Amazon Book Description
- The research for this work was undertaken during my tenure of a Senior Tutorship in the Faculty of Arts and Music at the University of Otago (1983-85). Versions of some of the chapters herein have already been accepted for publication in the form of journal articles in Philosophy, Philosophy East and West, Sophia, and Religious Studies. My thanks to the editors and publishers concerned for permission to reuse this material. A number of people have assisted me in various ways.
- My greatest debt is to Graham Oddie, who supervised my doctoral research in this area and with whom I have had the benefit of innumerable discussions on these and other philosophical matters. I am very grateful for all I have learned from him. I would also like to thank: Bob Durrant for commenting helpfully on Chapter 2; the late Jim Harvie, both for his valuable suggestions (particularly regarding the material of Chapter 4) and for his encouraging enthusiasm for the whole project; George Hughes for his extensive comments on the whole work; and (for various points of detail) Alan Musgrave, Charles Pigden and Bryan Wilson.
- Despite much good advice, however, I have sometimes preferred to go my own way, recalling Blake's proverb: "If the fool would persist in his folly he would become wise."
Book Comment
Photocopy of complete book; Filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".
"Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Introduction"
Source: Perrett - Death and Immortality - 1987, Introduction
Full Text1
- Schopenhauer writes that without death there would hardly have been any philosophizing. For this to be plausible it would have to be added that death is most often the unconscious muse of philosophy; certainly it is difficult to see much contemporary professional philosophy as standing squarely within the Socratic tradition Schopenhauer here alludes to. This work, however, is self-avowedly inspired by death. It discusses a number of philosophical problems of death and immortality; particularly certain questions in metaphysics, ethics and philosophy of religion which naturally arise from philosophical reflection upon these matters. However since philosophical concepts and arguments are embedded in a network of other concepts and arguments, the inquiry sometimes involves both the consideration of issues in other areas of philosophy (including epistemology and metaphilosophy) and in areas other than philosophy (including literature, theology and religious studies).
- Concern with death and immortality is, of course, universal and hence the literature is enormous. Obviously I could not discuss everything, even if per impossibile I had read it all. The principles governing my choice of material are largely generated by the philosophical style I work in, i.e. the style of the analytic tradition that dominates contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Thus although the great Western philosophers are often mentioned, their positions receive little historical attention. Similarly, except for a brief reference to Heidegger, I do not discuss recent Continental philosophers at all. Rather I usually prefer to develop positions with particular reference to contemporary discussions in the analytic tradition. This is not because I believe that the great figures of the past have nothing to say to us on these issues; nor do I mean to denigrate recent Continental contributions. However this work is primarily conceived of as an attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the methods of analytic philosophy for traditional philosophical concerns about death and immortality. Until quite recently many analytic philosophers too often regarded such concerns as falling outside of the competence of philosophy. Fortunately there are now signs of an increasing openness to such questions among more and more philosophers within the analytic tradition. This work is an attempt to foster this trend. Of course, there is a danger that the constraints thus imposed upon the inquiry will render the resulting work too parochial. I have deliberately attempted to rectify any such tendency to narrowness by introducing some sorts of relevant material from outside of the usual ambit of analytic philosophy. In particular, I not only discuss literary and theological works, but I also give detailed consideration to concepts and arguments drawn from the Indian philosophical tradition. My aim is to show both that such material has important insights to contribute and also that it is in fact amenable to rigorous examination.
- It will perhaps be convenient before we begin the inquiry proper to offer an outline of the overall structure of the argument. Briefly, this work divides into two parts:
- The first part discusses philosophical problems about death that arise for everyone, regardless of his or her stance on immortality;
- The second part focuses on the notion of immortality and the major traditional accounts of this.
…
Paper Comment
Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".
In-Page Footnotes ("Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Introduction")
Footnote 1: Except the Chapter summaries have been removed to form the abstracts for the Chapters themselves.
"Perrett (Roy W.) - Death"
Source: Perrett - Death and Immortality - 1987, Chapter 1
Author’s Abstract1
- Chapter 1 presents a discussion of the concept of death (including the troubled question of "defining" death) and considers the epistemic status of our knowledge of death.
Paper Comment
Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".
In-Page Footnotes ("Perrett (Roy W.) - Death")
Footnote 1: Taken from "Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Introduction".
"Perrett (Roy W.) - 'My Death'"
Source: Perrett - Death and Immortality - 1987, Chapter 2
Author’s Abstract1
- Chapter 2 considers the claim that it is impossible to imagine one's own death and what the significance of this might be if it is indeed true.
Paper Comment
Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".
In-Page Footnotes ("Perrett (Roy W.) - 'My Death'")
Footnote 1: Taken from "Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Introduction".
"Perrett (Roy W.) - The Fear of Death"
Source: Perrett - Death and Immortality - 1987, Chapter 3
Author’s Abstract1
- Chapter 3 argues that (contra the Epicurean tradition) the fear of death is rational under certain conditions.
Paper Comment
Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".
In-Page Footnotes ("Perrett (Roy W.) - The Fear of Death")
Footnote 1: Taken from "Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Introduction".
"Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and the Meaning of Life"
Source: Perrett - Death and Immortality - 1987, Chapter 4
Author’s Abstract1
- Chapter 4 discusses some more general questions about the relation of death to the meaning of life, arguing by way of a consideration of Tolstoy's A Confession and "Tolstoy (Leo) - The Death of Ivan Ilyich" that immortality is not a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of life.
Paper Comment
Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".
In-Page Footnotes ("Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and the Meaning of Life")
Footnote 1: Taken from "Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Introduction".
"Perrett (Roy W.) - Immortality"
Source: Perrett - Death and Immortality - 1987, Chapter 5
Author’s Abstract1
- Chapter 5 argues that immortality is not a sufficient condition for the meaningfulness of life either.
- Of course, "eternal life" has typically referred to a transformed quality of life in the hereafter according to most religious thinkers.
- Some writers, however, wish to understand "eternal life" as referring only to a quality of life now, with no eschatological implications (e.g. Tolstoy, D.Z. Phillips). This view often goes with a conviction that traditional conceptions of immortality are incoherent.
- The remaining three chapters of the second part of the work critically address this conviction.
Paper Comment
Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".
In-Page Footnotes ("Perrett (Roy W.) - Immortality")
Footnote 1: Taken from "Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Introduction".
"Perrett (Roy W.) - Disembodied Existence"
Source: Perrett - Death and Immortality - 1987, Chapter 6
Author’s Abstract1
- Disembodied existence2 is found to face an identity problem, though it is suggested that the Hindu monistic eschatology of Advaita Vedanta can meet this difficulty at a certain cost.
Paper Comment
Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".
In-Page Footnotes ("Perrett (Roy W.) - Disembodied Existence")
Footnote 1: Taken from "Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Introduction".
"Perrett (Roy W.) - Resurrection"
Source: Perrett - Death and Immortality - 1987, Chapter 7
Author’s Abstract1
- Resurrection is argued to be a metaphysically coherent doctrine, as also is the general Indian account of rebirth.
Paper Comment
Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".
In-Page Footnotes ("Perrett (Roy W.) - Resurrection")
Footnote 1: Taken from "Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Introduction".
"Perrett (Roy W.) - Rebirth"
Source: Perrett - Death and Immortality - 1987, Chapter 8
Philosophers Index Abstract
- I argue for the metaphysical coherence of the general Indian account of rebirth.
- Two arguments for pre-existence are considered, one for the pre-existence (and, by analogy, post-existence) of the consciousness series, and one for the pre-existence of the agent. Both are found to be plausible, given certain qualifications.
- Furthermore the notion of a beginningless agent (conceived of as a locus of basic actions and abilities) is one which would be non-vacuous in terms of personal significance.
Author’s Introduction
- Traditional Western conceptions of immortality characteristically presume that we come into existence at a particular time (birth or conception), live out our earthly span and then die. According to some, our death may then be followed by a deathless post-mortem existence. In other words, it is assumed that
- we are born only once and die only once; and
- that - at least on some accounts - we are future-sempiternal creatures.
The Western secular tradition affirms at least (i); the Western religious tradition - Christianity, Judaism, Islam - generally affirms both (i) and (ii).
- The Indian tradition, however, typically denies both (i) and (ii). That is, it maintains both that we all have pre-existed beginninglessly, and that we have lived many times before and must live many times again in this world. The Indian picture, then, is that we have died and been reborn innumerable times previous to this life and (failing our undertaking some spiritual discipline) we will be reborn many times in the future.
- This is sometimes called the Indian belief in reincarnation1. The difficulty with this usage is that the term 'reincarnation2' suggests a belief in an immortal soul that transmigrates or reincarnates. However Buddhism, while affirming rebirth, specifically denies the existence of an eternal soul. Thus the term 'rebirth' is preferable for referring to the generally espoused Indian doctrine
Author’s Conclusion
- To sum up then. I have argued for the metaphysical coherence of the general Indian account of rebirth. To this end two arguments for pre-existence were considered.
- The first of these was for the pre-existence (and, by analogy, post-existence) of the consciousness series. Given certain qualifications, the argument was found to be sound.
- The second argument for the pre-existence of the agent was also found to be plausible (given, once again, certain qualifications).
However, neither argument establishes the pre-existence or post-existence of persons (unless one is unwisely willing simply to identify these with the consciousness series of the first argument). But this is to be expected when we remember the rather different conception of the nature and value of personal existence operating in the Indian context. Nevertheless the notion of the pre-existence and post-existence of the beginningless agent (conceived of as a locus of actions and abilities) was argued to be not only a metaphysically coherent view, but also one which would be non-vacuous in terms of personal significance.
- Of course, the Indians consider the doctrine of rebirth to be more than just a metaphysically coherent theory. Typically they regard the existence of the beginningless cycle of birth, death and rebirth (samsdra) to be a disagreeable fact. The eschatological goal of the Indian religio-philosophical tradition is complete freedom (moksa) from this cycle. In keeping with our general account of the agent as a locus of actions and abilities, complete freedom in this tradition is conceived of as a state of non-action wherein those abilities which individuate the agent are nevertheless retained. The agent in such a state does not necessarily cease to exist, even though such an agent is no longer aware of himself as an individual. Once again the basic conception of the nature and value of personal existence presupposed here is very different from the traditional Western view and hence so too is the treatment of the notion of immortality. Of course, there still remains the philosophical matter of the nature and value of this Indian goal of complete freedom. But that is another question.
Paper Comment
For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File3.
- This chapter appears to be based closely on "Perrett (Roy) - Rebirth", Religious Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 41-57.
- The extracts above were taken from this Paper.
- Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".
"Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Postscript and Appendix (Karma and the Problem of Suffering)"
Source: Perrett - Death and Immortality - 1987, Postscript and Appendix
Author’s Abstract1
- The Postscript offers some concluding remarks about the main part of the investigation and
- The Appendix (on karma and the problem of suffering) discusses a topic that is relevant but somewhat tangential to the thrust of the central argument. There the viability of karma is defended against the charge that it involves a vicious explanatory regress.
Paper Comment
Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".
In-Page Footnotes ("Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Postscript and Appendix (Karma and the Problem of Suffering)")
Footnote 1: Taken from "Perrett (Roy W.) - Death and Immortality: Introduction".
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)