Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts

Write-up₁ (as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12): Nihilism

Plug Note²

• Thesis Text:
  1. Otherwise known as Eliminitivism, Nihilism is the view that there are no persons or – more alarmingly – that we don’t exist.
  2. Whether what is eliminated is the same in all cases must await detailed examination.
     1. Peter Unger – at least at one time₃ – argued (rather improbably) that:-
        • He didn’t exist: "Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist" (1979).
        • There are no people: "Unger (Peter) - Why There Are No People" (1979), though this seems to be a corollary of a more general thesis, introduced in Section 6.
        • There are no ordinary things: "Unger (Peter) - There are no Ordinary Things" (1979).
     2. Eric Olson:
        • "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Nihilism" (2007) considers the matter (but rejects the thesis).
        • Olson accepts some of the arguments that lead to nihilism. See:-
          → "Olson (Eric) - Why I Have No Hands" (1995), as sensationalised in …
          → "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands" (2012).
     3. Peter Van Inwagen: thinks that all that exists are organisms and simples. See:-
        → "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Extreme Answers to the Special Composition Question: Nihilism and Universalism" (1990)
        This is no threat to the existence of persons, of course.
     4. "Merricks (Trenton) - Objects and Persons" (2001); in particular:-
        → "Merricks (Trenton) - Surviving Eliminativism", and
        → "Merricks (Trenton) - Considerations in Favour of Eliminating Us?"
        Merricks thinks that we – and other organisms – exist, but that statues don’t. Again, this is no threat to the existence of persons.
  3. One reason for considering this topic is that lots of the arguments – sorites-style⁴, or “too many occupants” – occur throughout the topic of personal identity. If they are unsound here, they may be so elsewhere.
  4. In particular, it’ll be interesting to compare Olson’s argument that he has no hands with his “thinking animal⁵” argument. He seems committed to both.

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  Further Remarks:
  1. Note that nihilism is also used in many other contexts. Obviously, I ignore the ethical / political sense. But there is also the mereological⁶ sense, which is more relevant to my concerns. Mereological nihilism is the doctrine that things don’t have proper parts.