Philosophy of Religion
Rowe (William L.) & Wainwright (William), Eds.
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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Back Cover Blurb

  1. The third edition of Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings offers a wide variety of readings designed to introduce students to important issues in the philosophy of religion. This reader is excellent for use as a main text or as a supplement for introductory courses in philosophy and religion.
  2. In the preface to this edition, Rowe and Wainwright note that “A number of these selections represent new dimensions that have emerged in the current discussion of the topics included in this book.” Some of the new readings include essays by Robert M. Adams, Peter Van Inwagen, William P. Alston, and Peter Byrne. The authors have coupled these modern essays with readings from classical philosophers, thus offering instructors and students an even more comprehensive and well-focused textbook. A second important feature is the inclusion of essays that are particularly accessible to beginning philosophy students.
  3. The combination of these features results in a textbook that is especially helpful for students but also provides room for the instructor to create a unique course plan.
Book Comment

Harcourt Brace College Publishers, Third Edition; 1998. Paperback.


"Adams (Robert Merrihew) - Divine Necessity"

Source: The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 80, No. 11, Eightieth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Nov., 1983), pp. 741-752


Philosophers Index Abstract: I attempt to refute two principal reasons for holding that the existence of god, or indeed of any concrete being, could not be necessary in the strongest possible sense.
  1. I grant that existential propositions cannot be analytic in a certain clear sense, but argue that identification of necessity with analyticity in that sense provides no explanation of the meaning of 'necessary'.
  2. I argue that our knowledge of necessary truths is not easier but perhaps harder to explain on the assumption that they cannot explain any real existence or real event.

Paper Comment

The text in "Rowe (William L.) & Wainwright (William), Eds. - Philosophy of Religion" is excerpted - best to read the original.


"Alston (William) - Is Religious Belief Rational?"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Anselm - God Is Timeless, Immutable, and Impassible"

Source: Proslogion & Monologium (extracts); Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Anselm - Reply to Gaunilo"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion

Paper Comment

The Ontological Argument


"Anselm - The Divine Nature Exists through Itself"

Source: Monologium; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Anselm - The Ontological Argument"

Source: Van Inwagen & Zimmerman - Metaphysics: The Big Questions, 1998

Paper Comment


"Aquinas (Thomas) - God's Nature Cannot Be Separated from His Existence"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


Full Text

First Article. Whether The Existence Of God Is Self-Evident?
    ... A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject: e.g., Man is an animal, for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore, the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are certain common notions that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and the like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says, that there are some notions of the mind which are common and self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space. Therefore I say that this proposition, God exists, of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown. Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature—namely, by His effects...

Third Article. Whether God Is The Same As His Essence Or Nature?
  1. Objection 1. It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing is in itself. But the essence or nature of God—i.e., the Godhead—is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.
  2. Objection 2. Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the suppositum is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
    • On the contrary, it is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: I am the way, the truth, and the life (Jo. xiv. 6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.
    • I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the suppositum, for the essence or nature includes only what falls within the definition of the species; as humanity includes all that falls within the definition man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individuating accidents, does not fall within the definition of the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., do not fall within the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities designating this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the reality which is a man. Hence, the reality which is a man has something in it that humanity does not have. Consequently, humanity and a man are not wholly identical, but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined function as the formal constituent in relation to individuating matter. The situation is different in things not composed of matter and form, in which individuation1 is not due to individual matter—it is to say, to this matter—but the forms themselves are individuated of themselves. Here it is necessary that the forms themselves should be subsisting supposita. Therefore suppositum and nature in them are identified. Since, then, God is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is so predicated of Him.
  3. Reply Objection 1. We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore, in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite, and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In speaking therefore of Godhead, or life, or the like as being in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God.
  4. Reply Objection 2. The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able. It pertains to defect in imitation that what is simple and one can be represented only by a multiplicity. This is the source of composition in God's effects, and therefore in them suppositum is not the same as nature.

Fourth Article. Whether Essence And Being Are The Same In God?
  1. Objection 1. It seems that essence and being [esse] are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is the being-in-general which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being-in-general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false. For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood (Wisd. xiv. 21). Therefore God's being is not His essence.
  2. Objection 2. Further, we can know whether God exists, as was said above, but we cannot know what He is. Therefore God's being is not the same as His essence—that is, as His quiddity or nature.
    • On the contrary, Hilary says: In God being is not an accidental quality but subsisting truth. Therefore what subsists in God is His being.
    • I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as has been shown, but also His own being. This may be shown in several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a proper accident that necessarily accompanies the species—as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man—and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent,—as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the being of a thing differs from its essence, this being must be caused either by some exterior agent or by the essential principles of the thing itself. Now it is impossible for a thing's being to be caused only by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own being, if its being is caused. Therefore that thing, whose being differs from its essence, must have its being caused by another. But this cannot be said of God, because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His being should differ from His essence.
    • Second, being is the actuality of every form or nature; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as being. Therefore, being must be compared to essence, if the latter is distinct from it, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from being. Therefore His essence is His being. Third, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation, so that which has being, but is not being, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as was shown above. If, therefore, He is not His own being, He will be not essential, but participated, being. He will not therefore be the first being—which is absurd. Therefore, God is His own being, and not merely His own essence.
  3. Reply Objection 1. A thing-that-has-nothing-added-to-it can be understood in two ways. Either its essence precludes any addition (thus, for example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason), or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it (thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it of the essence of animal to lack reason). And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas being-in-general has nothing added to it in the second sense.
  4. Reply Objection 2. To be can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of being, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking to be in the first sense, we cannot understand God's being (or His essence); but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say God is, is true; and this we know from His effects, as was said above.

Paper Comment

From Summa Theologica, Part 1, Questions 2 and 3. Hard copy filed in "Various - Heythrop Essays & Supporting Material (Boxes)".


"Aquinas (Thomas) - Reason and Revelation"

Source: On the Truth of the Catholic Faith; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Aquinas (Thomas) - The Existence of God and the Beginning of the World"

Source: Summa Theologica; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Aquinas (Thomas) - The Knowledge of God"

Source: Summa Theologica; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Aquinas (Thomas) - The Omnipotence of God"

Source: Summa Theologica; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Aquinas (Thomas) - The Simplicity and Immutability of God"

Source: Summa Theologica; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Boethius (Ancius) - Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom of the Will"

Source: The Consolations of Philosophy; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Broad (C.D.) - The Appeal to Religious Experience"

Source: Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Brown (Patterson) - Infinite Causal Regression"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Byrne (Peter) - A Religious Theory of Religion"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Clarke (Samuel) - A Future State"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Clarke (Samuel) - Can God Do Evil?"

Source: Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Clarke (Samuel) - The Cosmological Argument"

Source: Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Clifford (William K.) - The Ethics of Belief"

Source: Lectures and Essays; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


Note
  • This paper is quoted in the first Chapter of "Blackburn (Simon) - Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed". It seems that "James (William) - The Will to Believe" is – in large part – a response.
  • Clifford’s paper begins with the famous passage about a ship-owner, who – if he believes his ship is sound without making proper investigation – is guilty of any deaths that occur on its sinking. Nor is he exonerated if the ship does not sink.
  • The issue of “moral luck1” may be somewhat – but not greatly – linked with the latter contention.
  • It looks to me as though the anthologized version is only the first Section, as it begins “I. THE DUTY OF INQUIRY”, but there is no Section II2, etc.

Author’s Conclusion
  1. To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
  2. If a man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in his mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and the company of men that call in question or discuss it, and regards as impious those questions which cannot easily be asked without disturbing it; the life of that man is one long sin against mankind.
  3. If this judgment seems harsh when applied to those simple souls who have never known better, who have been brought up from the cradle with a horror of doubt, and taught that their eternal welfare depends on what they believe; then it leads to the very serious question. Who hath made Israel to sin?
  4. It may be permitted me to fortify this judgment with the sentence of Milton
    "A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only because his pastor says so, or the assembly so determine, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his heresy."
  5. And with the famous aphorism of Coleridge?.—
    "He who begins by loving Christianity better than Truth, will proceed by loving his own sect or Church better than Christianity, and end in loving himself better than all."
  6. Inquiry into the evidence of a doctrine is not to be made once for all, and then taken as finally settled. It is never lawful to stifle a doubt; for either it can be honestly answered by means of the inquiry already made, or else it proves that the inquiry was not complete.
  7. "But," says one, "I am a busy man; I have no time for the long course of study which would be necessary to make me in any degree a competent judge of certain questions, or even able to understand the nature of the arguments." Then he should have no time to believe.



In-Page Footnotes ("Clifford (William K.) - The Ethics of Belief")

Footnote 1: Footnote 2:
  • It seems that there are two further Sections:-
    → II – The Weight of Authority, and
    → III – The Limits of inference


"Descartes (Rene) - The Supremely Perfect Being Must Exist"

Source: Meditations; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Dostoyevsky (Fyodor) - Rebellion"

Source: The Brothers Karamazov; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Findlay (J.N.) - Can God's Existence Be Disproved?"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion

Paper Comment

A (large) excerpt from "Findlay (J.N.) - Can God's Existence Be Disproved?".


"Gaunilo - The Perfect Island Objection"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion

Paper Comment

The Ontological Argument


"Geach (Peter) - Omnipotence"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


Author’s Introduction
  1. It is fortunate for my purposes that English has the two words 'almighty' and 'omnipotent', and that apart from any stipulation by me the words have rather different associations and suggestions. 'Almighty' is the familiar word that comes in the creeds of the Church; 'omnipotent' is at home rather in formal theological discussions and controversies, e.g. about miracles and about the problem of evil. 'Almighty' derives by way of Latin 'omnipotens' from the Greek word 'pantokrator'; and both this Greek word, like the more classical 'pankratis', and 'almighty' itself suggest God's having power over all things. On the other hand the English word 'omnipotent' would ordinarily be taken to imply ability to do everything; the Latin word 'omnipotens' also predominantly has this meaning in Scholastic writers, even though in origin it is a Latinization of 'pantocrator'. So there already is a tendency to distinguish the two words; and in this paper I shall make the distinction a strict one. I shall use the word 'almighty' to express God's power over all things, and I shall take 'omnipotence' to mean ability to do everything.
  2. […]
  3. I shall consider four main theories of omnipotence.
    1. The first holds that God can do everything absolutely; everything that can be expressed in a string of words that makes sense; even if that sense can be shown to be self-contradictory, God is not bound in action, as we are in thought, by the laws of logic. I shall speak of this as the doctrine that God is absolutely omnipotent.
    2. The second doctrine is that a proposition 'God can do so-and-so' is true when and only when 'so-and-so' represents a logically consistent description.
    3. The third doctrine is that 'God can do so-and-so' is true just if 'God does so-and-so' is logically consistent. This is a weaker doctrine than the second; for 'God is doing so-and-so' is logically consistent only when 'so-and-so' represents a logically consistent description, but on the other hand there may be consistently describable feats which it would involve contradiction to suppose done by God.
    4. The last and weakest view is that the realm of what can be done or brought about includes all future possibilities, and that whenever 'God will bring so-and-so about' is logically possible, 'God can bring so-and-so about' is true.

Paper Comment

Originally in Philosophy , Jan., 1973, Vol. 48, No. 183 (Jan., 1973), pp. 7-20


"Hacking (Ian) - The Logic of Pascal's Wager"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


Preamble (Full Text)
  • Pascal’s wager is the name of some game-theoretic considerations that concern belief in God.
  • I shall show that Pascal briefly presents three distinct arguments, each with different premisses. In each case, the conclusion does follow from the premisses. In each case, there is at least one unacceptable premiss.
  • I am here concerned only with the logic of the wager, that is, with the question of whether the conclusion does follow from the premisses. My aims are twofold.
    1. First, Pascal's wager has been extensively studied, especially in recent times when the existential and non-deductive characteristics of the argument have seemed more important to moralists and theologians than traditional, more deductive, ways to God. Despite such studies, the logic of Pascal's three arguments has never been set out. Moralists tend not to study decision theory. Pascal invented it. This paper may help the moralists who read his thoughts to understand his invention.
    2. Secondly, I have the historical aim, divorced from morality, of stating a bit of the history of probability.
  • Pascal's arguments show that it was possible to have a deep understanding of what we now call decision theory, even in the 17th century. Possible, but not easy: Pascal's distinctions escaped most of his readers. Yet despite misunderstanding, Pascal's wager was a decisive turning point in probability theory.
  • Pascal is celebrated for the probability correspondence with Fermat, but that is not his most profound contribution to probability. Pascal's thought showed that the mathematics of games of chance had quite general applications. He made it possible for the doctrine of chances (a theory involving "objective" frequencies, whose primitive concept is expectation, or average winnings) to become the art of conjecture (a "subjective" theory about degrees of confidence).

Paper Comment
  • For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File1.
  • Originally published in The American Philosophy Quarterly 9 (No 2) April 1972, 186-192


"Hartshorne (Charles) - The Divine Relativity"

Source: The Divine Relativity; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Hick (John) - The Pluralistic Hypothesis"

Source: An Interpretation of Religion; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Hick (John) - The 'Soul-Making' Theodicy"

Source: Evil and the God of Love; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion

Paper Comment

An excerpt from "Hick (John) - Evil and the God of Love"


"Hume (David) - Design and the Teleological Argument"

Source: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Hume (David) - Doubts About Immortality"

Source: Two Essays on Suicide and Immortality; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Hume (David) - God and the Problem of Evil"

Source: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Hume (David) - Of Miracles"

Source: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777), Section 10, “Of Miracles” (Full Text1)
  1. Part 1
    • There is, in Dr. Tillotson's writings, an argument against the real presence, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with them as sense; when they are considered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.
    • Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane2.
    • Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of JUNE than in one of DECEMBER, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.
    • A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments. He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.
    • To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other3. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were not these, I say, discovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature, we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony. A man delirious, or noted for falsehood and villany, has no manner of authority with us.
    • And as the evidence, derived from witnesses and human testimony, is founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and is regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable. There are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes, that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience and observation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning reports of others. We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline to it; but still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist.
    • This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be derived from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary testimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the manner of their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all these circumstances. We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument, derived from human testimony.
    • Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason, why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.
    • I should not believe such a story were it told to me by CATO; was a proverbial saying4 in ROME, even during the lifetime of that philosophical patriot5. The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate so great an authority.
    • The INDIAN prince6, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and which bore so little analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it.
    • But in order to encrease the probability7 against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony, considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.
    • A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed, in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior8.
    • The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention). ‘That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish: And even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting the inferior.’ When any one tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.
  2. Part 2
    • In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But it is easy to shew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous event9 established on so full an evidence.
    • For first, there is not to be found in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time, attesting facts, performed in such a public manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men.
    • Secondly. We may observe in human nature a principle, which, if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance, which we might, from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is, that the objects, of which we have no experience, resemble those, of which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations. But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the same rule; but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very circumstance, which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events, from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others.
    • With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality: He may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: Or even where this delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence: What judgment they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects: Or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity encreases his impudence: And his impudence overpowers their credulity.
    • Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or reflection; but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understanding. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a TULLY or a DEMOSTHENES could scarcely effect over a ROMAN or ATHENIAN audience, every Capuchin, every itinerant or stationary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching such gross and vulgar passions.
    • The many instances of forged miracles10, and prophecies, and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the most common and most credible events. For instance: There is no kind of report, which rises so easily, and spreads so quickly, especially in country places and provincial towns, as those concerning marriages; insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see each other twice, but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them together. The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the intelligence. And this is so well known, that no man of sense gives attention to these reports, till he find them confirmed by some greater evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still stronger, incline the generality of mankind to believe and report, with the greatest vehemence and assurance, all religious miracles?
    • Thirdly. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority, which always attend received opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations, we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world; where the whole frame of nature is disjointed and every element performs its operations in a different manner, from what it does at present. Battles, revolutions, pestilence, famine, and death, are never the effect of those natural causes, which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles, judgments, quite obscure the few natural events, that are intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn, that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvellous, and that, though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.
    • It is strange, a judicious reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of these wonderful historians, that such prodigious events never happen in our days. But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all ages. You must surely have seen instances enow of that frailty. You have yourself heard many such marvellous relations started, which, being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured, that those renowned lies, which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height, arose from like beginnings; but being sown in a more proper soil, shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate.
    • It was a wise policy in that false prophet11, ALEXANDER, who, though now forgotten, was once so famous, to lay the first scene of his impostures in PAPHLAGONIA, where, as LUCIAN tells us, the people were extremely ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion. People at a distance, who are weak enough to think the matter at all worth enquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better information. The stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances. Fools are industrious in propagating the imposture; while the wise and learned are contented, in general, to deride its absurdity, without informing themselves of the particular facts, by which it may be distinctly refuted. And thus the impostor above-mentioned was enabled to proceed, from his ignorant PAPHLAGONIANS, to the enlisting of votaries, even among the GRECIAN philosophers, and men of the most eminent rank and distinction in ROME: Nay, could engage the attention of the sage emperor MARCUS AURELIUS; so far as to make him trust the success of a military expedition to his delusive prophecies.
    • The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among an ignorant people, that, even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generality of them (which, though seldom, is sometimes the case) it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if the first scene has been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad. None of their countrymen have a large correspondence, or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the delusion. Men's inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance. But had ALEXANDER fixed his residence at ATHENS, the philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately spread, throughout the whole roman empire, their sense of the matter; which, being supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is true; LUCIAN, passing by chance through PAPHLAGONIA, had an opportunity of performing this good office. But, though much to be wished, it does not always happen, that every ALEXANDER meets with a LUCIAN, ready to expose and detect his impostures12.
    • I may add as a fourth reason, which diminishes the authority of prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let us consider, that, in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and that it is impossible the religions of ancient ROME, of TURKEY, of SIAM, and of CHINA should, all of them, be established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that system was established; so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other. According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any miracle of MAHOMET or his successors, we have for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous ARABIANS: And on the other hand, we are to regard the authority of TITUS LIVIUS, PLUTARCH, TACITUS, and, in short, of all the authors and witnesses, GRECIAN, CHINESE , and ROMAN CATHOLIC, who have related any miracle in their particular religion; I say, we are to regard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that MAHOMETAN miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument may appear over subtile and refined; but is not in reality different from the reasoning of a judge, who supposes, that the credit of two witnesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the testimony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues distant, at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed.
    • One of the best attested miracles in all profane history, is that which TACITUS reports of VESPASIAN, who cured a blind man in ALEXANDRIA, by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot; in obedience to a vision of the god SERAPIS, who had enjoined them to have recourse to the Emperor, for these miraculous cures. The story may be seen in that fine historian13; where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence, if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition. The gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by ALEXANDER and DEMETRIUS. The historian, a cotemporary writer, noted for candour and veracity, and withal, the greatest and most penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity; and so free from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the contrary imputation, of atheism and profaneness: The persons, from whose authority he related the miracle, of established character for judgment and veracity, as we may well presume; eye-witnesses of the fact, and confirming their testimony, after the FLAVIAN family was despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward, as the price of a lie. Utrumque, qui interfuere, nunc quoque memorant, post quam nullum mendacio pretium. To which if we add the public nature of the facts, as related, it will appear, that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood.
    • There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal DE RETZ, which may well deserve our consideration. When that intriguing politician fled into SPAIN, to avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed through SARAGOSSA, the capital of ARRAGON, where he was shewn, in the cathedral, a man, who had served seven years14 as a door-keeper, and was well known to every body in town, that had ever paid his devotions at that church. He had been seen, for so long a time, wanting a leg; but recovered that limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump15; and the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church; and the whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact; whom the cardinal found, by their zealous devotion, to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here the relater was also contemporary to the supposed prodigy, of an incredulous and libertine character, as well as of great genius; the miracle of so singular a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the witnesses very numerous, and all of them, in a manner, spectators of the fact, to which they gave their testimony. And what adds mightily to the force of the evidence, and may double our surprize on this occasion, is, that the cardinal himself, who relates the story, seems not to give any credit to it, and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He considered justly, that it was not requisite, in order to reject a fact of this nature, to be able accurately to disprove the testimony, and to trace its falsehood, through all the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced it. He knew, that, as this was commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place; so was it extremely difficult, even where one was immediately present, by reason of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and roguery of a great part of mankind. He therefore concluded, like a just reasoner, that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a miracle supported by any human testimony, was more properly a subject of derision than of argument.
    • There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person, than those, which were lately said to have been wrought in FRANCE upon the tomb of Abbé PARIS, the famous JANSENIST, with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were every where talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But what is more extraordinary; many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent theatre that is now in the world. Nor is this all: A relation of them was published and dispersed every where; nor were the Jesuits, though a learned body, supported by the civil magistrate, and determined enemies to those opinions, in whose favour the miracles were said to have been wrought, ever able distinctly to refute or detect them16. Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation.
    • Is the consequence just, because some human testimony has the utmost force and authority in some cases, when it relates the battle of PHILIPPI or PHARSALIA for instance; that therefore all kinds of testimony must, in all cases, have equal force and authority? Suppose that the CAESAREAN and POMPEIAN factions had, each of them, claimed the victory in these battles, and that the historians of each party had uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own side; how could mankind, at this distance, have been able to determine between them? The contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related by HERODOTUS or PLUTARCH, and those delivered by MARIANA, BEDE, or any monkish historian.
    • The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favours the passion of the reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his family, or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations and propensities. But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a character? Or if, by the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man has first made a convert of himself, and entered seriously into the delusion; who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds, in support of so holy and meritorious a cause?
    • The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame; because the materials are always prepared for it. The avidum genus auricularum the gazing populace17, receive greedily, without examination, whatever sooths superstition, and promotes wonder.
    • How many stories of this nature, have, in all ages, been detected and exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon is obvious; and we judge in conformity to regular experience and observation, when we account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature?
    • I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any private or even public history, at the place, where it is said to happen: much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgment, which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions. But the matter never comes to any issue, if trusted to the common method of altercation and debate and flying rumours; especially when men's passions have taken part on either side.
    • In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery.
    • No means of detection remain, but those which must be drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters: And these, though always sufficient with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of the vulgar.
    • Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle18 has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof, derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but substract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here explained, this substraction, with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion.
    • I beg the limitations here made19 may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history. Thus, suppose, all authors, in all languages, agree, that, from the first of JANUARY 1600, there was total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: Suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people: That all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction: It is evident that our present philosophers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived20. The decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many analogies, that any phaenomenon, which seems to have a tendency towards catastrophe, comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and uniform.
    • But suppose, that all the historians who treat of ENGLAND , should agree, that, on the first of JANUARY 1600, Queen ELIZABETH dies; that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court, as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being interred a month, she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed ENGLAND for three years: I must confess that I should be surprised at the occurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. I should not doubt of her pretended death, and of those other public circumstances that followed it: I should only assert it to have been pretended, and that it neither was, nor possibly could be real. You would in vain object to me the difficulty, and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence; the wisdom and solid judgment21 of that renowned queen; with the little or advantage which she could reap from so poor an artifice: All this might astonish me; but I would still reply, that such the knavery and folly of men are such common phaenomena, that I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence, than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature.
    • But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion; men, in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but reject it without farther examination. Though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed, be, in this case. Almighty, it does not, upon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions, in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation, and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men, with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable. As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact; this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a general resolution, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretence it may be covered.
    • Lord BACON22 seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning. ‘We ought,’ says he, ‘to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or productions, and in a word of every thing new, rare, and extraordinary in nature. But this must be done with the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all, every relation must be considered as suspicious, which depends in any degree upon religion, as the prodigies of LIVY: And no less so, every thing that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchimy, or such authors, who seem, all of them, to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable.
    • I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian Religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason, and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. To make this more evident, let us examine those miracles, related in scripture; and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field, let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch, which we shall examine, according to the principles of those pretended Christians, not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere human writer and historian. Here then we are first to consider a book, presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present: Of our fall from that state: Of the age of man, extended to near a thousand years: Of the destruction of the world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary choice of one people, as the favourites of heaven; and that people the countrymen of the author: Of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable: I desire any one to lay his hand upon his heart, and after a serious consideration declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which is, however, necessary to make it be received, according to the measures of probability above established.
    • What we have said of miracles may be applied, without any variation, to prophecies; and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and as such only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretel future events, it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from heaven. So that upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.
  3. Editions, referred to in the Footnotes
    → Edition E. Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding. London: A Millar, 1748.
    → Edition F. Ditto. 2nd ed. London: Printed for M. Cooper, MDCCLI.
    → Edition K. Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. London: A Millar. MDCCLIII–IV.
    → Edition M. Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. London: A Millar. MDCCLVIII.
    → Edition N. Ditto. MDCCLX.
    → Edition O. Ditto. MDCCLXIV.
    → Edition P. Ditto. Printed for A. Millar, A. Kincaid, J. Bell, and A. Donaldson in Edinburgh. MDCCLXVIII.
    → Edition Q. Ditto. Printed for T. Cadell, MDCCLXX.

Paper Comment



In-Page Footnotes ("Hume (David) - Of Miracles")

Footnote 1: Footnote 2:
  • [In all prophane history: Editions E and F.]
Footnote 3:
  • [Editions E to K substitute: Did not Men's Imagination naturally follow their Memory.]
Footnote 4:
  • [This paragraph was added in Edition K.]
Footnote 5:
  • PLUTARCH, in vita Catonis Min. 19.
Footnote 6:
  • [This paragraph was added in Edition F.]
Footnote 7:
  • NO INDIAN, it is evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to tell a priori what will result from it. It is making a new experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One may sometime conjecture from analogy what will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that, in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational INDIAN would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it come to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony, to render it credible to people in a warm climate: But still it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of SUMATRA have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they never saw water in MOSCOVY during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence. [This note first appears in the last page of Edition F, with the preface: The distance of the Author from the Press is the Cause, why the following Passage arriv'd not in time to be inserted in its proper Place.]
Footnote 8:
  • Sometimes an event may not, in itself, seem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some Circumstances, be denominated a miracle; because, in fact, it is contrary to these laws. Thus if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little a force requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us.
Footnote 9:
  • [In any History: Editions E and F.]
Footnote 10:
  • [This paragraph was printed as a note in Editions E to P.]
Footnote 11:
  • [Cunning impostor: Editions E to P.]
Footnote 12:
  • [Editions E to P append the following note: It may here, perhaps, be objected, that I proceed rashly, and form my notions of ALEXANDER merely from the account given of him by LUCIAN, a professed enemy. It were, indeed, to be wished, that some of the accounts published by his followers and accomplices had remained. The opposition and contrast between the character and conduct of the same man, as drawn by friend or enemy, is as strong, even in common life, much more in these religious matters, as that betwixt any two men in the world, betwixt ALEXANDER and St. PAUL, for instance. See a letter to GILBERT WEST, Esq; on the conversion and apostleship pf St. PAUL.]
Footnote 13:
  • Hist. Lib. v. cap. 8. SUETONIUS gives nearly the same account in vita VESP. 7. [The reference to Suetonius was added in the Eratta to Edition F.].
Footnote 14:
  • [20: Editions E to N.]
Footnote 15:
  • [Editions E and F substitute: And when the Cardinal examin'd it, he found it to be a true natural Leg, like the other.]
Footnote 16:
  • This book was writ by Mons. MONTERON, counsellor or judge of the parhammet of PARIS, a man of a figure and character, who was also a martyr to the cause, and is now said to be somewhere in a dungeon on account of his book.
  • There is another book in three volumes (called Recueil des Miracles de l'Abbé PARIS) giving an account of many of these miracles, and accompanied with prefatory discourses, which are very well written. There runs, however, through the whole of these a ridiculous comparison between the miracles of our Saviour and those of the Abbé; wherein it is asserted, that the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former: As if the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that of God himself, who conducted the pen of the inspired writers. If these writers, indeed, were to be considered merely as human testimony, the FRENCH author is very moderate in his comparison: since he might, with some appearance of reason, pretend, that the JANSENIST miracles much surpass the other ill evidence and authority. The following circumstances are drawn from authentic papers, inserted in the above-mentioned book.
  • Many of the miracles of Abbé PARIS were proved immediately by witnesses before the officiality or bishop's court at PARIS, under the eye of cardinal NOAILLES, whose character for integrity and capacity was never contested even by his enemies.
  • His [M. de Ventimille.-ED] successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the JANSENISTS, and for that reason promoted to the see by the court. Yet 22 rectors or cures of PARIS with infinite earnestness, press him to examine those miracles, which they assert to be known to the whole world, and undisputably certain: But he wisely forbore.
  • The MOLINIST party had tried to discredit these miracles in one instance, that of Madamoiselle le FRANC. But, besides that their proceedings were in many respects the most irregular in the world, particularly in citing only a few of the JANSENIST witnesses, whom they tampered with: Besides this, I say, they soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses, one hundred and twenty in number, most of them persons of credit and substance in PARIS, who gave oath for the miracle. This was accompanied with a solemn and earnest appeal to the parliament. But the parliament were forbidden by authority to meddle in the affair. It was at last observed, that where men are heated by zeal and enthusiasm, there is no degree of human testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest absurdity: And those who will be so silly as to examine the affair by that medium, and seek particular flaw in the testimony, are almost sure to be confounded. It must be a miserable imposture, indeed, that does not prevail in that contest.
  • All who have been in FRANCE about that time have heard of the reputation of Mons. HERAUT, the lieutenant de Police, whose vigilance, penetration, activity, and extensive intelligence have been much talked of. This magistrate, who by the nature of his office is almost absolute, was invested with full powers, on purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles; and he frequently seized immediately, and examined the witnesses and subjects of them: But never could reach any thing satisfactory against them.
  • In the case of Madamoiselle THIBAUT he sent the famous DE SYLVA to examine her; whose evidence is very curious. The physician declares, that it was impossible she could have been so ill as was proved by witnesses; because it was impossible she could, in so short a time, have recovered so perfectly as he found her. He reasoned, like a man of sense, from natural causes; but the opposite party told him that the whole was a miracle, and that his evidence was the very best proof of it.
  • The MOLINISTS were in a sad dilemma. They durst not assert the absolute insufficiency of human evidence, to prove a miracle. They were obliged to say, that these miracles were wrought by witchcraft and the devil. But they were told, that this was the resource of the jews of old.
  • No JANSENIST was ever embarrassed to account for the cessation of the miracles, when the church-yard was shut up by the king's edict. It was the touch of the tomb, which produced these extraordinary effects, and when no one could approach the tomb, no effects could be expected. God, indeed, could have thrown down the walls in a moment; but he is master of his own graces and works, and it belongs not to us to account for them. He did not throw down the walls of every city like those of jericho , on the sounding of the rams' horns, nor break up the prison of every apostle, like that of St. PAUL.
  • No less a man, than the Duc de CHATILLION, a duke and peer of FRANCE, of the highest rank and family, gives evidence of a miraculous cure, performed upon a servant of his, who had lived several years in his house with a visible and palpable infirmity.
  • I shall conclude with observing, that no clergy are more celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the secular clergy of France, particularly the rectors or cures of PARIS, who bear testimony to these impostures.
  • The learning, genius, and probity of the gentlemen, and the austerity of the nuns of PORT-ROYAL, have been much celebrated all over EUROPE. Yet they all give evidence for a miracle, wrought on the niece of the famous PASCAL, whose sanctity of life, as well as extraordinary capacity, is well known. [Edition F adds: Tho’ he also was a Believer, in that and in many other Miracles, which he had less opportunity of being inform'd of. See his Life. Here Edition F. stops.] The famous RACINE gives an account of this miracle in his famous history of PORT-ROYAL, and fortifies it with all the proofs, which a multitude of nuns, priests, physicians, and men of the world, all of them of undoubted credit, could bestow upon it. Several men of letters, particularly the bishop of TOURNAY, thought this miracle so certain, as to employ it in the refutation of atheists and free-thinkers. The queen-regent of FRANCE, who was extremely prejudiced against the PORT-ROYAL, sent her own physician to examine the miracle, who returned an absolute convert. In short, the supernatural cure was so uncontestable, that it saved, for a time, that famous monastery from the ruin with which it was threatened by the JESUITS. Had it been a cheat, it had certainly been detected by such sagacious and powerful antagonists, and must have hastened the ruin of the contrivers. Our divines, who can build up a formidable castle from such despicable materials, what a prodigious fabric could they have reared from these and many other circumstances, which I have not mentioned! How often would the great names of PASCAL, RACINE, ARNAUD, NICOLE, have resounded in our ears? But if they be wise, they had better adopt the miracle, as being more worth, a thousand times, than all the rest of their collection. Besides, it may serve very much to their purpose. For that miracle was really performed by the touch of an authentic holy prickle of the holy thorn, which composed the holy crown, which, &c. [This note was added in Edition F.]
Footnote 17:
  • LUCRET. iv. 594. [This reference was added in Edition F, and the mistranslation was inserted in the text in Edition M.]
Footnote 18:
  • [Can ever possibly amount to: Editions E and F.]
Footnote 19:
  • [This and the three following paragraphs are given as a note in Editions E to P.]
Footnote 20:
  • [This sentence was added in Edition K.]
Footnote 21:
  • [And integrity: Editions E to P.]
Footnote 22:
  • [This paragraph, which is not found in Editions E and F, is also put in the note in Editions K to P. It is quoted in Latin in Editions K to Q.]. Nov. Org. lib. ii. aph. 29.


"Hume (David) - Some Objections to the Cosmological Argument"

Source: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"James (William) - The Will to Believe"

Source: The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


Brief Note
  • This paper is in large part a response to "Clifford (William K.) - The Ethics of Belief".
  • Both papers are discussed in the first Chapter of "Blackburn (Simon) - Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed".
  • James agrees that Clifford’s paper – while too strident – has some truth, but doesn’t think the “scientific method” is the correct method for addressing all our beliefs.
  • In particular, in inter-personal relations – which may include relation to the Divine – if we wait for proof we will get nowhere. All relations demand basic acceptance to get going. In them lack of trust is as bad as rejection.
  • This applies to beliefs that are “live options” for us.
  • I may add more when I’ve read what Blackburn has to say.


"Kant (Immanuel) - Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof"

Source: Critique of Pure Reason; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Kant (Immanuel) - The Moral Argument"

Source: Critique of Practical Reason; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Leibniz (Gottfried) - The Argument Reduced to Syllogistic Form"

Source: Theodicy; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion

Paper Comment

The Problem of Evil


"Mackie (J.L.) - Kant on the Moral Argument"

Source: The Miracle of Theism; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Mavrodes (George I.) - Religion and the Queerness of Mortality"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"McTaggart (J. McT. E.) - The Dependency Argument"

Source: Some Dogmas of Religion; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Nielsen (Kai) - A Critique of Wittgensteinian Fideism"

Source: The Autonomy of Religious Belief; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Paley (William) - The Evidence of Design"

Source: Natural Theology; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Pascal (Blaise) - The Wager"

Source: Pensees; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Phillips (D.Z.) - Philosophy, Theology and the Reality of God"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Pike (Nelson) - Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Plantinga (Alvin) - A Modal Version of the Ontological Argument"

Source: God, Freedom and Evil; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion

Paper Comment

Same as "Plantinga (Alvin) - The Ontological Argument"


"Plantinga (Alvin) - Is Belief in God Properly Basic?"

Source: Nous, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1981 A. P. A. Western Division Meetings, Mar., 1981, pp. 41-51; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


Philosophers Index Abstract
    I argue that it is entirely rational to accept belief in god as basic--that is, without evidence and not on the basis of other propositions.

Paper Comment


"Plantinga (Alvin) - The Free Will Defense"

Source: God, Freedom, and Evil; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Price (H.H.) - The Problem of Life After Death"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion

Paper Comment

For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File1.


"Quinton (Anthony) - The Soul"

Source: Perry - Personal Identity


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. This is an argument for the constructability of an empirical concept of the soul, which, like Locke's, interprets the soul as a sequence of mental states logically distinct from the body and is neutral with regard to the problem of the subject.
  2. The soul is defined as a series of mental states connected by continuity of character and memory.
  3. The objection that a memory criterion presupposes a bodily criterion is considered.
  4. Arguments for it are judged forceful but not conclusive.
  5. Finally, the paper deals with the complex question whether a soul can exist in an entirely disembodied1 state.

Paper Comment

For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File2.


"Rowe (William L.) - The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion

Paper Comment

Also in "Howard-Snyder (Daniel), Ed. - The Evidential Argument from Evil".


"Rowe (William L.) - Two Criticisms of the Cosmological Argument"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Rowe (William L.) & Wainwright (William J.) - Arguments for the Existence of God: Introduction"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Rowe (William L.) & Wainwright (William J.) - Death and Immortality: Introduction"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Rowe (William L.) & Wainwright (William J.) - Faith and Miracles: Introduction"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Rowe (William L.) & Wainwright (William J.) - Mysticism and Religious Experience: Introduction"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Rowe (William L.) & Wainwright (William J.) - Objections to Traditional Theism: Introduction"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Rowe (William L.) & Wainwright (William J.) - The Nature and Attributes of God: Introduction"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Rowe (William L.) & Wainwright (William J.) - The Problem of Evil: Introduction"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Smart (Ninian) - Numinous Experience and Mystical Experience"

Source: A Dialogue of Religions; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Stace (Walter) - The Nature of Mysticism"

Source: The Teachings of the Mystics; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Swinburne (Richard) - Miracles"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


Philosophers Index Abstract
    (I understand by a miracle, a violation of a law of nature by a god.) A violation of a law of nature is the occurrence of a non-repeatable counter-instance to it. Contrary to hume's view, there could be good historical evidence both that a violation had occurred and that it was due to the act of a god.


"Tillich (Paul) - Revelation and Miracle"

Source: Systematic Theology; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Wider Teleological Argument"

Source: Metaphysics; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Wainwright (William J.) - The Cognitive Status of Mystical Experience"

Source: Mysticism: A Study of Its Nature, Cognitive Value, and Moral Implications; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Wainwright (William J.) - Worldviews, Criteria and Epistemic Circularity"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Wittgenstein (Ludwig) - Religious Belief"

Source: Lectures and Conversations; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Wykstra (Stephen) - Towards a Sensible Evidentialism: On the Notion of 'Needing Evidence'"

Source: Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


"Zaehner (R.C.) - Nature Mysticism, Soul Mysticism and Theistic Mysticism"

Source: Mysticism: Sacred and Profane; Rowe & Wainwright - Philosophy of Religion


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)


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