Author's Abstract
- This paper outlines the views of two 17th Century thinkers (Thomas Jackson and John Locke) on the question of the metaphysics of resurrection1.
- I show that Jackson and Locke2 each depart from central 17th Century Scholastic convictions regarding resurrection and philosophical anthropology (convictions laid out in §1). Each holds that matter or material continuity is not a plausible principle of diachronic individuation for living bodies such as human beings.
- Despite their rejection of the traditional view, they each provide a defence of the possibility of a personal afterlife3.
- I outline these (quite different) defences in §2-3.
- I then argue (§4) that it is likely either that Locke had read Jackson on the issue of resurrection or that the two were influenced by a common source.
- I argue that matter4 might provide a suitable principle of diachronic individuation in both everyday cases of living bodies5 and in the case of resurrection.
ContentsIntroduction
- The background: the resurrection of the same body in Late Scholasticism
- Thomas Jackson’s defence of resurrection
→ 2.2 The sceptical rebuttal: Continuous life as principle of individuation
- Locke’s view of the individuation of living bodies as (implicit) criticism of resurrection
- Jackson and Locke: Historical influence?
- Matter as principle of individuation?
- Conclusions
Bibliography:
Author’s Conclusions
- I have argued that Thomas Jackson provided a critical treatment of resurrection in the 17th Century which has gone hitherto unexplored. Jackson’s reflections are an important step in the ascendancy of Platonism in the 17th Century, and they also anticipate aspects of John Locke’s rejection of matter as a principle of individuation.
- I have also outlined Locke’s reflections on the resurrection of the living body and suggested some modest influence from Jackson.
- Finally, I have argued that material continuity is more plausible than Jackson or Locke admit, since they misunderstand the traditional account of material continuity. That is, substantial material continuity – rather than strict retention of matter – constitutes the material condition of everyday diachronic identity in the Aristotelian tradition. Such substantial material continuity is also a natural and reasonable necessary condition for resurrection of the same living body.
- Furthermore, when put in its place as a necessary condition on the identity of the living body at resurrection, the material condition can avoid problems of shared matter.
- Therefore, the Scholastic notion that the living body of the human being can possibly be resurrected at the Last Day – and that it might even be a resurrection of the very same flesh – is more plausible than either Jackson or Locke imagined.
Notes
- As this paper is a discussion of Locke’s views, see my Note on Locke6, which will need updating in the light of this Paper and my comments thereon.
- For the primary text of Locke, see "Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity".
- There were doubts in Locke’s day about his Christian orthodoxy (and some other luminaries). They were accused of being Socinians7, though this became a general term of abuse.
- Socinians denied the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, and Udo Thiel8 thinks this influenced Locke’s account of PID. Neither I nor the author wish to pursue the matter further.
- The doctrine of the resurrection of the body was more central to Locke’s concerns, and it’s this matter that is pursued in this essay.
- Thompson cites "Boeker (Ruth) - Locke on Personal Identity: A Response to the Problems of His Predecessors" as ‘insightful’ but says her analysis doesn’t sufficiently focus on the then current doctrine of the resurrection of the same body.
- We’re referred to9 "Ayers (Michael R.) - Personal Identity Before the Essay", p. 256, as supporting the importance of the resurrection in Locke’s account of PID.
- Diachronic individuation: what makes an individual identified at different times the same (or different). Locke thinks of Identity as diachronic but individuation as synchronic. We’re referred to Antonia Fitzpatrick for the alternative view (equating Identity and individuation). Also to "Furth (Montgomery) - Transtemporal Stability in Aristotelian Substances", which I’ve not had time to read – though I read "Code (Alan) - What Is It To Be An Individual?" which is a response to it. There are interesting discussions on individuation, persistence, (resistance to) metamorphosis10 and the role of Matter11 in persistence. I should follow this up.
- Locke is responding to the late Scholastics, who claimed that resurrection saw the return of ‘the same numerical body’, a reassembly of ‘the same particles’. There are problems with this idea, so, Locke makes a sharp distinction between the identity of the Person12 and the identity of the Body13 as a collection of particles.
- Locke does distinguish between ‘masses of matter’ and Organisms14 (in the case of human beings his term is ‘Men’) – which are individuated by their Lives15. Despite organisms having different – and more tolerant – persistence conditions to those of ‘masses of matter’, Locke thinks that sameness of Consciousness16 is the only sure determinant of resurrection (into another body, if necessary). This puts him at odds with Bishop Stillingfleet17. He thinks that resurrection of ‘numerically the same living body’ is impossible18.
- Locke is explicit that the resurrection is central to his concerns in the 2nd Edition of the Essay. Thompson quotes from Section 1519, and also cites Sections 2120 and 2621 but notes that Locke changes “Resurrection of the Body after death” to “Resurrection of the Dead” in the 4th Edition22.
- … to be continued
Bibliography23
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→ "Lukasiewicz (Jan) - The Principle of Individuation: I"
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→ "Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke (Vol 1 - Epistemology)"
→ "Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology)"
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→ "Strickland (Lloyd) - Review - Forstrom: John Locke and Personal Identity"
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In-Page Footnotes
Footnote 7: Footnote 8:
- I don’t have, and can’t find free on-line the work cited.
Footnote 9:
- I’ve hitherto ignored this aspect of Ayers’ account of Locke. I need to catch up now!
Footnote 17: Footnote 18: Footnote 22:
- We’re referred to Section 23.
- I’ve not yet resolved the textual differences between the two editions, but can’t find either reference.
- It may be that Thompson is comparing Locke’s ideas at the time of the First Edition of the Essay with the text of the Fourth Edition.
- I’m not sure I care enough to get to the bottom of this.
Footnote 23:
- I have neither the time nor the inclination to follow up on the author’s arguments in the history of ideas, but only on philosophy-proper as it impinges on my studies in PID and the possibility of resurrection for human beings.
- Consequently, I’ve only provided links to those relevant books and papers I already had in my library or could easily obtain on-line.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)