Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)
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Write-up2 (as at 14/02/2026 00:41:46): Thesis - Chapter 06 (Animalism and Arguments for It)

Chapter Contents
  1. Abstract3
  2. Methodology4
  3. Introduction5
  4. Note Hierarchy6
  5. Main Text7
  6. Concluding Remarks8
  7. Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed9
  8. Works Read10
  9. Further Reading11
  10. References & Reading List

Abstract
  1. This Chapter describes what Animalism is, with an excursus on animals and organisms and their persistence.
  2. It puts forward the arguments in favour of animalism, those against being reserved for Chapter 812.
  3. It focuses on the account of Eric Olson, the primary contemporary exponent of Animalism.


Research Methodology
  • Follow this Link13 for a generic statement of how I intend to pursue each Chapter.
  • The method is broken down into 16, possibly iterative, stages, some of which have sub-stages.
  • Follow this Link14 for my progress dashboard on these tasks.


Chapter Introduction15
  1. As we saw in Chapter 0216, nothing is more obvious than that we are Human Animals17. The disadvantages of whole-hearted acceptance of this seemingly obvious fact – leading to ‘conversion’ to Animalism18 – are at least twofold:-
    1. Firstly, that it seems to demote human beings from their status of being made in the image of the God many – maybe most – people no longer really believe in. There are two responses to this: Either
      1. Deny that it does, or
      2. Accept this claim and agree that the differences between human beings and other animals are those of degree rather than kind.
    2. A second disadvantage is that accepting that we are human animals makes the prospects for post-mortem survival look bleak. This is addressed in Chapter 1119.
  2. So, while saying that we are human animals might seem to be the default position – and so the burden is on others to demonstrate that we are not – the historical situation places a burden on the Animalist to present the case for animalism with as much rigour as possible. Saying ‘it’s obvious’ isn’t enough.
  3. Firstly, it needs to be made clear what the claim that ‘we are animals’ – the Biological View20 – amounts to. The Animalist makes the claim that this is one of numerical identity. We’re not simply animals in the sense of having animal bodies, while ‘really’ being something else. Being members of the species Homo Sapiens21 is what we really are.
  4. So, our persistence criteria are Biological Criteria22, and the implications of this need to be spelled out.
  5. Despite the ‘obviousness’ of the Biological View, most contemporary philosophers are unconvinced, as was noted in the Chapter 123. I have a Note detailing just which Philosophers can be counted as Animalists24. Eric Olson25 was probably responsible for clarifying and popularising the position. I also have a Note on David Wiggins26, though his status as a card-carrying Animalist is doubted by some, including Olson.
  6. The Biological View is often referred to as the Organism View, so we need to consider what Organisms27 are, and – indeed – what Life28 is, including when it starts – Animation29. I’ve referenced my Note on Quantum Mechanics30 here as recent research has attempted to implicate it in the mechanism of life. We discuss life’s end – Death – in Chapter 1131.
  7. Recently, some philosophers have tried ascribing intentionality to Plants32, which I think is muddying the waters, just as is trying to include fish in the moral community.
  8. We need to consider Evolution33, especially as this is a major consideration in why we are animals. I also have Notes on Genetics34 and Origins35, which are connected to this subject and others.
  9. After all this ground-clearing, we need to consider Animals36 themselves – especially those at the higher end of the spectrum most closely related to Homo Sapiens in their abilities and potential moral considerability, leading on to Animal Rights37.
  10. Finally, we get down to the actual Arguments for Animalism38, of which Olson’s favourite is the Thinking Animal Argument39.


Note Hierarchy
  1. Animalism40
    1. Human Animals41
    2. Biological View43
    3. Biological Criterion44
    4. Animalists45
  2. Organisms49
    1. Life50
    2. Plants53
    3. Evolution54
  3. Animals57
    1. Animal Rights58
  4. Arguments for Animalism59
    1. Thinking Animal Argument60


Main Text
  1. Animalism61
    1. There are different interpretations of Animalism, which I need to compare and contrast. My preferred option is Olson62’s, namely, that animalism is the view that we are identical to human animals63 and that, since human animals64 don’t have any psychological properties essentially, neither do we.
    2. Olson is probably the best-known active Animalist65. His two books below need to be analysed in exhaustive detail.
      → "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology" and
      → "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology".
      Follow the above link for other animalists.
    3. Olson’s claim is not that there are no non-animal persons, but that human persons are essentially animals. Other animalists, such as Wiggins66, insist (or are said to insist, or used to insist) that the only persons are indeed human beings67, or are (maybe) other animals.
    4. I incline to agree with Olson on the topic of what we are68, but need to press hard with thought experiments69 to see why we can’t separate the two – that is, why we can’t separate where we go as persons70 from where we go as animals: our personhood can’t be pealed off from our animality and ported to some other infrastructure – or at least not while preserving our identity.
    5. There is a distinction between persons and human animals. Is the distinction empirical or conceptual? Why can’t I copy my consciousness71 onto a machine72 and that machine be me? There seem to be two issues here.
      1. Firstly, my intuition73 is that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves a brain-like infrastructure and
      2. Secondly, copying a consciousness onto a machine isn’t identity-preserving, even if possible, but is the creation of a simulacrum74 (or – significantly – multiples thereof).
    6. Basically, I reject both functionalism75 and the idea of consciousness “hopping from one infrastructure to another”. Incidentally, I rather hope we can’t copy our phenomenal consciousness onto a machine, or the possibility of hell on earth unfolds. The nasty business of very extended torment could be delegated to another machine that neither knows nor cares what it is doing.
    7. Also, should we consider fetuses76 and the senile or those in a PVS77 as persons? See Baker78 who alleges that those who have, will have or have had the capacity for a first-person perspective79 should be accounted persons. But is this simply arbitrary retrofitting of philosophy to Christian doctrine (though Wiggins80 seems to share this view; individuals are persons if typical individuals of their kind are persons)?
    8. I must also discuss animals81 under this head. If we are identical to (human) animals then to what, exactly, are we identical – that is, just what is a human animal – and that are their persistence conditions82? Note that there are disagreements about the referent of “animal” – is it the organism83 or the body84? The key issue is with corpses85. Feldman thinks they are animals, but Olson thinks they aren’t. Death86 is central to the enquiry. Just when does the person or animal commence87 or cease to be? If he is resuscitated (or resurrected88 / reincarnated89, assuming these to be possible) what happens in the interregnum90?
    9. As noted above and elsewhere91,92, I need to investigate the termini of human existence, and the issues they raise for the various views – the “fetus problem93” for the constitution view and the “corpse problem94” for animalism.
    1. Human Animals95
      1. I haven’t anything to say currently here other than what is covered in a bunch of related topics.
      2. However, as this is what I think answers the question What Are We?96, and is the plural of the title of "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology", it seems sensible to create this topic as one onto which detailed discussion may eventually be hived off.
      3. The main point – often re-iterated – is that we are Animals97, and while we are animals of a special kind98, there is no ontological99 difference – other than of degree – between our species100 and other animals.
      4. I note further that Baker101 might agree with this as far as it goes, but she thinks there is a major ontological difference when the human animal becomes a person102. I deny this, as will most animalists103.
    2. Biological View116
      1. The Biological View (BV) is that we are117 biological organisms118, and – in particular – have the persistence conditions119 of biological organisms. Since the organisms we are are obviously human animals120, this view is effectively just Animalism121.
      2. However, it is just possible that the BV and Animalism might part company for some philosophers. Maybe you might think that we are essentially animals, but can metamorphose122 from one species to another or be reincarnated123 as an individual of another species – or as a different individual of the same species. These might count as variants of the BV, but would not be Animalism124 as commonly understood, since it presupposes that we cease to be at death, and are essentially human animals125 and, indeed, essentially one and the same human animal.
      3. The BV is to be distinguished from older physicalist126 variants – in particular the “Body View127”.
      4. For the detailed principles of individuation and persistence criteria associated with the BV, see the Biological Criterion128.
    3. Biological Criterion129
      1. Biological Criteria are the criteria of identity130 associated with the biological view131 of what we132 human beings133 are.
      2. Animalism134 takes this biological view, that we are human animals135 (as distinct from persons136, or immaterial souls137). So, our persistence criteria are those of animals138.
      3. What should be discussed here is just what these criteria are.
      4. Biological identity criteria in general are slightly wider than those of animals in particular, as they include those for plants139 and other biological organisms140.
      5. Locke141 made the first stab at what this criterion might be. His view was that it was the participation in a single life142 that made an organism143 the same organism over time. The concept of a life is itself in need of explanation, and may not (in the absence of vitalism) be logically prior to the concept of an organism.
      6. It seems to me that the biological criterion could (theoretically, at least) allow for metamorphosis144 (provided that the metamorphosis145 is into another organism). There are, however, sortal146 objections to metamorphosis147.
      7. The jumping-off point for this topic is probably "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities". However, the book is at pains to point out that the persistence criteria for exemplars of particular species – and, indeed, their principles of individuation – differ greatly. Standard views are overly influenced by the assumption that all biological individuals are like large mammals rather than, say, strawberry plants148. However, as we are large mammals, I’m not too worried about this fine point.
      8. Note that the biological criterion is to be distinguished from the body criterion149, with which the psychological criterion150 was originally contrasted.
    4. Animalists151
      1. Who is an animalist depends on who you ask. Some are self-proclaimed, and others are claimed to be so by others.
      2. The following would definitely seem to be animalists:-
        1. Michael R. Ayers,
        2. Andrew M. Bailey,
        3. Stephan Blatti,
        4. William Carter,
        5. David Hershenov,
        6. David Mackie,
        7. Eric Olson,
        8. Paul Snowdon,
        9. Peter Van Inwagen, and152
        10. Richard Wollheim.
      3. In addition,
        1. David Wiggins, and
        2. Bernard Williams
        are sometimes claimed (I think by Stephan Blatti).
      4. Olson in "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology" has Carter, Ayers, van Inwagen and Snowdon; but also:-
        1. Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz, and
        2. Trenton Merricks.
      5. However, in "Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity", Olson claims that – contrary to appearances – David Wiggins and Jay Rosenberg are supporters of the PV153.
      6. "Bailey (Andrew M.) - The Elimination Argument" agrees that Merricks and van Inwagen are animalists.
      7. "Johansson (Jens) - What is Animalism?" has Ayers, Carter, Mackie, Merricks, Olson, Snowdon, Van Inwagen, and Wiggins154, but also:-
        1. John McDowell, and
        2. Derek Parfit.
      8. It is likely that many atheist or agnostic philosophers who don’t specifically treat of personal identity are animalists. "Quinn (Philip L.) - Review of Antony Flew's 'The Logic of Mortality'" seems to describe Antony Flew as such, though Quinn doesn’t use the term “animalist”.
      9. "Bourget (David) & Chalmers (David) - The PhilPapers Surveys: What Do Philosophers Believe?" has a question on Personal Identity, and it seems that only just under 17% of faculty at elite philosophy departments are even inclined towards animalism, with just under 6% being convinced. No recognised Animalist appears to have responded to the survey (or at least allowed their opinions to be published). I did, however, spot that my former supervisor – Jennifer Hornsby – claimed to be an animalist, though I don’t think she’s written anything on the subject.
  2. Organisms170
    1. Organisms feature highly in animalist discussions of personal identity, in that according to animalism171, human persons172 are (numerically identical173 to) human animals174, which are organisms.
    2. According to some philosophers – for instance Peter Van Inwagen – sorites175 and multiple-occupancy176 arguments yield that the only things that exist177 are simples and organisms.
    3. Organisms are to be distinguished from their bodies178, which have different persistence conditions179, for example post-mortem as corpses180.
    4. An organism seeks to maintain itself against its environment, and exchanges matter181 with it. An organism possesses none of its matter essentially182, and may indeed replace all – or at least most of183 – its matter many times during its life184.
    5. When organisms ultimately fail in the above endeavour, they die185.
    6. Prior to this, they are alive186; organisms are the only things that may properly be said to be alive – life is a biological process187. Other things may exist188, and come to an end, but they do not literally live189 or die190.
    7. Normally, a proper part of an organism is not an organism. Presumably organelles – such as mitochondria – are (parasitic) organisms living within, and – collectively if not individually – essential191 parts192 of, other organisms.
    8. In particular, a brain193 is not an organism, but an organ. We are organisms, not organs, whatever psychological TEs194 might imply, so we are not our brains. See my remarks on Brains195, BIVs196 and Brain Transplants197 for discussion of whether we could survive as198 our brains in a worst-case scenario and whether our brains are ‘just another organ’ as Olson199 claims.
    9. The chapter on ‘Crowd Intelligence200’ in "Wohlleben (Peter) - The Inner Life of Animals: Surprising Observations of a Hidden World" suggests that ants and bees – while organisms in their own right – might be considered as cells in a Superorganism. Also, that there is such a thing as a ‘Hive Mind201’. This thought might also suggest that human (and other) Societies202 are Superorganisms. Finally, it relates to the thought that some organisms can be Scattered Objects203, that is if Superorganisms are themselves organisms.
    10. For all this, see:-
      → Wikipedia: Superorganism
      → Wikipedia: Collective intelligence
      → Wikipedia: Swarm intelligence
    11. See "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities" for a full discussion of the persistence204 of organisms, though this considers the generality. The book thinks that the general topic is too much swayed by considerations of large mammals, which – of course – is what we are, and the only organisms whose persistence conditions I care about in this research.
    1. Life205
      1. There are (at least) two sub-topics that fall under this topic:-
        1. Lives: Life as an (extended) event – the career of an individual.
          → See "Wollheim (Richard) - The Thread of Life"
        2. Life: Life as a biological process.
          → See "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities"
      2. I assume that lives can be had by individuals that do not have (biological) life, but think it unhelpful to talk of non-biological individuals as “alive”, except in a figurative sense.
      3. Life – and its correlate, death206 – is a biological process, on which the word of the biologist (maybe as clarified by the philosopher) is final.
      4. I’m open to the idea that alternative biologies – other than the carbon-based exemplar ubiquitous on earth – are possible – or at least conceivable. So, anything sufficiently complex that “can extract energy from its environment, grow, repair damage to its body, and reproduce” is alive (Elliott Sober). We wouldn’t want to deny that aliens are alive, nor – just maybe – sufficiently complex machines of the far future.
      5. I have a question on the “reproductive” requirement above. At most, this must apply to “typical representatives” – else the infertile would not be alive. But – important though reproduction is for evolution207 – I’m not sure why this is essential. Note that computer hardware is unlikely to reproduce – or at least it’s not necessary that it should, as it can be manufactured. However, computer programmes would be able to – this seems to be claimed of AIs, who are hoped to be able to produce improved versions of themselves.
      6. What I object is the notion that computer programmes are – or will eventually be – “alive” in the same sense as organisms are alive, though their hosting computers might be.
      7. I say this by analogy with my thoughts on the supposed consciousness208 of computer programs: computer programs can’t be conscious, though the hardware that runs them might be. However, I’m not sure the analogy works, as the “living” is said to be at the program level, and not to involve any physical changes to the computer (other than the usual changes to the contents of memory locations).
      8. So, "Tegmark (Max) - Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence" has – as is indicated by the book’s title – three versions of life, but only Life 1.0 is ‘life’ in my sense; the others are – or impact on – ‘lives’:-
        1. Life 1.0: Biological Evolution209 – no hardware or software change within a lifetime.
        2. Life 2.0: Cultural Evolution210 – software, but not hardware, change within a lifetime. Learning.
        3. Life 3.0: Technological Evolution211 – potential for both software and hardware change within a lifetime.
      9. "Al-Khalili (Jim) & McFadden (Johnjoe) - Life on the Edge: The Coming of Age of Quantum Biology" has recently raised the question whether quantum phenomena212 are essential to life. This is not parallel with speculation on the association of quantum phenomena with Consciousness213 as it seems to be based on hard science – mechanisms – rather than ‘explaining’ one mystery with another.
      10. So, interesting philosophical questions about Life include:-
        1. Just what is (biological) life?
        2. When does biological life begin? This is presumably an empirical question, the answer to which will vary from species to species.
        3. Are there borderline cases of life?
        4. When does life cease? Again, the answer to this question will be species-dependent.
        5. Can life intermit214? Does it make sense to say that so-and-so died215 (on the operating table, say) and then revived?
      11. Interesting philosophical questions about Lives include:-
        1. How are lives individuated?
        2. What sort of things can have lives?
        3. How closely coupled is the life of a human organism216 with the life of a human person217?
        4. Can a life lived courtesy of a human organism be continued after the death218 of that organism?
      • Animation219
        1. “Animation” is an important matter. Just when does a particular life220 begin, and does it require any “vital force” or “infused soul221” (as the term implies)? Of course, the scientific answer to the latter question is that it doesn’t. However, such notions are central to many religious claims, though are not assumed by Christian Materialists222.
        2. We also need to consider:-
          1. Reanimation, and
          2. Suspended animation
        3. Both of these concepts are beloved of the Transhumanists223, at least those who are interested in the idea that their body224 or brain225 might be frozen until the time comes when it is possible for their reanimation.
        4. Suspended animation – in the form of cryoscopic suspension – appears as a TE226 in "Clark (Andy) & Kuhn (Robert Lawrence) - Aeon: Video - Andy Clark - Virtual immortality", to try to demonstrate that we are “patterns in information space227”.
      • Quantum Mechanics228
        1. Quantum Mechanics, per se, is very peripheral to my research concerns, but is connected – or alleged to be connected – to sub-topics that are slightly less peripheral.
        2. At a first guess, these include:-
          1. Consciousness229: either because – doubtfully – QM “explains” consciousness or – equally doubtfully, in my view – because “observers” are conscious and so consciousness is involved in the measuring process and the “collapse of the wave function”.
            • My view on the former has been that “explaining” one scarcely-understood phenomenon by another even-less-understood phenomenon has been a non-starter. Also, the mechanisms proposed have been very dubious.
            • My view on the latter is that the “observer” is any interfering macroscopic object, the record of which (eg. on a photographic plate) may or may not be viewed by a conscious observer, but has the record nonetheless.
          2. Life230: because QM may be involved – or necessary for – various life-processes and indeed the origin of life itself.
          3. Teletransportation231: Because of quantum entanglement.
          4. Transhumanism232: because of quantum computing and the impact this might have on superintelligence and AI generally.
        3. The Many Worlds Interpretation of QM is sometimes said to involve either a very profligate example of Fission233, or a spreading out of the “Quantum Self234” across all these worlds. This is discussed in "Ball (Philip) - Beyond Weird: Why Everything You Thought You Knew About Quantum Mechanics is ... Different", pp. 288-305, Chapter “There is no other ‘quantum’ you”.
    2. Plants235
      1. I’d never imagined having to say anything about Plants under the topic of Personal Identity. However, there appears to be a movement in biology and analytic philosophy to include plants in the category of organisms236 with minds237, on account of their ability to take advantage of their environment.
      2. I think this is absurd and is simply changing the meaning of “mind238”.
      3. A good place to start to consider the principles involved may be "Segundo-Ortin (Miguel), Etc - Plant Cognition - A Methodological Primer: Theories, Methods and Challenges".
    3. Evolution239
      1. One of the arguments for Animalism240, due to Stephan Blatti, is that from our evolutionary origins. If we’ve evolved from animals241, then it’s likely that’s what we are242. This requires careful consideration, because it would seem to provide the default view of what we are – but then so does common sense.
      2. Species evolve – both improving the characteristics of average exemplars of that species but also generating new species. So – prima facie – there’s no reason not to describe the emergence of human persons243 as “more of the same” from non-person hominids, ie. just tweaking their capacities – rather than as making an “ontological change” – as Baker244 argues.
      3. The persistence criteria245 for species also makes an interesting topic of research, as does deciding just what “species” are: for instance, are they concepts246 or universals247 or are they collections of concrete individuals248? Is the evolution of a new species a form of metamorphosis249?
      4. There will be some considerable overlap between this discussion and that on Homo Sapiens250.
      5. There’s also an overlap between speculations on the future of human evolution and Transhumanism251.
      6. Evolutionary Psychology has much to say (and much that is disputed) about what makes us tick – what makes us what we are252 in both a narrative253 and a metaphysical sense.
      7. There’s also the question of the evolution of consciousness254; when, why and how did it evolve?
      8. I might add a discussion of cultural evolution – see especially "Heyes (Cecilia M.) - Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking" – and how this has made us what we are255 by extending our cognitive capacities.
      • Origins256
        1. Our origins – just when “we” came into existence – are closely tied up with whatever “we” are257.
        2. So, an Animalist258 (who thinks that we are essentially animals259, rather than persons260, and for whom psychology261 is irrelevant to our identity) would insist that we come into existence earlier than would a supporter of the Psychological View262, or of the Constitution View263 (for whom a First-Person Perspective264 is definitive of our identity). Our psychology – and particularly a psychology rich enough to qualify us as persons265 – comes into existence fairly late on in our development.
        3. For modal266 reasons, endurantists267 can’t have “us” coming into existence before the possibility of twinning268 is past, though perdurantists269 don’t have this worry.
        4. I would also like to discuss Saul Kripke’s views on origins-essentialism.
          1. Metaphysically, I could not have been born other than from the particular egg-sperm combination from which I was born, and consequently
          2. Practically, I could not have been conceived other than at the time at which I was conceived.
        5. There are ethical ramifications in the context of abortion270 debates (and infanticide, for that matter), but I cannot pursue these in any detail.
      • Genetics271
        1. Genetics would seem to be a fairly peripheral topic as far as my thesis is concerned, though it is relevant insofar as some philosophers claim that we are identical to our genome, or that our genome is an essential Property272 of a Human Being273 (or any other Animal274 or Plant275 with a genome).
        2. As such, it has connections to What We Are276, our Origins277 and whether or not we are Information278.
        3. Of course, that we are NOT identical to our genome is proved by the fact of identical twinning279. Then there’s the question of gene editing which -we may assume – doesn’t cause us to lose our identities any more than transplant280 surgery does.
  3. Animals281
    1. According to the Animalists282, human animals are what we are283. Some philosophers, eg. Baker284, seem to think that describing us as animals is demeaning, but this seems to muddle together all the varieties of animal into one bestial bunch. Clearly, there are lots of differences between lug-worms and the great apes, and further – but much less significant – differences between the non-human great apes and ourselves.
    2. Several points need to be made here.
      1. Firstly, what all animals have in common is that they are organisms285 and have common persistence-conditions286 (PCs) in virtue of this fact; or at least large mammals like ourselves do. In particular, our – and their – psychology287 – however important to us288 – and them – is irrelevant to our persistence289, and hence, to our numerical identity (though not to our Narrative Identity290). The persistence of animals (and other organisms) is covered in detail in "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities".
      2. Secondly, the contentious point is whether aspects of the psychology291 of some higher animals are so distinctive that (as Baker claims) an ontological292 difference beyond the mere existence of a new species is in evidence. Baker thinks the watershed is a First Person Perspective293.
      3. Leading on from this is the claim that the FPP294 is so important, that we are not animals, but persons295.
    3. A question to consider, probably under the topic of organisms296, is whether the PCs of all organisms are the same. Plants297 and animals are both organisms.
    4. Non-animalists raise issues about the presumed supreme moral status and cognitive abilities of human beings298. Demonstrating that these abilities – however well or badly exemplified by humans as a species or as individuals – are on a continuum with those of the higher animals – in particular the great apes – rather than unique in kind to human beings – requires the researcher into personal identity to investigate just what the cognitive and moral capacities of animals actually are. This study is stimulated by Locke’s299 claim that personhood300 is a forensic property301.
    5. It is difficult to imagine what it is like to be a non-human animal. Partly, this is because of their differing sensory modalities. I’ve found "Yong (Ed) - An Immense World: How Animal Senses Reveal the Hidden Realms Around Us" particularly enlightening in this regard (much more that "Nagel (Thomas) - What is it Like to Be a Bat?").
    6. Another recent find worth pursuing is "Wandrey (Mona-Marie) & Halina (Marta) - The Evolution of Animal Consciousness", touching additionally – as it does – on the topics of Consciousness302 and Evolution303.
    1. Animal Rights304
      1. The motivation for including this topic – which is in its primarily ethical aspect largely tangential to my Thesis (which focuses on metaphysics) – is at least fivefold:-
        1. Firstly, as Locke noted, personal identity is a forensic305 matter.
        2. As I’m inclined towards animalism306, the status of other animals is relevant – in particular in resisting the claims of those (eg. Lynne Rudder Baker) that when a First Person Perspective307 comes into existence, we get a major ontological308 change.
        3. Some animal rights theorists – eg. Gary Francione in "Francione (Gary) - Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation" – want to give (at least some) animals the legal and moral standing of persons309.
        4. Other contemporary philosophers – eg. Peter Carruthers in "Carruthers (Peter) - The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice" – argue that animals have no rights at all.
        5. My view is somewhere in the middle. I’m not a fan of rights (in the absence of a contract) but think that human beings have duties to one another and to the higher animals in virtue of the others’ needs.
      2. A passage in the advertising blurb for "Calarco (Matthew) - Thinking Through Animals: Identity, Difference, Indistinction" is:-
        • The rapidly expanding field of critical animal studies now offers a myriad of theoretical and philosophical positions from which to choose.
        • It uses three rubrics — identity, difference, and indistinction — to differentiate three major paths of thought about animals.
          1. The identity approach aims to establish continuity among human beings and animals so as to grant animals equal access to the ethical and political community.
          2. The difference framework views the animal world as containing its own richly complex and differentiated modes of existence in order to allow for a more expansive ethical and political worldview.
          3. The indistinction approach argues that we should abandon the notion that humans are unique in order to explore new ways of conceiving human-animal relations.
        • Each approach is interrogated for its relative strengths and weaknesses, with specific emphasis placed on the kinds of transformational potential it contains.
      3. A fairly recent book that catalogues the atrocities and discusses the issues is "Ricard (Matthieu) - A Plea for the Animals: The Moral, Philosophical, and Evolutionary Imperative to Treat All Beings with Compassion".
      4. Also deserving of a mention is "Rowlands (Mark) - The Philosopher and the Wolf" which contrasts supposed lupine virtues with simian vices. I’m not convinced.
  4. Arguments for Animalism310
    1. I’m not currently aware of many arguments in favour of Animalism311. Rather, Animalists argue that Animalism is – or ought to be – the default position, and try to pick off the arguments of those who have other positions on personal identity.
    2. The main argument – covered next - is Olson312’s Thinking Animal Argument313, which is both an argument for Animalism and intended as a refutation of the Constitution View314.
    3. However, there are others, and saying that ‘it’s just obvious’ that we are animals is insufficient, especially since most philosophers deny this ‘obvious’ fact.
    4. The only other argument I’m aware of (or can remember) is the “Animal Ancestors Argument” as given in "Blatti (Stephan) - A New Argument for Animalism", with an attempted rebuttal by "Gillett (Carl) - What you are and the evolution of organs, souls and superorganisms: a reply to Blatti".
    1. Thinking Animal Argument315
      1. This argument is otherwise known as the “too many minds” argument, the “too many thinkers” argument, or Olson316’s “master argument”. For many years, Olson has trotted out this argument at every opportunity.
      2. The basic idea is that a human animal317 thinks, and if it is not identical to the person318, then we have too many thinkers – the animal319 and the person320, unless we deny that one or other of them thinks, which is at the least very counter-intuitive.
      3. Additional to this metaphysical problem, we have – Olson says – an epistemological question. Which one are we? The animal or the person?
      4. While I’m inclined to accept animalism321, I think this argument fails, and it does the cause for animalism no good by having it as the main argument in its favour.
        1. This form of argument has been used by nihilists322 to argue that there are no ordinary things, usually invoking vagueness323 and fuzzy boundary considerations. Which of the many cats (give or take a few atoms) is the “real cat”? There’s no principled reason and I can’t know which. So there are no cats, or if there are, I can’t know which of the many cat-a-likes is the real cat. Since there are ordinary things, there must be something wrong with this argument form (though I don’t yet have a strong opinion as to just what it is).
        2. I accept Moore’s “two hands” argument – nothing is plainer than that I have two hands, so any metaphysical or epistemological theory that says I haven’t, or can’t know that I have, must have something wrong with it. I do know that there are arguments against the existence of hands and other “arbitrary undetached parts”, so maybe it’s safer to stick to cats. Olson (see "Marshall (Richard) & Olson (Eric) - Eric T. Olson: The Philosopher with No Hands"), as well as Peter Van Inwagen (eg. in "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts"), argue against the existence of hands, though van Inwagen is happy with the existence of cats and other organisms, so I need to address their arguments head-on to determine the subtleties thereof.
        3. Baker324 and other supporters of the Constitution View325 have answers to the argument used as an argument against their view (along the lines of “thinking derivatively”).
        4. There are also resources like “Lewis counting”, as in perdurantism326 where a “soon to fission327” entity is really two entities sharing stages. Our language is fit for purpose.


Concluding Remarks
  1. Having discussed Animalism, we can now in our next Chapter328 turn to the main alternative I want to consider, the Constitution View and the arguments for it.
  2. This is work in progress329.


Links to Books / Papers to be Addressed330
  1. This section attempts to derive the readings lists automatically from those of the underlying Notes, but removing duplicated references. The list is divided into:-
  2. As this is a “core” chapter, the coverage of the literature will be very complete, if not exhaustive, when it comes to Animalism itself.
  3. For background topics, it will be more selective333.
  4. I’ve not been overly careful to segregate the reading-list of this Chapter from that of Chapter 8334. I will address the segregation in due course. There will, in any case, be some overlap.
  5. Many aspects of these papers will need to be either ignored or reserved for other chapters.


Works on this topic that I’ve actually read335, include the following:-
  1. Animalism
    1. Animalism336
    2. Human Animals342
    3. Biological View353
    4. Biological Criterion358
    5. Animalists
  2. Organisms
    1. Organisms394
    2. Life
    3. Plants399
    4. Evolution400
  3. Animals
    1. Animals409
    2. Animal Rights410
  4. Arguments for Animalism
    1. Arguments for Animalism414
    2. Thinking Animal Argument416

A further reading list might start with:-
  1. Animalism
    1. Animalism427
    2. Human Animals429
    3. Biological View431
    4. Biological Criterion433
    5. Animalists
  2. Organisms
    1. Organisms442
    2. Life
    3. Plants448
    4. Evolution449
  3. Animals
    1. Animals452
    2. Animal Rights454
  4. Arguments for Animalism
    1. Arguments for Animalism455
    2. Thinking Animal Argument456


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 2:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (14/02/2026 00:41:46).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 15:
  • The hyperlinks in this Introduction – as in the other Chapter Introductions – are intended to help motivate the various Notes used in the construction of the Chapter.
  • So, a link appears once and once only per Note in the Note Hierarchy below and appears – as far as possible – in the order of the Hierarchy, even if this is not its first mention.
  • Links to other Notes are omitted in the Chapter Introduction but appear passim in the Main Text.
  • To enable the same text to be used in my Thesis Write-up as in this document, Chapter links are to the former.
Footnote 48:
  • It's unclear whether Wiggins is an Animalist.
  • It might be best to consider Wiggins under the head of Substance.
Footnote 66:
  1. I’m not clear on whether Wiggins is or is not an Animalist.
  2. "Ferner (Adam) - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity" has him as a Human Being Theorist.
Footnote 152:
  1. The evidence for this – by way of self-confession – is in "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity".
Footnote 154:
  1. David Wiggins is a difficult case, as is discussed at length in "Ferner (Adam) - Metaphysics and biology: a critique of David Wiggins’ account of personal identity".
  2. Wiggins has his own Note later.
Footnote 183:
  1. See "Frisen (Jonas), Etc. - Retrospective Birth Dating of Cells in Humans" for the argument that cerebral grey-matter retains its carbon atoms from infancy, and hence that neurons are as old as the individual. However, other cells are replaced – sometimes frequently.
Footnote 330:
  • See the section on Research Methodology for what is to be done with these.
Footnote 333:
  • There are a few papers listed on the cognitive capacities of animals.
  • I got bored with listing these, so the sample may not be representative.
  • These are, in any case, probably more relevant to Chapter 9 – as an antidote to Baker’s attempted ontological separation of human persons from human animals – so I will move them there – and expand the list if necessary – in due course.
Footnote 338:
  • I’ve not explicitly listed the individual chapters, though my comments and write-ups are variable in completeness and quality.
Footnotes 355, 371: Footnote 356:
  • Olson is one of the primary exponents of the Biological View, so almost anything by him might be cited.
  • I’ve restricted the list to those items that – in the text or comments I’ve incorporated on-line – explicitly use the term.
Footnotes 357, 360: Footnote 362:
  • The burden of this paper is to reject body transfer, but PVI claims to be an animalist therein.
Footnote 375: Footnote 379: Footnote 381: Footnote 384: Footnote 404:
  • I don’t like Le Fanu’s angle on evolution; he’s a not-very-crypto creationist.
  • Also, what is all his “gee-whiz” stuff about “animal wonders” supposed to mean? Their bodies do function fine in the real world, so they must satisfy the laws of physics. It’s not as though there’s a continuous miracle going on. He never says there is, but I suspect he thinks it.
Footnote 405:
  • An annoying book, but one I ought to study.
Footnote 411:
  • This is about the ethics of biotechnology.
Footnote 412:
  • This is relevant to the discussion of animal rights only tangentially, but importantly, I think.
Footnote 413:
  • Individual Chapters not noted individually.
Footnote 426: Footnote 432:
  • Very tangentially relevant, but Uploading and the BV are antithetical theories of PID.
Footnote 435:
  • This, from the book below, looks particularly useful.
Footnote 439:
  • Not the same as the previous paper.
Footnote 440: Footnote 444:
  • Not the same as the above paper!
Footnote 445:
  • Hailing from 1970, this book is dated, and might only be used as background for the thoughts of philosophers writing about this time.
Footnote 453:
  • This is very elementary, but short and maybe entertaining.

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