Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts

Write-up₁ (as at 06/07/2023 00:43:12): Intermittent Objects

• Thesis Text:
  0. This topic is to be discussed under at least six heads, as follows …
  1. Artifacts²
     • Are the classic cases of possibly intermittent objects, in that many small artefacts can be disassembled and then reassembled, and it is usually thought that the reassembled object is numerically identical to the original.
     • But it is not clear whether the watch (say) ceases to exist when disassembled for cleaning, or whether it continues to exist in a scattered³ state. The recipient of a bag of watch-parts would still consider they had received their watch back, even if annoyed at having to reassemble it themselves.
     • But, as with all things artifactual, there’s a question whether our intuitions⁴ are conventional⁵ and could be otherwise. My gut-feel⁶, however, is that disassembled artifacts just exist in a disassembled, scattered state, rather than ceasing to exist. Hence, disassembled artifacts are examples of scattered objects⁷ rather than of intermittent objects.
     • I suppose the counterargument might be that artifacts are the things they are for functional reasons, but does a disassembled thing have a function (or, at any rate, the same function it had when assembled)? I imagine we could say that an object might be delivered in kit-form, and then assembled, and it is probably arbitrary (or can be stipulated) whether the kit is of the same kind as the object or not.
     • The Write-up⁸ of "Carter (William) - Artifacts of Theseus: Fact and Fission" will cover all this in more detail.
  2. Persons⁹
     • When it comes to Persons, it’s the possession of certain capacities, not the present exercise of them, that qualifies an individual as a person.
     • David Wiggins holds the view that a person is one who belongs to a kind whose typical members possess some open-ended list of properties.
     • In that case, a foetus or someone in a PVS¹⁰ would still be a person. They would not “intermit” while in that state.
     • However, on a “present capacity” view, they would not qualify as persons in such a state, and a person might have intermittent existence. For instance, if I were to fall into, and then recover from, a PVS I would not be a person when in the PVS, but would on recovery again be a person, and (importantly) the same person.
     • So, someone like Baker¹¹ might be committed to persons as intermittent objects because she thinks of human persons as ontologically separate from the human animals that constitute them.
     • However, an animalist like Olson¹² would not be so committed. For the animalist, it’s the animal that’s the persisting thing, and the animal persists throughout the PVS.
     • I’m not sure what Olson’s view is of the ontological status of persons (I don’t think he considers them a kind); they are just individuals of another kind (most notably human animals) with special, maybe temporary, properties.
  3. Phase Sortals¹³
     • My view is that human persons are phase¹⁴ sortals¹⁵ of human animals.
     • So, I side with Olson against Baker in the controversy about what Persons are.
     • While persons are ontologically significant, this does not bring into being a new kind – namely ‘PERSON’ but raises the status of the kind whose typical members are persons (and of the individuals who are persons, of course).
     • So, I do not think that persons – at least persons falling under the kind HUMAN ANIMAL – can have intermittent existence. A fetus or a human animal in a PVS remains the same human animal.
  4. Constitution¹⁶
     • I’ve not yet discussed intermittent objects under either this head¹⁷, or that of Baker’s Constitution View¹⁸, but will do, eventually.
     • The possibility of intermittent objects is covered in passing in two overlapping and incomplete reviews of "Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter": a Write-up¹⁹ and an Essay²⁰.
     • The possibility is also raised in my discussion²¹ of "Markosian (Ned) - Three Problems for Olson's Account of Personal Identity" which – while ostensibly addressed to Olson – also discusses the Constitution View.
  5. Scattered Objects²²
     • The topic of physical continuity²³ addresses – amongst much else – both scattered objects²⁴ and intermittent objects, the former intermitting in space, the latter in time (and maybe in space as well).
     • So, if persons are things constituted by other things, then the person intermits during a PVS, but there is no physical discontinuity.
     • But, as Baker believes, the very same person can be constituted by different bodies at different times, then there must necessarily be persistence in the absence of spatio-temporal continuity, which it usually taken as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for persistence.
     • This leads on to our next topic.
  6. Resurrection²⁵
     • The possibility of Resurrection²⁶ is the main reason for my interest in intermittent objects.
     • Clearly, if we are to claim that the very same individual who died is resurrected somewhere else (maybe not a place as such, though it is difficult to envisage bodies that are not at places) at some other time (or not in time – but similar worries apply) then we have an intermittent object.
     • This process (or fiat) would also seem to involve some sort of metamorphosis²⁷, though maybe the Constitution View does not worry about such things, as it is the constituted person that persists, not the constituting body.
       

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  Further Remarks:
  1. I allude to the possibility of intermittent existence in these Notes:-
     1. Artifacts²⁸,
     2. Persons²⁹,
     3. Phase Sortals³⁰,
     4. Constitution³¹,
     5. Scattered Objects³²,
     6. Resurrection³³.