Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It)
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Write-up2 (as at 14/02/2026 00:41:46): Thesis - Chapter 07 (The Constitution View and Arguments for It)

Chapter Contents
  1. Abstract3
  2. Methodology4
  3. Introduction5
  4. Note Hierarchy6
  5. Main Text7
  6. Concluding Remarks8
  7. Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed9
  8. Works Read10
  9. Further Reading11
  10. References & Reading List

Abstract
  1. This Chapter gives an account of Lynne Rudder Baker’s thesis that human persons are not identical to human animals but are – temporarily at least – constituted by them.


Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link12 for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 16, possibly iterative, stages, some of which have sub-stages.
  • Follow this Link13 for my progress dashboard on these tasks.


Chapter Introduction14
  1. Baker’s account of Constitution15 is not the standard Mereological16 account, of some composite body being constituted by its parts, but is her own idea that requires – and receives – detailed explication.
  2. Despite this deviation, it is worth spending some time on standard Mereology, in particular mereological Essentialism17 (which challenges any idea of Persistence).
  3. Finally, there needs to be a discussion of Hylomorphism18, an Aristotelian idea that has some modern supporters, and which may or may not be similar to the Constitution View19 (CV).
  4. As a cornerstone of her Constitution View, Lynne Rudder Baker20 reifies a useful idea – that of a First-Person Perspective21. It is the FPP that individuates persons, according to Baker, so the FPP requires explanation as well. Baker retrofits its definition so that – according to her – it applies to non-defective Human Beings (and, no doubt, higher beings) but not to any non-human Animals.
  5. The big analogies for the CV are TEs involving Coincident Objects22, previously seen in discussions of Contingent Identity, though this isn’t the message the CV takes because it denies that Constitution is Identity.
  6. I’ve parked in this Chapter discussion of further standard problems of Coincident Objects, starting with the Statue and the Clay23, Dion and Theon24 (more recently repackaged as Tibbles the Cat25) and continuing on to classic conundrums such as The Problem of the Many26 and The Ship of Theseus27. They are here because of their connection to Mereology, with Constitution being introduced as an explanation, though they are relevant elsewhere as well.
  7. Baker has a commitment to Persons being Substances in their own right, rather than “Person” being an honorific title applied to substances that at other times might not deserve the honorific. She thinks that a Person comes into existence with the FPP, which make an Ontological difference. She asserts that many other views do not Take Persons Seriously. All this is covered in Chapter 3 (on Persons) but could as well be covered in this Chapter.
  8. One suspects that Religious28 commitments strongly influence the philosophy of many supporters of the CV, who tend to be Christian Materialists29 and who want a way for Christians to persist through Resurrection.


Note Hierarchy
  1. Constitution30
    1. Mereology31
    2. Hylomorphism33
  2. Constitution View34
    1. Lynne Rudder Baker35
    2. First-Person Perspective36
    3. Coincident Objects37
  3. Christian Materialism43
    1. Religion44


Main Text
  1. Constitution45
    1. At first sight, it might seem that a full understanding of constitution – by which I mean Material Constitution – is required to understand Lynne Rudder Baker’s46 Constitution View47 (CV) of Personal Identity.
    2. There are many accounts of the mereological type of Constitution, in particular:-
    3. However, the concept of Constitution required by the CV seems to differ from the normal mereological48 view of material constitution.
    4. As a way in to this subject, which is geared towards the topic of Personal Identity, I intend in the first instance to focus on two chapters from "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View", namely:-
      1. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Very Idea of Constitution", and
      2. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution".
    5. I will then look at two chapters from Baker’s book "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism" that deal, respectively, with these two aspects of Constitution, namely:-
      1. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Constitution Revisited",
      2. "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Mereology and Constitution".
    6. I will, of course, have to consider other accounts. I had supposed that Baker’s view was idiosyncratic, though "Wasserman (Ryan) - The Constitution Question" considers it to be widely held.
    7. Wasserman outlines the traditional49 view as follows:-
      1. Adequacy conditions on any proposed answer to the Constitution Question.
        • First, constitution requires spatial coincidence — x constitutes y at t only if x and y have the same spatial location at t.
        • Second, constitution requires material coincidence — x constitutes y at t only if x and y have all the same parts.
      2. The formal properties of the constitution relation (are)
        • First, the constitution relation is transitive. So, consider a representative clay statue (Statue) and the lump of clay (Lump) from which it is made. If Lump is constituted by a certain aggregate of elementary particles and Statue is constituted by Lump, then Statue is also constituted by that particular aggregate of elementary particles.
        • Second, the constitution relation is irreflexive, for the defenders of the constitution view traditionally deny that objects like Lump and Statue constitute themselves.
        • Finally, the constitution relation is asymmetric; while Lump constitutes Statue, Statue does not constitute Lump.
      3. Constitution is not mere coincidence, for coincidence (the sharing of spatial location or parts) is both reflexive and symmetric.
      4. In summary, constitution requires material (as well as spatial) coincidence and that it is a transitive, irreflexive, asymmetric relation.
    8. Various papers by Eric Olson, of course, also consider the topic, which he considers would be fatal to animalism – as it would be were it true. I should probably start with "Olson (Eric) - Composition and Coincidence".
    9. There may also be an overlap between Constitution and Supervenience50.
    10. The various cases of ‘coincidence’ – addressed later in this Chapter – highlight the question whether the constitution-relation is or is not the identity-relation. Is there anything left out in the description of a thing once we’ve said what it is made up of, and how these parts link together? Those – like Baker – who hold that one whole thing can be constituted by another whole thing deny identity. For instance – Baker says – a stature is something over and above its clay because it requires an external relation – to an art-world, or at least to people who care about statues – before it is a statue.
    1. Mereology51
      1. While Baker’s52 understanding of constitution53 is distinct from a mereological one, it is necessary to understand mereology. I would include the following reasons relevant to my Thesis:-
        1. Lots of arguments relevant to multiple occupancy theses depend on mereological issues. See Dion and Theon54 and the like. These are collated under the topic of Coincidence55.
        2. Mereological Essentialism56 has an impact on the whole notion of persistence. If it is taken seriously, we may have to countenance Scattered Objects57 or no physical thing would persist for long on this view.
        3. The DAUP (Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts) impacts on whether such things as brains exist. I58 can’t be a brain59 if brains60 don’t exist.
        4. It impacts on issues of vague identity61 and Olson’s62 Thinking Animal Argument63.
      2. As a general principle I will discuss here whether proper parts of things exist and – if so – how they make up the things of which they are parts. The note on Constitution64 – which overlaps with that on Coincidence65 – will focus on how one whole things can “constitute” another whole thing. All with a focus on Personal Identity, of course.
      • Essentialism66
        1. The topics of relevance to my Thesis to cover under this head will include:-
          1. Mereological67 essentialism; the doctrine that wholes have all their parts essentially – that is, that a whole ceases to exist at the moment it loses or gains a particle, however small; mutatis mutandis for abstract objects.
          2. A second topic will be essential properties68; those whose loss cause their owner to cease to exist.
        2. Mereological69 essentialism
          1. Whether we have any essential parts depends on what we are70.
          2. If we are fundamentally psychological beings, then it’s unclear whether we have proper parts – particularly if we are souls71; at least Descartes thought we didn’t, given that the mind is not extended. However, we would not survive the loss of our psychology72, but – and this is a problem for any psychological view73 – it is vague74 just how much psychology is enough to ensure our survival75.
          3. If we are organisms76, then we can lose – indeed do lose77 – all our parts over time.
          4. Provided change78 is gradual, and enough of lost particles are replaced, we persist79. There is an argument within the animalist80 camp whether our brains are “just another organ” or whether their regulatory function means they are essential to our survival81.
          5. If we are brains82 – or proper parts thereof – then our brains would seem to be essential parts of ‘us’, though there might be some quibbling about whether they might be chiselled down a bit.
          6. "Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'" – seemed to think we are mereological atoms, though the identity of the atom is obscure. If there is such a thing, it would be our only essential part.
        3. Property83 essentialism
          1. If “being a person” is a property that we have, and we are human animals84, then – animalism85 claims – we would survive even when we no longer qualify as persons86 (and also existed87 before we became persons).
          2. Most philosophers who aren’t animalists88 say that we are essentially persons89, so can’t survive if we are no longer persons, or even if our personality90 has changed too radically. Some of our mind’s91 properties may be essential, others not so.
          3. I’m not sure whether Lynne Rudder Baker treats the First Person Perspective92 as a property of the person, or the person itself. But, if it is a property, it will be an essential one.
    2. Hylomorphism93
      1. This Aristotelian idea is very peripheral to my concerns, though it appears somewhat similar to – or a rival to – the Constitution View94, as is discussed in "Quitterer (Josef) - Hylomorphism and the Constitution View".
      2. "Keles (Serap) - Personal identity and persistence over time : the hybrid view with regard to hylomorphism" looks important in attempting to bring together Animalism95 and the Constitution View96 as a Hybrid Theory97 in the context of Hylomorphism.
      3. "Cohen (S. Mark) & Reeve (C.D.C.) - Aristotle’s Metaphysics" discusses the topic of Hylomorphism in Section 7 (Substance and Essence) and Section 8 (Substances as Hylomorphic Compounds).
      4. Wikipedia has a sound-looking article ("Wikipedia - Hylomorphism"), from which I’ve extracted a few quotations (pending my writing something of my own):-
        • Aristotle defines X's matter as "that out of which" X is made. For example, letters are the matter of syllables. Thus, "matter" is a relative term: an object counts as matter relative to something else. For example, clay is matter relative to a brick because a brick is made of clay, whereas bricks are matter relative to a brick house.
        • Change is analyzed as a material transformation: matter is what undergoes a change of form. For example, consider a lump of bronze that's shaped into a statue. Bronze is the matter, and this matter loses one form (that of a lump) and gains a new form (that of a statue).
        • Aristotle applies his theory of hylomorphism to living things. He defines a soul as that which makes a living thing alive. Life is a property of living things, just as knowledge and health are. Therefore, a soul is a form — that is, a property or set of properties — belonging to a living thing. Furthermore, Aristotle says that a soul is related to its body as form to matter.
        • Hence, Aristotle argues, there is no problem in explaining the unity of body and soul, just as there is no problem in explaining the unity of wax and its shape. Just as a wax object consists of wax with a certain shape, so a living organism consists of a body with the property of life, which is its soul. On the basis of his hylomorphic theory, Aristotle rejects the Pythagorean doctrine of reincarnation98, ridiculing the notion that just any soul could inhabit just any body.
        • It is unclear whether Aristotle identifies the soul with the body's structure. According to one interpretation of Aristotle, a properly organized body is already alive simply by virtue of its structure. However, according to another interpretation, the property of life — that is, the soul — is something in addition to the body's structure. Likewise, according to this second interpretation, a living body is alive not only because of its structure but also because of an additional property: the soul is this additional property, which a properly organized body needs in order to be alive. John Vella uses Frankenstein's monster to illustrate the second interpretation: the corpse lying on Frankenstein's table is already a fully organized human body, but it is not yet alive; when Frankenstein activates his machine, the corpse gains a new property, the property of life, which Aristotle would call the soul.
  2. Constitution View99
    1. The Constitution View is that human persons100 are constituted101 by their bodies102 but are not identical to them, though a lot more needs to be said here.
    2. The primary source of this View is (or was) Lynne Rudder Baker103, starting with "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View".
    3. Baker’s account of constitution is not the standard mereological104 account, of some larger body being constituted by its parts, but is her own idea that requires explication. She appears to have a non-mereological view of constitution which is hard to unravel, involving the relation of one complete thing to another (or to a context).
    4. I also need to discuss her concern for primary kinds105, and the concept of “having of properties106 derivatively”.
    5. It’s unclear to me whether the brain107 has a special place for Baker; as far as I remember, she uniformly refers to “bodies108”.
    6. Baker also has a commitment to Persons109 being substances110 in their own right, rather than personhood being an honorific title applied to substances that at other times might not deserve the honorific.
    7. She also reifies a useful idea – that of a First-person Perspective111. It is the FPP that individuates persons, according to Baker, so the FPP requires explanation as well.
    1. Lynne Rudder Baker112
      1. Lynne Rudder Baker was113 notable for defending her version of the Constitution View114 of Personal Identity, which is important in its own right, but also in opposition to Eric Olson115’s Animalism116.
      2. Baker is a “Christian Materialist117 in that she denies that we are (or have) immaterial souls (see "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism").
      3. However, she is against physicalism118 in the philosophy of mind – see "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism".
      4. Her view on Personal Identity is, to quote "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Materialism with a Human Face", that “Persons are constituted by bodies with which they are not identical. The metaphysical difference between persons and their bodies is that persons have first-person perspectives119 essentially. ”
      5. Her concept of a First-Person Perspective120 strikes me as important and substantially correct121. However, she thinks of personhood122 not merely as a property of certain beings, but as making some sort of ontological123 difference.
      6. Because a person is constituted by – but not identical to – the being that constitutes it, she claims that a particular person is portable from one of these beings to another. I don’t think she would allow a person to exist disembodied, as though the Cheshire Cat’s smile could exist in the absence of the cat, but I still think she is reifying a property124.
      7. From my perspective, her most important work is "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View", but also see "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'" in "Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'".
      8. However, "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Big-Tent Metaphysics", part of "Olson (Eric), Etc. - Abstracta Special Issue on 'The Human Animal'", and analysed here125, is as good a place as any to start.
      9. That said, her more recent book – "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism" – may give a more technical account of some of her ideas.
    2. First-Person Perspective126
      1. The concept of a “First-Person Perspective” (FPP) is central to the Constitution View127 of personal identity, which I reject. However, the concept of a FPP is important in its own right, and explains the attraction of Psychological Views128 of personal identity. It also motivates Hybrid129 Accounts.
      2. Just what the FPP is needs spelling out – what does Lynne Rudder Baker130 think it is, and why does she think it so ontologically131 important? She seems to be obsessed by the thought that beings that can contemplate their own deaths132 are ontologically different from those that are presumed not to be able to do so. Why is it that it is this, rather than simply a phenomenally conscious133 perspective, that counts as the ontological watershed? I suppose either both or neither might count ontologically. Also, both might have enormous significance, yet not imply that an ontologically distinct entity had come on the scene. Note that – for Baker – it’s the moment the FPP (or maybe the as-yet-unrealised capacity for an FPP) comes on the scene that marks the ontological change, not the emergence of the constituting134 individual135.
      3. We might instead posit another property136 – that of consciousness of Self137 – as the critical moment in the ontological ladder leading to persons138. I suspect some philosophers of rigging the qualifications for personhood139 so that only human beings140 – and maybe some others even more exalted (like God and angels) – qualify. Non-human animals141 must be excluded to ensure the uniqueness and specialness of humans.
      4. Also, can we really use this term to explain142 personal identity, as “person143” appears in it? If it’s supposed to be elucidatory of personal identity, we seem to have a circle.
      5. Really what’s important – it seems to me – is that we have animals with certain properties that are important to them. We can’t reify the property and make it a stand-alone thing, like the Cheshire Cat’s smile. Nor can we assume without a lot of careful argument that this property can hop from one infrastructure to another – as in uploading144 or resurrection145.
      6. An argument I’m fond of is that – despite whatever psychological146 differences there may be between me and my future self147 – I can both rationally anticipate his experiences and should display rational concern for his well-being. That is because we share the same “window on the world” (which is just the FPP without the tendentious terminology). I just need to try out the future great pain test148 on the individual resulting from some adventure and see if I'm worried!
      7. Now is this “window on the world” the same as a FPP? After all, it may be that my senile old self149 no longer qualifies as a person150, though is phenomenally conscious151, and I should be concerned for him whatever his ontological status; only the absence of phenomenal consciousness152 would remove all that matters153.
      8. In summary, I think the FPP is a useful concept, and represents our window on the world, and what matters154 to us in survival155. But it is a property of a human animal156, and that animal’s persistence157 doesn’t rest upon it.
    3. Coincident Objects158
      1. Coincident objects are those – presumed to be distinct – that (appear to) occupy the same space – or substantially the same space – at the same time.
      2. There are a number of classic puzzles that have worried about such things, and which appear below.
      3. Additionally, the alleged problems with coincident objects feature in Olson’s159 Master Argument (Thinking Animal Argument160) in favour of Animalism161 and contra the Constitution View162.
      4. The classic consideration of the topic is "Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time".
      5. "Gallois (Andre) - The Puzzle Cases" draws together some of these and more, though in the cause of a deviant logic of identity163.
      • The Statue and the Clay164
        1. This topic arises in the theory of material constitution165 when we are considering whole objects (rather than their parts) that appear to be co-located because they are (or seem to be) of different kinds166, or (seem to) have different persistence conditions167.
        2. This issue was exploited by "Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity" in the cause of supposed contingent identity168.
        3. Supporters of the Constitution View169 of Personal Identity (are sometimes said to) hold that persons170 are constituted by their bodies171 much as statues are constituted by lumps of clay.
        4. Some – eg. Trenton Merricks – get rid of this whole problem by adopting eliminativism172 – there are no such things as statues, only clay arranged statue-wise. See "Merricks (Trenton) - No Statues".
      • Dion and Theon173
        1. ‘Dion and Theon’ is an ancient conundrum that has been revived by Peter Geach, Michael Burke and others – in the form of “Tib and Tibbles174” – and is put to a variety of uses.
        2. It is so closely associated with one version of Tibles the Cat175 that I’ll describe them together, though a variant form of Tibbles the Cat will be discussed under its own Note.
          1. The conceit is that there is a whole man (Dion; or cat, Tibbles) and a partially overlapping thing (Theon or Tib) that is identical to Dion (or Tibbles) apart from its right foot (or tail). It is, of course, moot whether this “thing” is a man (or cat) – or even whether it exists at all.
          2. Subsequently Dion (or Tibbles) suffers the misfortune of losing the relevant member.
          3. Post-ectomy, it appears that Dion is identical to Theon (and Tibbles to Tib).
          4. What are we to make of this apparent contradiction, as it would seem that beforehand the respective pairs were non-identical?
        3. The solutions to this puzzle, taken from "Burke (Michael) - Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle", include:-
          1. Restrict the principle that different objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Some philosophers, following Locke176 and David Wiggins177, modify the principle so that it applies only to objects of the same sort.
          2. Embrace mereological essentialism178, the doctrine that each of the parts of an object is essential to its identity. Popular in antiquity, but not supported these days.
          3. Deny that the concept179 of a torso is a proper one, or deny that there ever was such a thing as Theon.
          4. Invoke the doctrine of temporal parts.
          5. Relativizing identity180, whether to time or to sort181. George Myro and Peter Geach both would say that the amputation has left just one (man-sized) object, an object that is both a man and a torso. Is that object Dion? Or is it Theon? Myro's answer would be "both."
          6. Michael Burke’s solution: Post amputation there is just one object; it is (predicatively) both a man and a torso; this one object is Dion, who once was two-footed and now is one-footed; Theon has ceased to exist.
      • Tibbles the Cat182
        1. There appear to be two puzzles involving Tib and Tibbles, both due to Peter Geach.
          1. Tibbles and Tib – his tail-less concommitant – feature firstly as a variant of Dion and Theon183.
          2. There’s also a variant of the Problem of the Many184, in which Tibbles loses 1,000 hairs one by one.
        2. I’m not sure there’s much that will need to be added here that’s not to be covered in one or other of those two Notes.
        3. I note in passing that "Parsons (Josh) - Dion, Theon, and DAUP" refers to "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts" and the problem of Descartes’ Foot, another variant on this theme.
      • The Problem of the Many185
        1. This problem is to do with objects – whether clouds or human beings – that have vague boundaries. What is wrong with saying that instead of just one object there are many overlapping ones; or, if we hate this idea, what’s the solution so that we only have one (as we first thought)?
        2. Clearly, this topic overlaps considerably with that on Vagueness186, but is a particular symptom thereof.
        3. There are also connections to:-
          1. Dion and Theon187, and
          2. Tib and Tibbles188
        4. Whereas these are rather “The Problem of the Few”, some of the same issues arise. However, it’s easier to come to a principled decision as to which is the “real” person (or cat) in these cases.
        5. The problem doesn’t just arise with living189 things, so can’t be solved (I don’t think) by moving from a substance190 to a process191 metaphysics, though it’s worth investigation.
      • The Ship of Theseus192
        1. There’s no Stanford entry on this topic per se, so see "Wikipedia - Ship of Theseus" for an introduction.
        2. Versions:-
          • The original version, recounted by Plutarch, just considers whether an artifact (specifically a ship) can continue the same thing if its parts are gradually replaced until all the original parts have been replaced.
          • Hobbes added the further paradox of collecting up the replaced parts and assembling them into a rival claimant to be the original ship.
          • There are various “minimalist” cases in popular culture whereby half of an artifact is replaced, followed by the other half, and maybe the process is then repeated.
            1. The traditional example is “grandfather’s axe” (the blade and the handle being successively replaced).
            2. A more recent one is “Trigger’s Broom”, from Only Fools and Horses, where the broom handle and head are successively replaced.
        3. I’m greatly attracted to David Lewis193’s solution194 to the Hobbesian version of the Ship of Theseus thought experiment195, but need to consider alternative solutions that don’t depend on Perdurantism196, and whether this case is really relevant to personal identity.
          • Is there anything special about artifacts197 that makes identification arbitrary or a matter of convention198, while the continued identity of a person199 (from the first-person perspective200, whatever society201 – which only has a third-person perspective – may say) is not arbitrary?
          • Organisms202 – it is said – do replace (most of) the matter making up (most of) their parts in the course of their lives, yet we are sure that the organism persists. Also, the matter that is lost and replaced are not “parts” in the way that planks of a ship are parts. It’s only in transplant203 surgery when parts properly so-called are replaced.
          • However, is there a fact of the matter whether the repaired ship or the reconstructed ship is the “true” ship?
          • The minimalist case is interesting because it presses our intuitions204. Personally, I don’t think half or any large part of an artifact205 can be replaced while the thing remains the same, but this may just be a prejudice. Habituation comes into consideration – just as assimilation of new matter is important to organisms206. If we become habituated to some major change in a building, say, then we may agree that it has persisted207. Then we may become habituated – over generations – to the replacement of the other half. Then – if persistence is identity-preserving – we must be prepared to say – given the logic of identity208 – that the original building is identical to the current one, even if it looks nothing like it.
          • I have had such a conundrum with my house, where it was decided to rebuild the front and most of the rear walls, and the “Trigger’s Broom” variant of the Ship of Theseus paradox was mentioned by a mortgage adviser.
          • As discussed in the Note on artifacts209, Eastern traditions are much less fussy about material continuity in the persistence of buildings. See "Han (Byung-Chul) - Shanzhai: Deconstruction in Chinese".
        4. Returning to the specific case of the Ship, and generally where individuals210 lose parts211, we need to consider what the status of the lost part is:-
          • When a bicycle is disassembled with the intention of reassembling it again later, its parts are not released but merely dispersed and it becomes a scattered object212.
          • However, when an object loses a part in the normal case of wear and tear, that part – unless the artifact can be mended by having the part re-attached – is not dispersed but is returned to the environment for use elsewhere and is no longer associated with the object of which it once formed a part.
          • The same can be said where parts – in particular, planks – are removed and replaced. The ship (in this case) no longer has a lien over them.
          • If this account is correct, it solves Hobbes’s problem of the Ship of Theseus without the need for perdurantism213, though this theory of persistence214 may still be useful for other puzzles of fission215.
  3. Christian Materialism216
    1. This Note focuses on those philosophers who profess both some form of Christianity and some form of materialism217, though it also lists those other philosophers associated in one way or another with the philosophy of Personal Identity who have professed Christian faith.
    2. The form of materialism218 I have in mind is that we human beings consist wholly of matter219, without the need to posit a soul220 to ensure our post-mortem survival221 and, in particular, our posited resurrection222.
    3. I will also discuss those Christian philosophers who are dualists or hold other non-materialist accounts of human identity, and who resist Christian Materialism223.
    4. Obviously, no Christian with any claim to orthodoxy believes that all persons224 are essentially225 embodied – as God is, and presumably angels are, taken to be persons and immaterial.
    5. I also suppose that Christians may differ as to what they think of as the intermediate state between death226 and resurrection227 (ignoring those that think that the future state is incorporeal228).
    6. They may also differ as to whether they think matter requires animating229 by the breath of the Spirit in a literal sense.
    7. Lists of Christian Materialists and Related Philosophers
    1. Religion231
      1. This Note has to do with the – historical and contemporary – ways in which religious questions and commitments have influenced philosophers in their discussions of Personal Identity.
      2. I disagree fundamentally with philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga who claim that belief in God is “epistemologically basic”. Instead, I claim that philosophy asks questions that are prior to any others except, possibly, metaphilosophical questions, which are also philosophical, so part of philosophy itself.
      3. But – it seems to me – Christians allow their prior beliefs to constrain which results of their philosophical endeavours are acceptable. Worse; having decided on pre-philosophical grounds what to believe, they use the techniques of philosophical argument to bolster these beliefs. They don’t follow an argument where it goes but argue on a casuistical basis232.
      4. Also, despite there being little agreement on Christian doctrine amongst the various denominations and sects, philosophers seem to find the arguments they’ve dreamt up for their own sectarian beliefs the most convincing.
      5. This applies to “damnable doctrines” such as Hell, which seems to be discussed academically and unselfconsciously on the pages of Faith and Philosophy233, just as much as to comfortable ones like Heaven.
      6. I’ve briefly investigated Michael Sudduth, who wrote on the topic of ‘Reformed Epistemology’ (in "Sudduth (Michael) - Reformed Epistemology and Christian Apologetics"), but has since moved away from Calvinism and the Christian faith generally. I intend to look into his reasons and determine what he thinks of his earlier writings.
      7. There has been some concern amongst Christian Materialist234 Philosophers as to whether heaven is a “place we can get to”. I’m not aware of the same concern for Hell, nor of just what metaphysics of the human person235 is needed to allow eternal conscious torment.
      8. Locke236’s thoughts on personal identity were initially motivated by worries about the metaphysics of Resurrection237 – seen as necessary in order to right the wrongs inflicted on the righteous in this life – as well as theodicy and other forensic238 concerns.
      9. I will focus on those philosophers who are still living or who were active in the latter quarter of the 20th century and / or thereafter, during which period it has been relatively unusual for a philosopher to openly espouse theism (except in the USA).
      10. A useful source of relatively contemporary theists ought to be "Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) - The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe?", though there were virtually none that I recognised.
      11. "Plantinga (Alvin) - Twenty Years Worth of the SCP" claimed (in 1998) that there were 1,000 members of the Society of Christian Philosophers.
      12. I’ve discussed, and listed, Christian Materialists under the Note of that title239. Below, I simply list all the significant living or recently deceased philosophers I know of with Christian affiliation, divided into those whose opinion on materialism I know and those I don’t, to be checked & corrected in due course.
      13. I’ve not given much time to considering the philosophy motivated by religious beliefs antithetical to Christianity, other than to Hindu and Buddhist242 thought on the topic of Reincarnation243 and Karma.
      14. I’ve not yet made much of a study of Jewish views where these diverge from Christian views on the topic of personal identity and the future state.
      15. No doubt Muslim philosophers have similar concerns and motivations, but I have not investigated them yet.


Concluding Remarks
  1. Having now discussed both Animalism and the Constitution View, we can now in our next Chapter244 turn to the arguments against these views, starting with those against Animalism.
  2. This is work in progress245.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed246
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. I’ve not been overly careful to segregate the reading-list of this Chapter from that of Chapter 9249. I will address the segregation in due course. There will, in any case, be some overlap.
  3. While Baker’s understanding of constitution is distinct from a mereological one, it is necessary to understand mereology.
  4. I’m not sure whether the section on co-location belongs here, but it must go somewhere!
  5. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.


Works on this topic that I’ve actually read250, include the following:-
  1. Constitution
    1. Constitution251
    2. Mereology255
    3. Hylomorphism258
  2. Constitution View
    1. Constitution View260
    2. First-Person Perspective276
    3. Lynne Rudder Baker280
    4. Coincident Objects295
  3. Christian Materialism315
  4. Christian Materialism321
  5. Christian Materialism324
    1. Religion328

A further reading list might start with:-
  1. Constitution
    1. Constitution331
    2. Mereology333
    3. Hylomorphism335
  2. Constitution View
    1. Constitution View336
    2. First-Person Perspective337
    3. Lynne Rudder Baker338
    4. Coincident Objects339
  3. Christian Materialism353
  4. Christian Materialism357
  5. Christian Materialism361
    1. Religion362


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 2:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (14/02/2026 00:41:46).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 14:
  • The hyperlinks in this Introduction – as in the other Chapter Introductions – are intended to help motivate the various Notes used in the construction of the Chapter.
  • So, a link appears once and once only per Note in the Note Hierarchy below and appears – as far as possible – in the order of the Hierarchy, even if this is not its first mention.
  • Links to other Notes are omitted in the Chapter Introduction but appear passim in the Main Text.
Footnote 49:
  1. This makes it sound as though the CV goes back centuries!
  2. Wasserman uses the term “traditionally” when he probably just means “usually” or “standardly”.
Footnote 77:
  1. That I mean here is that the matter that constitutes our various proper parts changes over time.
  2. This is an empirical matter but is largely true.
  3. We can also lose parts of our bodies or have them replaced. At least some parts, in some circumstances.
Footnote 113:
  1. Sadly, she died on 24th December 2017.
  2. I’ve retained the “historic present” in the rest of this discussion.
Footnote 121:
  1. Where I would depart from her is that she makes the FPP too prescriptive and stringent.
  2. I think a grammatical FPP (but including sentience) rather than one explicitly invoking a high view of personhood is what is needed.
Footnote 232:
  1. I need to provide evidence for these claims. For now …
  2. For ‘not following arguments where they go’: see Kevin Corcoran (or Trenton Merricks, I forget).
  3. For casuistry, see William Lane Craig
Footnote 233:
  1. To their credit, the Society of Chistian Philosophers have made their journal Faith and Philosophy freely available on-line.
  2. See Faith and Philosophy.
  3. I need to reference the discussion on Hell, not that it’s really relevant to my Thesis.
Footnote 240:
  1. I’m not sure how committed (if at all) E.J. Lowe was to Christianity, nor how important he was as a philosopher (he died in 2014).
  2. He did once argue for the modal ontological argument against Graham Oppy (where?), but in "Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) - The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe?" he’s only down as “leaning towards” theism.
  3. The TLS Obituary (Times Higher Education: Jonathan Lowe - Obituary) described him as “one of the leading philosophers of his generation” but made no mention of any religious faith.
Footnote 241:
  1. I could probably make a guess at the “materialistic” affiliation of these philosophers – in that the default position is dualistic – but will wait until I’ve looked at their work.
Footnote 246:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
Footnote 264:
  • The whole book is relevant, but the most relevant Chapters are also listed separately.
Footnotes 270, 289, 318, 327: Footnote 279:
  • This Chapter has rather more to do with distributive ethics than personal identity or the FPP.
Footnote 297:
  • This may be the place to start!
Footnote 299:
  • Clay seems to be used in a discussion of fusion.
Footnote 330:
  • This is a Note – that needs sorting out a bit – that demonstrates the impact of religious doctrines on narrative identity.
  • I’ve added it here partly because I’d forgotten all about it.
Footnote 332: Footnote 340: Footnotes 341, 344, 347:
  • This looks like an important paper, which rejects the “proofs” of 4D based on the “coincidence” TEs.
Footnote 343:
  • Propositional attitudes “create” statues and other artifacts.
Footnote 348:
  • This book has been selected because of the discussion of Tibbles by an Amazon reviewer!
Footnote 350: Footnote 352: Footnotes 354, 358:
  • This (rather than hylomorphic) is the chosen spelling!
Footnotes 355, 359:
  • I’ve not bought the book as it is too expensive!
Footnote 363: Footnote 364:

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