Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts

INTRODUCTION – 6
1. ‘D’ – 17
   1. Methodological preliminaries: descriptivism and conceptualist-realism – 19
      1. Conceptualist-realism – 21
         
   2. Wiggins’ D thesis – 26
      1. Is D a metaphysical or psychological thesis? – 26
      2. The reciprocal elucidation of identity and individuation – 33
      3. Sortal identity and relative identity – 40
      4. Principles of individuation – 43
         
   3. Artefacts and natural objects – 48
      1. The semantics of natural kind words – 49
      2. Artefact words and puzzles – 51
      3. Wiggins’ view of the existence of artefacts – 54
      4. Wiggins’ view of the substancehood of artefacts – 58
      5. Wiggins’ view of substance – 63
         
   4. Conclusion – 70
      
2. THE HUMAN BEING THEORY – 72
   1. Neo-Lockean and animalist readings – 75
      1. Quasi-memory – 79
      2. Against an ‘animalist’ reading – 80
         
   2. Arguments from conceptual consilience – 83
      1. The Strawsonian argument: a preliminary link – 83
      2. The semantic argument and the Animal Attribute View – 89
      3. An argument from interpretation and indexicality – 92
      4. Intermediary conclusion – 95
         
   3. Testing the conceptual connection – 98
      1. A genealogy of the notion of a person – 98
         → i. Preliminaries – 100
         → ii. ‘Person’ as a mask – 102
         → iii. ‘Person’ as a legal fact – 105
         → iv. ‘Person’ as a moral fact, and a metaphysical entity – 108
      2. A critique of Wiggins’ semantic analysis – 110
         
   4. Conclusion – 118
      
3. THE BIOLOGY OF PERSONS – 119
   1. Investigation the human being principle – 121
   2. Are organisms real? – 126
      1. ‘Reductionism’ and ‘anti-reductionism’ – 127
      2. An emergentist reading? – 132
      3. Reasons for doubt – 136
         
   3. Descriptivism and pluralism – 140
      1. Ambitious descriptivism? – 140
      2. A pluralistic picture – 143
      3. Implications of Wiggins’ pluralism – 145
         
   4. A neo-Aristotelian organism concept – 147
      1. Organic unities – 147
      2. Aristotelian organisms – 150
         → i. Teleology – 153
         → ii. Ontological dependence – 156
         
   5. Conclusion – 161
      
4. BRAIN TRANSPLANTATION 163
   1. Changing perspectives – 164
   2. Transplantation and mechanism – 175
      1. Methodological concerns – 175
      2. A suppressed assumption – 178
         
   3. A history of the brain transplantation story – 183
      1. Locke’s mechanistic / corpuscularian picture – 183
      2. The problem of resurrection – 185
      3. A connection – 190
         
   4. Wiggins’ approach to brain transplantation – 192
      1. A shift in metaphysical focus: ‘human persons as artefacts?’ – 192
      2. Final worries – 195
         
5. CONCLUSION – 200
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY – 203

• Introduction
• Personal identity
• Philosophy of biology
• Prospectus
• Overview of texts

1. Chapter 1: D
   • The aim of chapter 1 is largely exegetical. It starts with some methodological points that set out, in general terms, Wiggins’ overall approach to philosophical investigation. He is situated within a Strawsonian ‘descriptive’ tradition, where metaphysical inquiry is guided by investigation of our pre-theoretical thoughts. His work is characterized by an emphasis on elucidation₁₃ (rather than reductive analysis of our everyday thinking) and by careful examination of the way our concepts develop reciprocally₁₄. Some issues with this ‘descriptive’ approach are voiced – most importantly, its association with conceptualism. Wiggins’ response to these objections – realized in his ‘conceptualist-realism’ – is outlined.
   • With these methodological foundations in place, discussion is turned to Wiggins’ D theory, which encapsulates his interrelated claims about identity and individuation. Wiggins’ position is a ‘sortalist’ one; he claims that identity judgments can only be made once it is specified what the items under investigation are (this is his sortal theory of identity). Being able to pick out and re-identify items similarly depends on picking them out as a sort of thing, with a specifiable mode of being or principle of activity (this is his sortal theory of individuation). The exposition of D presented here is developed in response to Paul Snowdon’s reading; it corrects some of the problems with Snowdon’s treatment by putting due emphasis on the reciprocity between our concept of identity and our everyday individuative practices.
   • The final section of this chapter focuses on the natural / artefactual distinction as it figures in Wiggins’ system. Some commentators – Massimiliano Carrara, Pieter Vermaas, Michael Losonsky and Lynne Rudder Baker – claim that Wiggins understands artefacts to have an impoverished ontological status in comparison to natural items. These interpretations are found to be wanting, resulting as they do from terminological confusions. An alternative reading is suggested, whereby artefacts are construed as metaphysically distinct from (natural) substances, without being in anyway inferior.
2. Chapter 2: Personal identity
   • Chapter 2 presents an exposition and critique of Wiggins’ account of personal identity. Though interpreted by some (e.g. Olson) as neo-Lockean and as animalist by others (e.g. Peter Unger), Wiggins’ work resists these readings and the first section of this chapter is focussed on exactly how it straddles the ‘psychological/biological’ division. According to his human being theory we are fundamentally both animate beings and psychological ones. The thought that sits at the heart of this neo-Aristotelian picture is that the concepts person and human being are in some way, non-accidentally concordant. As such, they assign the same underlying mode of being, or ‘principle of activity’.
   • In §2.2., Wiggins’ attempts to elucidate this conceptual consilience are drawn out: the connection is seen to be formed of three interwoven strands: the strawsonian argument, the semantic argument, and the argument from interpretation. While Wiggins has never aspired to lay down a transcendental argument for the conceptual concordance of person and human being these elucidations show why the connection between them may be non-accidental and strong.
   • The aim in §2.3 is to test the strength of the connection – and it is suggested that a genealogical analysis of our notion of ‘a person’ undermines Wiggins’ semantic argument. With this strand severed, the other two are weakened as well, and the conclusion reached is that the connection between person and human being is not as fast as Wiggins supposes.
3. Chapter 3: The biology of persons
   • The discussions in the first two chapters are situated, in the third, in relation to issues in the philosophy of biology. Wiggins advises us to examine our principle of activity through biological inquiry, and the aim of the first section is to identify the controversy around organismic individuation and to demonstrate that, in order to bypass it, Wiggins can turn to Thomas Pradeu’s immunological-physiological account of biological individuation. Having shown how the parameters for a biological inquiry into the human being principle may be set, attention is turned to Wiggins’ claim that human beings – among other organisms – exemplify the category of substance. This is contrasted with the metaphysical reductionist’s claim that organisms are ‘nothing but’ atoms, and are in some way metaphysically less robust than the physical stuff that makes them up.
   • In §3.2, the debate between reductionists and emergentists – like John Dupré – is laid out. An emergentist reading of Wiggins is assayed but ultimately rejected in favour of a neo-Aristotelian one. Where reductionists and emergentists focus on causal dependence, Wiggins focuses on ontological dependence; organisms are just as real as the stuff that makes them up because, in conceiving of them, we cannot but understand them as genuine unities. They are ontologically prior to their parts. This reading of Wiggins is presented in conjunction with an analysis of Aristotle’s anti-reductionism, and an articulation of the metaphysical pluralism that sustains Wiggins’ position.
4. Chapter 4: Brain transplantation
   • The fourth and final chapter revolves around Shoemaker’s brain transplantation story and Wiggins’ responses to this peculiar narrative. The chapter starts with a survey of his shifting attitudes towards it, and describes how, despite numerous concerns, his assessment of the story remains ambiguous. The aim is to draw on the arguments in the previous chapters to demonstrate why the narrative resists Wiggins’ analysis. It is contended that it is underpinned by a mechanistic logic, and that it thus shifts one’s metaphysical focus from organisms – natural substances that are prior to their parts – to ‘living something-or-others’ – entities whose parts can be conceived as separable from the whole. The diagnosis of Shoemaker’s ‘thought experiment’ as mechanistic is supported by reference to Ian Hacking’s analysis of transplantation, and to a speculative historical study (in §4.3.) which links the Lockean position with mechanistic corpuscularianism.
   • These thoughts are further developed by reference to the discussion in chapter 1 about the metaphysical character of artefacts. The notion of a ‘living something-or-other’ is precisified, and the brain transplantation story is seen to describe the adventures of a biological artefact (not an organism). In concluding, the implications for Wiggins’ human being theory are discussed, and the critique offered in chapter 2 is reiterated and reinforced.

• There are inevitable difficulties in trying to compass succinctly that which has taken Wiggins’ himself three substantial books and innumerable articles to set out. Nevertheless, the aim of this first chapter is exposition and exegesis of his thesis ‘D’. The following overview involves a fair amount of glossing, liberal use of (typically lengthy) quotations, and a rather staccato presentation – but it should at least outline some of the rich concepts of substance, sortals, individuation and identity, as they stand in Wiggins’ distinctive philosophical system.
• The chapter is split into three parts. The first provides some necessary methodological background to Wiggins’ metaphysics. His project falls within the descriptivist tradition, and doing so exemplifies a particular method of inquiry that emphasizes how our ordinary everyday thoughts may be used to guide our metaphysical investigations. There is a general concern with this descriptivist approach – its apparent commitment to conceptualism – and Wiggins’ response to this, his ‘conceptualist realism’, is presented in §1.1.a.
• With this methodological groundwork completed, attention is turned to Wiggins’ thesis D. D is the collection of his interrelated theories of identity and individuation, his elucidations of our everyday concept of sameness₁₅. It is a web of claims, and the aim in the second part of this chapter is to draw out the different strands within this web, and show the points of contact between them. In doing this, and in showing how the various elements develop reciprocally, this reading resists a line of interpretation offered by Paul Snowdon that attempts to separate out Wiggins’ D into discrete and disconnected claims.
• §1.3 delves further into the details of Wiggins’ theory. Wiggins states that our everyday thoughts about sameness are sortalist: a cannot be understood to be the same as b without a and b being understood to be the same sort of thing. Relatedly, he holds that our pre-theoretical ability to track items through time and space (i.e. our ability to judge an earlier item a the same as a later item b) involves picking them out as specific sorts of things, with specific principles of activity. But while some sortal terms have profound nomological grounding – putatively natural kinds – others, like artefactual terms, are nomologically shallow. Wiggins questions whether or not artefacts realize genuine principles of activity. The aim in this final section is to assess Wiggins’ elucidation of the substance concept, and to examine whether he takes artefacts to be substances. Baker₁₆, Carrara, Vermaas and Losonsky deny that he does. Their readings are examined, found to be wanting, and an alternative line of interpretation developed.

• The D theory is – as Wiggins has it – a seamless web, and one in which the impolitic reader may become caught and confused. The aim in this chapter has been to emphasize the different strands that constitute it, and their connections. It has been shown how, consonant with his descriptivist methodology, Wiggins develops a sortal theory of identity and individuation that attempts to articulate the reciprocity between those two concepts. The above exposition also sets out his account of the substance concept, its centrality in our individuative practices, and how different items – artefactual or natural – may exemplify it to lesser and greater degrees.
• Simultaneously, this chapter has identified variant readings of Wiggins’ work. Snowdon’s attempt to detach Wiggins’ thoughts about identity and individuation was seen to fail – in large part because of his misinterpretation of ‘individuation’ – and his critique of what he saw to be Wiggins’ ‘psychological’ thesis was consequently dismissed. Vermaas and Carrara interpreted Wiggins as denying the existence of artefacts, and this was read as a Quinean corruption of his neo-Aristotelian position. Relatedly, Rudder Baker’s critique of Wiggins’ view of artefacts was seen to be based on a misattribution of the standard view of the artefact / natural item distinction. It was also seen to neglect the gradations of substancehood that Wiggins describes, and to make a contentious connection between substancehood and ontological superiority. Wiggins’ pluralism allows him to deny that artefacts are paradigm substances without committing him to the claim that they are ‘ontologically inferior’ or less ‘real’.
• Another aim here has been to give reasons for these variant readings. One is the opacity of Wiggins’ writing – though it has been emphasized as well that a systematic, descriptivist work of this kind is perhaps inevitably intricate. Another is the fact that his project sits somewhat outside the Analytic mainstream, which deploys a ‘piece-meal’ approach to philosophical questions. Commentators like Snowdon and Rudder Baker, who attempt to isolate the individual components of his theory, risk missing the connections that hold between these different elements. Thirdly, and more generally, it has been suggested that misinterpretations result from an ahistorical analysis of philosophical questions. Treatments like Vermaas and Carrara, which fail to situate Wiggins’ within the appropriate tradition and use metaphysical terms like ‘exist’ uncritically, will not be able to appropriately engage, or exposit the work in question.
• This chapter has also raised some points for further investigation. Wiggins is seen to rely heavily on the viability of conceptual invariance, and this is discussed more fully in the next chapter, with respect to the person concept. At the end of §1.3 mention was also made of his metaphysical pluralism – and this is set out and examined in §3.3. Questions were also raised about the distinction between artefacts and natural objects, and it was suggested that the metaphysical character of artefacts may be fleshed out in terms of the ontological dependence of their parts – this will bear on the discussions of biological mechanism and transplantation in chapters 3 and 4.

• The theory of individuation that has been set out in the preceding chapter finds distinctive expression in Wiggins’ account of personal identity. In chapter 7 of S&SR (a greatly revised version of the chapter that appeared in S&S) he considers identity judgments about persons, and elaborates the procedures by which we trace ourselves through space and time.
• In accordance with the method outlined above, Wiggins claims that we need to settle on the sortal under which we subsume ourselves before we can examine our principle of activity (and from there, our persistence conditions). What develops is his human being theory – a position novel enough, and subtle enough, to invite multiple, sometimes contradictory, readings. Eric Olson interprets the human being theory as a version of the Neo-Lockean account, whereby we are seen, fundamentally, to be persons – not animals – and our persistence conditions are those of these psychological beings. In contrast, Harold Noonan and Peter Unger position Wiggins as an ‘animalist’, i.e. as holding that we are fundamentally human animals – not persons – with the concomitant biological mode of being. It is the aim of the first section of this chapter to show what these readings capture, and where they falter.
• In essence, these divergent interpretations miss Wiggins’ crucial claim that we are fundamentally both persons and biological beings. This is the thought that lies at the heart of the human being theory – one that is simultaneously productive and controversial. Aside from the other worries it may excite, one is bound to wonder – as Paul Snowdon does – how we can be, fundamentally, more than one sort of thing. Wiggins himself notes that his proposal appears to provoke the worries with relativity with which he started his inquiry. Whatever else we may say, ‘a person’ means something different from ‘a human being’, and hence being one is different from being the other – they have different laws of activity, and thus different persistence conditions₁₇. To accept that we pick ourselves out, correctly, and fundamentally, as both is to accept the relativity of identity, anathema to the Leibnizian formulation of identity that Wiggins defends.
• In §2.2 Wiggins’ ingenious response to this concern is laid out. He claims that, though the terms ‘person’ and ‘human being’ differ in sense (just as ‘equus caballus’ and ‘horse’ capture different aspects of that animal), and though they may even differ in extension, the concepts to which these terms allude are in some way concordant. Our understanding of what a person is interweaves somehow with our understanding of what a human being is. The result of his argument here is briefly stated in an opening passage from chapter 7 of S&SR:
  [I]n so far as they assign any, the concepts person and human being assign the same underlying principle of individuation to A and to B and that that principle, the human being principle, is the one that we have to consult in order to move towards the determination of the truth or falsehood of the judgment that A is B…
  The conceptual consilience Wiggins divines between person and human being allows him to accommodate the insights of both neo-Lockeanism and animalism. It also provides a generative method for answering the puzzles of the personal identity debate. Assessing the identity conditions of persons leads into a well-trodden but nonetheless prickly thicket of philosophy; Wiggins’ advice is to turn to the concordant concept human being to avoid it. Both concepts assign the same underlying principle of individuation – but in the latter case it is less obscure.
• The aim of §2.3 is to problematize the connection Wiggins discerns between person and human being. There are three central struts that support his argument here, which emerge out of his elucidation of the person concept. The first is a Strawsonian point that our concept of a psychological being seems to allude to a biological substrate. The second relates to the semantics of the term ‘person’ – we use it, he argues, as though it were a natural kind word. The third strut is an argument from interpretation and indexicality, which develops out of Davidsonian thoughts about the conditions that must hold for us to be able to interact with one another in the way that we do. In each, Wiggins’ focus is a putatively pre-theoretical concept, an element – like substance – of our conceptual scheme. Yet the contention below is that his semantic analysis misses its target. Our use of the term ‘person’ – inflected by cultural bias – is not a reliable basis for an examination of our (human) conceptual scheme. This point is made, in §2.3.a., by reference to a genealogy of the notion of a person (supported by Marcel Mauss’s historical study). The object of Wiggins’ semantic analysis is shown to be a cultural accretion, devoid of any unifying rationale – a conception, as Wiggins would have it, and not the concept itself.
• The genealogical study demonstrates how cultural biases intrude on Wiggins’ descriptivist project, and in §2.3.b. it is suggested that while the Strawsonian argument and the argument from interpretation may grant insight into the structure of our conceptual scheme, they do not substantiate Wiggins’ claim that this primitive concept – which underwrites our everyday dealings with others – is a substance sortal concept. This is a culturally local bias that appears, it seems, out of his semantic analysis. It is proposed, in line with comments by David Bakhurst, that the pre-theoretical person concept does not necessarily subsume entities for every moment of their existence. The fact that person may be a phase sortal, while human being is a substance sortal is taken to undermine the connection that Wiggins sees between the two.

• The aim of this chapter has been threefold;
  → firstly, to present a clear statement of Wiggins’ account of personal identity;
  → secondly, to correct various misreadings of it; and
  → thirdly, to suggest a modification to his claim about conceptual consilience.
• Central to Wiggins’ view is a careful and complex elucidation of the person concept; he shows how it functions in our everyday language, and ties it to the Davidsonian notion of a subject of interpretation. What emerges from his analysis is the claim that, when properly considered, we find that person is conceptually consilient with human being. The genealogy, however, encouraged us to test the semantic analysis of our use of the term ‘person’. Our use, it was suggested, is guided by conflicting rationale – and, as a result, Wiggins’ reading of ‘person’ was seen to be inflected by certain sociocultural biases. Among these was the thought that our notion of a person is necessarily the notion of a substance. This thought is not licensed or corroborated by the Strawsonian argument or the argument from interpretation. It might be that our understanding of what it is to be a psychological being involves understanding that being as in some way material; and perhaps our notion of a person is developed through examination of creatures on the same wavelength as us – but these claims are compatible with the further thought that person is a sortal term that marks a phase of the life of a human being. Thus the conceptual relation between person and human being – if there is one – might well be an asymmetric one. A human being may be understood to become a person; their spatio-temporal limits, therefore, are not the same. This undermines a central tenet of Wiggins’ human being theory, that those two concepts assign the same principle of activity.

• Leaving aside the issues about the consilience of person and human being, let us fix our thoughts more firmly on the latter of the two concepts. Irrespective of the fate of person, Wiggins takes human beings to be natural substances – and examining his analysis one becomes aware of how his metaphysical project intersects with certain concerns in the philosophy of biology. Specifically, his work bears on, and is affected by, discussions about biological anti-reductionism and biological individuality. It is the aim of this chapter to draw these discussions out.
• As was noted in the introduction, Wiggins enters forceful claims about the relevance of the philosophy of biology to metaphysical issues – yet despite these claims, and occasional allusions to differing conceptions of that science, he fails to offer a sustained treatment of these issues. Moreover, his view appears to verge on what he calls ‘the anti-scientistic’ and he writes, at times, to deny his aim has ever been ‘to place the question of what we are under the alien direction of physiologists, biologists, evolutionists or others who are expert in matters relating to organisms.’
• Thus, commentators tend not to discuss the role of biology in Wiggins’ work, unless it is to bemoan his failure to attend to it. (Michael Ruse, for example, describes him as displaying ‘an almost proud ignorance of the organic world.’) This, it shall be argued, is an oversight of his critics. The following reading presents Wiggins as having a determinate view of the place of biology in his philosophical system – and this chapter aims to collect together and interpret his thoughts on the application of that science in metaphysics.
• What emerges is a broadly neo-Aristotelian analysis of the metaphysical character of organisms – an anti-reductionism, it is argued, that stands as a productive alternative to the kind of biological ‘emergentism’ advanced by, among others, John Dupré. Wiggins’ neo-Aristotelian picture is compatible with the thought that organisms are real because they possess novel causal properties, but it is not committed to it. Unlike the emergentist, Wiggins is not directly interested in causal dependence, but rather in some form of ontological dependence.
• Before turning to this, however, a more immediate concern must be addressed. Wiggins defers to biology to flesh out the human being principle – the theoretical description that allows us to articulate the spatio-temporal boundaries of human organisms. Yet, turning to the philosophy of biology, one finds lively debate about the possibility of some such theoretical description, and even about the viability of the organism concept itself. The aim in the next section is to set out this concern with biological individuality in greater depth, and to offer some clarifications.

• The aim of this chapter has been to set out a particular dialectic between biological reductionists and anti-reductionists, and to show how Wiggins may provide a sophisticated alternative to the emergentists’ position. The standard discussion was seen to be characterized by the question Are organisms real? There was found to be a sound scientific basis for picking out these everyday living things – in Pradeu’s physiological-immunological account – but that theory did not assay opinions either way as to their reality. Dupré, and other emergentists, were seen to hold that organisms are real, divining in them novel causal properties. Yet the focus on causation, and the appeals to science, were taken to be at odds with Wiggins’ general methodological approach.
• Wiggins’ anti-reductionism is neo-Aristotelian, not in any causal sense, but because he takes the dependence relation found in the Metaphysics to illuminate our pretheoretical understanding of living things as genuine unities₁₈. This unity, which Kant considers to be an ineliminable phenomenological fact, can be theorized in terms of dependence: the parts of a genuine unity are ontologically dependent upon it. This, it has been suggested, stands a genuine, alternative anti-reductionism to the emergentist picture₁₉.
• There are two consequences of this analysis that bear particularly in the chapter that follows. Firstly, we must take seriously the idea that we cannot conceive of organs (the parts of natural substances) as separate from the organized whole – a thought we find in Aristotle, but echoed also by Hegel (a philosopher who makes a notable, but over-looked, epigrammatic appearance in S&S):
  The limbs and organs for instance, of an organic body are not merely parts of it: it is only in their unity that they are what they are₂₀…
  Secondly, if Wiggins elucidates our pre-theoretical substance concept along these lines then he will hold that organisms, as natural substances, cannot conceivably be dismantled. It is beyond our conceptual limits to think of organized wholes as suffering disassembly. Organisms – as natural substances, and exemplifying the elements of that category – are ontologically prior to their parts. They cannot, then, be separated into their parts, because their parts can only exist in the integrated unity. In the next chapter it is discussed how these thoughts about natural substances are disturbed by the logic of transplantation.

• The time has come to consider Sydney Shoemaker’s infamous ‘brain transplantation’ narrative. The story is one that Wiggins frequently revisits – yet despite prolonged discussion he fails to provide a satisfactorily clear ruling on whether or not a person could survive such a procedure. Brown’s peculiar adventures seem somehow to resist his analysis. The aim of this chapter is to investigate why they do so, whether he can give a principled response to the story, and what the implications for such a response might be.
• In §4.1, Wiggins’ various (unsatisfactory) attempts to deal with the story are set out. Following this, the story is re-examined. Drawing on the work in chapter 3 it is argued (in §4.2) that the idea of a brain transplantation subtly shifts our metaphysical focus from an organism onto a biological item whose parts are ontologically independent of the whole. Shoemaker’s scenario is, in a relevant sense, mechanistic (the different senses of ‘mechanism’ are drawn out below). In §4.3 this mechanistic reading is supported by a historical review of the origins of the story in Locke; it is argued that the Lockean discussion of personal identity is a response to tensions between the doctrine of the resurrection, and corpuscularian forms of biological mechanism.
• Shoemaker’s narrative moves one’s focus from the organism onto a ‘living something-or-other’ or – to build on the discussions in chapter 1 – onto a biological artefact. Unaware of this shift, Wiggins’ analyses are confounded. The contention here, following the neo-Aristotelian treatment offered in §3.4, is that he has strong grounds for holding that the organism cannot suffer the sort of disassembly described by Shoemaker. Thus Brown does not survive. This assessment will lead to some concerns. More anodyne cases of transplantation – like heart transplantation – exhibit similar kinds of disassembly. Does the organism survive heart transplantation? And if not, does the person? These questions return us to the worries with the human being theory assayed in chapter 2, and in the conclusion a resolution to these concerns is proposed.

• I have got the subject into something of a mess…
• So wrote David Wiggins, in the conclusion to his first published paper, ‘The Individuation of Things and Places’ (1963). As the title suggests, the subject then was one that became a staple of his studies – and over the subsequent fifty years he has organized and reorganized his thoughts about identity, individuation and substance, in the hope of untangling the knotty problems contained within. In a way, perhaps, things remain just as messy; yet one cannot deny that his dealings with these matters enthral and enrich those who attend to them. His is a glorious mess – and to try and ensure that the present work has not rendered it ingloriously messy, an overview of the various conclusions reached above is now presented.
• One aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate exactly why Wiggins’ work is so difficult to read. His investigations intersect and interrelate more closely than most – his account of personal identity is carefully developed alongside, and in conjunction with, his thoughts about the logic of identity, our individuative procedures, his pluralism, and his sober brand of conceptualist-realism. In this – his systematicity – he resists the dominant impulse in English-language philosophy, for Russellian piece-meal analysis; as a result, his work is hard to grasp… but hard to grasp for the right reasons. The finespun links he draws between these different issues represent the real and important connections he sees to hold between our pre-theoretical concepts. That is, the complexity in his texts mirrors the complexity he divines in our minds.
• It was the work of chapter 1 to demonstrate the close connections Wiggins finds between our thoughts about identity, individuation and substance. He holds that our everyday ability to navigate the world is underwritten by these concepts, and it was argued that his critics and commentators fail when they fail to appreciate how his analyses of these notions relate to one another. Corrections were duly entered.
• Another central aim of chapter 1 was to assess his view, and the various interpretations of it, of the distinction between natural things and artefacts. Misinterpretations were identified, and a reading was offered whereby he was seen to hold that artefacts – stipulatively defined – are substances, but never paradigms of that category. The suggestion then offered, which has grown in importance, was that Wiggins has the resources to better analyse the ontological profile of artefacts, such that they may be differentiated from natural substances.
• This proposal was temporarily shelved, and in chapter 2, attention was turned to Wiggins’ human being theory. In line with his sortalism, he holds that to answer the puzzles of the personal identity debate we must turn to the sortals under which we fall, and interrogate the principle of activity they encapsulate. The ingenuity of his human being theory is to argue for a conceptual consilience of person (which, despite long-standing discussion, remains elusive) and human being (a notion with which we seem to be much more familiar). Having argued for this concordance, Wiggins claims that both concepts have the same underlying principle of activity, to which we should defer when ruling on persistence.
• The conceptual connection is grounded in three lines of argument: the Strawsonian argument, the semantic argument, and the argument from interpretation. Following a genealogical critique, the semantic argument was rejected, and the other two arguments appeared to weaken as a result. In §2.4, it was argued that the conceptual consilience that Wiggins finds between person and human being is less substantial than he envisages.
• Another concern that arose in chapter 2 was that the human being principle might be more difficult to explicate than one might suppose. In chapter 3 – following comments by Wiggins – it was suggested that one should turn to biology to investigate the living activity in greater depth. Yet biological individuation was found to be a controversial affair and it was argued that Wiggins must consult Thomas Pradeu’s immunological–physiological account to set the parameters for an investigation into the principle of activity for the human being.
• These thoughts about principles of activity led onto broader questions about the metaphysical character of the natural substances that realize them. It was argued that, while not explicitly stated, Wiggins’ position rests on a distinctive neo-Aristotelian view of organisms. Organisms exemplify the category of substance because they are genuine unities. They are genuine unities because, when we latch on to them, we cannot but see them as ontologically prior to their parts.
• Chapter 3 thus showed how Wiggins’ work could benefit from the insights of philosophers of biology, and – by presenting an alternative form of anti-reductionism to the emergentist mainstream – contribute to their discussions as well. Beneath the fields of biology and metaphysics are deep, living roots – roots that are no less strong for being hidden – and one thought this study has intended to promote is that inter disciplinary discussion here can be mutually beneficial (a thought further encouraged by the connection, described in §4.3., between the neo-Lockean account of personal identity and seventeenth-century mechanism).
• It was in chapter 4 that the various loose ends, and intermediary conclusions, were drawn together. The analysis of the metaphysical character of organisms assayed in chapter 3 was seen to bear on the distinction, discussed in chapter 1, between natural things and artefactual things. The tentative suggestion entered there – that one may draw a principled line between substances and artefacts – was revisited, and prompted a re-examination of Shoemaker’s notorious brain transplantation story. Fleshing out the distinction between the ontological profile of artefacts and substances provided an explanation of why Shoemaker’s narrative has always seemed to unsettle Wiggins; the notion of brain transplantation shifts our metaphysical focus from a biological substance onto a biological artefact.
• In turn, this thought was seen to connect to the conclusion in chapter 2, that the conceptual consilience of person and human being is not as strong as Wiggins supposes. The concordance of concepts that stands as the core of his human being theory was taken to be undermined. Yet rather than disavow his theory tout court, it was suggested that one should instead say that it marks a significant moment in the history of our conceptual scheme. The methods and framework that underpin his analysis are in no way challenged by the arguments above – but being sensitive to our everyday thoughts, and the fluctuations of our conceptual scheme, they now license a different conclusion to the one encapsulated by the human being theory.
• At the end of this study, I find I can echo another sentiment voiced by Wiggins in his first published paper. It is an expression of a dissatisfaction, verging on a hope – one that will resonate with all those who take as their subject rich and elusive works. It is a promise of the changes one could make, and the limitations of what one has written – a conditional too often disappointed, but one which Wiggins has thoughtfully fulfilled, and one which I will leave unfinished in the happy expectation of comments to come:
• If I had time to rewrite my contribution…

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83. Dupré, J. (2010c/2012) ‘Causality and Human Nature in the Social Sciences’ in Processes of Life (Oxford University Press)
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132. Griffiths, P.E. (1999) ‘Squaring the Circle: Natural Kinds with Historical Essences’, in Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, ed. Robert Wilson (Cambridge MA: MIT Press): 209– 28
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133. Griffiths, P.E. (2001) ‘Genetic Information: A Metaphor in Search of a Theory’, Philosophy of Science 68 (3): 394–412
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135. Haack, S. (1978) ‘Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics’, Philosophical Studies 35: 361– 371
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136. Hacking, I. (1968) ‘A language without particulars’ Mind LXXVII
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137. Hacking, I. (2007) ‘Our Neo-Cartesian Bodies in Parts’, Critical Inquiry 34(1): 78–105 209
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138. Hamlyn, D. W. (1993) (introduction) De Anima: Books II and III (with passages from Book I), translated with introduction and notes by D.W. Hamlyn (Clarendon Press: Oxford)
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140. Haraway, D. (1991) ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century’, in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (Routledge)
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141. Hare, R.M. (1952) The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
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142. Haslanger, S. (2003) ‘Persistence Through Time’, in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman (eds) The Oxford Handbook to Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
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143. Hawley, K. (2001) How Things Persist (Oxford: Clarendon)
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144. Hegel, G.W.F. (1817/1975) The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. In Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
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145. Heidegger, M. (1927/1962) Being and Time (trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson) (Basil: Blackwell)
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146. Hein, H. (1969) ‘Molecular Biology vs. Organicism: The Enduring Dispute between Mechanism and Vitalism’, Synthese 20(2): 238–253
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148. Heller, M. (1984) ‘Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects’, Philosophical Studies 46: 323–334
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149. Heller, M. (1990) The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four Dimensional Hunks of Matter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
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150. Hill, R. K. (1998) ‘Genealogy’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved April 16, 2013, from Link (Link Repaired)
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151. Hilpinen, R. (1993) ‘Authors and Artifacts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 155– 178
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152. Hobbes, T. (1839–45) De Corpore, pt II, ch. 11 in W. Molesworth (ed.) The English Works of Thomas Hobbes (London: John Bohn), vol. 1
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153. Hoffman, J. and Rosenkrantz, G. (1997) Substance: Its Nature and Existence (London: Routledge)
     → "Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) - Substance: Its Nature and Existence"
154. Hollis, M. (1985) ‘Of Masks and Men’ in The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, (eds) M. Carrithers, S. Collins, and S. Lukes (Cambridge University Press)
     → "Hollis (Martin) - Of Masks and Men"
155. Hull, D. (1972) ‘Reductionism in Genetics – Biology or Philosophy?’ Philosophy of Science 39: 491–499
     → David L. Hull
     → Obtain₇₃.
156. Hull, D. (1974) Philosophy of Biological Sciences (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.)
157. Hull, D. (1979) ‘Discussion: reduction in genetics’, Philosophy of Science 46, 316–320
     → Obtain₇₄.
158. Hull, D.L. (1981) ‘Philosophy and biology’, in Fløistad, G. (ed.), Contemporary philosophy: a new survey, vol. 2 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff)
159. Hull, D.L. (1992) ‘Individual’, in Fox Keller, E. & Lloyd, E. (eds) Keywords in Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press): 180–187
160. Hull, D.L. (1994) ‘Contemporary Systematic Philosophies’, in E. Sober (ed.), Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology (2nd Edition, MIT Press): 295–330
161. Hull, D.L. and Ruse, M. (eds) (1998) The Philosophy of Biology (Oxford University Press)
     → See "Hull (David L.) & Ruse (Michael), Eds. - The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology"
162. Ishiguro, H. (1980) ‘The Primitiveness of the Concept of a Person’, in Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson, (ed.) Z. Van Straaten (Clarendon Press: Oxford)
     → "Ishiguro (Hide) - The Primitiveness of the Concept of a Person"
163. Jacob, F. (1973) The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity (Allen Lane)
164. Jain, J., et al (2005) ‘Oocyte cryopreservation’, Fertility and Sterility 86: 1037–1046)
165. James, S. (2000) ‘Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity’ in M. Fricker and J. Hornsby (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
     → "James (Susan) - Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity"
166. Janzen, D. (1977) ‘What are dandelions and aphids?’, The American Naturalist 111(979): 596–589
167. Jiang, S.C. and Paul, J.H. (1998) ‘Gene transfer by transduction in the marine environment’, Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 64: 2780–2787
168. Johnston, M. (1987) ‘Human Beings’, Journal of Philosophy 84: 59–83)
     → "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings"; also …
     → "Johnston (Mark) - 'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal"
169. Joll, N. (2010) ‘Contemporary Metaphilosophy’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Link
     → "Joll (Nicholas) - Contemporary Metaphilosophy"
170. Jonas, H. (1966) The Phenomenon of Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology (New York: Harper and Row/Dell)
171. Jones, D. (1987) Manufacturing Humans: The Challenge of New Reproductive Technologies (Leicester: Intervarsity Press)
     → D. Gareth Jones ???
172. Jones, N. (forthcoming) ‘From Individuation to Essentialism’
     → Nicholas K. Jones ???
173. Joseph, M.A. (2011) ‘Davidson’s Philosophy of Language’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Link
174. Jubien, M. (1993) Ontology, Modality and the Fallacy of Reference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
     → "Jubien (Michael) - Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference"
175. Kant, I. (1790/1987), Critique of Judgment, trans. W. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett)
     → Immanuel Kant
     → "Kant (Immanuel) - Kant: Works"
176. Kass, L.R. (1999), The Hungry Soul: Eating and the Perfecting of Our Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
177. Kauffman, S. (1971), ‘Articulation of Parts Explanations in Biology and the Rational Search for Them’, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8: 257–272
178. Khalidi, M.A. (1993) ‘Carving Nature at the Joints’, Philosophy of Science 60: 100–113
     → "Khalidi (Muhammad Ali) - Carving Nature at the Joints"
179. Kim, J. (1992) ‘“Downward Causation” in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism’ in Beckermann, Flohr, Kim, (eds) Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.): 119–138
     → Jaegwon Kim
180. Kim, J. (1993) ‘The Non-Reductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation’ in Heil and Mele (eds.) (Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press): 188–210
     → "Kim (Jaegwon) - The Nonreductivist's Troubles With Mental Causation"
181. Kim, J. (1998) Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press)
     → "Kim (Jaegwon) - Mind in a Physical World - An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation"
182. Kitano, H. (2002) ‘Systems Biology: A Brief Overview’, Science 295: 1662–1664
     → Downloaded₇₅
183. Kripke, S. (1972) ‘Naming and Necessity’, in G. Harman, and D. Davidson (eds) Semantics of Natural Languages (Dordrecht: Reidel)
     → Saul Kripke (why have I not got this? Maybe I have?)
     → Downloaded₇₆
184. Kripke, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, revised edition)
     → "Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity"
185. Kochiras, H. (2009) ‘Locke's Philosophy of Science’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = Link.
     → Obtain₇₇.
186. Kolakowski, L. (1968) Towards a Marxist Humanism (New York: Gove Press)
187. Kornblith, H. (1980) ‘Referring to Artifacts’, Philosophical Review 89: 109–114
     → Hilary Kornblith
     → Obtain₇₈.
188. Koopman, C. (2012) Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Fordham University Press)
     → Colin Koopman
189. Koslicki, K. (2012a) ‘Essence, Necessity, and Explanation’, in Tuomas E. Tahko (ed.) Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press)
     → Kathrin Koslicki
     → Downloaded₇₉
     → Investigate₈₀
190. Koslicki, K. (2012b) ‘Varieties of ontological dependence’, in Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (eds) F. Correia and B. Schnieder (Cambridge University Press): 186–213
     → "Koslicki (Kathrin) - Varieties of Ontological Dependence"
191. Koslicki, K. (2013) ‘Substance, Independence, and Unity’, in Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics (ed.) E. Feser (Palgrave-MacMillan): 169–195
     → "Koslicki (Kathrin) - Substance, Independence and Unity"
192. Kosman, L.A. (1987) ‘Animals and other beings in Aristotle’ in Gotthelf and Lennox (eds), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology (Cambridge University Press)
     → Investigate₈₁
193. La Fontaine, J.S. (1985) ‘Person and individual: some anthropological reflections’ in The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, (eds) M. Carrithers, S. Collins, and S. Lukes (Cambridge University Press)
     → "La Fontaine (J.S.) - Person and individual: Some Anthropological Reflections"
194. Langton, R. (2009) Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification (Oxford University Press)
     → Rae Langton
195. LaPorte, J. (1997) ‘Essential Membership’, Philosophy of Science 64(1): 96–112
     → "LaPorte (Joseph) - Essential Membership"
196. Leibniz, G. (1765/1981) New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (trans.) P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge University Press)
     → "Leibniz (Gottfried), Remnant (Peter), Bennett (Jonathan) - New Essays on Human Understanding"
197. Leibniz, G. (1695/1978) Système Nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances aussi bien que de l’union de l’âme avec le corps, in Leibniz, Die Philosophischen Schriften, (ed.) G.J. Gerhardt (vol. 4, reprint, Hidesheim: Georg Olms): 471–504
     → Gottfried Leibniz
198. Lewis, D. (1971) ‘Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies’, Journal of Philosophy 68: 203–211
     → "Lewis (David) - Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies"
199. Lewis, D. (1976) ‘Survival and Identity’ in A. Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press)
     → "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity"
200. Lewis, D. (2002) ‘Tensing the Copula’, Mind 111: 1–14
     → "Lewis (David) - Tensing the Copula"
201. Lewontin, R. (1993) The Doctrine of DNA: Biology as Ideology (London: Penguin Books)
     → "Lewontin (Richard C.) - The Doctrine of DNA: Biology as Ideology"
202. Locke, J. (1690/1975) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
     → "Locke (John), Nidditch (Peter) - An Essay Concerning Human Understanding"
203. Loeb, L. (1937) ‘The Biological Basis of Individuality’, Science 86(2218): 1–5
204. Losonsky, M. (1990) ‘The Nature of Artefacts’, Philosophy 65: 81–88
     → Obtain₈₂.
205. Lovibond, S. (1996) ‘Ethical Upbringing: from Connivance to Cognition’ in Lovibond and Williams (eds) Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value (Blackwell Publishing)
     → "Lovibond (Sabina) - Ethical Upbringing: from Connivance to Cognition"
206. Lovibond, S., and Williams, S. (1996) Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value (Blackwell Publishing)
     → "Lovibond (Sabina) & Williams (S.G.) - Identity, Truth & Value: Essays for David Wiggins"
207. Lowe, E.J. (2002) ‘Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response to Olson’ (Discussion), The Philosophical Quarterly 52: 369–372
     → "Lowe (E.J.) - Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response to Olson"
208. Lowe, E.J. (2003) ‘Review of Sameness and Substance Renewed’, Mind, New Series, 112(October): 448
     → "Lowe (E.J.) - Review of Wiggins's 'Sameness and Substance Renewed'"
209. Lowe, E.J. (2005) ‘Is Conceptualist Realism a Stable Position?’ in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXI(2): 456–461
     → "Lowe (E.J.) - Is Conceptualist Realism a Stable Position?"
210. Luarner, F. and Malagelada (2003) ‘Gut flora in health and disease’, Lancet 361 (9356): 512–9
211. Mach, E. (1905) Erkenntnis und Irrtum: Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung (J.A. Barth)
212. Mackie, P. (2006) How Things Might have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
     → Penelope Mackie
     → Investigate₈₃.
213. Madden, R. (forthcoming) ‘Thinking Parts’ in Essays on Animalism (eds) S. Blatti and P. Snowdon (Oxford University Press)
     → "Madden (Rory) - Thinking Parts"
214. Madden, R. (draft) ‘The Persistence of Animate Organisms’
     → "Madden (Rory) - The Persistence of Animate Organisms"
215. Malaterre, C. (2013) ‘Life as an Emergent Phenomenon: From an Alternative to Vitalism to an Alternative to Reductionism’, in C. Wolfe and S. Normandin (eds) Vitalism and the Scientific Image in Post-Enlightenment Life Science, 1800–2010 (Springer)
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216. Malpas, J. (2013) ‘Donald Davidson’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = Link.
     → Obtain₈₅.
217. Mann, T. (1948/1999) Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkhün, As Told By A Friend (New York: AA Knopf)
     → Thomas Mann
218. Margulis, L. (1993a) ‘Origins of Species: Acquired Genomes and Individuality’, Biosystems 31: 121–5
219. Margulis, L. and Sagan, D. (1993b) The Garden of Microbial Delights: A Practical Guide to the Subvisible World (Kendal/Hunt)
220. Margulis, L. and Sagan, D. (2001) ‘The Beast With Five Genomes’, Natural History Magazine, online at : Link
     → Obtain₈₆.
221. Martin, R., and Barresi, J. (2000) Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century (Routledge)
     → Raymond Martin & John Barresi
222. Martin, R., and Barresi, J. (2006) The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self: An Intellectual History of Personal Identity (Columbia University Press: New York)
     → "Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John) - Rise And Fall of Soul And Self : An Intellectual History of Personal Identity"
223. Mauss, M. (1938/1985) ‘A Category of the human mind: the notion of person; the notion of self’ in M. Carrithers, S. Collins, and S. Lukes (eds) The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History (Cambridge University Press)
     → "Mauss (Marcel) - A Category of the Human Mind: the Notion of Person; the Notion of Self"
224. Mayr, E. (1942) Systematics and the Origin of Species (Columbia University Press)
     → Ernst Mayr
225. Mayr, E. (1969) Principles of Systematic Zoology (McGraw-Hill, New York)
226. Mayr, E. (1982) The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press)
227. Mayr, E. (2004) What Makes Biology Unique? Considerations on the Autonomy of a Scientific Discipline (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
     → Investigate₈₇
228. McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)
     → "McDowell (John) - Mind and World"
229. McLaughlin, B., and Bennett, K. (2014) ‘Supervenience’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.) forthcoming URL = Link.
     → "McLaughlin (Brian) & Bennett (Karen) - Supervenience"
230. McMichael, A. (1986) ‘The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: 35–52
     → "McMichael (Alan) - The epistemology of essentialist claims"
231. Mei, Tsu-Lin (1961) ‘Subject and Predicate: a Grammatical Preliminary’, Philosophical Review LXX
     → Obtain₈₈.
232. Merricks, T. (2001a) ‘How to live forever without saving your soul: Physicalism and immortality’, in K. Corcoran (ed.) Soul, Body and Survival (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)
     → "Merricks (Trenton) - How to Live Forever Without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality"
233. Merricks, T. (2001b) Objects and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
     → "Merricks (Trenton) - Objects and Persons"
234. Metchnikoff, E. (1907) Immunity in Infective Diseases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
235. Mill, J.S. (1843) A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (Harper and Brother: New York)
     → "Mill (John Stuart) - A System of Logic"
236. Miller, J. (1978) The Body in Question (New York: Random House)
     → "Miller (Jonathan) - The Body in Question"
237. Minic, Z. and Hervé, G. (2004) ‘Biochemical and enzymological aspects of the symbiosis between the deep-sea tubeworms Riftia Pachyptila and its bacterial endosymbionts’, Eur. J. Biochem. 271: 3093– 102
238. Moore, A.W. (1996) ‘On There Being Nothing Else to Think, or Want, or Do’, in Lovibond, S., and Williams, S. (eds) Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value (Blackwell Publishing)
     → "Moore (Adrian W.) - On There Being Nothing Else to Think, or Want, or Do"
239. Munzer, S. (1993) ‘Aristotle’s Biology and the Transplantation of Organs’, Journal of the History of Biology 26(1): 109–129
     → Stephen R. Munzer
240. Nagel, E. (1961) The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World)
     → "Nagel (Ernest) - Structure of Science - Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation"
241. Nagel, T. (1998) ‘Reductionism and Anti-reductionism’ in G.R. Bock and J.A. Goode (eds) The Limits of Reductionism in Biology (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons): 3–10
     → Thomas Nagel
242. Nicholson, D., and Gawne, R. (2013) ‘Rethinking Woodger’s Legacy in the Philosophy of Biology’ Journal of the History of Biology (Springer)
     → Daniel J. Nicholson
     → Downloaded₈₉
243. Nietzsche, F. (1887/1996) On the Genealogy of Morality (Oxford: Oxford World Classics)
     → Friedrich Nietzsche
244. Noonan, H. (1976) ‘Wiggins on Identity’, Mind 85
     → "Noonan (Harold) - Wiggins on Identity"
245. Noonan, H. (1978) ‘Sortal Concepts and Identity’, Mind 87
     → "Noonan (Harold) - Sortal Concepts and Identity"
246. Noonan, H. (1981) ‘Review of Sameness and Substance in The Philosophical Quarterly, 31(124)
     → Harold Noonan
     → Obtain₉₀.
247. Noonan, H. (1989) Personal Identity (London: Routledge) 214
248. Noonan, H. (1998) ‘Animalism versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy’, The Philosophical Quarterly 48: 302–318
     → "Noonan (Harold) - Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy"
249. Normandin, S., and Wolfe, C.T. (eds) (2013) Vitalism and the Scientific Image in Post- Enlightenment Life Science, 1800–2010 (Springer)
250. Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press)
     → "Nozick (Robert) - Philosophical Explanations"
251. O’Brien, F. (1939) At Swim-Two-Birds (Longman Green and Co.)
252. Ochman, H., Lawrence, J.G. and Groisman, E.A. (2000) ‘Lateral gene transfer and the nature of bacterial innovation’, Nature 45
253. O’Connor, T. (1994) ‘Emergent Properties’, American Philosophical Quarterly 31: 91–104
     → Timothy O'Connor
     → Downloaded₉₁
254. O'Connor, T. and Wong, Hong Yu (2012) ‘Emergent Properties’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = Link
     → Obtain₉₂.
255. Odegard, D. (1972) ‘Identity through Time’, The American Philosophical Quarterly 9
     → "Odegard (Douglas) - Identity Through Time"
256. O’Hara, A.M. and Shanahan, F. (2006) ‘The gut flora as forgotten organ’, EMBO Rep. 7: 688–93.
257. Okasha, S. (2002) ‘Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism’, Synthese 131(2): 191–213
     → "Okasha (Samir) - Darwinian Metaphysics: Species And The Question Of Essentialism"
258. Olson, E. (1997) The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
     → "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology"
259. Olson, E. (2001) ‘Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem’, The Philosophical Quarterly 51: 337–355
     → "Olson (Eric) - Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem"
260. Olson, E. (2003a) ‘Lowe’s Defence of Constitutionalism’ (Discussion), The Philosophical Quarterly 53: 92–95
     → "Olson (Eric) - Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism"
261. Olson, E. (2003b) ‘Was Jekyll Hyde?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66: 328–348
     → "Olson (Eric) - Was Jekyll Hyde?"
262. Olson, E. (2007) What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
     → "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology"
263. O’Malley, M., and Dupré, J. (2005) ‘Fundamental Issues in Systems Biology’, Bioessays 27(12): 1270–1276
     → John Dupré & Maureen A. O'Malley
     → Downloaded₉₃
264. Owen, G.E.L. (1986). ‘Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology’, in Logic, Science, and Dialectic: Collected Paper in Greek Philosophy: 259–78.
     → G.E.L. Owen
265. Paracer, S. and Ahmadjian, V. (2000) Symbiosis: An Introduction to Biological Associations, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
266. Parfit, D. (1971) ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review 80: 3–27
     → "Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity"
267. Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press)
     → "Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons"
268. Pasnau, R. (2004) ‘Form, Substance, and Mechanism’, The Philosophical Review 113(1): 31– 88
     → Downloaded₉₄
269. Paterson, H. (1985) ‘The Recognition Concept of Species’ in E. Vrba (ed.) Species and Speciation, Transvall Museum Monograph 4: 21–29
270. Perry, J. (1972) ‘Can the self divide?’, Journal of Philosophy 69: 463–488
     → "Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?"
271. Poplawski, N. and Gillett, G. (2009) ‘Ethics and Embryos’ in J.P. Lizza (ed.) Defining the Beginning and End of Life (John Hopkins University Press): 379–381
     → Downloaded₉₅
272. Post, J. (1993) ‘Review of Jaegwon Kim’s Supervenience and Mind’, Philosophy of Science 62: 338–340
     → John F. Post
     → Downloaded₉₆
273. Powell, A. and Dupré, J. (2009) ‘From Molecules to Systems: The Importance of Looking Both Ways’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 40: 54–64
     → Downloaded₉₇
274. Pradeu, T. and Carosella, E. (2006) ‘The Self Model and the Definition of Biological Identity in Immunology’, Biology and Philosophy 21: 235–252
     → Thomas Pradeu
     → Downloaded₉₈
275. Pradeu, T. (2010), ‘What is an organism? An immunological answer’, in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, special issue on The Concept of Organism: Historical, Philosophical, Scientific Perspectives, Huneman, P., Wolfe, C.T. (eds)
     → "Pradeu (Thomas) - What is An Organism? An Immunological Answer"
276. Putnam, H. (1967) ‘Psychological Predicates’, Art, Mind, and Religion, Capitan and Merrill (eds) (University of Pittsburgh Press)
     → Hilary Putnam
     → Downloaded₉₉
277. Putnam, H. (1973) ‘Meaning and Reference’, Journal of Philosophy 70: 699–711
     → "Putnam (Hilary) - Meaning and Reference"
278. Putnam, H. (1975) Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge University Press)
     → "Putnam (Hilary) - Philosophical Papers 2 - Mind, Language and Reality"
279. Putnam, H. (2004) Ethics Without Ontology (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.)
280. Quine, W.V.O. (1960) Word and Object (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press)
     → "Quine (W.V.) - Word & Object"
281. Quine, W.V.O. (1963) ‘On What There Is’ in From a Logical Point of View: 1–19 (Harper and Row)
     → "Quine (W.V.) - On What There Is"
282. Quine, W.V.O. (1971) ‘Speaking of Objects’ in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press)
     → "Quine (W.V.) - Speaking of Objects"
283. Quine, W.V.O. (1980) From a Logical Point of View (Harper and Row)
     → "Quine (W.V.) - From a Logical Point of View"
284. Quinton, A. (1975) ‘The Soul’, in J. Perry (ed.) Personal Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press)
     → "Quinton (Anthony) - The Soul"
285. Rea, M. (1997) ‘Supervenience and Co-Location’, American Philosophical Quarterly 34: 367– 375
     → "Rea (Michael) - Supervenience and Co-Location"
286. Reid, T. (1785) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell)
     → "Reid (Thomas), Woozley (A.D.), Ed. - Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man"
287. Rescher, N. (1982) Empirical Inquiry (London)
     → Nicholas Rescher
288. Ricchetti, M., Fairhead, C., and Dujon, B. (1999) ‘Mitochondria DNA repairs doublestrand breaks in yeast chromosomes’, Nature 402: 96–100
289. Robinson, H. (2014) ‘Substance’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = Link
     → "Robinson (Howard) - Substance"
290. Roe, S. (1996) ‘The Life Sciences’ in The Cambridge History of Science: Volume 4: Eighteenth-century Science, Roy Porter (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 397–4091
     → Investigate₁₀₀
291. Roll-Hansen, N. (1984) ‘E.S. Russell and J.H. Woodger: The Failure of Two Twentieth- Century Opponents of Mechanistic Biology’, in Journal of the History of Biology, 17(3): 399– 428
     → Obtain₁₀₁.
292. Rorty, A.O. (1990) ‘Persons and Personae’ in C. Gill (ed.) The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Clarendon Press: Oxford)
     → "Rorty (Amélie Oksenberg) - Persons and Personae"
293. Rose, S., R.C. Lewontin, and L.J. Kamin, (1984), Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human Nature (London: Penguin Books)
     → Steven Rose & Richard C. Lewontin
294. Rosenberg, A. (2006) Darwinian Reductionism: Or, How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology (University of Chicago Press)
     → Alexander Rosenberg???
295. Rosenberg, A. (2003) ‘Reductionism in a Historical Science’, in van Regenmortel and Hull (eds) Reductionism in the Biomedical Sciences (Wiley-Blackwell)
     → Downloaded₁₀₂
296. Rosenberg, A. (1985) The Structure of Biological Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
297. Rosenthal, D. (2009) ‘Aristotle’s Hylomorphism’ (via Philpapers)
     → Downloaded₁₀₃
     → David Rosenthal
298. Ross, D. (1923/1995) Aristotle (Routledge)
     → Not, presumably, Don Ross
299. Rudder Baker, L. (2000) Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
     → "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View"
300. Rudder Baker, L. (2002) ‘On Making Things Up: Constitution and Its Critics’, Philosophical Topics 30: 31–52
     → "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - On Making Things Up: Constitution and Its Critics"
301. Rudder Baker, L. (2004) ‘The Ontology of Artifacts’, Philosophical Explorations 7: 99–112
     → "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Ontology of Artifacts"
302. Rudder Baker, L. (2008), ‘The Shrinking Difference Between Artifacts and Natural Objects’, in Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, Piotr Boltuc (ed.), American Philosophical Association Newsletters 7:2: 1–10
     → "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Shrinking Difference Between Artifacts and Natural Objects"
303. Ruse, M. (1973) The Philosophy of Biology (London: Hutchinson & Co.)
     → See "Hull (David L.) & Ruse (Michael), Eds. - The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology"
304. Ruse, M. (1987/1992) ‘Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What?’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38: 225–42, repr. in The Units of Evolution: Essays on the Nature of Species, ed. Marc Ereshefsky, 343–61. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
     → "Ruse (Michael) - Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What?"
305. Russell, B. (1925) Mysticism and Logic (London: Longman’s, Green & Co.)
     → "Russell (Bertrand) - Mysticism and Logic"
306. Rykwert, J. (1992) ‘Organic and Mechanical’, Anthropology and Aesthetics: 11–18
     → Downloaded₁₀₄
307. Salmon, W. (1971) ‘Statistical Explanation’, in Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance, W. Salmon, (ed.), 29–87 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press)
     → "Salmon (Wesley) - Statistical Explanation"
308. Salmon, W. (1989) Four Decades of Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press)
     → Introduction Downloaded₁₀₅
     → Wesley Salmon
     → Full book may be on JSTOR
309. Sarkar, S. (1992) ‘Models of Reduction and Categories of Reductionism’, Synthese 91, 167–194
     → Sahotra Sarkar
     → Obtain₁₀₆.
310. Sarkar, S. (1998), Genetics and reductionism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
     → Investigate₁₀₇
311. Schaffer, J. (2003) ‘Is there a fundamental level?’, Nôus 37(3): 498–517
     → Jonathan Schaffer
     → Obtain₁₀₈.
312. Schaffer, J. (2009) ‘On What Grounds What’, in Metametaphysics: 347–83 (eds) Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman (Oxford University Press)
     → "Schaffer (Jonathan) - On What Grounds What"
313. Schaffer, J. (2010) ‘Monism: The Priority of the Whole’, Philosophical Review 119(1): 31–76
     → "Schaffer (Jonathan) - Monism: The Priority of the Whole"
314. Schaffer, J. (2013) ‘The Metaphysics of Causation’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.) URL= Link.
     → "Schaffer (Jonathan) - The Metaphysics of Causation"
315. Schaffner, K. (1969), ‘The Watson-Crick model and reductionism’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20, 325–348
     → Obtain₁₀₉.
316. Schlanger, J. (1971), Les métaphores de l'organisme (Paris: Vrin)
317. Schofield, M. (2002), Empedocles in E. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge – Link (Link Repaired)
     → Malcolm Schofield
     → Obtain₁₁₀.
318. Schwartz, S. (1978) ‘Putnam on Artifacts’, Philosophical Review 87: 566–574
     → Stephen P. Schwartz
     → Obtain₁₁₁.
319. Scriven, M. (1962) ‘Explanations, Predictions, and Laws’, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 3 Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time, H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds), 170–230. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press)
     → Downloaded₁₁₂
     → Michael Scriven
320. Sears, C.L. (2005) ‘A dynamic partnership: celebrating our gut flora’, Anaerobe 11: 247–51
321. Shapiro, R. (1986) Origins: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Creation of Life on Earth (New York: Bantam Books)
     → "Shapiro (Robert) - Origins: A Skeptic's Guide to the Creation of Life on Earth"
322. Shoemaker, S. (1963) Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)
     → "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity"
323. Shoemaker, S. (1970) ‘Persons and their pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly 7: 269–285
     → "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts"
324. Shoemaker, S. (1984) ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account’ in S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne (eds.) Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell): 69–132
     → "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account"
325. Shoemaker, S. (1999) ‘Self, body, and coincidence’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. 73: 287–306
     → "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Self, Body, and Coincidence"
326. Shoemaker, S. (2004a) ‘Brown-Brownson Revisited’, The Monist 87(4): 573–593
     → "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Brown-Brownson Revisited"
327. Shoemaker, S. (2004b) ‘Reply to Wiggins’, The Monist 87(4): 610–613
     → "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Reply To Wiggins"
328. Sider, T (1993) ‘Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk’ in Analysis 53: 285–289
     → "Sider (Ted) - Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk"
329. Sider, T. (2001) Four Dimensionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
     → "Sider (Ted) - Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time"
330. Sider, T. (2011) Writing the Book of the World (Oxford University Press)
     → Ted Sider
331. Simons, P. (1987) Parts: A Study in Ontology (Oxford University Press)
     → "Simons (Peter) - Parts: A Study in Ontology"
332. Skinner, Q. (2002) Visions of Politics: Vol. 1: Regarding Method (Cambridge University Press)
     → Investigate₁₁₃
333. Smith, J.S. (2000) ‘The Concept of Information in Biology’, Philosophy of Science 67(2): 177–194
     → Obtain₁₁₄.
334. Snowdon, P. (1990) ‘Persons, animals and ourselves’ in C. Gill (ed.) The Person and the Human Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
     → "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Ourselves"
335. Snowdon, P. (1996) ‘Persons and Personal Identity’ in S. Lovibond and S. Williams (eds.), Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value, (Blackwell Publishing)
     → "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons and Personal Identity"
336. Snowdon, P. (1998) ‘Strawson, Peter Frederick’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved September 18, 2013, from Link (Link Repaired)
     → Paul Snowdon
     → Obtain₁₁₅.
337. Snowdon, P. (2009) ‘Peter Frederick Strawson’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = Link
     → Obtain₁₁₆.
338. Snowdon, P. (2009) ‘On the Sortal Dependency of Individuation Thesis’ in From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics (ed.) H. Dyke (Routledge)
     → Investigate₁₁₇.
339. Soames, S. (2003) Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, vol.1 (Princeton University Press)
     → Scott Soames
     → See "Yablo (Stephen) - Review: Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 2: The Age of Meaning by Scott Soames"
340. Sober, E. (2000) Philosophy of Biology (2nd Edition) (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press)
     → "Sober (Elliott) - Philosophy of Biology"
341. Sosa, E. (1987) ‘Subjects among other things’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophers’ Perspectives, I (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview)
     → "Sosa (Ernest) - Subjects Among Other Things"
342. Sperry, R.W. (1966) Brain and Conscious Experience J.C. Eccles (ed.) (New York)
     → Roger W. Sperry
     → Downloaded₁₁₈
     → Paper is ‘Brain Bisection and Mechanisms of Consciousness’
343. Spinoza, B. (1883/1955) On the Improvement of the Understanding / The Ethics / Correspondence (vol. 2) R.H.M. Elwes (trans.) (Dover Publications)
     → "Spinoza (Benedict de), Elwes (R.H.M.) - On the Improvement of the Understanding, The Ethics, Correspondence"
344. Sterelny, K., and Griffiths, P. (1999) Sex and Death: An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology (University of Chicago Press)
     → "Sterelny (Kim) & Griffiths (Paul) - Sex and Death - An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology"
345. Steward, H. (2012) A Metaphysics for Freedom (Oxford University Press)
     → Helen Steward
     → Downloaded₁₁₉
346. Steward, H. (2013) ‘Processes, Continuants, and Individuals’, Mind 122
     → Obtain₁₂₀.
347. Strathern, M. (1992) Reproducing the Future: Essays on Anthropology, Kinship, and the New Reproductive Technologies (London: Routledge)
     → Downloaded₁₂₁
348. Strawson, P.F. (1959) Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Methuen)
     → "Strawson (Peter) - Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics"
349. Strawson, P.F. (1962) ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 1– 25
     → "Strawson (Peter) - Freedom and Resentment"
350. Strawson, P.F. (1974) Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar (Oxford University Press)
     → Peter Strawson
351. Strawson, P.F. (1981) ‘Review of Sameness and Substance’, Mind, New Series, 90(360): 603– 607
     → Obtain₁₂₂.
352. Strawson, P.F. (1992) Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford University Press)
353. Swinburne, R. (1984) ‘Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory’, in Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne (eds.) Personal Identity (Blackwell Publishing): 22–34
     → "Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory"
354. Taylor, C. (2003) ‘Ethics and Ontology’, The Journal of Philosophy 100(6): 305–320
     → Charles Taylor
     → Obtain₁₂₃.
355. Tamny, M. (1990) ‘Atomism and the Mechanical Philosophy’, in Companion to the History of Modern Science, R.C. Olby, G.N. Cantor, J.R.R. Christie, and M.J.S. Hodge (eds) (Routledge: London and New York): 597–609
356. Theurer, K.L. (forthcoming) ‘Seventeenth-century Mechanism: An Alternative Framework for Reductionism’
357. Thiel, U. (1998) ‘Locke and Eighteenth-Century Materialist Conceptions of Personal Identity’, The Locke Newsletter 29: 59-83.
358. Thiel, U. (2011) The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume (Oxford University Press)
359. Thomas, L. (1974) The Lives of a Cell: Notes of a Biology Watcher (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books)
360. Thomson, J.J. (1983) ‘Parthood and Identity Across Time’, Journal of Philosophy 80: 201– 220
     → "Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - Parthood and Identity Across Time"
361. Thomson, J.J. (1997) ‘People and their Bodies’ in J. Dancy (ed.) Reading Parfit (Blackwell Publishers): 202–229
     → "Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - People and Their Bodies"
362. Thomson, J.J. (1998) ‘The Statue and the Clay’, Noûs 32: 149–173
     → "Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - The Statue and the Clay"
363. Toulmin, S. and Goodfield, J. (1962) The Architecture of Matter (University of Chicago Press)
     → Stephen Toulmin
364. Tur, R. (1987) ‘The “Person” in Law’, in A. Peaocke and G. Gillett (eds) Persons and Personality (Oxford: Blackwell)
     → "Tur (Richard) - The 'Person' in Law"
365. Unger, P. (1979a) ‘I do not exist’ in G. Macdonald (ed.) Perception and Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)
     → "Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist"
366. Unger, P. (1979b) ‘There are no ordinary things’, Synthese 41: 117–154
     → "Unger (Peter) - There are no Ordinary Things"
367. Unger, P. (1990) Identity, Consciousness and Value (New York: Oxford University Press)
     → "Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value"
368. Uzgalis, W. (2012) ‘John Locke’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = Link.
     → William Uzgalis
     → Obtain₁₂₄.
369. Vaesen, K. (2012) ‘The cognitive bases of human tool use’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35: 203–262
     → Obtain₁₂₅.
370. Van Inwagen, P. (1981) ‘The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts’, The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62: 123–137
     → "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts"
371. Van Inwagen, P. (1990) Material Beings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)
     → "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings"
372. Van Inwagen, P. (1997) ‘Materialism and the Psychological-continuity view of Personal Identity’, Noûs, supp. Philosophical Perspectives 11: 305 – 319
     → "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity"
373. Van Valen, L. (1976) ‘Ecological Species, Multispecies, and Oaks’, Taxon 25: 233–239
     → Obtain₁₂₆.
374. Vutyavanich, T., Piromlertamorn, W., and Nunta, S. (2010) ‘Rapid freezing versus slow programmable freezing of human spermatozoa’, Fertility and Sterility 93: 1921–8
375. Walmsley, J. (2000) ‘“Morbus” – Locke’s Early Essay on Disease’, Early Science and Medicine 5(4): 366–393
376. Wasserman, R. (2004) ‘The Constitution Question’ Noûs 38: 693–710
     → "Wasserman (Ryan) - The Constitution Question"
     → Obtain₁₂₇.
377. Waters, C.K (1990), ‘Why the antireductionist consensus won’t survive the case of classical Mendelian genetics’, in A. Fine, M. Forbes and L. Wessels (eds), Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1 (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association), 125–139
     → Obtain₁₂₈.
378. Whiting, J. (2008) ‘The Lockeanism of Aristotle’, Antiquorum Philosophia
     → Jennifer E. Whiting
379. Wiggins, D. (1963) ‘The Individuation of Things and Places’ (a Symposium with M.J. Woods), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volumes, 37: 177–216
     → Obtain₁₂₉.
380. Wiggins, D. (1967) Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Oxford: Blackwell)
     → "Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity"
381. Wiggins, D. (1968) ‘On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time’, Philosophical Review 70: 90–95
     → "Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time"
382. Wiggins, D. (1973) ‘Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism’ in Ted Honderich (ed.) Essays on Freedom of Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul)
     → "Wiggins (David) - Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism"
383. Wiggins, D. (1976) ‘Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as a Natural Kind’, Philosophy 51: 131–158
     → "Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind"
384. Wiggins, D. (1978) ‘Are the Criteria of Identity that hold for a Work of Art in Different Arts Aesthetically Relevant? Reply to Richard Wollheim’, Ratio 20: 52-68
     → Obtain₁₃₀.
385. Wiggins, D. (1979) ‘Mereological Essentialism: Asymmetrical Dependence and the Nature of Continuants’, in E. Sosa (ed.) Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm (Grazer Philosophische)
     → "Wiggins (David) - Mereological Essentialism and Chisholm on Parts, Wholes, and Primary Things"
386. Wiggins, D. (1980) Sameness and Substance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)
     → "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance"
387. Wiggins, D. (1982) ‘Heraclitus’ conceptions of flux, fire and material persistence’ in M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (eds) Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy presented to G.E.L. Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
     → "Wiggins (David) - Heraclitus' Conception of Flux, Fire, and Material Persistence"
388. Wiggins, D. (1987) ‘The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value’, in A. Peaocke and G. Gillett (eds) Persons and Personality (Oxford: Blackwell)
     → "Wiggins (David) - The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of Experience, and as Locus of Value"
389. Wiggins, D. (1987/1991) Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford, Blackwell)
     → "Wiggins (David) - Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value"
390. Wiggins, D. (1996) ‘Replies’ in S. Lovibond and S. Williams (eds), Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value (Blackwell Publishing)
     → "Wiggins (David) - Replies: Autobiographical Comments"
     → "Wiggins (David) - Reply to Noonan (Absolute and Relative Identity)"
     → "Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)"
     → "Wiggins (David) - Reply to Williamson (The Necessity and Determinacy of Distinctness)"
     → "Wiggins (David) - Replies: To those other than Noonan, Snowdon and Williamson"
391. Wiggins, D. (1997a) ‘Sortal Concepts: a Reply to Fei Xu’, Mind and Language 12: 413–21
     → "Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: A Reply to Xu"
392. Wiggins, D. (1997b) ‘Languages as Social Objects’, Philosophy 72(282): 499–524
     → Obtain₁₃₁.
393. Wiggins, D. (1998) Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford University Press)
     → "Wiggins (David) - Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value"
394. Wiggins, D. (1999) ‘Substance’ in A.C. Grayling (ed.) Philosophy 1: A Guide Through the Subject (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
     → "Wiggins (David) - Substance"
395. Wiggins, D. (2000) ‘Sameness, substance and the human animal’, The Philosophers’ Magazine.
     → "Wiggins (David) - Sameness, Substance, and the Human Person"
396. Wiggins, D. (2001) Sameness and Substance Renewed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
     → "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed"
397. Wiggins, D. (2004a) ‘Reply to Shoemaker’, The Monist 87(4): 594–609
     → "Wiggins (David) - Reply To Shoemaker"
398. Wiggins, D. (2004b) ‘Reply to Shoemaker’s Reply’, The Monist 87(4): 614–615
     → "Wiggins (David) - Reply To Shoemaker's Reply"
399. Wiggins, D. (2005a) ‘Reply to Bakhurst’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17(2): 442–448
     → Obtain₁₃₂.
400. Wiggins, D. (2005a) ‘Précis of “Sameness and Substance Renewed”’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17(2) 442–448
     → "Wiggins (David) - Précis of 'Sameness and Substance Renewed'"
401. Wiggins, D. (2012) ‘Identity, Individuation and Substance’, European Journal of Philosophy 20(1): 1–25
     → "Wiggins (David) - Identity, Individuation, and Substance"
402. Williams, B. (1956–7) ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57
     → "Williams (Bernard) - Personal Identity and Individuation"
403. Williams, B. (1973) Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
     → "Williams (Bernard) - Problems of the Self"
404. Williams, B. (1974) ‘The Truth in Relativism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 75: 215–228
     → "Williams (Bernard) - The Truth in Relativism"
405. Williams, B. (1978) ‘Hylomorphism’, Princeton Classical Philosophy Colloquium, December 7th
406. Williams, B. (2002) Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton University Press)
     → "Williams (Bernard) - Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy"
407. Williams, G.C. (1992) Natural Selection: Domains, Levels, and Challenges (Oxford University Press)
408. Wilson, J. (1999), Biological Individuality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
     → "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities"
409. Williams, S.G. (2006) ‘David Wiggins’ in the Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy, (eds) Goulder, N., Grayling, A.C., and Pyle, A. (London: Thoemmes Continuum).
     → S.G. Williams
410. Wilson, E.O. (1975) Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)
     → "Wilson (Edward O.) - Sociobiology: The Abridged Edition"
411. Wilson, R. (1999) ‘Realism, Essence, and Kind: Resuscitating Species Essentialism?’ in Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, ed. Robert Wilson (Cambridge MA: MIT Press): 187– 208
     → Robert A. Wilson
     → Downloaded₁₃₃
412. Wilson, R., M. Barker, and I. Brigandt (2007) ‘When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds’, Philosophical Topics 35: 189–215
     → Matthew Barker
     → Downloaded₁₃₄
413. Wimsatt, W. (1976) ‘Reductive Explanation: A Functional Account’, in R.S. Cohen and A Michalos (eds) Proceedings of the 1974 meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel): 671–710
     → William Wimsatt
     → Downloaded₁₃₅
414. Wimsatt, W. (1980) ‘Reductionistic research strategies and their biases in the units of selection controversy’, in T. Nickles (ed.), Scientific Discovery: Case Studies (Dordrecht: D. Reidel): 213–259
415. Wolfe, C.T. (2010) ‘Do Organisms have an Ontological Status’, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 32(2)
     → Obtain₁₃₆.
416. Wollheim, R. (1989) The Thread of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
     → "Wollheim (Richard) - The Thread of Life"
417. Woodger, J.H. (1930–31) ‘The “concept of organism” and the relation between embryology and genetics.’ Quarterly Review of Biology 5:1–22
418. Woodger, J.H. (1937) The Axiomatic Method in Biology (Cambridge University Press)
419. Woodger, J.H. (1952) Biology and Language (Cambridge University Press)
420. Wright, R. (1994) The Moral Animal: Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life (New York, Pantheon Books)
421. Yablo, S. (2003) ‘Tables Shmables: Review of David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance Renewed’, in the Times Literary Supplement (July)
     → Downloaded₁₃₇
     → Stephen Yablo
422. Yolton, J. (1983) Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Minneapolis).
     → John Yolton
423. Young, J.Z. (1971) An Introduction to the Study of Man (Oxford: The Clarendon Press)
     → "Young (J.Z.) - An Introduction to the Study of Man"
424. Zemach, E.M. (1974) ‘In Defence of Relative Identity’ Philosophical Studies 26: 3–4
     → Eddy M. Zemach
     → Obtain₁₃₈.

• There is a helpful, and helpfully brief, characterization of some of the thoughts contained in D in Wiggins 2012 (page 1). Ie:-
• In discussing the problematic question of how best to understand our thoughts about identity and individuation, he writes: It is contended that the key to this problem rests at the level of metaphysics and epistemology alike with a sortalist position. Sortalism is the position which insists that, if the question is whether a and b are the same, it has to be asked what are they? Any sufficiently specific answer to that question will bring with it a principle of activity or functioning and a mode of behaviour characteristic of some particular kind of thing by reference to which questions of persistence or non-persistence through change can be adjudicated.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2026
2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)