Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)
Todman (Theo)
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Write-up2 (as at 14/02/2026 00:41:46): Thesis - Chapter 11 (Resurrection)

Chapter Contents
  1. Abstract3
  2. Methodology4
  3. Introduction5
  4. Note Hierarchy6
  5. Main Text7
  6. Concluding Remarks8
  7. Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed9
  8. Works Read10
  9. Further Reading11
  10. References & Reading List

Abstract
  1. If mind-body substance dualism is false, and we are identical to human animals, then the only possibility for post-mortem existence is some form of bodily resurrection.
  2. Since the body is destroyed at death, it would seem that any resurrected individual could only be a copy of the original. It might think of itself as the resurrected pre-mortem individual, but it would be wrong.
  3. Consideration of arguments by Peter Van Inwagen in this respect.
  4. This chapter is likely to be controversial, so needs to be very carefully argued, and factually correct concerning what is actually believed by intellectually-aware Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists (other religions are available …), unlike what seems to be the case with most swipes against religion.
  5. It also needs to cover other putative forms of post-mortem survival: I’m considering changing the title to “Life After Death”.


Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link12 for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 16, possibly iterative, stages, some of which have sub-stages.
  • Follow this Link13 for my progress dashboard on these tasks.


Chapter Introduction14
  1. While I wish in this chapter seriously to consider the religious hope of Resurrection, I do not want to get side-tracked onto matters of Scriptural exegesis, or into evidential matters of whether particular resurrections – specifically of Jesus – happened or not. In this regard, I’m interested only in what believers in resurrection take it to be, and whether they provide any detailed metaphysical account of how it is supposed to work.
  2. As in the chapter on Thought Experiments, this chapter is partly aimed at checking how (my version of) Animalism copes with the projected situations. As such, I may extend this to other posited versions of post-mortem survival, though most are ruled out by the essentially physical nature of the human person as proposed by Animalism.
  3. While not wanting to get too far off topic, especially at the end of the thesis, I want to consider some of the ethical consequences of adopting Animalism with – as I have argued – the lack of hope of post-mortem existence. The topic of “Death and Ethics” is already a bit tangential to my thesis, but there’s a set of questions in which I have an interest and on which I wonder whether my views on Personal Identity have anything to say. These two are the most important:-
    • Why is death bad (for the deceased)?, and
    • Can the dead be harmed (assuming they no longer exist)?
  4. So, we start off with a discussion of Death15, which – like Life (discussed in Chapter 6 – I take to be a biological event (or rather a Process). We touched on Brain Death in Chapter 2. Despite its pragmatic utility (which I suspect is the main motivator for accepting it as a criterion of Death) this idea is rather confused on any Biological View of What We Are.
  5. I will also discuss certain occasional events on the periphery of Death, namely Near Death Experiences16 and Out of Body Experiences17. Do these events have anything to say about “where we’re going”, in the first case, or what we are, in the second?
  6. Getting closer to Death itself, I need to discuss Persistent Vegetative States18. From an Animalist perspective, such persons are not dead – any more than (though this may be more controversial) the brain-dead are dead – but whether they should be kept alive is (I would claim) primarily a pragmatic issue to do with the use of resources, coupled with consideration of what life is like – if there is anything – for those in such a state.
  7. Then we get to the meat of the Chapter – discussion of Life after Death19. What is it supposed to involve, where is it enjoyed, and how do we get there? Clearly, there are many options. The question is are any of them possible – and, better – actual?
  8. The two options I consider are Resurrection20 and Reincarnation21. In both cases, the big question is what makes it the case that the individual Resurrected or Reincarnated is the same individual as the one who died. I suspect ‘nothing’ in the absence of a Soul, though much argumentation is required to reach this conclusion in the face of objections and various suggestions for possible mechanisms.
  9. We discussed Uploading to a Computer as a (bare) possibility for Life after Death in the Previous Chapter.
  10. In this regard, we need to discuss the possible interim states between Death and putative post-mortem survival. I need to discuss Corpses22, which – in some of the easiest cases – are (supposed to be) the mediators of continuity of identity between Death and Resurrection. Corpses also cause philosophical worries – on many physicalist accounts of Personal Identity – about where they “come from” and whether “we” end up as Corpses.
  11. We need to discuss the possibility of Disembodied Existence23 (which I imagine is the Interregnum24 for Reincarnation) together with a reconsideration of Intermittent Objects discussed in Chapter 5.
  12. Finally, we need to reflect on the consequences of Life after Death, which is usually taken to be Immortality25 (though supporters of the ‘conditional immortality’ position in Christianity have Resurrection followed by destruction for those found unworthy of eternal life).
  13. Before doing so, I will reflect on the supposed difficulty – displayed by Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilych26 – of truly and practically accepting the inevitability of our own deaths, whatever logic and the facts may dictate.
  14. But, is Immortality really something to be desired? Reflection on the Makropulos Case27 suggests that an infinite life would be unbearably tedious, even though at each possible terminus we might want to live on.


Note Hierarchy
  1. Death28
    1. Near Death Experiences29
    2. Out of Body Experiences30
    3. Persistent Vegetative State31
  2. Life After Death32
    1. Resurrection33
    2. Reincarnation34
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses35
    2. Disembodied Existence36
    3. Interregnum37
  4. Immortality38
    1. Ivan Ilych39
    2. Makropulos Case40


Main Text
  1. Death41
    1. Death is important to our study because we’re considering our persistence conditions42, whether we consider ourselves to be
      1. Human Persons43.
      2. Human Animals44 (members of the species homo sapiens45), or
      3. Human Beings46
      and death would seem to be the terminus of such existence47.
    2. That this is so has often been resisted, which is why we must consider such matters as:-
      1. Resurrection48,
      2. Reincarnation49, and
      3. Disembodied Existence50.
    3. Death should be considered a biological event, or maybe – better – a process51. It is the termination of life52, which is also a biological process, though usually a longer one.
    4. Other forms of – and terminations of – existence53 may be termed “life” or “death”, but these are metaphorical expressions used by analogy with biological life or death. So, is the resurrection54 life – if there is one – really “life” or a continued and enhanced form of existence55? Also, is the “second death” really “death”? I suppose we would allow alternative metabolisms to count as “life56”, so that an Android57 that maintained itself might be said to be “alive”; and, consequently, the destruction of such a being might be classified as “death”. A case for this is made in "Lyons (Siobhan) - Death and the Machine: Intersections of Mortality and Robotics".
    5. A particular case of the above is Brain Death58. It’s a large question for Animalists59 – and for holders of the Psychological View60 – whether Brain61 Death is really death, or whether it is (for holders of the PV62) the death (or end) of the Person63.
    6. As a spin-off from the (alleged) Corpse Problem64 for animalism65 (see "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", p. 81 for this objection to animalism66) we need to discuss the process67 of dying – the transition from life68 to death. Just when does death occur (for human animals69)?
    7. No doubt there is a degree of vagueness70 here (though ascribing ‘vagueness’ to such a ‘terminal’ event as death seems counter-intuitive).
    8. Consideration of whether we should fear death, or the process71 of dying, is probably beyond the bounds of this Thesis. However, for a comforting account of the normal process of dying in old age, see this “short” from the BBC: BBC: Dying is not as bad as you think. The author – a medical doctor (Kathryn Mannix – she’s now written "Mannix (Kathryn) - With the End in Mind: How to Live and Die Well") – talks about the “good death” and the process of dying in your bed being not so scary. The dying drift in and out of consciousness72 and return from unconsciousness feeling much as after a refreshing sleep, so we know the coma doesn’t feel frightening and isn’t noticed when it happens. The “death rattle” shows just how relaxed you were. Normal dying is a really gentle process.
    9. Would that were the way for all, rather than as the result of a rather painful trauma73 when you’re not ready to go.
    1. Near Death Experiences74
      1. NDEs, if they are experiences of anything veridical:-
        1. Offer a serious challenge to those who deny the possibility or actuality of life after death75,
        2. Appear to offer support for non-physicalist accounts of the mind and
        3. Cause problems for animalists76 by lending support to alternative accounts of what we are77 – maybe souls78.
      2. Most of the phenomena – which I need to document and comment on (see "Wikipedia - Near-death experience") – can probably be explained by the usual “dying brain” / anoxia / endorphins suggestions, though this can be rather facile – partly because not all NDEs are had by those near death79, but also because the dying brain80 might not be up to the job of having (and remembering81) scenes of such alleged clarity. However, see "Jarrett (Christian) - Ketamine trips are uncannily like near-death experiences", which reports on a study that makes a detailed connection between the experiences of Ketamine (and LSD) users and NDE-reports.
      3. I have my doubts about when such experiences actually occur – but the suggestion that they occur when the experiencer is “coming round” doesn’t seem to be popular.
      4. A difficult situation to “explain away” is where the NDE-experiencer claims to see something (while having an Out of Body Experience82) they could not have seen under normal circumstances.
      5. Further “awkward” cases to dispose of are where experiences analogous to the NDE are had by / shared with friends / relatives of the dying. I presume these accounts should be rejected out of hand, along with all other incredible reports of exotic parapsychological phenomena. The Fenwicks give a sympathetic hearing to (the then) recent results of parapsychological research – but in an undocumented way and showing unawareness that the claims are of slight (though allegedly statistically significant) deviations from chance, not of the exotic phenomena exhibited in the accounts of NDEs. See "Fenwick (Peter) & Fenwick (Elizabeth) - The Truth in the Light: An Investigation of Over 300 Near-Death Experiences", which also rejects the “shoe” case, but for different reasons to that on the Infidels site ("Augustine (Keith) - Hallucinatory Near-Death Experiences"): see also OBEs83.
      6. See "IANDS - Journal of Near-Death Studies". A wealth of material to download for free.
      7. Recently (December 2025) I’ve been challenged to make something of the case of George G. Richie:-
        → "Ritchie (George G.), Sherrill (Elizabeth) - Return from Tomorrow", and
        → "Ritchie (George G.) - Ordered to Return: My Life After Dying"
    2. Out of Body Experiences84
      1. As is the case with Near Death Experiences85, which sometimes include them, OBEs offer various challenges to physicalist86 accounts of the mind87, and to animalist88 accounts of what we are89.
      2. OBEs may or may not be a concomitant of an NDE. They seem sometimes to occur during other crisis times of illness.
      3. An example – see "BBC, Burgess (Gary) - Why do we know so little about ME?" – was given in March 2018 by a reporter suffering from Myalgic Encephalomyelitis, also known as ME, or Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS). He stated quite casually, without any self-consciousness about the prima facie absurdity of his account – “In the middle of a piece about maternity and paternity benefits, during the 6pm news programme, I had the most wonderful sensation. I left my body, was suddenly up in the studio ceiling, and was looking down on myself, the presenters, and all of the camera crew. I was having an out-of-body experience.”
      4. The question is – of course – whether these experiences are of anything outside the mind90. Do they really prove that something like a soul91 can wander out of the body92?
      5. A difficult situation to “explain away” is where the NDE-experiencer claims – as in the example above – to see something (while having an Out of Body Experience) they could not have seen under normal circumstances. The difficulty with evaluating such reports is that they are either vague and unsurprising, or anecdotal and hard to verify – so the presumption is that they aren’t veridical.
      6. There’s a famous “shoe” case where no follow-up seems to have been possible. There’s a (naturally sceptical) page on Infidels.org ("Augustine (Keith) - Hallucinatory Near-Death Experiences") which references this “shoe” case amongst others.
      7. The case of our reporter is surprisingly off-hand for such a surprising claim. "Blackmore (Susan) - Beyond the Body" asserts that 10% of people claim to have had OBEs. Maybe most also believe in immaterial souls93, and think that most other people do likewise. So, they may claim more than they strictly observed as a way of making their experience seem more important than those of rival accounts. Rather than thinking they are distorting the evidence-base for this phenomenon, they may simply take it as a fact, and want to share in the glamour associated with having experienced it. Much like alien abduction.
    3. Persistent Vegetative State94
      1. For information on what a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) actually is, see for example "Wikipedia - Persistent vegetative state". Note that the Wikipedia article uses the PVS acronym to stand for a Permanent Vegetative State.
      2. It’s never clear whether any such state is permanent, whereas it is clear that it is persistent. In the UK, the state becomes legally “permanent” after 12 months, and the term “continuous” is used in preference to “persistent”.
      3. The medical definition is given there as “A wakeful unconscious state that lasts longer than a few weeks”. Despite the (occasional) wakefulness, there is a “complete lack of cognitive function”.
      4. The interest in the Persistent Vegetative State within the topic of Personal Identity is that when in a PVS the attributes of personhood95 are not in evidence – and maybe not capable of being evidenced – so that it is possible to argue that the individual96 in the PVS is no longer a person97. It thus provides the opportunity to pull apart such prima facie co-referential terms as Human Person98 and Human Being99 (or Human Animal100).
      5. One may wonder why PVS is used in philosophical Thought experiments101 rather than Coma (a more severe condition). I suppose the issue is that in a PVS the brain-stem102 is substantially intact (whatever other brain-damage has been incurred), so that no life-support is required other than feeding tubes. In irreversible comas, the brain-stem may be so severely damaged that the basic functions of the organism103 cannot be carried on without life104 support. Consequently, there’s no debate whether those in a PVS are animals105, whereas it might be argued that those on life support in an irreversible coma are not. Hence, while the PVS definitely distinguishes human animals106 from human persons107 (according to most definitions), irreversible coma might not.
      6. I had originally put “vegetative functions” (rather than simply “functions”) above, but I’m unconvinced that any activity above cellular level ought to be classed as “vegetative”; but I think the Aristotelian classification is often adopted, where “animal” functions are those involving locomotion and the like, rather than nutrition, respiration, etc.
      7. I have discussed PVSs in my reviews of the following papers, amongst others:-
        → "Baillie (James) - What Am I?",
        → "Dennett (Daniel) - Conditions of Personhood",
        → "Fine (Kit) - The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter",
        → "Olson (Eric) - Precis of 'The Human Animal'", and
        → "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?"
  2. Life After Death108
    1. Here we must discuss possible ways in which post-mortem109 survival110 might be actualised, namely:-
      1. Resurrection111,
      2. Reincarnation112, or
      3. Immortality113 of the Soul114.
    2. To this list might be added the collection of hopeful possibilities expected by the Transhumanists115.
    3. We will discuss here broad issues rather than the specifics of the particular options.
    4. We need to discuss whether life116 after death117 – in the sense of eternal, or at least unending, life – is to be desired, though this can mostly be hived off to the Makropulos Case118.
    5. I’m not interested in cases of resuscitation, which are commonplace these days. The paradigm cases I’m interested in are after the total – or near-total – destruction of the body119.
    6. Resuscitation is probably best dealt with under the head of Near Death Experiences120, but see
      1. "Moody (Raymond A.) - Life After Life", and
      2. "Moody (Raymond A.) - The Light Beyond".
    7. Mark Johnston thinks (in "Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death") that there’s a forensic121 need for post-mortem survival122 of some sort, as otherwise there’s no incentive to be good, and hopes to provide it by a radical redefinition of what the person123 is. But this strikes me as changing the subject.
    8. "Martin (L. Michael) & Augustine (Keith) - The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death" is a comprehensive sceptical attack on the possibility of post mortem survival.
    1. Resurrection124
      1. Belief in a resurrection to paradise has occasionally pernicious effects and is also important to millions of non-explosive Americans. Consequently, the metaphysical125 possibility126 of the resurrection of beings like us127 is very important.
      2. This Thesis will aim to prove that resurrection requires substance dualism128.
      3. I will need to ensure I understand just what is believed by intellectually-respectable Jews, Christians and Muslims (though the topical believers are not amongst the ranks of the intellectually-respectable).
      4. Some discussion will be had about the orthodox Christian view being that there is no continuity of matter129 (the conundrum about the person consumed by cannibals was early recognised), and that the resurrection body130 is said to be in some sense a “spiritual” body.
      5. The locus classicus for the canonical Christian account of resurrection is in St. Paul’s 1st Letter to the Corinthians, Chapter 15, on which I’m preparing a commentary131.
      6. A good place to start for an understanding of what resurrection meant to Christians prior to the modern era is "Bynum (Caroline) - Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200 - 1336".
      7. The best place to start evaluating contemporary Christian philosophical views on the metaphysical possibility of resurrection is "Gasser (Georg), Ed. - Personal Identity and Resurrection: How Do We Survive Our Death?".
      8. One thing that strikes me is that the resurrection of Christ, taken to be the guarantee of our own resurrection, is no such thing in the sense of “showing it can be done”. The physical132 and metaphysical issues in resurrecting Jesus (or Lazarus, or Jairus’s daughter, or any recently-deceased133 person whose body134 is substantially intact) are much less than in the case of those whose bodies have been destroyed. Indeed, it might one day be possible135 to resurrect the recently-deceased136 by way of microscopic repair; at least this seems conceivable, whereas the resurrection of a human being whose body has become dispersed and whose parts have been recycled doesn’t even seem to make sense (on a materialist137 account of what we human persons138 are).
    2. Reincarnation139
      1. "Perrett (Roy W.) - Rebirth" makes a case for the metaphysical coherence of the traditional Indian account of rebirth – preferring the term “Rebirth” to “Reincarnation” because Buddhists deny the existence of an eternal Soul140, which may be presupposed by the concept of Reincarnation.
      2. My intuition141 is that – as well as doubts about its actual occurrence – Reincarnation suffers from even more philosophical problems from the perspective of personal identity than does resurrection itself.
      3. However, I’m substantially ignorant of the detailed philosophy and theology underpinning these ideas, though have read the rebuttal "Edwards (Paul) - Reincarnation: A Critical Examination".
      4. The topic is addressed negatively in the following works:-
        → "Edwards (Paul) - Reincarnation: A Critical Examination",
        → "Angel (Leonard) - Is There Adequate Empirical Evidence for Reincarnation? An Analysis of Ian Stevenson’s Work",
        → "Ransom (Champe) - A Critique of Ian Stevenson’s Rebirth Research",
        → "Smythe (Ingrid Hansen) - Objections to Karma and Rebirth: An Introduction", and maybe
        → "Penelhum (Terence) - 'Reincarnation'".
      5. I have only just bought – and therefore haven’t read – "Stevenson (Ian) - Children Who Remember Previous Lives: A Question of Reincarnation", much ridiculed by Edwards and others.
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses142
      1. The “Corpse Problem”
        • Corpses are troublesome143 for animalism144, which alleges (correctly in my view) that corpses are not animals145.
        • The claim is that, at death146, something ontologically147 new comes on the scene – because a corpse has different persistence148 conditions149 (those of masses of matter150) to those of organisms151.
        • Some philosophers – eg. Fred Feldman, in "Feldman (Fred) - The Survival of Death" – disagree. Feldman claims that we survive152 death153, but – rather disappointingly – as a corpse, which solves the “corpse problem”, but at the cost – most likely – of saying that we are bodies154 rather than organisms155.
        • The problem if we don’t survive death as our corpses – it is said – is to answer the question where the corpse comes from, and to answer the objection that if it was there all along – as a “corpse-to-be” – then we have a situation where we have two things of different sorts156 in the same place157 at the same time.
        • If this is taken seriously, then it can be used against the form of the animalist’s “too many thinkers158” argument.
        • I’m willing to accept that this “thinking animal” argument is unsound. However, just how the analogy would work for the “corpse-to-be” needs to be spelled out. The corpse has the persistence conditions159 of a mass of matter160. What are the persistence conditions161 of the “corpse-to-be”? If they are those of an organism162, then the corpse-to-be cannot be the same individual163 as the corpse. The Constitution View164 might be happy with this situation, promoting the idea that persons are constitute by bodies165 (rather than organisms) but what about Animalism?
        • I think the issue is again a parallelism in argumentation (the fetus problem for the CV versus the corpse problem for Animalism). We don’t need to follow this argumentative line.
      2. Resurrection
        • Corpses are probably also important for most Christian materialists166 who hope for some form of resurrection167.
        • If there is a corpse to be resurrected168, it is easier to see how identity is preserved than if we have total destruction. This is obviously so in the case of resuscitation, but even where we have a real case of death169 – not just clinical death, or brain death170, but real death with a bit of mouldering – there is some physical thing that is responsible for preserving identity.
    2. Disembodied Existence171
      1. As an Animalist172, I don’t hold out much hope for disembodied existence for such beings as ourselves173.
      2. It is true that most people, most of the time, seem to have thought it possible – or even certain. Presumably it is closely related to the view that we are – or at least have – immortal174 souls175 that survive the death176 of our bodies177. Maybe there are alternative “possibilities” to explain the origins of the belief. But there are worries whether disembodied existence is even coherent for concrete particulars.
      3. Note that “disembodied” is sometimes used for “disembodied brains”. Since the brain178 is part of the body179, I cover such possibilities under Brains In Vats180.
      4. There is some overlap between this topic and at least one topic in Transhumanism181. The idea behind Uploading182 seems to be that we are “patterns in information183 space” (Andy Clark) and these “patterns” could – in principle – be uploaded184 to a computer185. The entities resulting from such uploads would appear to be disembodied, at least if their experience (assuming that they are conscious186) is of having simulated bodies187 they don’t really have, as in The Matrix. But, all this illusion aside, are these minds188 actually disembodied, or are their “bodies189” (parts of) the computer190 that “runs” them?
    3. Interregnum191
      1. This is a term of art for the (supposed) period between death192 and reincarnation193, of which this is a sub-topic. I think the term is due to Paul Edwards.
      2. The problem with this period – whatever it is called – is that it may seem to imply intermittent existence194.
      3. Alternatively, it has to rely on some alternative substrate for the existence195 of which there is little or no evidence.
      4. The obvious candidate is a substantial soul196. However, it seems that orthodox Hinduism thinks of a rather tenuous “astral body” as providing the link.
      5. That said, the same issue arises for any post-mortem survival197 that is alleged to follow the total destruction of the body198. At least reincarnation199 has some tenuous evidence in its favour, whereas there are – as far as I’m aware – no claimed occurrences of the resurrection200 of a totally-destroyed body201.
      6. I suppose that theists might claim that the information202 that constitutes203 a person204 is held in the mind of God during the interregnum.
  4. Immortality205
    1. In the Biblical Christian tradition, God is the only being with natural immortality (see 1 Timothy 6:16 “God … who alone is immortal”, NIV), but Plato (and his Platonising Christian followers) had it that the (human) soul206 is also naturally immortal. The Biblical view – at least on some interpretations – is rather that God gives or denies immortality to whoever he wishes (and there is consequently no need to eternally roast the immortal souls of the wicked).
    2. St. Paul has it that “the perishable must clothe itself with the imperishable, and the mortal with immortality” (1 Corinthians 15:53, NIV). This is in the context of the resurrection207 of the just dead208 (or the metamorphosis209 of the just living) at the return of Christ.
    3. In the context of identity theory, it is doubtful whether the very same thing can at one time be perishable and at another time immortal, because a thing’s persistence conditions210 are taken to be essential211 properties212 of the sort213 it is, and a single thing cannot change sort214,215.
    4. As such, (as "Johnston (Mark) - Surviving Death" notes), natural immortality of the soul216 is the only hope for post-mortem survival217. But this hope is itself dashed by the lack of empirical evidence for the existence of the substantial218 soul219, immortal or otherwise.
    5. It does seem incongruous to talk about post-mortem immortality – how can something that has died be immortal? The idea, no doubt, is that it is the body220 that the soul221 occupied that was mortal. Hence, the soul222 needs a new immortal body223 to be clothed with. That seems to be the Pauline picture, though debated by the “Conditional Immortality” people.
    6. The Transhumanists224 hope that Uploading225 to a computer226 might lead to indefinitely extended life227, though this is hardly immortality. Indefinite identity-preserving life extensions might be possible using repair-microbots.
    7. In all this, I’m talking about the persistence of the individual228. I’m not talking about “immortality” in the sense of “undying fame”. As Woody Allen quipped (I’m not sure where this is from, but see Woody Allen: Immortality) – “I don't want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve immortality through not dying. I don't want to live on in the hearts of my countrymen; I want to live on in my apartment”.
    8. "Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality" argues that we wouldn’t even want immortality, but I’m not convinced. However, a bad immortality – uploading229 to an evil computer230, for instance – would be worse than no immortality, though some (eg. Miguel De Unamuno) are not even convinced of that. This topic is covered further under the Makropulos Case231.
    9. Of course, if animalism232 is the correct account of personal identity, immortality is not on offer, though if the transhumanists233 succeed, and an alternative account of personal identity is correct, an indefinite extension of life might be possible.
    1. Ivan Ilych234
      1. Tolstoy’s short novella "Tolstoy (Leo) - The Death of Ivan Ilyich" tends to feature in discussions on the philosophy of death235.
      2. I first came upon it via "Kagan (Shelly) - The nature of death (continued); Believing you will die". The contention in Kagan’s lecture was that Tolstoy’s novella taught that no-one really expects to die, an idea Kagan rejects.
      3. My own view is that this isn’t really what the novella is about, but is rather about how we should live our lives – or at least how we should not live them.
      4. In this Note, I intend to consider two main questions:-
        1. Does Tolstoy suggest that no-one really expects to die?
        2. What is the aim of the novella?
      5. As I’m not a literary critic, I’ll be somewhat briefer with regards to the second question than Tolstoy’s work deserves.
      6. The explicit passage on the expectation of death is where Ivan – on hearing that he is about to die – observes that the syllogism beginning “all men are mortal” applies to “all men”, but not specifically to him.
      7. Of course, no-one really believes they are immortal236 (or, at least, that they are not going to die) but the reality of personal death237 is pushed so far into the background that it is hardly taken into account in our plans (other than in the making of rather impersonal provisions), until it is just around the corner. Our plans always extend infinitely on, without the explicit acknowledgement until the last possible minute that we – and more urgently our faculties – will not continue on for ever, and that we need to eke out our time more carefully.
      8. No doubt this is especially true of the young, but I can vouch for the fact that it’s still true of at least one person aged 62238.
    2. Makropulos Case239
      1. This discussion is slightly off-topic, in that the focus isn’t on whether there is, in fact, any such thing as immortality240 (for human beings241).
      2. Rather, it is whether immortality – again for embodied human beings – would be desirable (or, indeed, tolerable).
      3. This discussion will investigate the controversy started in 1973 by "Williams (Bernard) - The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality".
      4. Williams’s conclusion – needless to say – is that immortality is not tolerable, though his reasoning is rather subtle.
      5. Thoughts on the value – or disvalue – of immortality242 tie in with the evil – or lack of evil – of death243. Some discussions of the disvalue of death mention the Makropulos Case in that regard.
      6. Ultimately, all discussion of the evils of death244 will fall under this Note.
      7. Since animalism245 strongly implies that “death is the end of us”, this may be important.


Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now discussed everything on our Agenda, we now in our next Chapter246 make our conclusions.
  2. This is work in progress247.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed248
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. I have segregated those works on the core topic of Resurrection that are from a religio-philosophical perspective from those that are pure philosophy. In general, those written by professional philosophers are in the latter section, even if addressed to a religious audience.
  3. The motivation for some of the works is as follows:-
    • Gasser is the most important work I need to address.
    • Wright’s big book (hopefully) supplies all there is from the Christian side – even though the focus is on a specific – and theologically and metaphysically special – resurrection.
    • Bynum and Gillman provide background information from the Christian and Jewish perspectives, respectively.
    • Badham is a rather elementary Christian discussion, and may be rejected.
    • Corcoran is an important survey, already included in the reading for a couple of other Chapters.
    • Edwards, Flew and Penelhum are useful surveys of older material, which is useful just to read for the appropriate background. There is some considerable overlap in the selections.
    • I suppose I need to discuss death itself, hence Kagan, McMahan, Regan & Wyatt – though skipping the ethical bits.
    • Perrett and Tippler may be a little off-centre, and I may reject them on closer inspection.
    • The other individual papers – especially those by van Inwagen and Shoemaker – are probably important, but justification is to be supplied.
  4. Many aspects of these and other works will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.


Works on this topic that I’ve actually read251, include the following:-
  1. Death
    1. Death252
    2. Near Death Experiences257
    3. Out of Body Experiences258
    4. Persistent Vegetative State260
  2. Life After Death
    1. Life After Death266
    2. Resurrection268
    3. Reincarnation272
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses273
    2. Disembodied Existence276
    3. Interregnum278
  4. Immortality
    1. Immortality279
    2. Ivan Ilych281
    3. Makropulos Case283

A further reading list might start with:-
  1. Death
    1. Death284
    2. Near Death Experiences289
    3. Out of Body Experiences291
    4. Persistent Vegetative State294
  2. Life After Death
    1. Life After Death296
    2. Resurrection300
    3. Reincarnation303
  3. Interim States
    1. Corpses304
    2. Disembodied Existence305
    3. Interregnum308
  4. Immortality
    1. Immortality309
    2. Ivan Ilych310
    3. Makropulos Case311


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 2:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (14/02/2026 00:41:46).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 14:
  • The hyperlinks in this Introduction – as in the other Chapter Introductions – are intended to help motivate the various Notes used in the construction of the Chapter.
  • So, a link appears once and once only per Note in the Note Hierarchy below and appears – as far as possible – in the order of the Hierarchy, even if this is not its first mention.
  • Links to other Notes are omitted in the Chapter Introduction but appear passim in the Main Text.
Footnote 73:
  1. Consider (random examples at a time in 2018) Wikipedia: Ray Wilkins & Wikipedia: Eric Bristow dying of cardiac arrest “before their time”, plus far too many young blacks (and those mistaken for being young blacks) dying from puncture wounds.
Footnote 238:
  1. When I originally wrote this in February 2016.
Footnote 248:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
Footnote 254:
  • This is probably the best place to start, though it spends a lot of time discussing the problem of personal identity.
Footnote 255:
  • Was this book ever published?
  • This paper probably ought to be in the note on Brain Transplants.
Footnote 259:
  • This paper is about the author’s experience of sleep paralysis, but includes discussion of OBEs.
Footnote 262: Footnote 285:
  • While it looks like this paper should be studied under the head of Brain Death, and it could be, it really deals with the definition of “death”, so is best covered here.
Footnotes 286, 288:
  • One of the two main books on this topic.
Footnote 287: Footnote 292:
  • This book – though sceptical – is probably the best starting point.
Footnote 295:
  • I have read this in the distant past, but made no notes, so must read it again.
Footnote 297:
  • Unlikely to have anything to do with resurrection, but I want an excuse for reading the book!
  • Maybe belongs to Chapter 8.
Footnote 298:
  • I’ve not noted individual papers from this volume, except where I’ve read them.
Footnote 301:
  • Many items from this collection are separately itemised in these lists and those of related Notes.
Footnote 302:
  • Hardly philosophy, but important to have read!
Footnote 306:
  • This is a long and controversial book, calling on us to face up to the fact that the mind isn’t disembodied.
  • I doubt I’ll have the time to read it!
Footnote 307: Footnote 312:
  • The discussion of Pascal’s Wager is a tangent on a tangent, but an interesting one nonetheless.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

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