Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts

Write-up₁ (as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12): Reductionism

Plug Note²

• Thesis Text:
  1. Reductionism in the field of Personal Identity has much the same meaning as elsewhere in philosophy, namely:-
     1. Explanatory Reduction: explaining PID in terms of simpler concepts³, or
     2. Ontological Reduction: saying that persons⁴ are “really” other things, or are made up of or constituted by⁵ other things.
  2. This contrasts with the Simple View⁶, which denies either of these options.
  3. Currently, my thoughts on the matter are derived from:-
     1. "Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Reductionism", and
     2. "Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism",
        but I will add to the topic further over time.
        
  4. From my perspective, the interesting element is Garrett’s consideration of Phase Sortals⁷.
  5. "Cassam (Quassim) - Parfit on Persons" claims that Animalism⁸ is a non-reductionist account of PID – indeed, the best one!
  6. Derek Parfit is credited with introducing the term “Reductionism” into the field of Personal Identity from elsewhere in philosophy.

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  Further Remarks:
  1. Of course, Reductionism in the field of Personal Identity is a subset of Reductionism generally in science, and is open – invalidly in my view – to the same “nothing buttery” objections. I’ve included those items I’ve actually read that fall within this wider remit, but not (much) otherwise.
  2. An area that might be included under this heading is the question of reductionism in the philosophy of mind₉ – whether (for instance) mental events are reducible to physical events. I believe and assume that they are, and anything I have to say on the topic will be covered under my Note on Dualism¹⁰.
  3. A number of items on the reading list are responses to Parfit’s ideas. I’ve not included many of his own writings under this head – see my Note on Parfit¹¹ for these