belief, which Crane looks at in the last section of the book.

41. The Argument from Illusion

- Crane introduces the rival theories of Direct Realism, which claims that we perceive objects immediately, and Sense-Data, which can either take an Indirect Realist form, or a Phenomenalist / Idealist form. The last theory denies that we

\(^{140}\) Presumably Crane has no place for sense-data. This theory is discussed later.

\(^{141}\) This sounds like a quote from Wittgenstein.

\(^{142}\) I have residual questions about illusions and holograms.
perceive material objects at all, claiming that they are constructed out of sense data.

- Sense data (eg. according to Moore) are supposed to be what is presented to the senses in an act of perception. As such, they could be the objects themselves, or at least their surfaces. However the argument from illusion supports the denial of this stance, arguing that it’s never a physical object that’s directly given to the mind.

- Crane points out that the argument is really from hallucination (where there is no object presented) rather than from illusion (which is merely a misperception). The argument is that, because one’s experience could be the same even if no object exists, the physical object cannot be the direct object of one’s perception. Hence the immediate objects of perception – sense data – cannot be physical objects. Crane thinks this is just a dogmatic argument with implausible premises and a bizarre conclusion, but attempts to make it more plausible.

- Crane imagines perceiving a blue flower, and suggests (for the sake of the argument he doesn’t agree with) that it’s conceivable we might have a hallucination and be in a mental state phenomenally indistinguishable from that on perceiving a real blue flower when there’s no flower there. Hence, the existence of the flower is not necessary for the existence of this type of mental state. It’s wrong to say I’m not aware of anything since it seems to me that I’m perceiving a blue flower, though this can’t be a physical object. If experiences of the same type must have the same immediate objects, then the object in the non-hallucinatory case can’t be physical either. So, sense data (defined as those things immediately presented to the senses) can’t be physical objects.

- The argument can be objected to on account of its structure, as well as at many points of detail:
  1. Some have suggested that phenomenally indistinguishable hallucinations are impossible – they are illegitimate empirical speculations – because no one would mistake such disturbed states for the real thing any more than one would mistake dreaming for wakefulness. Crane thinks this response is no good, because the supposed hallucination is only supposed to be metaphysically possible, one that’s allowed by our ideas of perception and experience. So, the objector needs to show that veridical hallucinations are not just never actual, but are metaphysically impossible. In order to show this possibility, we need to imagine the causal chain of light bouncing off objects, with information passed to the brain via the retina and optic nerve. In any interaction between cause and effect, it makes sense to consider E-type effects without C-type causes. The causal chain can be interrupted at any point, eg. by artificially stimulating the retina. The only escape is implausibly to deny that experience is caused by events in the brain.
  2. We could deny that phenomenally indistinguishable mental states are always of the same type. Experiences of different types might seem the same. We might accept that we perceive sense data in the case of hallucinations, but deny this in the case of veridical perception, claiming that perceiving a sense-datum seems just like perceiving a physical object. Externalists defend the

---

143 It seems to me to a scientific intuition that what is presented to our senses are light rays bouncing off physical objects, and that there can be the same rays with no object, resulting in a disconnection between what is immediately presented and the objects. Maybe this is just illusion. Hallucinations may come about with no light rays at all. Crane discusses this later in the section.

theo@theotodman.com 07/07/2003 Page 61 of 71
view that phenomenal sameness isn’t sufficient for sameness of thought (\( \text{XYZ} \) versus \( \text{H}_2\text{O} \)). So, someone hallucinating isn’t really seeing. This can’t rest merely on conventional usage, for it’s not a misuse of language to say that Macbeth really did see a dagger before him, or that someone sees spots before their eyes after a bang on the head. However, Crane thinks we can make a distinction based on a proper account of the phenomenology of our states of mind, but that there’s a better response as below.

3. We might deny that there’s any object of any kind seen in a hallucination. We need only suppose the existence of an object if having an experience means experiencing something real. Can’t one have a visual experience when nothing is seen?

- The **Phenomenal Principle** (PP) is crucial to the argument from illusion. It states that, **if there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware that possesses it.** The sense-datum theory endorses the Principle, but the Direct Realist also accepts something similar, namely the **Genuine Perception Principle** (GPP), which is that **if a subject is genuinely perceiving an object with a certain sensible quality, then there is an object which does so.** That is, for something to be a genuine perception, something must exist with certain properties. A perception is only veridical if it has the sensible properties it appears to have, so misperceptions count as genuine but non-veridical perceptions. The PP claims that sensory experience requires an object to be present, while the GPP claims that an object need only exist for something to be genuinely perceived.

- So, both the Sense-Datum theorist and the Direct Realist share the presumption that sensory experience is a relation between perceivers and the objects of perception. This presumption of a relation is why it’s natural to suppose there’s something given to the mind in sense perception, and why Moore had no doubts about the existence of sense-data. This has no epistemological ramifications, because nothing has been said about refuting scepticism or finding foundations for knowledge. All concepts appealed to are phenomenological rather than epistemological and, while one might be able to argue from epistemological premises to the same conclusion, this isn’t the same thing.

- Philosophers such as Sellars, Brandom and McDowell have considered any appeal to “the given” as involving deep philosophical confusion. Crane doesn’t care, insofar as these criticisms are concerned with epistemology rather than phenomenology.

- If the idea that something real is given in sensation is compelling, then both Sense-Datum and Direct Realist theories are plausible. Crane states without argument his position that neither is wholly acceptable. The next section is devoted to describing a compromise.

1. The Sense-Datum theory claims plausibly that perception and hallucination involve a common state of mind but implausibly that they involve a real relation to a non-physical sense-datum. Crane doesn’t believe in sense-data.

2. The Direct Realist claims implausibly that genuine perception and hallucination don’t involve a common state of mind but that only genuine perception involves a relation to a real perceived object. Crane thinks that it is an obvious phenomenological fact that visual perception presents us immediately with physical objects.
42. **Perception as a Form of Intentionality**

- Crane thinks the answer to the above problem is to hold a correct understanding of the *intentionality* of perception. Both the above theories treat perception as a *relation*, whether to real sense data or ordinary material objects. While the Sense-Data theory answers the argument from illusion, it leaves us with mysterious non-physical objects. The Direct Realist theory is metaphysically economical but can’t explain the shared phenomenal character of perception and hallucination.

- The answer is to deny that perception is a relation to real objects. It is an intentional state – a relation to an intentional *content*. While every perceptual state *does* have an intentional object – which is the answer to the question what is the object of the experience – this object need not exist, so both the PP and the GPP can be rejected. What is essential to an intentional state is the structure:

  \[ \text{Subject} \rightarrow \text{mode} \rightarrow \text{content}. \]

  The PP may be rejected by analogy with the intentional state of belief (rather than knowledge). The latter (but not the former) requires the existence of the intentional object.

- There are *de re* belief-ascriptions of which the object of the belief exists, and some externalists think this is true of expressions such as thoughts expressed using demonstratives (“that F is a G”)
  \(^{144}\). However, the existence of the intentional object is false for beliefs and intentional states in general. The intentionalist view of sense perception is that the PP is not generally valid.

- The Direct Realism (DR) and Sense-Data (SD) theories are also intentional theories, involving relations to real objects (only for genuine perception in the case of DR), on which the mind is directed. Perception relates the mind to real objects.

- Crane asks whether this makes his intentional theory of perception trivial. He thinks the *adverbial theory*, in contrast, is *not* intentional. According to this theory, what are for other theories predicates of perceived objects are treated as adverbs of the perceptual verb (“perceiving bluey”). This view (due to Chisholm) arose in response to the metaphysical excesses on the SD theory, so that qualities of the objects of perception are seen as qualities of the perceptual state itself and strange objects are never required. Crane thinks this is no good, because the view cannot account for the spatial array of objects
  \(^{145}\). According to Mike Martin, perceptions have *subject-matter*, and this is the basis of Crane’s intentionalist theory, shared by SD & DR despite their other deficiencies. To avoid confusion with SD & DR, Crane’s theory is hereafter called *Standard Intentionalism* (SI).

- According to SI, the intentional *modes* of perception are (unsurprisingly) the 5 ordinary sensory modalities, though there may be others – and Crane includes proprioception and kinesthesia.

- There’s no easy description of the intentional *content* of perception, but Crane seeks to clarify matters by distinguishing between perception of:
  (1) Objects or events, and
  (2) Facts or states of affairs.

\(^{144}\) Need to review previous material to understand what this means.

\(^{145}\) Ie. the adverbial theory is OK for blue patches, but we can’t perceive “lawn with 5-molehills’ly”.

**theo@theotodman.com**

07/07/2003

Page 63 of 71
The complement (to “I saw”) required for (1) is a noun phrase (“the light”) and for (2) is a proposition (“that the light was good”). Noun phrases may be events (“the fall of Icarus”) as well as ordinary objects. Similar distinctions are relevant for the other senses. There’s an apparent exception for touch – though this is only a verbal problem – for we can touch the carpet or feel that its pile is thick. There are also perceptions of events where the complement is neither a noun phrase nor a sentence (“I saw my lady weep”).

- Crane has mentioned the above to show the different kinds of perceptual content and objects there can be. The latter can be things, events or states of affairs. Propositional objects imply propositional attitudes, though not all perceptions are propositional attitudes since we can notice an object without noticing that it is a certain way.

- The kinds of entities that can be objects of visual experience differ from those of the other modalities. We can smell, hear or taste objects, but the smell, sound or taste of the object may itself be an object of experience. Crane thinks these latter may be like the event/object-like things rejected in the case of bodily sensations. They are like events, in that they have temporal duration and parts, and like objects, in that they can move spatially. There are differences amongst them – in that one can smell the smell of something, but not touch the touch (or even feel) of something. However, they all differ from vision where one cannot see the look of something (the “look” of something isn’t an event/object but a property – the way something looks). Crane will show in the next section that the ability to smell smells and such-like doesn’t count against standard intentionalism. All that’s needed is the right structure: subject → mode → content. The interest is in the account given of intentional contents and modes.

43. The Phenomenal Character of Perceptual Experience

- Strong standard intentionalism denies that visual experience involves awareness of qualia because it claims that:
  
  (1) Objects and properties in the mind-independent world are presented to the mind in experience, and
  
  (2) All phenomenal aspects of mental states are aspects of their intentionality.

- This is the transparency of experience – when one sees something blue one is not aware of any intrinsic properties of one’s experience but sees through to the blueness itself. Crane points out the possible confusion that Frege has used the term “transparent” to describe mental states whose existence entails that we know we’re in them.

- Tye and Harman support this (non-Fregean usage of) transparency from the argument from introspection. We can be delighted by the phenomenal character of visual experience, but this doesn’t show that there are visual qualia. We experience a particularly delightful shade of blue as a property of the object rather than of the experience, which certainly isn’t blue. The experience represents the object as blue, and the delight is in specific aspects of the content of experience. Introspection reveals facts about the object or content of experience – what is represented, and how this is presented).

- Some philosophers deny that intentionality has sufficient resources to exhaust the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences, which also have qualia – the
allegedly non-intentional, non-representational, intrinsic properties of states of mind. Omitting mention of qualia leaves something out.

- Crane asks what qualia are. Not everyone thinks it’s obvious they exist, some thinking them a philosopher’s invention, whereas others think it’s obvious that they do exist – so we can’t decide the existence of qualia by appealing to obviousness. There are two approaches to making the existence of qualia seem plausible:
  
  (a) Appeal to actual cases of things universally agreed to occur in experience, and argue that these are qualia. Examples are blurred or double vision, spots before the eyes and such-like, which will be dealt with in this section.
  
  (b) Appeal to possible cases and deduce from these cases that actual cases are qualia. Examples are the inverted spectrum and Block’s inverted earth, which will be discussed in the next section.

- The examples in (a) are familiar from the arguments for Sense-Data. Spots before the eyes or double vision don’t represent the world to us as being in this way: we don’t reach out for the spots or buy a 6-fingered glove for the extra digit seen double. Hence, it’s said that perceptual phenomena aren’t exhausted by how the world is represented, and one is aware of intrinsic non-representational, non-intentional aspects of experience.

- Crane has already argued that the SD theory is quasi-intentional, so how can what is presented to the mind both be sense-data and qualia? Crane claims that we’d have to take the adverbial approach and “see two-finger-ly”, but that this is phenomenologically implausible and an adverbial translation of all experience is impossible. Hence, these examples do more for the SD theory than for the qualia theory.

- However, Crane has already rejected the SD theory, so this conflict isn’t there to reject qualia. Boghossian and Velleman think (contra Crane’s intuition) that the world is represented as having spots before our eyes or as there being two fingers where only one is held up. The example they give is of an after-image of a red dot obscuring the face of the person who’s just taken our photo. You aren’t under the illusion that the red spot is in front of the face, so in what sense do you see it as occupying a location? The answer is, they claim, that the spot appears to be there without actually being so. It must appear in a location without appearing to be in that location. They claim that this distinction is beyond the resources of intentional theories, which will ascribe the location to something in the intentional content of your visual experience; but the content is that there is nothing at all between you and the photographer.

- Crane rejects this argument, saying that there is a sense in which it visually appears as though there is a red spot before your eyes. While it’s not a feature of your experience – you don’t believe or judge that there’s anything there, and have complete knowledge of what is really before your eyes, yet something seems to be there. This just goes to show that perception isn’t a kind of judgement or belief. All that’s required for perception – and which is possessed by these examples – is the subject → mode → content structure. It’s another question entirely whether the subject takes the content to be about the external world. So, these examples

---

147 It seems to me that the world is represented to us as being in this way, and it’s only experience that enables us to override the naïve intuition.

148 In Colour as a Secondary Quality (Mind) – read it!
show at most sense-data, and not qualia. And evidence for sense-data is just
evidence for another form of intentionalism.

- Hence, these examples are irrelevant. Relevant cases are where the way one is
  aware of something, rather than what one is aware of, is said to go beyond an
  intentional characterisation of experience. Crane considers viewing the world with
  and without glasses – the world hasn’t changed, only the properties of the
  experience. The question is whether these properties are intentional or non-
  intentional (qualia).

- Defenders of qualia claim that since the normal subject doesn’t judge the world to
  have changed, the change must be in the non-intentional properties. Crane thinks
  all this shows is that there’s a difference between perception and judgement.
  While there’s no change in how you judge the world to be, there’s still a change in
  the content of experience. You might even believe that things were that way.
  Crane’s example is of thinking that the printing on an underground poster was too
  small for anyone to read, and then realising that you need glasses. So, Crane
  thinks there is a change in the intentional properties of visual experience with and
  without glasses, even though a normal subject wouldn’t judge the world to have
  changed.

- Crane thinks he’s disposed of qualia as far as these arguments go – they don’t
  exist, even though the phenomena the term was invented to describe do. Crane
  now asks whether the transparency thesis is correct. If it means that the
  phenomenal character of experience is determined by its intentionality, then yes.
  However, Crane denies the version that claims that all differences in phenomenal
  character are due to differences in intentional content. The intentional mode also
  needs to be taken into account.

- Crane points out (contra Howard Robinson) that intentionality is only sustainable
  if we emphasise the differences between perceptual experience and other mental
  states – some intentional modes have logical properties very different from those
  of beliefs.

44. Inverted Spectrum, Inverted Earth

- Having disposed of real-case examples, Crane turns as promised to the more
difficult hypothetical cases.

- In the Inverted Spectrum case we’re to consider Invert and Norma, who see
  colours respectively as reversed and as the same as the normal population. Invert
  sees something as green where Norma sees it as red, even though he still calls fire-
  engines “red” and grass “green”. Their differences in colour-perception are
  undetectable.

- This old speculation can be used sceptically to say that we can never know from
  the outside what another’s phenomenal experience is like, but Crane is only
  interested in it as an argument for the existence of qualia. It goes like this:
  1. Norma and Invert are similar in the intentional content of their states of mind
     concerning colours, which is that fire engines are red – a belief they both
     share.
  2. They differ not intentionally but with respect to the qualia of the experience.

- Crane now considers objections to the argument:
  1. He’s sympathetic to the argument that the inverted spectrum hypothesis might
     be incoherent for deep metaphysical and empirical reasons, but thinks the
     argument can be repudiated without taking this approach. So, …
2. We have to distinguish the inverted spectrum argument as directed at intentionalism from the same argument against functionalism (the theory that mental states are individuated by their functional or causal roles). Clearly, Invert and Norma are functionally identical but psychologically different. While there is a relation between functionalism and intentionalism, Crane is only defending the latter.

3. Even though there’s no functional difference between Invert and Norma, it’s implausible to say there’s no intentional difference. Things look different to Invert than they do to Norma, so it’s a difference in the way things seem – i.e. in the intentional content. Why attribute this difference to qualia?

4. Crane acknowledges that the difficulty arises when we try to express the way their states of mind differ in intentional content. We cannot use public-language words, as they use the same ones for the same states of affairs in the world. Crane says that the view we take of the semantics of colour-words doesn’t matter, whether this is (a) a complex primary quality of surfaces or (b) the disposition of objects to cause a certain kind of phenomenal experience in normal subjects.

5. Even so, the world is presented differently to Invert and Norma. They both mean the same thing by “red”, so the difference isn’t linguistic. Crane thinks the solution is to say that Invert’s experience represents a fire engine as green whereas his belief represents it as red. He has a true belief about the fire engine’s colour, but a false belief about how it looks to him. The content of his experience is that the fire engine looks green.

6. Crane thinks that we must accept the difference between the truth-values of Invert’s belief and experience this way round. He thinks it implausible that all Invert’s statements about colour should be false. So, he is wrong about how things appear to be – he has a false belief that (for him) fire engines look red.

7. Crane recognises the difficulty that the above argument rests on Invert being in a minority. If half the population (Group A) is inverted relative to the other half’s (Group B), things become harder to adjudicate. It’s no longer clear who is the “normal perceiver”. It’s like the case of phenol-thio-urea which is bitter to ¾ of people, but tasteless to the remaining ¼. Is it bitter or tasteless?

8. Crane thinks that this is a problem for the theory of colour – whose intentional colour judgements are correct – not a problem for intentionalism. Hence, he can ignore it.

- Crane now turns to Block’s Inverted Earth. This thought-experiment is designed to show the converse of what the Inverted Spectrum shows. In this case, the qualia are supposed to stay the same while the intentional content changes.
- Inverted Earth is a variant of Twin Earth (covered in §37). Everything is the same on Inverted Earth as on Earth, with two exceptions – both the objective colours of things and the way people talk about them are systematically inverted relative to Earth. Hence, on Inverted Earth, fire engines are green, but “red” means what “green” does on Earth – so people on Inverted Earth still say that fire engines are red, even though they look green (their vision is normal).
- There’s a further twist. Someone from Earth is transported to Inverted Earth, but unknowingly has colour-inverting lenses inserted into his eyes. So, fire engines look red, and he calls them “red”. Block, however, claims that colour words for

---

149 There are behavioural differences between the groups in this case, but this isn’t relevant to the question.
that person mean something different to what they used to and that the intentional content of his thoughts has changed. When he first moves to Inverted Earth, he claims that fire engines are red, using Earthly English, but speaks falsely since his use of “red” refers to Earthly red. However, as he starts to causally interact with things on Inverted Earth, his language migrates to Inverted English. Hence, after 50 years on Inverted Earth, his words and the intentional contents of his thoughts and experiences refer to inverted colours, but (because of the inverting lenses) the way colours seem to him has remained the same. Hence, Block argues that what has remained the same are the qualia of his experience; only the intentional content has changed, and that the qualia of experience are therefore distinct from its intentional content.

- This argument was invented against functionalism – the transportee is functionally different because red things cause him to say “green” and so on. However, his qualia, it is argued, are the same for him and inverted-him, so qualia cannot be captured by a functionalist account. Crane doesn’t care to defend functionalism here, but says that the argument is only effective against intentionalism if certain strong assumptions are added.
- Crane argues as follows:
  1. It is most natural to talk about the similarities between the person and his inverted self in intentionalist terms. Things look the same to him; it’s just that fire engines, while looking red, are really green. Talking about how things (or their colours) look seems to be talk about how things are presented to perceivers. We can distinguish between how things look and how they really are, so the idea of representation clearly and unproblematically applies. So, what’s Block’s problem? Why is the difference not an intentional one?
  2. The reason is that Block is assuming a broad\(^{150}\) functional role conception of intentional content, whereby the intentional content of my beliefs and experiences is the actual property in the world that typically causes them. Hence, according to Block, the intentional content of the transportee’s mature beliefs about the colour of fire engines is green rather than red.
  3. Crane rejects this causal and externalist theory of intentional content, but Block’s conclusion also requires that this is the only kind of intentional content that colour experiences have. The intentional states of the transportee differ from what they were before in that they have different broad contents (the normal causes of experiences and beliefs about colours are different). However, they are the same in having the same narrow content (the colours of things seem the same before and after transportation).
  4. Crane explains the narrow content of these seemings. They supervene on local properties of (respectively) the person and inverted person. The phenomenal properties of objects of which we are aware are apparent properties of the objects not of ourselves (normal or inverted). The states of mind are correct, because the person’s inverted experience would correctly represent the colour of things on return to Earth\(^{151}\). Hence, what’s common between the person and his inverted self is the narrow content of their visual experience.
  5. So, unless Block can rule out narrow content of this sort, his argument won’t work. He considers and rejects a functionalist account of narrow content, but

\(^{150}\) Ie. externalist.

\(^{151}\) But with the inverting lenses removed? I don’t understand this argument.
this account is in any case implausible. His opponent need only be intentionalist.

6. All Crane thinks he need claim here is what he’s defended in §§36-8 that the notions of narrow content and intentional states are coherent. The narrow content is how the world visually seems to be, and it seems the same to the person and the inverted person. However, we may still ask how the same intentional content (looking red) can be brought about by such different states of affairs (green and red) in the two worlds. While, in the Twin Earth case, H₂O and XYZ can plausibly cause the same narrow intentional states, how can red and green systematically do this?

7. Crane has an obvious answer to this. What an object looks like depends not just on the object but on the light it reflects and the visual system. Since the inverted person has an altered visual system, this is sufficient to explain differences in experience. Crane points out that if this objection were any good it would also be effective against any two very different properties causing the same qualia.

• Hence, Crane concludes that neither the Inverted Spectrum nor the Inverted Earth arguments refute the intentionalism of visual experience. Many difficult questions about the metaphysics of colour and of mind are raised, but these are largely independent of the truth or falsity of intentionalism.

45. Perception as Non-conceptual

• In the above, Crane had pointed out the difference between the intentional modes involved in perceptual states and those of belief or judgement. Since someone experiencing an after-image is not normally inclined to believe there’s anything there, this shows that the mode of visual perception is not that of belief. So, what is the nature of the intentional mode involved in perception?

• Are perceptions judgements about the perceived environment? Yes – they are a kind of propositional attitude, though they can additionally have other kinds of intentional content. But, perceptions have only the fact that they aim at truth in common with judgements because part of the functional role of perception, unlike desires, is to provide true beliefs about the environment. However, perceptions aim at truth in a different way to beliefs, as is illustrated by Moore’s Paradox. It makes no sense to say “I believe p, but p is false”, but there is nothing odd about saying “I desire that p, but p is not the case” nor, more relevantly, “I perceive that p, but p is false”. One might know that one is subject to an optical illusion. The persistence of illusion is one feature of perception that distinguishes it from belief.

• Another distinguishing feature of belief, as against perception, is that one can believe some X is Φ-ing while knowing little about X, but to see some X Φ-ing one usually ends up knowing a lot about X. Hence, the content of perception is replete, and has a fineness of grain, compared to that of belief. It also rules out more possibilities and contains more information. The content of perception outruns our modes of description of it. This has led some philosophers to claim that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Crane agrees with this and will spend the rest of the section explaining it.

152 This has come up before in the context of pain as bodily perceptions.

teo@theotodman.com 07/07/2003 Page 69 of 71
Crane clarifies the terminology. Non-conceptual content seems to imply a contrast with conceptual content, and some have held that beliefs have conceptual content. This can be misleading if taken to mean that there are two kinds of intentional content – the conceptual and the non-conceptual, with non-conceptual content not being made up of concepts. However, Crane thinks it’s wrong to think that conceptual content is composed of concepts in the first place. If we take the view expounded in §33 that the content of a belief is the set of possible worlds in which the belief is true, then it can’t be made up of concepts.

This is a superficial problem, because we’re really (in distinguishing conceptual from non-conceptual content) trying to distinguish between kinds of intentional states or acts. Someone believing “a is F” must have the concepts a and F, and thus we can consider the concepts to be in these intentional states (conceptual states) themselves. Conversely, being in non-conceptual states does not require having certain concepts. Crane defines this purely negatively. Certain concepts are canonical for being in a state with content p (“canonical for p”). Being in a non-conceptual state with content p does not require you to have the concepts you would need to have to be in a conceptual state with content p. A state is non-conceptual if subjects in it don’t need to possess the concepts which are canonical for p. This definition Crane labels NCC.

The difference between conceptual and non-conceptual content is illustrated by the example of flying pigs. Crane claims that to believe that a certain pig is flying you have to have the concept of pig, but to see that this pig is flying, you don’t.

Someone who believes in Jerry Fodor’s representational theory of mind (RTM) might have no interest in Crane’s distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual states, saying that all intentional states have representations as constituents, so what’s so significant about concepts?

Crane rejects the simple answer to this question – that having concepts is just a matter of having language and someone has concept A as soon as he has a word for A in the language, and creatures with no language have no concepts. John McDowell’s view is that there are no non-conceptual states and that only language users can be in intentional states. However, if one accepts non-conceptual states, then the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual states is just the distinction between those intentional states that require language and those that don’t. Most philosophers will accept this, so the distinction isn’t very controversial if that’s all it amounts to.

Consequently, there are two ways of addressing the thesis that having a concept is a matter of having a language. McDowell’s view is implausible since it disallows non-linguistic creatures from partaking in anything like reasoning. The other view doesn’t give an interesting distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual states. Crane thinks the best way forward is to reject the association between concepts and language. On this view, having a concept depends on the capacities such as recognition and inference one can exercise in one’s thinking. Not all such capacities require mastery of a language. For instance, one might be able recognise and reason about an animal of a particular kind, and have enough of an idea of what it is to qualify for possession of the concept, yet have no word for it. Crane gives the analogy of thinking about someone without knowing their name.

---

153 I’m not quite sure about this – to see an unknown X, you don’t need to have the concept “X”, but to see a pig as a pig you need the concept “pig”.

theo@theotodman.com 07/07/2003 Page 70 of 71
So, armed with this rough idea of a concept, and the NCC definition, we can say that a non-conceptual state is one where the world is presented in a certain way, but where the subject doesn’t have the inferential or recognitional capacities for each way in which the world is presented. Applying this to colour perception, Crane asks whether each of us has a distinct concept (in this sense of inferential and recognitional capacity) of each shade of colour. If we don’t, then this is a reason to hold that perceptual experiences have non-conceptual content. Perception has a phenomenological richness that’s not constrained by the perceiver’s stock of concepts. Peacocke fills out the claim by theorising that part of the content of visual experience is a *scenario* – the set of ways, consistent with the experience of the perceiver, of filling out the space around him with properties and relations. Peacocke thinks that experiences have many layers of content, some conceptual, some not. In contrast, McDowell thinks that all are conceptual, whereas Evans thinks that none are.

McDowell (in *Mind and World*) thinks that treating perception as non-conceptual is to be committed to the *Myth of the Given* – that experience involves being presented with an unconceptualised “given” which the mind then goes on to conceptualise. McDowell’s view is that the content of experience is wholly conceptual. He allows for the phenomenal richness of colour experience by saying that we have a recognitional capacity for each shade of colour even though we don’t have a word for them. We can express the capacity by use of a demonstrative – “that shade” – which being linguistic is conceptual, given McDowell’s equation of the conceptual with the linguistically expressible.

Crane makes the obvious response that it’s not clear that McDowell has any right to claim that “that shade” is a concept in any interesting sense of the word. It doesn’t correspond to Crane’s capacities for claiming the use of a concept. I may not be able to recognise the shade again, imagine or remember it, and have nothing that helps me reason about it once the experience has passed. The only thing that justifies “that shade” expressing a concept is McDowell’s association of having a concept with speaking a language – an association Crane rejects. Crane can’t investigate the complex area of the relation of language to concepts and thought any further here.