Selfless Persons: Goodness in an Impersonal World?
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: O'Hear (Anthony), Ed. - Mind, Self and Person
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Mark Johnston takes reality to be wholly objective or impersonal, and aims to show that the inevitability of death does not obliterate goodness in such a naturalistic world. Crucial to his argument is the claim that there are no persisting selves.
  2. After critically discussing Johnston's arguments, I set out a view of persons that shares Johnston's view that there are no selves, but disagrees about the nature of reality. On my view, a wholly objective world is ontologically incomplete: Persons have irreducible first-person properties.
  3. My aim is to show that we can (and should) reject selves, but that we can (and should) retain persons and their essential first-person properties as ontologically significant.

Comment:

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