Write-up1 (as at 06/02/2026 20:41:17): Mill on the Higher Pleasures
Introductory Note
- This is the third of my three pre-submitted BA Finals essays on Ethics. Caveat lector! I never got the hang of ethics. This essay addresses utilitarianism. Can Mill successfully explain why it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied?
- This Essay was previously only available as a PDF: Click here.
- I may update this essay with my current thoughts in due course. For now it’s ‘as was’.
Does Mill successfully explain why it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied?
- Mill’s argument for why it is better to be Socrates is contained in the following passage:
“…. (1) a sense of dignity … is so essential a part of happiness to those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them. (2) Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness – that the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not happier than the inferior – confounds two very different ideas, of happiness and content. (3) It is indisputable that the being whose capacities for enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and (4) a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which we can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But … (5) its imperfections … will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify. (6) It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; (7) better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. (8) And, if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question.” (Mill [1861], p.10, my numbering).
- Mill’s account of the good life
- In order to address the question we need to consider just what Mill thinks is the human good. This is Utility, which is pleasure together with the absence of pain. Utility is not to be confused with gross pleasure, for instance a life of beer and football. Mill considers many sorts of pleasures, in particular the intellectual, moral and aesthetic higher pleasures that are contrasted with the merely sensual.
- For Mill, all desirable things are so either due to their inherent pleasureableness or as means to providing pleasure or avoiding pain. In taking this stand, Mill is, as Crisp [1997] points out, a full hedonist. That is, he is a hedonist because he takes it that Utility consists in pleasurable experiences. He is a full hedonist because he believes that it is the pleasure to be had from these pleasant things that is what makes them good.
- Mill can adequately counter the objection that it is mean and groveling to have no higher end than pleasure, an end suitable only for swine. He argues that responding in this way accounts human beings capable only of enjoying swinish pleasures. If this were true, the rule of life for one would be good enough for the other. This imputation is seen as degrading to humans precisely because swinish pleasures don’t satisfy the human conception of happiness. Humans have higher capacities than do swine, and once these capacities have been awakened, don’t count themselves happy unless these capacities are to some degree satisfied.
- Higher and Lower Pleasures
- Mill divides pleasures into higher and lower. To quote:
“Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experienced both give a decided preference … that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account” (Mill [1861], p. 9).
- This preference must be irrespective of felt moral obligation to do so; that is, they really do prefer the higher to the lower, and not just think that they ought to do so.
- The Competent Judge
- Mill thinks we can ascribe superiority in quality to a pleasure if competent individuals prefer it, even at the cost of some pain, to other pleasures, no quantity of which will equate to it. He claims that it’s an empirical fact that those acquainted with both higher and lower pleasures prefer the manner of existence that employs the higher faculties. No- one appraised of the higher faculties would be content to be transformed into a beast, fool, ignoramus or base person however much lower pleasure might accrue to him in that situation. Importantly, Mill sees an exception where unhappiness is so great that any alternative would do. Our question doesn’t really expect us to argue that it’s better to be Socrates than the satisfied fool in any conceivable circumstance.
- At point (8) of his argument, Mill claims that if the fool thinks of himself as better off than Socrates, it’s because he’s not a competent judge – he only knows half the story. Consequently, Mill has to address the problem of the wrong choices made by people who are supposed to be competent judges. He acknowledges that people may, through weakness, or through unsuitable society or occupations, pursue the nearer but lesser good knowing that they are thereby sacrificing a greater but more remote good. He also acknowledges that youthful zeal decays into indolence. Mill doubts that the decline is the result of voluntary choice of the lower over the higher pleasures, but thinks that devotion to the lower makes such people insensitive to the higher. The nobler feelings decay for want of sustenance. Mill thinks an attempt to combine both higher and lower pleasures has a tendency to lead to breakdown, but it seems to me that this is true only in cases of excess. In fact, any excess can lead to breakdown, as Mill himself knew by his early excessive attachment to the higher pleasures.
- Why prefer the higher pleasures?
- The competent judge does indeed prefer the higher pleasures, but what, for Mill, explains this fact? Can we say that the higher pleasures are “more pleasurable” than the lower? This can seem to be a blunder that completely undermines the quality / quantity distinction that Mill tries to set up. It is true that Mill has “more desirable”, not “more pleasurable”. However, on the assumption that what is desirable is good, and the Good for Mill is pleasure, then the only reason open to Mill for desiring one thing rather than another is because it is, mediately or immediately, more pleasurable.
- I do need to face the commonsense objection that not all pleasures are commensurable. Does it make sense to ask whether reading a novel is more desirable than eating a hearty meal? Mill claims that in general it is. However, this doesn’t argue against the claim that, given a context, the two pleasures are commensurable, and the choice of action is based on comparison. If I’m exceptionally tired and hungry, I will prefer the meal, even though in most circumstances I might prefer the novel. The full hedonist, intent on maximising his happiness as a rational hedonist ought, needs a calculus that tells him how pleasurable one course of action or another is. I choose one pleasure over the other because, in that situation, it is more pleasurable – or is at least a necessary means to preserving a pleasurable life.
- A balanced life?
- It is true that Mill wants to maintain a clear qualitative distinction between the higher and lower pleasures, so that he can show his opponents that hedonism doesn’t lead to swinishness. But, in allowing quantity to be of “small account” he doesn’t dismiss the lower pleasures altogether, nor is it sensible to do so.
- I think the thought of choosing one pleasure exclusively over another is mistaken. What We need a sensible balance. The higher pleasures will still preponderate in the optimal life because their intensity is greater. However, the lower pleasures are not needed just to fill in when we’re too tired, bored or exhausted for philosophy, but are required for us to lead a fulfilled and balanced life.
- I suggest that it is prudent to agree that some pleasures are indeed better than others, but not at all times and places; and that the competent judge would agree with this evaluation. Because of the kind of organism human beings are, we require a variety of pleasures. Taking Crisp’s examples, neither a life totally devoted to appreciating fine malts, nor one devoted to reading Jane Austen, is optimal, but rather one in which higher and lower pleasures are blended together and where the pleasure accruing to any particular experience depends on its context. The higher pleasures are indeed more pleasurable, but not in all circumstances. It might be that, if forced to choose between x units of higher pleasure A and y units of lower pleasure B, in the situation where choosing for A meant that throughout the whole of life one had none of pleasure B, and vice versa, one would choose pleasure A whatever the ratio x:y. However, choices are not usually of an “all or none” variety.
- The point Mill needed to make is that it’s more likely that we’d choose a mixture of the two pleasures. We might prefer pleasure A to pleasure B, but not exclusively. We’d have to complicate our calculus, of course. Maybe we would make the marginal utility of any pleasure, whether higher or lower, decrease the more of a glut was enjoyed in any particular time, or increase the more of a dearth. In that way, we might be able to explain why it is rational for the hedonist to choose the steak over a 25th chapter of Dostoyevsky.
- Happiness versus satisfaction
- We should note that Socrates unhappy may well be worse off than a happy fool. The thought of Socrates unhappy doesn’t contradict the thought of our questioner; that Socrates dissatisfied is better off than a fool satisfied. For Mill, the unhappy Socrates would be one for whom pain preponderates over pleasure. There may be “higher pains” as well as higher pleasures. That is, not only may the person of refined sensibilities by more sensitive to “lower” pains, but will find some things grieving that those of lower sensibilities either ignore or find satisfying. The vandal’s pleasure is the aesthete’s pain.
- I understand satisfaction etymologically; that one has had enough of what one desires, that one has no more urgent desires, and is content. The dissatisfied Socrates is one whose desires are (substantially) unfulfilled, but who may yet be happy because his pleasures exceed his pains. Mill agrees, at stage (3) of his argument, that the being of lower faculties has a higher probability of being satisfied, because he has fewer desires. But, he points out at stage (2) that someone supposing that the superior being is not happier than the inferior in like circumstances confuses happiness with contentment. At stages (4) and (5) of his argument, Mill points out that the “highly endowed being” will not envy the inferior because the only reason the inferior is satisfied is that he doesn’t even recognise the higher pleasures that the superior realises are imperfect.
- Mill claims at stage (3) of his argument that the capacity for pleasure of the being of lower faculties is lower, so they are not likely to be better off. However, when he says, at stage (2), “in anything like equal circumstances” he speaks obscurely. Would Socrates really be happier in the next trough to a pig? He would certainly be dissatisfied and discontented, but would he nonetheless be happier? He’d certainly have the potential for greater happiness, but then were the circumstances to be realised so that Socrates could enjoy his higher pleasures, the circumstances would no longer be the same. True, in changed circumstances he would be happier than the pig in those circumstances, but in the hypothetical circumstances he’s in, he isn’t.
- Consequently, we should consider the negative Utility associated with dissatisfaction a little more seriously. There is one sense in which dissatisfaction has positive Utility, in being a spur to further endeavour and so a mediate cause of pleasure. However, dissatisfaction has another sense – that of frustration – which might be seen as more irritating to the person of higher sensitivities than to one of lower. That is, frustration may be a higher pain, and not just an absence of pleasure.Mill can respond that the higher being has more scope, and if frustrated in one endeavour has many others to pursue, whereas the fool has nowhere to go when his base pleasures are frustrated or grow tedious. While the higher being can make better use of opportunities, he has more to fall back on within himself when these opportunities fail and can accommodate himself to whatever the situation offers.
- Why not be Socrates?
- Mill thinks that a person of higher faculties is more exposed to suffering, and requires more for satisfaction than others, but also thinks that he would never really consent to descend to a lower order of existence. He suggests that this may be attributable to pride or to love of freedom, power or excitement – but most appropriately on account of dignity. This dignity is held in rough proportion to the exercise of the higher powers.
- We might ask whether Mill can legitimately help himself to these human goods of pride, dignity or love of freedom. It’s important for Mill that these can all be cashed out in terms of pleasure, and this does seem possible. Mill’s claim at point (1) of his argument is that pride and dignity, even if not intrinsically pleasurable, stop us descending to excess in the lower pleasures which, because of their disruptive effect on the possibility of enjoying the higher pleasures, make life as a whole less pleasurable if indulged.
- Conclusion
- Let us now review Mill’s explanation of why it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. Socrates has had his higher capacities awakened, enabling him to enjoy the higher pleasures. Higher pleasures are, according to Mill, qualitatively more enjoyable than the lower pleasures, though I would say not incommensurably so – the quantity of lower pleasures is of small account, not of no account. Exposure to the higher pleasures raises the stakes. Opportunities for happiness rise, but so does the risk of unhappiness. Because of the raised stakes, a wise man will normally be happier than a fool, unless he is continually unhappy and his life has negative utility. Socrates is, ex hypothesi, dissatisfied, but not unhappy, because he is at least to some degree satisfied by the higher pleasures. Life has positive Utility for him, even though many of his desires remain unsatisfied. He can pleasurably recollect his past achievements and has the prospects for future enjoyment. The fool may be both satisfied and happy, but Socrates is happier because of his greater enjoyment of the higher pleasures. Because he is happier, it is better to be him, because happiness is what the good life consists in1.
- Bibliography
In-Page Footnotes
Footnote 1:
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (06/02/2026 20:41:17).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)