Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience
Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
Text Colour-ConventionsDisclaimerPapers in this BookBooks / Papers Citing this BookNotes Citing this Book


Amazon Book Description

  1. In this provocative survey, a distinguished philosopher and a leading neuroscientist outline the conceptual problems at the heart of cognitive neuroscience.
  2. Surveys the conceptual problems inherent in many neuroscientific theories.
  3. Encourages neuroscientists to pay more attention to conceptual questions.
  4. Provides conceptual maps for students and researchers in cognitive neuroscience and psychology.
  5. Written by a distinguished philosopher and leading neuroscientist.
  6. Avoids the use of philosophical jargon.
  7. Constitutes an essential reference work for elucidation of concepts in cognitive neuroscience and psychology.

Back Cover Blurb
  1. In this provocative work, a distinguished philosopher and a leading neuroscientist outline the conceptual problems at the heart of cognitive neuroscience.
  2. Writing from a scientifically and philosophically informed perspective, the authors provide a critical overview of the conceptual difficulties encountered in many current neuroscientific and psychological theories, including those of Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Penrose and Weiskrantz. They propose that conceptual confusions about how the brain relates to the mind affect the intelligibility of research carried out by neuroscientists, in terms of the questions they choose to address, the description and interpretation of results and the conclusions they draw.
  3. The book forms both a critique of the practice of cognitive neuroscience and a conceptual handbook for students and researchers.
  4. M. R. Bennett AO is Professor of Physiology and University Chair at the University of Sydney. He is the author of many papers and books in neuroscience, including The Idea of Consciousness (1997) and A History of the Synapse (2001). He is President of the International Society for Autonomic Neuroscience, Past President of the Australian Neuroscience Society, and the recipient of numerous awards for his research in neuroscience, including the Neuroscience Medal, the Ramaciotti Medal and the Macfarlane Burnet Medal.
  5. P. M. S. Hacker is a Fellow of St John’s College, Oxford. He is the author of numerous books and articles on philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, and the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Among his many publications is the monumental five–volume Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein′s Philosophical Investigations, and its epilogue Wittgenstein′s Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy, published by Blackwell (first two volumes co–authored with G. P. Baker).
Book Comment

Blackwell Publishing, 2003


"Robinson (Daniel) - Review of Bennett & Hacker's 'Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience'"

Source: Philosophy - 79, Jan2004, Issue 307, p141-146, 6p

Paper Comment

Review of "Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience".


"Smith (Joel) - Review of Bennett & Hacker's 'Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience'"

Source: Mind, 114, Number 454, April 2005, pp. 391-394(4)

Paper Comment

Review of "Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience".


"Noble (Denis) - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience: Foreward"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Foreward


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience: Introduction"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Introduction


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - The Early Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge; The Integrative Action of the Nervous System"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 1


Sections
  1. Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius; The Origins of the Ventricular Doctrine – 12
  2. Fernel and Descartes: The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine – 23
  3. The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and its Aftermath – 30
  4. The Concept of a Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall – 33
  5. Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig – 38
  6. The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sherrington – 41

Paper Comment

Part I: Historical Problems in Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - The Cortex and the Mind in the Work of Sherrington and his Proteges"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 2


Sections
  1. Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact – 43
  2. Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism – 47
  3. John Eccles and the 'Liaison Brain' – 49
  4. Wilder Penfield and the 'Highest Brain Mechanism' – 57

Paper Comment

Part I: Historical Problems in Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 3


Sections
  1. Mereological Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience – 68
    (Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Damasio, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird)
  2. Methodological Qualms
    (Ullman, Blakemore, Zeki, Young, Milner, Squire and Kandel, Man, Frisby, Sperry)
  3. On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to a Being
  4. On the Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity
    (Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick)
  5. The Inner
    (Damasio)
  6. Introspection
    (Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz)
  7. Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect
    (Blakemore)
  8. Privacy or Subjectivity
    (Searle)
  9. The Meaning of Psychological Predicates and How they are Learnt
  10. Of the Mind and its Nature
    (Gazzaniga, Doty)

Paper Comment

Part I: Historical Problems in Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis - Preliminaries"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Introduction to Part II


Sections
  1. Brain-Body Dualism
  2. The Project
  3. The Category of the Psychological

Paper Comment

Part II: Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Sensation and Perception"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 4


Sections
  1. Sensation
    (Searle, Libet, Geldard and Sherrick)
  2. Perception
    (Crick)
    • 2.1 – Perception as the causation1 of sensations: primary and secondary qualities
      (Kandel, Schwartz and Jessell, Rock)
    • 2.2 – Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz
      (Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young)
    • 2.3 – Visual images and the binding problem
      (Sherrington, Damasio, Edelman, Crick, Kandel and Wurtz, Gray and Singer, Barlow)
    • 2.4 – Perception as information processing: Marr's theory of vision
      (Marr, Frisby, Crick, Ullman)

Paper Comment

Part II: Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - The Cognitive Powers"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 5


Sections
  1. Knowledge and its Kinship with Ability – 148
    • 1.1 – Being able to and Knowing how to – 149
    • 1.2 – Possessing Knowledge and Containing Knowledge – 151
      (LeDoux, Young, Zeki, Blakemore, Crick, Gazzaniga)
  2. Memory – 154
    (Milner, Squire and Kandel)
    • 2.1 – Declarative and non-declarative memory – 155
      (Milner, Squire and Kandel)
    • 2.2 – Storage, retention and memory traces – 158
      (LeDoux, Squire and Kandel; Gazzaniga, Mangun and Ivry; James, Kohler, Glynn; Bennett Gibson, and Robinson; Damasio)

Paper Comment

Part II: Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - The Cogitative Powers"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 6


Sections
  1. Belief – 172
    (Crick)
  2. Thinking – 175
  3. Imagination and Mental Images – 180
    (Blakemore, Posner and Raichle, Shepard)
    • 3.1 – The logical features of mental imagery – 187
      (Francis Galton, Richardson, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Finke, Luria, Shepard, Meudell, Betts, Marks, Shepard and Metzler, Cooper and Shepard, Posner and Raichle)

Paper Comment

Part II: Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Emotion"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 7


Sections
  1. Affections – 199
    (Rolls, Damasio)
  2. The Emotions: A Preliminary Analytical Survey – 203
    • 2.1 – Neuroscientists' confusions – 207
      (LeDoux, Damasio, James)
    • 2.2 – Analysis of the emotions – 216

Paper Comment

Part II: Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Volition and Voluntary Movement"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 8


Sections
  1. Volition – 224
  2. Libet's Theory of Voluntary Movement – 228
    (Libet, Frith et al.)
  3. Taking Stock – 231

Paper Comment

Part III: Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Intransitive and Transitive Consciousness"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 9


Sections
  1. Consciousness and the Brain – 239
    (Albright, Jessell, Kandel and Posner, Edelman and Tononi; Glynn, Greenfield, Llinas, Gazzaniga, Searle, Johnson-Laird, Chalmers, Dennett, Gregory, Crick and Koch, Frisby)
  2. Intransitive Consciousness – 244
    (Searle, Dennett)
  3. Transitive Consciousness and its Forms – 248
  4. Transitive Consciousness: A Partial Analysis – 253

Paper Comment

Part III: Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Conscious Experience, Mental States and Qualia"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 10


Sections
  1. Extending the Concept of Consciousness – 261
    (Libet, Baars, Crick, Edelman, Searle, Chalmers)
  2. Conscious Experience and Conscious Mental States – 263
    • 2.1 – Confusions regarding unconscious belief and unconscious activities of the brain – 268
      (Searle, Baars)
  3. Qualia – 271
    (Searle, Chalmers, Glynn, Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Nagel, Dennett)
    • 3.1 – 'How it feels' to have an experience – 274
      (Searle, Edelman and Tononi, Chalmers)
    • 3.2 – Of there being something which it is like . . .277
      (Nagel)
    • 3.3 – The qualitative character of experience –281
    • 3.4 – Thises and thuses – 282
      (Chalmers, Crick)
    • 3.5 – Of the communicability and describability of qualia – 284
      (Nagel, Edelman, Glynn, Sperry)

Paper Comment

Part III: Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Puzzles About Consciousness"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 11


Sections
  1. A Budget of Puzzles – 293
  2. On Reconciling Consciousness or Subjectivity with our Conception of an Objective Reality – 294
    (Searle, Chalmers, Dennett, Penrose)
  3. On the Question of how Physical Processes can give rise to Conscious Experience – 302
    (Huxley, Tyndall, Humphrey, Glynn, Edelman, Damasio)
  4. Of the Evolutionary Value of Consciousness – 307
    (Chalmers, Barlow, Penrose, Humphrey, Searle)
  5. The Problem of Awareness – 314
    (Johnson-Laird, Blakemore)
  6. Other Minds and Other Animals – 316
    (Crick, Edelman, Weiskrantz, Baars)

Paper Comment

Part III: Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Self-Consciousness"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 12


Sections
  1. Self-Consciousness1 and the Self – 323
  2. Historical Stage Setting: Descartes, Locke, Hume and James – 324
  3. Current Scientific and Neuroscientific Reflections on the Nature of Self-Consciousness2 – 328
    (Damasio, Edelman, Humphrey, Blakemore, Johnson-Laird)
  4. The Illusion of a 'Self' – 331
    (Damasio, Humphrey, Blakemore)
  5. The Horizon of Thought, Will and Affection – 334
    • 5.1 – Thought and language – 337
      (Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Francis Galton, Penrose)
  6. Self-Consciousness3 – 346
    (Edelman, Penrose)

Paper Comment

Part III: Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Reductionism"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 13


Sections
  1. Ontological and Explanatory Reductionism – 355
    (Crick, Blakemore)
  2. Reduction by Elimination – 366
    (P. M. and P. S. Churchland)
    • 2.1 – Are our ordinary psychological concepts theoretical? – 367
      (P. M. Churchland)
    • 2.2 – Are everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory? – 370
      (P. M. Churchland)
    • 2.3 – Eliminating all that is human – 372
      (P. M. and P. S. Churchland, Dawkins)
    • Sawing off the branch on which one sits – 376

Paper Comment

Part IV: On Method


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Methodological Reflections"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Chapter 14


Sections
  1. Linguistic Inertia and Conceptual Innovation – 379
    (P. S. Churchland)
  2. The 'Poverty of English' Argument – 386
    (Blakemore)
  3. From Nonsense to Sense: The Proper Description of the Results of Commissurotomy1 – 388
    (Crick, Sperry, Gazzaniga, Wolford Miller and Gazzaniga, Doty)
    • 3.1 – The case of blind-sight: misdescription and illusory explanation – 393
      (Weiskrantz)
  4. Philosophy and Neuroscience – 396
    (Glynn, Edelman, Edelman and Tononi, Crick, Zeki)
    • 4.1 – What philosophy can and what it cannot do – 399
    • 4.2 – What neuroscience can and what it cannot do – 405
      (Crick, Edelman, Zeki)
  5. Why it Matters – 408

Paper Comment

Part IV: On Method


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Daniel Dennett"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Appendix 1


Sections
  1. Dennett's Methodology and Presuppositions – 415
  2. The Intentional Stance – 419
  3. Heterophenomenological Method – 427
  4. Consciousness – 431

Paper Comment

Appendices


"Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - John Searle"

Source: Bennett & Hacker - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Appendix 2


Sections
  1. Philosophy and Science – 436
  2. Searle's Philosophy of Mind – 443
  3. The Traditional Mind-Body Problem – 449

Paper Comment

Appendices


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)


© Theo Todman, June 2007 - June 2026. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page